JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. This is an application seeking review of the judgment and order passed by this Court dated 30th October 2015 in the Special Civil Application No. 5999 of 2002. The review is sought for on the ground that few contentions although canvassed at the time of the hearing of the main matter, yet those have not been dealt with in the judgment. 2. The applicant herein challenged the order of dismissal from service by filing the Special Civil Application No. 5999 of 2002. The same was rejected observing as under: "7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the authorities concerned committed any error in passing the impugned orders. 8. I only need to consider one submission as regards the authority of the Bank to initiate the departmental inquiry and pass the order of dismissal, more particularly, when the petitioner is alleged to have committed misconduct in his capacity as the Executive Trustee of the Bank of India Mutual Fund and Managing Director of the Bank of India Asset Management Company, which according to the petitioner, is a separate legal entity. In this regard, the respondent bank has filed an additional affidavit explaining the same as under: "2. I deny the contents of the amended paragraph 28-A, as amended and the petitioner be put to strict thereof. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has no where denied that he is an officer employee of the respondent bank and he was discharging his duties as officer-employee of the respondent bank even while the petitioner was deputed as Executive Trustee of Bank of India Mutual Fund and Managing Director of Bank of India, Asset Management Company, a fully owned subsidiary of the bank during the period June 1992 to September, 1998. It is further stated that the petitioner has never raised such a contention during the course of inquiry and/or during the appellate proceedings and therefore has wives the said contention/acquiesced and therefore the petitioner now at this stage cannot raise such a contention. It is further stated that the petitioner has never raised such a contention during the course of inquiry and/or during the appellate proceedings and therefore has wives the said contention/acquiesced and therefore the petitioner now at this stage cannot raise such a contention. It is further stated that the petitioner has as such participated during the course of inquiry without any demur as an employee of the respondent bank and has submitted to the jurisdiction of the disciplinary proceedings initiated under the regulations and now the petitioner cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate as alleged in the said amendment. 3. I further submit that clause (i) of Regulation (2) of the Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct Regulation) 1976, defines officer employee as under: (i) Officer Employee means a person who holds a supervisory, administrative or managerial post in the Bank or any other person who has been appointed and is functioning as an officer of the Bank, by whatever designation called, and includes a person whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government or a State Government or any other Government undertaking or any other public sector bank or the Reserve Bank of India or any other organisation but shall not include casual, work charged or contingent staff or the Award staff; Similarly Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 provides the definition of officer employee vide clause (j) of regulation (3) which is as (j) Officer Employee means as person who holds a supervisory, administrative or managerial post in the Bank or any other person who has been appointed and is functioning as an officer of the bank, by whatever designation called and includes a person whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government or a State Government or any other Government undertaking or any other public sector bank or the Reserve Bank of India or any other organization, but shall not include casual work charged or contingent staff or the award staff; 4. It is further submitted that even articles of the BOI Asset Management Company Limited is amply clear on the said issue. It is further submitted that even articles of the BOI Asset Management Company Limited is amply clear on the said issue. Article 85(b) of the said Article provides that not more than 50% of the total number of directors shall be appointed/nominated by the respondent bank for the period and terms as it deems fit and it may replace or remove at any time by notice to the company, any director appointed by it. Initially the petitioner was deputed as director No. 8 on behalf of the respondent bank and was reverted back to the respondent bank in the month of September, 1996. Article 127 of the said Articles provides that the remuneration of a Managing Director or a whole time Director shall from time to time be subjected to such terms and conditions of service as may from time to time be determined by the respondent bank. 5. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is amply clear that the said Regulations are applicable to the petitioner and the petitioner was deputed by the respondent Bank for a temporary period and was subject to the said regulations of the respondent Bank and therefore the petitioner even otherwise cannot claim immunity from the application of said Regulations to the petitioner as alleged or for the reasons alleged or at all. 6. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner was deputed to the said place by the respondent bank with a view to secure interest of the respondent bank as the said company and the said fund are wholly owned subsidiary of the respondent bank, however, from bare perusal of the said charges levelled against the petitioner and proved during the course of inquiry would amply demonstrate the manner and extent of serious misconduct committed by the petitioner which amount to direct violation of the said Regulations of the respondent bank by the petitioner, subjecting the petitioner to the said disciplinary proceedings. It is further stated that vide order dated 11.05.1992 the petitioner was deputed to the BOI Mutual Fund while he was working as Zonal Manager, Zonal Office, Orissa Zone, subject to the said Regulations. Copies of the said Article of BOI Asset Management Company Limited and the said order dated 11.05.1992 are annexed hereto and marked as Annexure X (colly)." 9. I find the explanation quite convincing. Copies of the said Article of BOI Asset Management Company Limited and the said order dated 11.05.1992 are annexed hereto and marked as Annexure X (colly)." 9. I find the explanation quite convincing. Besides the same, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to raise this contention, more particularly, when at no point of time, in the course of the inquiry, he objected to the same." 3. The applicant being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by this Court referred to above challenged the same by filing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 1457 of 2015. