JUDGMENT AND ORDER : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Kh. Mani, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. M. Rakesh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Senior G.A. for the respondents. 2. In this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for setting aside the dismissal order dated 27.09.1999 primarily on the ground that the criminal case relating to which he was also proceeded in a departmental enquiry and after which he was dismissed from service, was subsequently closed by acquitting him, entitling him to be reinstated in service. 3. The brief facts of the case as may be relevant may be stated as follows. The petitioner at the relevant time was serving as a Rifleman in the 1st Battalion, Manipur Rifles having been appointed in the year 1985. While he was assigned the duty as one of the members of the escort contingent of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, Manipur, he was charged with committing offences u/s 452/397/326 IPC & 25(1-B) Arms Act and an FIR case was registered against him being FIR No. 87(4) 97 City P.S. In the complaint filed before the police which led to the registration of the aforesaid FIR case, the complainant who was a doctor had alleged that on 09.04.1997 at about 7.30 p.m. while he was inside his clinic, two persons came to his clinic, one of whom was identified to be the petitioner who got treatment from his clinic and thereafter, left the clinic. After some time, these two persons entered the pharmacy attached to the clinic and asked the 72 years old father of the complainant to give medicine which the complainant wrote on the prescription note. Suddenly, the petitioner pounced on the complainant’s father with a small arm and boxed on his mouth, upon which his father cried out for help. In the meantime, the petitioner drew out the drawer in the pharmacy and took out the bundle of money and ran away. As a result of the said assault, his father lost 5 teeth. The local people who were present there pursued the two persons and one of them i.e., the petitioner was caught with one fire arm by the police who were on duty near the Assembly Road crossing and also the stolen money amounting to Rs. 8,660/- (Rupees eight thousand six hundred and sixty) were recovered from his possession. The local people who were present there pursued the two persons and one of them i.e., the petitioner was caught with one fire arm by the police who were on duty near the Assembly Road crossing and also the stolen money amounting to Rs. 8,660/- (Rupees eight thousand six hundred and sixty) were recovered from his possession. Thereafter, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner in connection with the aforesaid incident. The Memorandum of Charges along with the list of documents and witnesses by which the articles of charges were to be proved were furnished to him. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence. Thereafter, the departmental enquiry was held by giving him full opportunity of defending himself. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted the report holding the charges against him proved. A copy of the enquiry report was furnished to him and was given the opportunity of submitting his representation against the findings. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the representation of the petitioner, imposed the penalty of dismissal as he was found to have committed gross misconduct by the aforesaid acts, vide order dated 27.09.1999 issued by the Commandant (Ops-I), 1st Manipur Rifles. 4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid dismissal order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-I), Manipur declined to entertain the appeal and rejected the same vide order dated 02.11.2000. 5. Later, in the year 2005, the petitioner was acquitted by the Fast Track Court, Manipur East in the Session Trial Case No.7/2000/10/2005 arising out of the aforesaid FIR case. 6. After the petitioner was acquitted in the aforesaid criminal case, he again preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 05.07.2006 for reinstating him into the service on the ground that the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal case which was the basis for initiating departmental enquiry and dismissal from service. However, the Appellate Authority on examination of the records found the said appeal to be without any merit and rejected the same vide order dated 22.07.2006. However, the Appellate Authority on examination of the records found the said appeal to be without any merit and rejected the same vide order dated 22.07.2006. The petitioner, however, pursued his remedy and again submitted a representation to the Inspector General of Police (Ops) on 05.06.2007 for reinstating him in service contending that as he has been subsequently found to be innocent in the criminal trial, the penalty of dismissal from service may be withdrawn by reinstating him into service, which representation, according to the petitioner has remained unconsidered. The petitioner, thereafter, filed certain applications before the authorities for furnishing copies of documents relating to the departmental enquiry which however, were refused. Subsequently, the petitioner has approached this Court filing the present writ petition seeking the relief for quashing the order of dismissal and for reinstating him in service on the ground that he has been subsequently acquitted in the criminal case arising out of the same incident. 