JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Shri B.P. Sahu, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri M. Tapan Sharma, Advocate, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner; Shri S. Nepolean, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as well as Shri R.K. Nokulsana, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Sanajaoba, Advocate, the learned counsels appearing for the respondent No. 3, the private respondent. 2. By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing an appropriate writ/order/direction to quash the impugned order dated 02-04-2016 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Edn./S), Government of Manipur and to allow him to discharge his duties as the DDO of the Office of the Zonal Education Officer, Zone-IV, Bishnupur. 3.1. According to the petitioner, although he was initially appointed as Hindi Graduate Teacher in the Department of Educations, Government of Manipur in the year 1991, he was allowed by the competent authorities to discharge his duties as the Assistant Inspector of Schools on in-charge basis with effect from 15-11-2015 and to discharge his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools with effect from 19-09-2014. While discharging his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools, Moirang, he was transferred and posted at the Office of the Zonal Education Officer, Zone-IV, Bishnupur, Government of Manipur vide order dated 07-03-2016 as the Deputy Inspector of Schools with the Drawing and Disbursing Officer (DDO) of the said office and accordingly, he joined his duties by submitting a joining report on 08-03-2016. As the incumbent who was discharging his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools and the DDO left the office without handing over the charge to him, the petitioner had to take self-charge of the said post i.e., the Deputy Inspector of Schools as well as the DDO of the said office on 17-03-2016 with the approval of the authorities. 3.2. To the shock and surprise of the petitioner and hardly 25 days after the issuance of the said order dated 07-03-2016 by which the petitioner was allowed to discharge his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools as well as the DDO, the Deputy Secretary, Educations, Government of Manipur issued an order dated 02-04-2016 allowing the Private respondent to function as the DDO of the said office of the Zonal Education Officer, Bishnupur with immediate effect and until further order in public interest. Being aggrieved by the said impugned order dated 02-04-2016, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. The instant writ petition is contested by the State respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition dated 21-07-2016 wherein it is stated that although the petitioner and the Private respondent are holding their substantive posts of Hindi Graduate Teacher and Science Graduate Teacher, they are allowed to discharge their duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools; that the fact of allowing an officer to function as the DDO of an office is a matter of decision of the Government so taken in consideration of the integrity and accountability of the officer concerned and that the petitioner has no legitimate right to claim for appointment as the DDO of the office concerned. It is further stated therein that the issuance of the impugned order dated 02-04-2016, allowing the private respondent to function as the DDO, is not in violation of the principle of natural justice. Contesting the writ petition, the private respondent also has filed an affidavit-in-opposition contending inter-alia that there are three Deputy Inspector of Schools in Zone-IV(B), out of which he is the senior most and the petitioner, the junior most; that he being the senior most in the rank of the Deputy Inspector of Schools, he has been entrusted with the duties and functions of the DDO without extra remuneration; that it is well settled law that even in case of appointment on in-charge basis, the senior most ought to be given preference to juniors and that with effect from 04-04-2016, he has started functioning as the DDO after submitting his joining report to the Director of Educations, Govt. of Manipur through the Zonal Education Officer, Bishnupur. In reply thereto, the petitioner in his affidavit has stated that he is still functioning as the DDO and has not handed over the charge to the Private respondent who is a stranger on account of his MGEL still being in the Office of the Zonal Education Officer, Churachandpur; that the alleged taking over charge by the Private respondent was made in collusion with Zonal Education Officer who is his cousin and that in order to defeat the interim order dated 07-04-2016 passed by this court, the Private respondent was collusively allowed by the Zonal Education Officer to sign some of the bills. 5. 5. It has been contended by Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that although the transfer and posting is within the domain of the State Government, the removal of charge from an officer, without assigning any reason, for being given to another will develop personal enmity between them and there has been no adverse remark against him in the discharge of his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools as well as the DDO. It has further been submitted that the acts of the State respondents in allowing the Private respondent to function as the DDO without assigning any reason, are not only in violation of the principles of natural justice but are also arbitrary, malafide and illegal. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. S.R. Vemnkataraman Vs. Union of India & ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 491 and Jayalalita & ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & ors., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 401 . On the other hand, Shri S. Nepoleon, the learned Government Advocate has, relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Airport Authority of India Vs. Rajeev Ratan Pandey & ors., reported in (2009) 8 SCC 337 , submitted that mere allegation of malafide is not enough, it must be supported by requisite materials. Shri R.K. Nokulsana, the learned senior Advocate has placed reliance in Pratibha Mohan Das & ors. Vs. State of Orissa & ors., reported in (2001) 2 SCC 480 and Phupendra Nathsarma Vs. State of Assam & ors., reported in 2012 (5) GLT 653. 