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 27th January 2016 disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal in the following terms: "The contention of the appellant is that there were number of contentions raised and material was produced but the learned Single Judge has decided the matter only on one point. We are not at all impressed by the submission because if such was the situation, in all fairness, it was for the appellant to move the learned Single Judge by way of review or otherwise. In absence of such an attempt or in absence of any material in this regard, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge did not consider the contentions which were raised before him. At this stage, Mr. Shastri seeks permission to withdraw the appeal with a view to file an appropriate application for review or otherwise. Permission granted. Disposed off as withdrawn. In view of the order passed in the main Letters Patent Appeal, Civil Application would not survive and the same is disposed off." 4. Pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench referred to above, this application for review has been filed. 5. Mr. D.C. Dave, the learned senior advocate assisted by Ms. M.O. Narsinghani appearing for the applicant submitted that five contentions have not been dealt with in the main judgment and order, and therefore, this Court may consider those contentions and pass an appropriate order in that regard. The contentions are as under: "(i) The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are based on "no evidence". M.O. Narsinghani appearing for the applicant submitted that five contentions have not been dealt with in the main judgment and order, and therefore, this Court may consider those contentions and pass an appropriate order in that regard. The contentions are as under: "(i) The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer are based on "no evidence". To put it in other words, the case in hand is one wherein there is no legal evidence to come to a conclusion that the applicant had indulged in any misconduct warranting dismissal from service after putting in forty one years of service. (ii) Many relevant documents were demanded, but those were not supplied. As a result, the applicant was not in a position to defend himself. The failure to supply the relevant documents although demanded rendered the entire inquiry vitiated, as a result, rendering the order of dismissal illegal. (iii) The Bank thought fit to initiate the inquiry only against the applicant herein though the decision to purchase the shares was taken by the Board consisting of many members. (iv) The witnesses examined in the course of inquiry were of no consequence. (v) Lastly even if the misconduct is believed, having regard to the fact that the applicant had put in almost forty one years of unblemished service, he should not have been dismissed from service, but could have been inflicted with any other penalty on the basis of which at least he could have received retiral benefits. In short, the learned counsel has invoked the doctrine of proportionality." 6. Let me clarify that no other contentions were raised, except those referred to above. 7. Mr. Dave, the learned senior advocate appearing for the applicant therefore prays that there being merit in this application, the same may be allowed and either the main judgment and order be recalled or the contentions may be dealt with and the order of dismissal be quashed and set aside. 8. On the other hand, this writ application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Nandish Chudger, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Nanavati Associates appearing for the Bank. Mr. Chudger submits that this application for review is not maintainable in law. He pointed out that during the course of the hearing of the main matter, only one contention was pressed hard, the one relating to the authority of the Bank to initiate the departmental inquiry. Mr. Chudger submits that this application for review is not maintainable in law. He pointed out that during the course of the hearing of the main matter, only one contention was pressed hard, the one relating to the authority of the Bank to initiate the departmental inquiry. He pointed out that such contention was pressed hard on the argument that the applicant herein is alleged to have committed the misconduct in his capacity as the Executive Trustee of the Bank of India Mutual Fund and Managing Director of the Bank of India Assets Management Company, which altogether is a separate legal entity. He pointed out that this contention has been dealt with by this Court and the same was negatived. According to Mr. Chudger, the contentions, which are sought to be raised in this application, were never canvassed. 9. Mr. Chudger, therefore, prays that there being no merit in this writ application, the same may be rejected. 10. I need not reiterate the facts as those could be found in the judgment and order passed in the main matter dated 30th October 2015. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in this application. 12. Having regard to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and also considering the impugned order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, it is very difficult for me to say that the case in hand is one of "No evidence". In this regard, let me look into the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Siddharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University [ 1982 (1) GLR 233 ]. The Division Bench has explained the rule of "No evidence" very succinctly. The following observations are made: "The findings of fact recorded in the course of such an inquiry, unless they are collateral or jurisdictional, are exempt from judicial review and that the Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the ultimate decision based on such findings and review it on merits. However, there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First, the case must not be one where there is "no evidence" to support the findings. However, there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First, the case must not be one where there is "no evidence" to support the findings. Secondly, the ultimate decision based on such findings must not be perverse or unreasonable." The following further observations on "no evidence" rule were also pressed in service. They are as under: "The "no evidence" rule has the same content and meaning in our country as in England "No evidence" does not merely signify total dearth of evidence; evidence which does not reasonably support the conclusion is also comprehended within the meaning of the said expression. In other words, cases where there is complete lack of evidence and cases where the evidence, if any, is incapable of rationally leading to