7. At the outset, Mr. Kh. Mani, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the only ground on the basis of which he has filed the petition seeking setting aside the dismissal order is that the criminal trial arising out of the same FIR and incident in respect of which the petitioner was proceeded in the departmental enquiry and dismissed from service, was closed acquitting the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner is that since he has been discharged from any criminal trial liability by a competent Court of law, establishing his innocence, there is no reason why the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner earlier should not be revoked. In view of the above submission made, this Court is confining the examination only on this issue, whether acquittal in a criminal case arising out of an incident relating to which a person has been dismissed from service by holding a departmental enquiry, would result in nullifying or revoking of the order of dismissal and reinstatement in service. 8. This petition, however, has been opposed by the State not only on merit but also on the ground that the writ petition is hopelessly time barred. The petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1999 vide order dated 27.09.1999 and his appeal against dismissal order was rejected on 02.11.2000. 8. This petition, however, has been opposed by the State not only on merit but also on the ground that the writ petition is hopelessly time barred. The petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1999 vide order dated 27.09.1999 and his appeal against dismissal order was rejected on 02.11.2000. The judgment in the criminal case by which the petitioner was acquitted was passed on 29.09.2005 and as such, filing of the writ petition in 2014 belatedly is a sufficient ground for not entertaining this writ petition. In this regard, Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Senior G.A. has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court rendered in A. Obangmenla Jamir Vs. State of Nagaland & Ors., 2014 (2) GLT 266 in which the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition which was filed after five years of the dismissal from service. 9. Coming to the main issue raised in this writ petition, Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Senior G.A. has submitted that acquittal in the criminal case arising out of an incident based on which a person is dismissed from service after holding a departmental enquiry cannot automatically nullify the order of dismissal and result in reinstatement in service. In this regard, Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Senior G.A. relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. Vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 has submitted that unless the person is “honourably acquitted”, the question of reinstatement may not arise. As to the meaning of the expression “honourably acquitted”, he submits that the same has been explained in Baljinder Pal Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., (2016) 1 SCC 671 . 10. It has been submitted by Mr. RS Reisang, learned Sr. G.A. that the petitioner was not acquitted honourably but was acquitted in the criminal case as the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. It has been submitted that it cannot be said that in the present case, there was absolutely no evidence against the petitioner but the criminal Court did not find the evidence good enough to sustain conviction, as principle applied in a criminal trial is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it has been submitted that it is not a case of honourable acquittal of the petitioner which may require interference by this Court. 11. Therefore, it has been submitted that it is not a case of honourable acquittal of the petitioner which may require interference by this Court. 11. In this regard, we may refer to the relevant laws. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 had laid down the following principles involving departmental enquiry and criminal trial arising out of the same incident : 6 “(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 12. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265 ; State Bank of Hyderabad Vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 ; Gurpal Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 and Inspector General of Police Vs. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265 ; State Bank of Hyderabad Vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 ; Gurpal Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94 and Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same or would not entitle automatic reinstatement. In S.Samuthiram (supra) it was held that, “23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the prosecution................. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined. 