JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Cause shown is sufficient. 3. The Delay Condonation Application No. 356917 of 2013 is allowed. 4. The delay in filing the restoration application is condoned. 5. Cause shown is sufficient. 6. The Restoration Application No. 356921 of 2013 is allowed. The order dated 15.5.2008 is recalled and the writ petition is restored to its original number. 7. We have heard Sri Ashok Kumar, the learned Advocate alongwith Sri Ashish Agrawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Sunil Kumar, the learned Advocate alongwith Sri Ashish Srivastava, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 8. Upon a charge of defrauding the Income Tax Department by issuing forged refund vouchers and getting them encashed the respondent No. 2 was suspended in the year 1986 and continued to remain suspended for five long years. No disciplinary proceedings was initiated, as a result, the respondent No. 2 filed Original Application No. 1618 of 1991 before the Central Administrative Tribunal in which an order dated 6.11.1992 was passed directing the department to issue a charge-sheet within two weeks and conclude the enquiry within two months, failing which the suspension order would be revoked and the respondent No. 2 would be reinstated with all consequential benefits 9. In compliance of the aforesaid order, a chage-sheet dated 31st December, 1992 was issued. Since the enquiry could not be concluded within the stipulated period, time was sought from the Tribunal which was allowed and directed the department to conclude the enquiry within four months. 10. Based on the aforesaid direction, the respondent No. 2 received a letter dated 18.2.1993 informing him about the appointment of an enquiry officer and also indicating that the enquiry would be held at New Delhi on 16th March, 1993. Upon receipt of the said letter, the respondent No. 2 wrote a letter dated 5th March, 1993 indicating his inability to travel to Delhi to attend the enquiry proceedings on the ground of financial constraints and specifically stating that it was not possible for him to travel to Delhi and pay for his boarding and lodging from his meagre subsistence allowance. 11. The Enquiry Officer, on this letter, directed the respondent No. 2 to approach the disciplinary authority for release of the subsistence allowance. 11. The Enquiry Officer, on this letter, directed the respondent No. 2 to approach the disciplinary authority for release of the subsistence allowance. This was followed by another letter of the respondent No. 2 dated 8th April, 1993 indicating his inability to travel on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance w.e.f. March, 1993 onwards and requested the department to release the subsistence allowance for March, 1993 and also hold the enquiry at Allahabad since he was residing there. This letter remained unattended by the petitioners and no reply was given nor this letter has been denied by them. Since the respondent No. 2 did not attend the proceeding, the Enquiry Officer proceeded ex parte and submitted an ex parte enquiry report finding him guilty of the charges. 12. Based on the enquiry report, a punishment order dated 31st March, 1994 was passed against which the respondent preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 25.2.2003. 13. Thereafter, the respondent filed an original application before the Tribunal which was allowed by order dated 24th May, 2004 holding that the ex parte enquiry was violative of the principles of natural justice. The orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were quashed and the disciplinary authority was directed to start a fresh enquiry in accordance with law from the stage it was in March, 1993. The Tribunal further directed to pay subsistence allowance to the respondent No. 2 and conclude the enquiry within a reasonable period. 14. The department being aggrieved, has filed the present writ petition which was admitted and the order of the Tribunal was stayed. 15. It is a settled law that if the subsistence allowance is not paid to an incumbent during the pendency of the departmental proceedings such action amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. In this regard, the Tribunal has relied upon a series of decisions, namely, (i) Ghanshyam Das Srivastava v. State of M.P., 1973 SCC (L & S) 289 (ii) Capt. In this regard, the Tribunal has relied upon a series of decisions, namely, (i) Ghanshyam Das Srivastava v. State of M.P., 1973 SCC (L & S) 289 (ii) Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, [1999 (2) ESC 1009 SC] (iii) Jagdhamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 (4) ESC 2431 SC (iv) Shafi Ullah Ansari v. Union of India and others (O.A. No. 269/91 decided by Allahabad C.A.T. on 11.9.2000) (v) State of Punjab and others v. K.K. Sharma, 2003 SCC (L &S) 18 and (vi) Anwarun Nisha Khatoon v. State of Bihar and others, (2002) 6 SCC 703 . 16. A plea was raised by the respondent No. 2 that till February, 1993, the subsistence allowance was being paid pursuant to the furnishing of a certificate as required under Fundamental Rule 53(2) indicating that the respondent No. 2 was not engaged in any other department. 17. The petitioners contended that from March, 1993 such certificate was not furnished and consequently, the subsistence allowance was not released. Such plea raised by the petitioners cannot be accepted nor is tenable in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ghanshyam Das Srivastava (supra) and Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) which clearly states that the subsistence allowance cannot be stopped merely on the ground of non-submission of the certificate. Such non-submission in our opinion is not fatal and cannot deny the right of an incumbent to receive the subsistence allowance. 18. We find from the perusal of the record that a specific request was made by the respondent No. 2 vide his letter dated 8th April, 1993 indicating that he is unable to bear the expense of travelling and lodging at Delhi for the purposes of attending the disciplinary proceedings on account of meagre subsistence allowance that has also not been paid since March, 1993. This aspect was crucial and essential and ought to have been addressed by the department which they failed to do so. We find that there is nothing on record to indicate that the said letter dated 8th April, 1993 was never received by them. The petitioners only stand is that the certificate as required under Fundamental Rule 53 (2) was not furnished by the respondent. 19. We find that there is nothing on record to indicate that the said letter dated 8th April, 1993 was never received by them. The petitioners only stand is that the certificate as required under Fundamental Rule 53 (2) was not furnished by the respondent. 19. In the light of the aforesaid, we find that the misery and the plight of respondent No. 2 in surviving on meagre subsistence allowance from 1986 to 1993 cannot be overlooked. No steps were taken by the department to initiate the disciplinary proceedings by issuance of the charge-sheet between 1986 and 1993. It was only when a direction was issued by the Tribunal in November, 1992 that a charge-sheet was served and the Enquiry Officer was appointed in March, 1993. 20. We find that the denial of the subsistence allowance and forcing the respondent No. 2 to travel all the way from Allahabad to Delhi without payment of subsistence allowance is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in setting aside the impugned order on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 21. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned order. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with the observation that the direction of the Tribunal shall be complied by the petitioners and the enquiry be held and concluded, in the event the petitioners so desire to pursue, within four months from today.