the conclusion reached, are both treated, on a par so far the applicability of the rule of "no evidence" is concerned. In none of these decided cases, there was "no evidence" in the sense of there being utter paucity of evidence. There was some evidence, direct or circumstantial, on the basis of which the domestic tribunal had reached the conclusion of guilt. The grievance that there was "no evidence" was examined by applying the test whether or not, accepting the whole of the evidence as it stood, the impugned conclusion followed legally or logically. In cases where direct evidence was not available, the totality of circumstances was carefully considered and the challenge that there was no evidence in support of the decision was examined by applying the test whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence justified the conclusion. Where direct evidence was available, the challenge was examined by applying the test whether it was so thoroughly inconsistent with the rest of the evidence as to make it impossible of acceptance. Mere suspicion, even if honestly and bona fide entertained on the basis of apparently cogent circumstances, was held to be out of bounds even in domestic inquiries, where the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished, was found to apply as much as it applies to regular criminal trials. In the ultimate analysis, the test which appears to have been applied is whether there was some material capable of having any evidential value. If not, the case was held to fall within the mischief of the rule of "no evidence"." 13. In the ultimate analysis, the test which appears to have been applied is whether there was some material capable of having any evidential value. If not, the case was held to fall within the mischief of the rule of "no evidence"." 13. At this stage, I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 ]: "There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant' it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated." Further important observations are: "Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." 14. Therefore, if there is some evidence on the basis of which the employer has reached to a conclusion as regards the guilt of the charge against the delinquent, this Court in exercise of its extraordinary powers should be very slow to interfere with the same. The case in hand, in my view, cannot be said to be of "no evidence". All relevant aspects of the charge levelled against the applicant were considered threadbare and at the end of it, the Bank, as the employer, thought fit to dismiss the applicant from service. 15. The case in hand, in my view, cannot be said to be of "no evidence". All relevant aspects of the charge levelled against the applicant were considered threadbare and at the end of it, the Bank, as the employer, thought fit to dismiss the applicant from service. 15. In my view, this is a case of "loss of confidence". Since the loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee, the allegation of loss of confidence amounts to a stigma and, therefore, a regular departmental inquiry was initiated which ultimately resulted in the order of dismissal from the service. 16. The Supreme Court, in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors. [ (2003) 3 SCC 583 ], while considering the nature of proof required in a departmental enquiry on the scope of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226, observed as under; "It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 ). In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ) the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. ( 1999 (8) SCC 90 ) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits." 17. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], the Supreme Court observed as under: "A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 18. The Supreme Court, in the case of Michael & Anr. Johnson Pumps Ltd., AIR 1975 SC 661 , indicated that the loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or an individual reaction to an objective set of facts and motivations. Therefore, in a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started. Therefore, in a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started. When a termination order, after a full fledged departmental inquiry is based on the ground of misconduct or loss of confidence, and the same is not a colourable one, then a Court should be slow to interfere, but such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy and it should be bona fide and reasonable and must rest on some tangible basis. The punishment of dismissal from the service having been inflicted after considering the materials and after giving opportunity to the writ applicant, this Court should not enter into the question of merit of the finding either of the Inquiry Officer or with regard to the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority with regard to the quantum of punishment. This Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is shown that the same is arbitrarily imposed or is beyond the competence of the Disciplinary Authority or is apparently disproportionate or is impermissible in law. 19. The above takes me to deal with the contention as regards the failure to supply the relevant documents though demanded. This contention has also not appealed to me. Practically, in all service matters of the present nature and more particularly in the cases arising from the departmental inquiry, this contention of non-supply of the documents is a stock argument. I take notice of the letter dated 26th March 1999 of the Presenting Officer addressed to the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiry and Inquiring Authority, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi. This letter is at page - 541 (Annexure : A-III) to the main petition. This issue has been dealt with exhaustively. The relevancy of each and every document has been considered and reasons have been assigned in that regard. 20. I am also not impressed by the submission that only the applicant was targeted and proceeded departmentally. There is no basis as such to put forward such a contention. The facts of the case speaks for itself. There is nothing to impute any bad faith or mala fide or malice in this regard. 21. 20. I am also not impressed by the submission that only the applicant was targeted and proceeded departmentally. There is no basis as such to put forward such a contention. The facts of the case speaks for itself. There is nothing to impute any bad faith or mala fide or malice in this regard. 