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755 had observed that ordinarily the question as to whether acquittal in a criminal case would be conclusive in regard to order of punishment imposed upon the delinquent officer in a departmental proceeding is a matter which will depend upon the fact situation involved in a given case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to consider the two lines of decisions operating in the field, one in terms of the decision of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to consider the two lines of decisions operating in the field, one in terms of the decision of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . The second line of the decision shows that an honourable acquittal in the criminal case itself may not be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer, inter alia when : (i) the order of acquittal has not been passed on the same set of facts or same set of evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in the standard of proof in a criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been considered or where the delinquent officer was charged with something more than subject-matter of the criminal case. In the aforesaid case of Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : “21. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. One being the cases which would come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810 and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121. However, the second line of decisions show that an honourable acquittal in the criminal case itself may not be held to be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer, inter alia, when: (i) the order of acquittal has not been passed on the same set of facts or same set of evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in the standard of proof in a criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been considered (see Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh (2006) 4 SCC 265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686), or; where the delinquent officer was charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case and/or covered by a decision of the civil court (see G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121, Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank (2006) 1 SCC 566 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 401: (2006) 11 Scale 204 and Noida Entrepreneurs’ Assn. v. Noida (2007) 10 SCC 385 : (2007) 2 Scale 131 , para 18). 22. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. v. Noida (2007) 10 SCC 385 : (2007) 2 Scale 131 , para 18). 22. In Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&s) 840 this Court held : (SCC p. 729, paras 39-41). “39. Under certain circumstances, a decision of a civil court is also binding upon the criminal court although, converse is not true (See Karan Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 694 .) However, it is also true that the standard of proof in a criminal case and civil case is different. 40. We, may notice that in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810, this Court observed : (SCC p. 695, para 35) ‘35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case.’ 41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law that in all such circumstances the decision of the civil court or the criminal court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions points out that the same would depend upon other factors as well. See e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor4 Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067 and Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani, (2005) 5 SCC 100 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 609. Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts. 23. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ganesh Dutt, (1972) 4 SCC 834 this Court stated: (SCC p. 842, para 31) “31. Mr. Sharma referred us to Para 40 of the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant Company Ext. M-4 to the effect that in the order deciding to dismiss the workman, the appellant Company has not taken into account, as it is bound to, the previous record, if any, of the workmen. Mr. Sharma referred us to Para 40 of the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant Company Ext. M-4 to the effect that in the order deciding to dismiss the workman, the appellant Company has not taken into account, as it is bound to, the previous record, if any, of the workmen. This contention cannot be accepted because in the order dated May 9, 1966, communicated to each of the workmen, in the penultimate paragraph it has been stated that while arriving at the decision to dismiss the employees from the service for misconduct, all relevant circumstances including the past record of service, have been fully taken into consideration. So far as we could see, no challenge has been made by the workmen that the appellant has not taken into account his past record.” 