ORDER : S. Vimala, J. 1. "We do not want to be branded as criminals, especially, when we are happy to be known as the law abiding citizens" - so saying the father-in-law and mother-in-law (revision petitioners) of the respondent/daughter-in-law filed an application before the Sub Court, Tambaram, seeking appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for the purpose of taking inventory of the articles, as described in the schedule to the petition and to place them to the custody of the Court, for passing suitable order for due return of those articles to the parties concerned. 1.1. When the Honourable Supreme Court pointed out that in family matters, pending lis causes emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow, why the matrimonial Court declined to entertain the reasonable request of the in-laws to hand over the property to the daughter-in-law, is the issue raised in this case. 1.2. It is a classic case of irritable, irksome and unrelenting priests even when the Presiding deity is ready with a boon to the devotee, as though the law provided the space but not the Court. 1.3. Procrastination can be the greatest assassin of the lis in matrimonial matters. This has been pointed out in the case of Vimal K. vs. Veeraswamy, K. 1991 (1) SCR 904 , which the trial Court has omitted to take note of. The relevant observation reads as under: "It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The delineation of the lis by the family judge must reveal awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the parties has to be sternly dealt with for family court judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him is an emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it to grow." 2. The battle to get back the shridhana property is an ever ending battle for the daughter-in-law is the history written sofar. When such is the order of the day and when the in-laws come forward to return the shridana property to the daughter-in-law, the Court has declined to entertain the petition, which is under challenge in this revision petition. 3. Shridhana property is the separate property of the wife on proof that she entrusted the property or dominion over the shridhana property to her husband or any other member of the family. 3.1. 3. Shridhana property is the separate property of the wife on proof that she entrusted the property or dominion over the shridhana property to her husband or any other member of the family. 3.1. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on this point is relevant. (i) Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Another (1985) 98 L.W. 812 : 1985 2 SCC 370 . "It is, therefore, manifest that the position of stridhan of a Hindu married woman's property during coverture is absolutely clear and unambiguous; she is the absolute owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner she likes "she may spend the whole of it or give it away at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference to her husband. Ordinarily, the husband has no right or interest in it with the sole exception that in times of extreme distress, as in famine, illness or the like, the husband can utilise it but he is morally bound to restore it or its value when he is able to do so. It may be further noted that this right is purely personal to the husband and the property so received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against even in execution of a decree for debt." "A pure and simple entrustment of stridhan without creating any rights in the husband excepting putting the articles in his possession does not entitle him to use the same to the detriment of his wife without her consent. The husband has no justification for not returning the said articles as and when demanded by the wife nor can he burden her with losses of business by using the said property which was never intended by her while entrusting possession of stridhan. On the allegations in the complaint, the husband is no more and no less than a pure and simple custodian acting on behalf of his wife and if he diverts the entrusted property elsewhere or for different purposes he takes a clear risk of prosecution under Section 406 of the IPC. On a parity of reasoning, it is manifest that the husband, being only a custodian of the stridhan of his wife, cannot be said to be in joint possession thereof and thus acquire a joint interest in the property." (ii) Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997 2 SCC 397 . "9. On a parity of reasoning, it is manifest that the husband, being only a custodian of the stridhan of his wife, cannot be said to be in joint possession thereof and thus acquire a joint interest in the property." (ii) Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997 2 SCC 397 . "9. A woman's power of disposal, independent of her husband's control, is not confined to saudayika but extends to other properties as well. Devala says: "A woman's maintenance (vritti), ornaments, perquisites (sulka), gains (labha), are her stridhana. She herself has the exclusive right to enjoy it. Her husband has no right to use it except in distress."" In N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law - Principles and Precedents, (8th Edn.) edited by Prof. S. Venkataraman, one of the renowned Professors of Hindu Law para 468 deals with "Definition of Stridhana". In para 469 dealing with "sources of acquisition" it is stated that the sources of acquisition of property in a woman's possession are: gifts before marriage, wedding gifts, gifts subsequent to marriage etc. Para 470 deals with "Gifts to a maiden". "Wedding gifts" and it is stated therein that properties gifted at the time of marriage to the bride, whether by relations or strangers, either Adhiyagni or Adhyavahanika, are the bride's stridhana. In para 481 at page 426, it is stated that ornaments presented to the bride by her husband or father constitute her Stridhana property. In para 487 dealing with "powers during coverture" it is stated that saudayika meaning the gift of affectionate kindred, includes both Yautaka or gifts received at the time of marriage as well as its negative Ayautaka. In respect of such property, whether given by gift or will she is the absolute owner and can deal with it in any way she likes. She may spend, sell or give it away at her own pleasure. 10. It is thus clear that the properties gifted to her before the marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of giving farewell or thereafter are her stridhana properties. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property. Husband may use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. He has no control over her stridhana property. Husband may use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. Therefore, stridhana property does not become a joint property of the wife and the husband and the husband has no title or independent dominion over the property as owner thereof." 