M. Karthick v. State Represented by : The Inspector of Police
2016-03-31
P.DEVADASS
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The sole accused in S.C.No.72 of 2014 on the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, [Fast Track Mahila Court], Dharmapuri, seeks suspension of his sentence by granting him appeal bail under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. 2. After trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced him as under: Conviction Sentence (i) Section 306 IPC (i) 5 years R.I and fine Rs.2,000/- i/d 2 months S.I. The fine amount has been paid. 3. PW1's daughter Mekala attempted suicide on 01.07.2010 by pouring kerosene upon herself. She was rushed to the hospital with extensive burn injuries. On 01.07.2010, she gave oral statement to PW10-Doctor [A.R.Copy Ex.P5]; on 02.07.2010, she gave statement to PW12-Judicial Magistrate [Ex.P8] and on 04.07.2010 she gave statement to PW11-Head Constable [Ex.P6-FIR]. On 05.07.2010, she died. 4. In such circumstances, under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, the said three statements of Mekala to Doctor [oral]; to Judicial Magistrate [judicial] and to Head Constable [written] have become dying declarations. Although, it was given to PW11- Head Constable, it also becomes a Dying Declaration under Section 162(2) Cr.P.C r/w 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Now, in this case, there are multiple, plural dying declarations. The trial court relied on the Dying Declaration recorded by PW12-Judicial Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused as stated already. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the dying declarations given before the Doctor and given before the Magistrate are contradictory. One excludes the other. There are contrary version in the dying declaration given to the police/PW11 as to certain vital aspects. In such circumstances, it is highly unsafe to act upon the dying declaration given by the deceased to PW12. 6. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the following decisions: (i) Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf vs. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 13 SCC 112 ] (ii) Lakhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2010) 8 SCC 514 ] 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even taking the allegations levelled against the accused as such, it would not warrant an offence under Section 306 IPC. Mekala was a weak minded woman. There is paucity of any positive act on the part of the accused. In such circumstances, an offence under Section 306 IPC will not arise. 8.
Mekala was a weak minded woman. There is paucity of any positive act on the part of the accused. In such circumstances, an offence under Section 306 IPC will not arise. 8. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the following decisions: (i) Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2002) 5 SCC 371 ] (ii) Mani vs. State rep.by the Inspector of Police, J-3, Guindy Police Station, Chennai [(2014) 3 MLJ (Crl) 18] 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. He was on bail throughout the trial court proceedings. He may be granted appeal bail. 10. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate (Cri.side) would submit that the accused and the deceased are within prohibited degree of relationship. They are in the nature of brother and sister. The accused fancied for her. The accused forgotten their consanguinity. The deceased chided him. Yet the accused did not budge. In such circumstances, unable to bear the shameless act, she had committed suicide. 11. The learned Government Advocate further contended that she had stated to PW12-Judicial Magistrate that because of the shameless act committed by the accused, she had committed suicide. In such circumstances, the trial court has rightly convicted him and punished him. There is no prima facie case in his favour. 12. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions; perused the trial court's judgment, gone through the relevant evidence pointed out by either side and also the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. Now the question is whether in the facts and circumstances, the accused could be granted appeal bail under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C.? 14. We must keep in our mind that still the appeal is pending. In granting relief under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C., the Court has to consider the nature of the accusations made against the accused and also see, is there any prima facie case in his favour. But, it should not be misunderstood as a strong case. For the purpose of Section 389(1) Cr.P.C, prima facie case should be understood in the sense that from the evidence adduced and from the impugned judgment, there are certain eminently arguable points, which are required to be examined in detail during the main appeal. 15.
But, it should not be misunderstood as a strong case. For the purpose of Section 389(1) Cr.P.C, prima facie case should be understood in the sense that from the evidence adduced and from the impugned judgment, there are certain eminently arguable points, which are required to be examined in detail during the main appeal. 15. In this case, the accused is stated to have eyed on Mekala, daughter of PW1, although she is a sister to him. Under the circumstances, Mekala self-immolated herself on 01.07.2010. Nobody knows what made her to give goodbye to this world. She cannot be brought back. But her last words are there. She left her testamentum as to why she has decided to leave this world. 16. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, furnishes a res gestae called 'dying declaration'. It is based on the principle that, 'a dying man will not lie, ''Truth sits on the lips of a dying man". Yet it is always subject to the truth and genuineness of the contents therein. It becomes relevant when question as to death of a person is in issue. 17. A sole dying declaration is sufficient to record a conviction; but it must be true and genuine. Corroboration need not be insisted upon. Problem arises when there are more than one dying declaration. It is 'multiple' or 'plural' dying declarations. Dying declaration takes different forms, viz., oral, judicial and written. 18. In case of multiple dying declarations, it is not the rule that the Court must reject them. But still the general principles relating to dying declaration applies to multiple dying declarations also. The Court must take into account each dying declaration in its intrinsic value and consider the totality of the circumstances pertaining to the dying declaration. But in case, there is a dying declaration given before a non-police man, such as Doctor, Magistrate, the dying declaration given before the judicial person has to be preferred. Even the dying declaration given before a Magistrate must also conform to the general principles relating to genuineness, true and acceptability and fit mental condition of the declarant. Cases of tutoring, prompting of the victim to introduce story-telling, concoction, implication will weaken the dying declaration even if it is given before a Magistrate. 19.