14. It is well established law that the standard of proof required in a departmental proceeding and criminal trial are different and it is also well established that if an employee has been acquitted in a criminal case, the same by itself will not nullify the effect of the departmental enquiry against him, unless it is a case of “honourable acquittal” where it may have effect on the departmental enquiry depending on the fact situation. As to what is meant by the expression “honourable acquittal” has been explained in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 . In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that if an accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charge levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was “honourably acquitted” as observed in para 25 thereof which is reproduced herein below. “25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this Court in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229. In that case this court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal18, where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” 15. The only ground in assailing the dismissal order in this writ petition is that the basis of charges against the petitioner in the said Session Trial and departmental enquiry are the same and since the Trial Court had found him not guilty and had acquitted him of the said charges, finding of the departmental enquiry cannot be sustained. 16. As already discussed above, the scope of a criminal trial and departmental proceedings are different and the departmental authority would be within the jurisdiction to proceed to hold a departmental enquiry during the pendency of a criminal case against the delinquent officer and only where complicated questions of facts and law are involved, it would be desirable for the Departmental Authority to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case as has been held in the Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra). This Court has already observed that the present case is not such a case which involves complicated questions of facts and law. Therefore, the authority was competent to proceed with the departmental enquiry. In any event, as this issue has not been raised, it may not detain us any longer. 17. M. Paul Anthony (supra). This Court has already observed that the present case is not such a case which involves complicated questions of facts and law. Therefore, the authority was competent to proceed with the departmental enquiry. In any event, as this issue has not been raised, it may not detain us any longer. 17. As we proceed further, we may examine the order by which the Fast Track Court had acquitted the petitioner from the charges. To appreciate this issue, the relevant portions of the judgment of the trial Court acquitting the petitioner may be reproduced herein below : “5. Prosecution had produced and examined S.P. was P.W. No. 1 is ballistic expert S. Joychandra Singh according to him the revolver alleged to have been seized in connection with this case was unserviceable while the cartridge under ext. B/1 to B/4 were lived P.W. No. 2 is Mandalal Jain 75 years old proprietor of Trio Medical Store, Dharmasala, Thangal Bazar is the direct eye witness and who has been allege to have been assaulted by the accused person. He identifies the accused Itocha as the person who had assaulted him. According to P.W. Nos. 2 and 3 Mandalal Jain direct eye-witness and Dr. Pradeep Jain P.W. No. 3, the incident took place in the month of July 1997 at about 7 p.m. P.W. No. 2 mentioned in his deposition two person. One of them being accused Itocha. P.W. No. 2 is the proprietor of Trio Medical Store, Dharmasala, Thangal Bazar, Imphal were accused person is alleged to have made purchase of medicine of that medical store. Only Itocha was arrested by the police and seizure was prepared at the City Police Station in his presence vide Rxt.P/2 and P/2/1. According to P.W. No. 2 Mandalal Jain his medical store is the private clinic where his son Dr. Pradeepkumar Jain is a doctor treating patients. But P.W. No. 3 Dr. Pradeepkumar Jain deposes before the court as if nothing have happened I the medical store. Instead he went to the City Police Station at the Police Station he did sign papers Ext. P/3, Ext. P/3/11, Ext. P/4 and P/4/12. From this it is found that every seizure was made at the City Police Station without the provisions of law laid down in the Cr.P.C. P.W. No. 6 is one Sh. Naba Sharma seizure witness. Instead he went to the City Police Station at the Police Station he did sign papers Ext. P/3, Ext. P/3/11, Ext. P/4 and P/4/12. From this it is found that every seizure was made at the City Police Station without the provisions of law laid down in the Cr.P.C. P.W. No. 6 is one Sh. Naba Sharma seizure witness. He is declared hostile when he deposes that he signed the seizure memo without seeing the seized articles and money at the time of making the seizure memo. Other witnesses are P.W. No. 4 is the doctor at RIMS who had examined Mandalal Jain on 9.4.1997. P.W. No. 5 is one of the police patrolling party who had arrested accused Itocha who seems to have acted on the detection of his superior office I.O. Pradeep Singh at Police Head Quarters without using his conscience. P.W. No. 7 and 8 are I.Os. of the case. Now before the court questions are whether accused Itocha had committed the offences and that prosecution has