4. In the petition filed by the in-laws, it has been made clear that the matrimonial relationship between the revision petitioners' son and the respondent has been brought to an end by the decree of divorce granted by the Sub Court, Tambaram in HMOP. No. 36 of 2014 dated 16.10.2014. 5. After the decree of divorce, the respondent herein has filed an application in I.A.355 of 2014 seeking return of her Shridana Articles and this petition has been allowed by the order dated 28.08.2014. 6. The revision petitioners herein has filed an application before Sub Court, Tambaram, stating that they are intending to return the Shridana articles of their daughter-in-law and they anticipate return of articles given by them to her at the time of marriage. 6.1. This petition has been returned by the Sub Court, Tambaram on 24.11.2015 questioning how the petition is maintainable. The petition returned has been represented on 07.01.2016, giving details of the factual circumstances under which this petition is maintainable. Again the petition has been returned on 17.03.2016 stating that HMOP. No. 36 of 2014 has already been disposed of on 16.10.2014 and how the petition is maintainable. That made the petitioners to approach the Court seeking direction to the Court below to take up the case on file. 7. It is represented by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that despite the reasonable explanation given by the revision petitioners, the Court was not inclined to take the petition on file. 8. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the jurisdiction of the matrimonial Court to deal with the disputes relating to shridhana property. 8.1. 7. It is represented by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that despite the reasonable explanation given by the revision petitioners, the Court was not inclined to take the petition on file. 8. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the jurisdiction of the matrimonial Court to deal with the disputes relating to shridhana property. 8.1. The Family Courts Act 1984 confers jurisdiction upon the Family Courts which are exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation: Jurisdiction:- (1): Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall: (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation:- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the "case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, as Family Court shall also have and exercise:- (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment. 9. It is appropriate to quote Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, under which, jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Matrimonial Court to decide the dispute regarding the matrimonial property, without having to take recourse to the filing of the separate civil suit. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads thus: "Disposal of property - In any proceedings this Act, the court may make such provision in proper with respect to any property presented, at or about the time of marriage, which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife." 9.1. On a plain reading of the section, it becomes obvious the Matrimonial Court trying any proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has the jurisdiction to make such provision in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to any property presented "at or about the time of marriage" which may belong jointly to both the husband and wife. This section provides an alternate remedy to the wife so that she can recover the property which is covered by the Section, by including it in the decree in the matrimonial proceedings, without having to take resources to the filling of a separate Civil Suit and avoid further litigation. 10. Having regard to the purpose and function of the Family Court, the matrimonial Court exercising jurisdiction over matrimonial matters are also expected to exercise their jurisdiction. 11. It is relevant to quote the decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 3562 , whereunder, it has been held that the matrimonial court trying any proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, has the jurisdiction to make such provision in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to nay property presented "at or bout the time of marriage" which may belong jointly to both the husband and wife. 12. 12. It is also well settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would by itself being not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of the Court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its powers the Court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. 13. Under such circumstances, when the family member of the husband has filed the application which would enable them to return the shridana property to the respondent-daughter in law, the Court should have welcomed them to do that. Instead, the Court has chosen to return the petition. 14. It is appropriate to quote the observation of the Supreme Court reported in Krishna Bhatacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and another (Crl. Appeal No. 1545 of 2015 @ SLP (Crl) No. 10223 of 2014 - reported in 2016 (3) L.W. 193, wherein, the principles laid down have to be kept in mind in order to render justice to the litigants. "It is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the facts from all angles whether a plea advanced by the respondent to nullify the grievance of the aggrieved person is really legally sound and correct. The principle "justice to the cause is equivalent to the salt of ocean" should be kept in mind. The court of law is bound to uphold the truth which sparkles when justice is done. Before throwing a petition at the threshold, it is obligatory to see that the person aggrieved under such a legislation is not faced with a situation of non-adjudication......" In the very same decision, the right of the wife to ask for return of shridhana property has been discussed and it has been pointed out that keeping the shridhana property may amount to continuing offence also. The relevant observation reads as under: "A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 29...... 30. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities and adverted to Deokaran Nenshi (supra) and eventually held:- "The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence...." 15. Having regard to the legal position, it is claimed by the in-laws that by retaining the property, they do not want to be branded as criminals. Under such circumstances, this Court directs the Sub Court Tambaram, to take the case on file and to pass orders on merits in accordance with law and after hearing both sides, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With the above direction, this Civil Revision Petition is disposed of. No costs.