Even the dying declaration given before a Magistrate must also conform to the general principles relating to genuineness, true and acceptability and fit mental condition of the declarant. Cases of tutoring, prompting of the victim to introduce story-telling, concoction, implication will weaken the dying declaration even if it is given before a Magistrate. 19. But in case of multiple dying declarations, the Court cannot adopt an yardstick that out of the same, one will be nice and so it has chosen it cannot be a proper course. As dying declaration is given much more weight in the Court, so, so much weight has to be given as to its acceptability. Possibility of adding and padding in a dying declaration cannot also be ruled out. 20. Now, in this case, when Mekala was rushed to the hospital on 01.07.2010; she was examined by PW10- casualty doctor, to whom she had stated that she sustained injury by accidental fire. [See Ex.P5 A.R.copy]. She had excluded the accused. Subsequently, on 02.07.2010 in her statement to PW12-Judicial Magistrate, Mekala had implicated the accused that he had sexually abused her; unable to put up with the shame she had decided to commit suicide. [See Ex.P8]. This dying declaration has devastating effect in the nature of forcing, provoking, instigating her to commit suicide. It may take the case near Section 306 IPC. 21. On 04.07.2010 at the hospital, to PW11-Head Constable, Mekala gave a lengthy statement [See Ex.P6] as to why she had decided to commit suicide. If Mekala is alive, it will be hit under Section 161 r/w 162 (1) Cr.P.C. When Mekala dies, the said bar will go away and in view of Section 162(2) Cr.P.C., it will become a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian evidence Act. But yet it will not be glorified or elevated to the status of a dying declaration given to a Magistrate. 22. In the present case, there are three dying declarations, one to a Doctor (oral), one to a Magistrate (judicial) and one to a policeman (written). The Court must analyse each dying declaration in its intrinsic value. Its central focus has to be deciphered. In the dying declaration to the Doctor, she had given clean chit to the accused.
22. In the present case, there are three dying declarations, one to a Doctor (oral), one to a Magistrate (judicial) and one to a policeman (written). The Court must analyse each dying declaration in its intrinsic value. Its central focus has to be deciphered. In the dying declaration to the Doctor, she had given clean chit to the accused. But when we compare it to the dying declaration given to PW12 and given to PW11 there are vital contradiction, namely, in the dying declaration to PW12, she had stated that because the accused had committed an indecent act on her, ashamed of that she had committed suicide. But in her lengthy dying declaration to PW11, this vital aspect is missing. 23. In Mani (supra), it was held that merely because a lady has left a statement that the accused is responsible for her to commit suicide, readily the Court cannot jump to the conclusion that Section 306 IPC will arise. The Court has to consider, whether the statement amounts to 'abetment' under Section 306 IPC. Missing of the vital aspect in the dying declaration to PW11 police will miss an offence under Section 306 IPC. On the other hand, if we look at the dying declaration given to PW12, a vital aspect therein will bring him under Section 306 IPC. 24. Now, we have to see whether the dying declaration is true. There is significant improvement in the dying declaration given to police. Thus, we see some eminently arguable points are involved in this criminal appeal, which are required to be examined in the main criminal appeal. 25. Thus, I see prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. He was on bail throughout the trial court proceedings. There is no allegation that he has misused his liberty. There is no allegation that he will flee away from justice. Further, it is a fact that it will take some time for the disposal of this criminal appeal. In the circumstances, I am inclined to grant him appeal bail. 26.
He was on bail throughout the trial court proceedings. There is no allegation that he has misused his liberty. There is no allegation that he will flee away from justice. Further, it is a fact that it will take some time for the disposal of this criminal appeal. In the circumstances, I am inclined to grant him appeal bail. 26. Ordered as under: (i) Appeal bail granted to the petitioner; (ii) His sentence of imprisonment alone is suspended; (iii) There shall be two sureties and that they and the petitioner shall execute a bond for Rs.15,000/- (Rupees fifteen Thousand only) each to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Dharmapuri; (iv) Petitioner shall report before the said Judge daily at 10.30 a.m until further orders.