proved the charges against Itocha beyond the shadow of any reasonable doubt. As per the Exhibits P/8, P/12, P/14 the incident took place on 9.4.1997 but according to the deposition of P.Ws. Nos. 2 and 3, the incident took place in the month of July, 2000 a difference of about 2/3 months. The seizures are also not proved according to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Why any other independent and reliable person of the place of occurrence has not been mentioned and named as seizure witnesses are provided in section 100(4) of the Cr.P.C. Why the other accused Persons are not properly identified through T.I.P. all these have made the prosecution case weakest and unacceptable in the eye of law. Heard Addl. P.P. and also Ld. Counsel for defence. Examined the materials on record. Prosecution miserably fails to prove the case beyond the shadow of doubt. In the result, accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. His bail and surety bond are cancelled. Case is accordingly disposed of. Announced in the open court in the presence accused person/defence counsel and prosecution. Sd/- Addl. Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court). Manipur East.” 18. It may be noted that of the two prosecution witnesses, PW 2 who was 75 years old and father of the complainant, had identified the petitioner as the person who had assaulted him. Announced in the open court in the presence accused person/defence counsel and prosecution. Sd/- Addl. Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court). Manipur East.” 18. It may be noted that of the two prosecution witnesses, PW 2 who was 75 years old and father of the complainant, had identified the petitioner as the person who had assaulted him. PW 3, the complainant had also testified about the incident. However, there is sketchy reference to the evidence of PW 3, Dr. Pradeepkumar Jain son of PW 2 and that of PW 4, the doctor at RIMS who examined the PW 2 on 09.04.1997. The trial Court has not discussed at all about the injury received by the PW 2 and seemed to be concerned more about the lack of proof of the seizures under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and that the accused persons were not properly identified through T.I.P. The Trial Court accordingly, held that the prosecution had “miserably” failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Though this Court is not sitting in appeal or reappraising the evidence on record in the aforesaid Session Trial Case, this Court can examine how the petitioner was acquitted and whether appreciation of evidence by the Trial in such a casual manner would have any binding effect on the departmental proceedings. This Court cannot but observe that the evidence of the witnesses more particularly of the victim and the complaint had not been adequately discussed and properly appreciated. There is no finding, much less any discussion of the grievous injury received by the PW 2. Further, even if the seizure of the small arm and money from the petitioner were held to be not proved in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C., there were sufficient evidence in terms of the deposition of the PW 2 of he being assaulted by the petitioner. The Trial Court for unknown and unfathomable reasons discarded the primary evidence of PW 2 who had identified the petitioner as the one who assaulted him. The fact that the petitioner was apprehended by the police patrol party near the Assembly Road is on record. Merely because, the revolver seized was unserviceable cannot make the assault on an old man less criminal. The fact that the petitioner was apprehended by the police patrol party near the Assembly Road is on record. Merely because, the revolver seized was unserviceable cannot make the assault on an old man less criminal. The evidence of PW 5, a member of the police patrol party who arrested the petitioner was ignored by the Trial Court as having acted on the direction of a superior officer “without using his conscience”, which this Court finds utterly incomprehensible. The Trial Court also did not discuss anything about the evidence of PW Nos. 7 and 8 who are the IOs of the case. Therefore, it is not the case where the petitioner can be said to have been given a clean chit and honourably acquitted. It cannot be said that there was a positive finding of innocence of the petitioner. The Trial Court invoked the principle of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” to acquit the petitioner, not because of total lack of evidence but by giving benefit of doubt. 