6. Admittedly, the transfer and posting is the domain and prerogative of the State Government and the courts shall not interfere with it except in cases where the transfer order has been issued in violation of the provisions of a rule or on the ground of malafide. In other words, the power of transfer and posting of the State Government is a discretionary power but is always subject to the exceptions curbed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. The issue relating to transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in various cases, settling the law thereof. The issue relating to transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in various cases, settling the law thereof. In this regard, some of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which both the parties will have no disagreement, may be referred to herein. In E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & anr., reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court inter-alia held that a transfer is malafide when it is made not for professed purpose, such as normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose, that is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. In Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ors., reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “The courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights.” In M. Shankaranarayan, IAS Vs. State of Karnataka & ors., reported in (1993) 1 SCC 54 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the court may draw reasonable inference of malafide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture. In N.K Singh Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 98 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “6. ...the scope of judicial review in matters of transfer of a government servant to an equivalent post without any adverse consequence on the service or career prospects is very limited being confined only to the grounds of malafides and violation of any specific provision...” In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. ...the scope of judicial review in matters of transfer of a government servant to an equivalent post without any adverse consequence on the service or career prospects is very limited being confined only to the grounds of malafides and violation of any specific provision...” In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri Bhagwan & anr., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled that no government servant or employer of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place, since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. In Public Services Tribunal Bar Assn. Vs. State of UP & anr., reported in (2003) 4 SCC 104 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “37. Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This court consistently has been taking a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.” In Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi Vs. UP Jai Nigam & ors., reported in (2003) 11 SCC 740, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “3. In our view, transfer of officers is required to be effected on the basis of set norms or guidelines. The power of transferring an officer cannot be wielded arbitrarily, malafide or an exercise against efficient and independent officer or at the instance of politicians whose work is not done by the officer concerned. For better administration, the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration.” In State of UP & ors. Vs. Gobardhan Lal reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “7 .... Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Vs. Gobardhan Lal reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “7 .... Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of a malafide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made...” In Tejshree Ghag & ors. Vs. Prakash Parashuram Patil and ors., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 220 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “An order of transfer ordinarily should be in terms of the existing rules. Transfer may even incidental to the conditions of service, but thereby nobody can be deprived of his existing rights. Existence of a power and exercise thereof are two different concepts. An executive power in absence of any statutory rules cannot be exercised which would result in civil or penal consequences. Such exercise of power must, moreover, be bonafide. It cannot be done for unauthorized purpose. An executive order passed for unauthorized purpose would amount to malice in law. An order of transfer cannot prejudicially affect the status of an employee. If orders of transfer substantially affect the status of an employee, the same would be violative of the conditions of service and thus, illegal. Transfers must be made to an equivalent post.” In Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras Vs. R. Perachi & ors., reported in (2011) 12 SCC 137 , the Hon’ble supreme Court has observed that the transfer is an incident of service and one cannot make a grievance if a transfer is made on the administrative grounds and without attaching any stigma. It is thus seen that in a matter of transfer and posting, the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with it, is very limited except on ground of malafide or violation of the provisions of a rule. It is thus seen that in a matter of transfer and posting, the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with it, is very limited except on ground of malafide or violation of the provisions of a rule. In order to substantiate his contention and in support thereof, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in two cases as aforesaid in the preceding para. In Smt. S.R. Venkataraman case (supra), the appellant questioned the order dated 26-03-1976 retiring her prematurely from service on the ground that the hostile attitude was shown to by one of her superior officers who gave adverse remark in her service record and that the order of premature retirement was not made in public interest but was arbitrary and capricious. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal mainly on the concession made by the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India that there was nothing on the record which could justify the order of the appellant’s premature retirement. In Jayalalita’s case (supra), the Government order dated 10-09-2013 asking the Special Public Prosecutor not to appear in the matter, came to be challenged on the ground that no reason was assigned for it and that too, without consulting the High court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned order holding inert-alia that the reason put forth by the Government of Karnataka for removing the respondent No. 4 as SPP appears to be rather unusual and that the order of removal of the respondent No. 4 is a product of malafide and is not sustainable in law. It may be noted that in the said cases, the decisions of which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not taken any view contrary to what has been decided in those cases referred to herein above and has interfered with the actions of the respondents therein on the ground of malafide. Therefore, the short question that arise for consideration by this court is as to whether the State respondents, while issuing the impugned order, have violated any provision of law or have acted in a malafide manner. Therefore, the short question that arise for consideration by this court is as to whether the State respondents, while issuing the impugned order, have violated any provision of law or have acted in a malafide manner. In this regard and while considering the said short question, the decision rendered in Airport Authority of India case (supra) and relied upon by the learned Government Advocate is relevant, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held: “7. In State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, while dealing with a matter of transfer, this Court observed that allegations of mala fides must inspire confidence of the Court and ought not to be entertained on the mere asking of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference would ordinarily be made with an order of transfer. That the burden of proving mala fides is on a person levelling such allegations and the burden is heavy, admits of no legal ambiguity. Mere assertion or bald statement is not enough to discharge the heavy burden that the law imposes upon the person levelling allegations of mala fides; it must be supported by requisite materials.” The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondent are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, the same are not referred to herein. 7. In the writ petition, there is no any specific averment made by the petitioner about the actions of the State respondents, while issuing the impugned order, being violative of a provision of law or being malafide. In other words, a plea of malafides is not made in the writ petition. All that the petitioner has averred herein, are that he has been discharging his duties as the Deputy Inspector of Schools as well as the DDO without any adverse remark being made against him and the removal of charge from him from being the DDO, has been made without assigning any reason. His further grievance is that the Deputy Secretary, Edn./S, Government of Manipur has issued the impugned order without considering the pros and cons of issuance of such order and that too, by acting in the form of unruly horse. His further grievance is that the Deputy Secretary, Edn./S, Government of Manipur has issued the impugned order without considering the pros and cons of issuance of such order and that too, by acting in the form of unruly horse. However, in his reply affidavit, it has been alleged that the Zonal Education Officer is the cousin of the private respondent and he, in collusion with the private respondent, has made the alleged taking over of charge by the private respondent, without a formal charge being taken from the petitioner and consequently, has allowed the private respondent to sign as the DDO in some of the bills. It is further alleged that there has been a conspiracy between the Zonal Education Officer and the private respondent to ensure that the charge of being the DDO, is removed from the petitioner. But the allegation cannot be said to be supported by requisite materials. In order to appreciate the allegation of the petitioner, this court directed the State respondents to produce the relevant file for perusal by this court and in compliance with the said direction, the State respondents have produced it before this court. On perusal of the said file, it is seen that on 08-03-2016, the Zonal Education Officer addressed to the Director of Educations, Manipur a letter proposing that the private respondent being the senior most Deputy Inspector of Schools be entrusted the work of a DDO. In the said letter, the Zonal Education Officer has not mentioned anything about the order dated 07-03-2016 issued by the Under Secretary, Edn./S transferring the petitioner as the Deputy Inspector of Schools as well as the DDO and therefore, the said letter appears to have been written by the Zonal Education Officer after having knowledge about it but before the receipt of a copy of the order dated 07-03-2016. However, it may be too much to say that the actions of the State respondents, while issuing the impugned order, are malafide because the impugned order has been issued on the basis of the said proposal. It may be noted that it was only a proposal and the Zonal Education Officer is not the competent authority to issue the impugned order and there is no material on record to show that the Zonal Education Officer has influenced the State respondents to issue the impugned order. It may be noted that it was only a proposal and the Zonal Education Officer is not the competent authority to issue the impugned order and there is no material on record to show that the Zonal Education Officer has influenced the State respondents to issue the impugned order. Even assuming that the Zonal Education Officer has acted in collusion with the private respondent, he is not made a party in the writ petition and therefore, he cannot be condemned unheard. Moreover, on receipt of the said proposal, the file was processed in the Governmental level and before issuing the impugned order, two points came to be considered in the file - one, the private respondent is the senior most amongst the Deputy Inspector of Schools in the Office of Zonal Education Officer, Zone-IV, Bishnupur District and two, the petitioner was allowed to function as the DDO on the recommendation of a Minister, Government of Manipur. Thus, a conscious decision was taken by the State respondents only after the file was moved at different levels upto the concerned Minister who granted the approval thereof. Therefore, the power of transfer and posting being a discretionary one and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the materials placed on record by the petitioner as regards the allegation of malafide, are not sufficient to hold that the actions of the State respondents being malafide, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.