21. So far as the fourth contention as regards the relevancy of the witnesses examined in the course of the inquiry is concerned, I may only say that if otherwise on the basis of the materials on record, the guilt of the delinquent is established, then such contention pales into insignificance. It is the department to decide who is to be examined. The delinquent always gets an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The delinquent also gets an opportunity to examine his own defence witness, if any. Thus, this contention has also not impressed me at all. 22. So far as the last contention as regards the "doctrine of proportionality" is concerned, I may only say that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being the fact finding authority have the exclusive powers to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose the appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court, while exercising the powers of judicial review, should not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 23. In the matter of Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court has explained the Wednesbury principle applicable on the subject of punishment and proportionality. 24. 23. In the matter of Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 386 , the Supreme Court has explained the Wednesbury principle applicable on the subject of punishment and proportionality. 24. A Division Bench of this Court has, in an unreported decision rendered in the matter of J.H. Joshi v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No. 5691/2002, decided on 10th May 2005), observed as under: "The doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule evolved in England in Council of Civil Services Union v. Minister for Civil Services (1983) 1 AC 768 and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation - 1948 2 All ER 680 have been applied by the Courts in India in various decisions. In Union of India v. C.G. Ganayutham - AIR 1997 SC 3387 , the Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of the doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule in the light of various judicial pronouncements and laid down the following propositions: "(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms."" 25. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms."" 25. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and laid down the following propositions:-- "It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." 26. In Om Kumar v. Union of India [ AIR 2000 SC 3689 ], the Supreme Court traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the propositions culled out in Union of India v. C.G. Ganayutham's case [AIR 197 SC 3387], noticed the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p. International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All ER 129, wherein the principles of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgment which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgment which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. By 'proportionality' we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the Legislature or the Administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the Legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties, or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve. The Legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality." "29. The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, for considering whether restrictions imposed were restrictions which were 'necessary' - within Arts. 8 to 11 of the said Convention (corresponding to our Art. 19(1) and to find out whether the restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than required. (Handyside V. UK(1976) 1 EHR p.737) Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention contain provisions similar to Art. 21 of our Constitution relating to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the principle of proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Art. 14 of the Convention (corresponding to Art. 14 of our Constitution). (See European Administrative Law by J. Schwaze, 1992. Pp. 677-866)." "66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Art. 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying proportionality and is a primary reviewing authority." "67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Art. 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. (In G.B. Mahajan V. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 at p. 111 :( AIR 1991 SC 1153 at 1165), Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that 'reasonableness' of the Administrator under Art. 14 in the context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 at Pp. 679-680: (1994 AIR SCW 3344 and at Pp. 3369-70: AIR 1996 SC 11 ); Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691 : (AIR 1986 SC 515 at Pp. 542-43): Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association V. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 at p.241 : ( AIR 1990 SC 334 at p.368: 1990 Lab IC 324 at p.358) and U.P. Financial Corporation V. GEM CAP (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 , at p. 307: (1993 SC 1435 at p.1439), while judging whether the administrative action is arbitrary' under Art. 14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always." "71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Art. 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art. 14 applies in such a context. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art. 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rate cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and (in) such extreme or rate cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment." 27. In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under: "The Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go in to the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) 28. In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) 28. In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Sai Babu [ (2003) 4 SCC 331 ], the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition of punishment and observed: "Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of the charges proved, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works." 29. The above noted decisions give a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose a particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the High Courts/Tribunals should not exercise the appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinions by the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority should not be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the High Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 30. It is true that the applicant herein had put in long service of almost forty one years, but unfortunately, at the fag end, he indulged in an act which shook the confidence of his employer. He should have been careful more particularly, having regard to the fact that he was a Bank Officer and was dealing with the money of the people at large. He owed a higher responsibility considering the post he was holding and the nature of duties and functions he was discharging. 31. As a result, this application fails and is hereby rejected. Rule is discharged.