19. Though the petitioner has not annexed the Memorandum of Charges against him, it is evident from the order dated 02.11.2000 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Ops-I), Manipur, the appellate authority that the allegation against the petitioner was that he was absent on 09.04.1997 from the guard-cum-escort duty of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, Manipur without any leave or permission from the competent authority and on the same day at about 7.30 pm he assaulted one Madanlal Jain, father of the proprietor of M/s Trio Medical Stores, Thangal Bazar with deadly weapon and looted a sum of Rs. 8,600/- (Rupees eight thousand six hundred) from the said medical store with one Md. Mazhar and had also caused injuries to the said Madanlal Jain for which he was arrested in connection with the FIR case No. 37(4)97 City P.S. under Section 452/397/326 IPC and 25(1-B) Arms Act on the same day near Manipur Legislative Assembly with the recovery of one Country-made pistol and Rs.8,600/- (Rupees eight thousand six hundred) from his possession. However, these charges are clearly reflected in the order passed by appellate authority dated 02.11.2000, relevant portions of which are reproduced herein below : “Orders by the Dy. Inspector General of Police (Ops-I): Manipur Imphal, the 2nd November, 2000. No. H-7/(Ops-I)/99 : Whereas the Ex-Rfm No. 61144 Md. Itoj Ali of 1st Bn. However, these charges are clearly reflected in the order passed by appellate authority dated 02.11.2000, relevant portions of which are reproduced herein below : “Orders by the Dy. Inspector General of Police (Ops-I): Manipur Imphal, the 2nd November, 2000. No. H-7/(Ops-I)/99 : Whereas the Ex-Rfm No. 61144 Md. Itoj Ali of 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles, Imphal preferred an appeal to the undersigned to re-instate him to his former post of Rfm. That, on perusal of the Comments furnished by the Commandant, 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles, Imphal it is found that the Ex.Rfm. No. 61144 Itoj Ali was absent on 9/4/97 from the guard-cum-escort of Hon’ble Chief Minister, Manipur without any leave or permission from the competent authority. Further, on the same day i.e. 9/4/97 at about 7.30 P.M. he assaulted Shri Madanlal Jain (72) father of Shri Pradeep Kumar Jain proprietor, M/S Trio Medical Stores, Thangal Bazar with deadly weapon and looted a sum of Rs.8,600/- (Rupees eight thousand six hundred) only from the said Medical Stores with one Md. Mazhar (30) s/o Md. Nazir Ali of Kairang and sustained serious injury to Shri Madanlal Jain. He was arrested by the City Police, Imphal in connection with FIR case No. 37(4)97 City P.S. under Section 452/397/326 IPC and 25(1-B) A. Act on the same day at about 7.30 P.M. near Manipur Legislative Assembly with one Country-made pistol and Rs. 8,600/- (Rupees eight thousand and six hundred) only from his possession. A D.E. was initiated against him for his grave misconduct and the disciplinary authority i.e. Commandant, 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles, examined the report of the Enquiry Officer and as well as written statement of Defence statement submitted by the Ex-Rfm. No. 61144 Md. Itoj Ali very carefully and considered that it was not proper to retain such Rifleman in a disciplined Force like Manipur Rifles. Thus, he was dismissed from service. Vide order No. DE- 543/IMR/97/1797 dated 27/9/99. I have examined the D.E. file and other relevant documents. It is established beyond doubt that Md. Itoj Ali (Ex-Rfm. No. 61144) had actually assaulted Shri Madan Lal Jain of Thangal Bazar on the evening of 9/4/97 and he had also robbed the old man. The incident took place inside the shop of the said Shri Madan Lal Jain. Ex-Rfm. I have examined the D.E. file and other relevant documents. It is established beyond doubt that Md. Itoj Ali (Ex-Rfm. No. 61144) had actually assaulted Shri Madan Lal Jain of Thangal Bazar on the evening of 9/4/97 and he had also robbed the old man. The incident took place inside the shop of the said Shri Madan Lal Jain. Ex-Rfm. No. 61144 Itoj Ali who was posted as escort of the Chief Minister, Manipur did not seek permission from his controlling officer and absented himself from the place of duty and he committed criminal offence of extortion and assault. Retention of such a person in the police force shall be in contradiction of all social norms. The decision taken by the Commandant, 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles is proper and just and the punishment of dismissal awarded on the said Ex-Rfm. Itoj Ali is justified. Now, therefore, I Shri N. Shyamananda Singh, Dy. Inspector General of Police (Ops-I), Manipur in exercise of the power conferred upon me as appellate authority do hereby uphold the order of the Commandant, 1st Bn.Manipur Rifles, Imphal. Thus, the appeal preferred by the delinquent Ex-Rfm. No.61144 Md. Itoj Ali is hereby rejected. Sd/- (N. Shyamananda Singh) IPS. Dy. I.G. of Police (Ops-I), Manipur, Imphal.” 20. In the present case, as already discussed above, we are of the view that the acquittal of the petitioner does not amount to “honourable acquittal” as there were certain vital evidences against the petitioner which the Trial Court ignored and the Trial Court held the charges against the petitioner not to be proved by applying the strict test of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. We are of the view that there are evidences as disclosed in the criminal trial that the petitioner was in the pharmacy on the fateful day and also that he had assaulted an old man and was apprehended by the police near the Assembly Road. These evidences themselves were sufficient to uphold the charges of absence without authorization and assaulting an elderly person against the petitioner in the departmental inquiry. 21. It may be also mentioned that the charge of absence without authorization, thus behaving in a manner unbecoming of a disciplined force was never an issue in the said criminal trial. These evidences themselves were sufficient to uphold the charges of absence without authorization and assaulting an elderly person against the petitioner in the departmental inquiry. 21. It may be also mentioned that the charge of absence without authorization, thus behaving in a manner unbecoming of a disciplined force was never an issue in the said criminal trial. As already observed, the Trial Court did not give any finding about the assault of the PW 2, Madanlal Jain by the petitioner in spite of being identified by the said Madanlal Jain in course of the trial. Though this Court is not sitting in appeal or reappraising the evidence on record in the aforesaid Session Trial, this Court cannot but observe and ignore the fact that the Trial Court has not given any finding as regards the allegation of assault in spite of the evidence from the mouth of the victim himself as also mentioned in the judgment of the Trial Court. In the judgment, the Trial Court recorded that PW 2 is a direct witness who was assaulted by the petitioner and PW 2 had identified the petitioner as the person who had assaulted him. Yet, surprisingly, there is no reference to this vital piece of evidence which clearly indicates the culpability of the petitioner as far as the charge under Section 326 IPC is concerned. This Court is of the view that considering the aforesaid evidence before the Court, it was sufficient for the purpose of a departmental enquiry to uphold the charge of assaulting an elderly person. This factum considered with unauthorized absence from duty, in the opinion of this Court, can form the basis for imposing major penalty against the petitioner. With the kind of sloppy appreciation or lack of appreciation of evidence, this Court cannot come to the conclusion that the petitioner was “honourably acquitted” by the Trial Court for the purpose examining the effect of the judgment on the departmental enquiry. Accordingly, we are of the view that the petitioner has failed to make any case for interference with the dismissal order. 22. This Court has also taken into consideration this aspect that the standard of proof required in a departmental enquiry and in criminal trial are different and distinct. Accordingly, we are of the view that the petitioner has failed to make any case for interference with the dismissal order. 22. This Court has also taken into consideration this aspect that the standard of proof required in a departmental enquiry and in criminal trial are different and distinct. While in the case of departmental enquiry the standard of proof is that of “preponderance of probabilities”, in a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”. In the present case, if the less stringent rule of application of evidence is adopted, dismissal on the ground of assaulting an elderly person while remaining on unauthorized absence cannot be said to be unreasonable or irrational, even if other charges of looting with deadly weapon are held not proved. In any event, it is not the case of the petitioner that the finding in the departmental enquiry was not based on any credible or admissible evidence. In fact, the petitioner has not raised any such issue before the appellate authority or before this Court about the veracity of the finding arrived at by the departmental enquiry or that such a finding is not based on evidence. He has not challenged the finding of the Enquiry Officer or Disciplinary Authority on any ground whatsoever including lack of evidence. His only grievance before this Court is that since he has been subsequently acquitted by the criminal Court, the dismissal cannot be sustained and he should be reinstated in service. 23. We are also mindful of the fact that the petitioner has approached this Court belatedly. The petitioner was dismissed in the year 1999. Though the petitioner may legitimately claim that he was awaiting his acquittal in the criminal case for challenging his dismissal order before approaching this Court, the fact remains that the acquittal in the said case took place in the year 2005 and the petitioner has failed to explain satisfactorily the delay in approaching this Court after he was acquitted in 2005. Though he claimed that he was approaching the authorities for seeking review and also seeking certain documents, this Court has also noted that the appellate authority had rejected his plea for reinstatement based on his acquittal by an order passed on 22.07.2006. Though he claimed that he was approaching the authorities for seeking review and also seeking certain documents, this Court has also noted that the appellate authority had rejected his plea for reinstatement based on his acquittal by an order passed on 22.07.2006. His plea for getting copies cannot be valid ground for condoning the delay in as much as the petitioner was afforded with the copies of these documents in course of the departmental enquiry. Thus, on this ground of delay also, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. Accordingly, we hold that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed.