JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicant, a former employee of the Medhasan Gram Panchayat, has prayed for the following reliefs:- "(A) To admit and allow this petition; (B) To quash and set aside the impugned action of termination of services by the agents, servants and nominees of respondent No. 1, by a resolution in a general meeting on 30.9.1992; (C) To declare that the petitioner was appointed as a teacher in a pre-primary educational establishment of a "Bal Mandir" run by the respondent No. 1 and on getting grant-in-aid from the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, and is entitled to protection of fundamental rights before this Hon'ble Court, for protection of service conditions under the State; (D) Direct respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to withdraw recognition for running a Shishu Vihar "Bal Mandir" and from entitlements from grant-in-aid." 2. The writ-applicant, after a due process of law, was appointed on 1.2.1977 as a Headmistress in the Bal Mandir run by the Gram Panchayat. The writ-applicant preferred an application seeking leave from 1.7.1992 to 30.12.1992. She absented herself although there was no sanction of the leave sought. It appears that even after 30.12.1992, she did not resume her duty. Therefore, a show cause notice was issued to her by the Panchayat as to why her service should not be terminated. Thereafter, the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution terminating her services. On her services being terminated, she approached the Labour Court at Ahmedabad by Reference (LCA) No. 992 of 1993. The Labour Court, by its award dated 5th August, 1993, allowed the reference and ordered reinstatement of the writ-applicant herein in service with back wages and continuity. 3. The Panchayat, being dissatisfied with the award passed by the Labour Court, preferred SCA No. 1132 of 1995. The said application came to be rejected by an order dated 22.3.1995, which reads as under:-- "Impugned herein is an ex-parte award dated 5th August, 1994. Remedy is available to the petitioner by virtue of Rule 26 of Gujarat Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, rejected." 4. It appears that thereafter the Panchayat preferred the Misc. Application No. 62 of 1995 under Rule 26A of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, pursuant to the observations made by this Court referred to above. Remedy is available to the petitioner by virtue of Rule 26 of Gujarat Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, rejected." 4. It appears that thereafter the Panchayat preferred the Misc. Application No. 62 of 1995 under Rule 26A of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, pursuant to the observations made by this Court referred to above. The Labour Court, by order dated 8.11.1995, rejected the application with costs of Rs.400, to be paid to the writ-applicant herein. 5. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Labour Court dated 8.11.1995, the Panchayat challenged the same by filing SCA No. 10947 of 1995 before this Court. The said writ-application came to be allowed vide judgment and order dated 29.7.1998. While allowing the same, the learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under:-- "12. Though the petition was originally filed in Dec. 1995, it came up before the court for five time in May, 1996. The respondent also appeared in May, 1996. Therefore the respondent is entitled to get the wages from May, 1996 to July, 1997. The respondent was drawing a salary of Rs.350/- per month as has been stated by the Labour Court in his judgment. The said fact that the respondent was getting Rs.350 per month when her services brought to an end is stated on the statement on oath made by the respondent before him. Therefore she is entitled to get Rs.350 for 27 months. The respondent is already paid Rs.5,000 as per the order passed on her application by way of interim relief. Therefore the said amount will have to be deducted. Thus, the respondent is entitled to get Rs.4450 more. Mr. Pandya had argued that the Government has passed a resolution on 1.8.1995 and the pay of teacher of Balmandir is fixed at Rs.600/- and that claim of him could not be accepted in view of the statement on oath made by the respondent that the last pay drawn by her was Rs.350 per month and under Section 17B she is entitled to get the wages at rate of wages last drawn. 13. Thus, the special Civil Application filed by the petitioner is allowed and the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference No. 992/93 on 5.8.1994 is quashed and set aside. Hence the rule is made absolute in the above terms. 13. Thus, the special Civil Application filed by the petitioner is allowed and the award passed by the Labour Court in Reference No. 992/93 on 5.8.1994 is quashed and set aside. Hence the rule is made absolute in the above terms. However the petitioner is directed to pay Rs.4,450 within two weeks from today to the respondent. In view of the above direction C.A No. 1391 of 1998 stands disposed of. Parties are directed to bear their respective cost in both proceedings." 6. In such circumstances referred to above, the writ-applicant was left with no other option, but to prefer the present writ-application. 7. I take notice of the fact that this writ-application was ordered to be rejected by a learned Single Judge, vide order dated 5.4.2000, which reads as under:- "Mr. D.N. Pandya, for the petitioner. Mr. P.S. Chari, for the respondent No. 1. This Court in the Spl. C.A. No. 10947 of 1995 has observed as under:- "Therefore, in view of the fact that the respondent is a Teacher, the dispute regarding the termination of her services can not be considered and decided by the Labour Court or Industrial Court. The Labour Court/Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. She will have to go before the proper forum. If she cannot go to School Tribunal as contended by the Mr. Pandya, then she will have to go before the Civil Court. But, in any case, Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide her dispute. I therefore hold that the award passed by the Labour Court will have to be quashed and set aside." Looking to the aforesaid observation, it is specifically mentioned that the petitioner have to go before the Civil Court. The petition is rejected." 8. Being dis-satisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the present writ-application, the writ-applicant preferred LPA No. 800/00, which came to be allowed by a Division Bench vide order dated 31.8.2005. The order reads thus:-- "Heard the learned counsel for the parties, Ms. Shah for the appellant and Mr. Chari for the respondent? Panchayat. This is the second round of litigation between the parties. On earlier occasion, the petitioner? teacher approached the Labour Court against her termination which was quashed and set aside by the Labour Court against which the respondent? The order reads thus:-- "Heard the learned counsel for the parties, Ms. Shah for the appellant and Mr. Chari for the respondent? Panchayat. This is the second round of litigation between the parties. On earlier occasion, the petitioner? teacher approached the Labour Court against her termination which was quashed and set aside by the Labour Court against which the respondent? Panchayat filed Special Civil Application No. 10947 of 1995 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge of this court (S.D. Pandit, J.) on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction and, therefore, the impugned judgment and award passed by the Labour Court was quashed and set aside. The said order has become final in the sense that it was not challenged further by the present petitioner. Be that as it may. 2. Later on, the petitioner approached this court by way of fresh Special Civil Application No. 8718 of 1998 and challenged her termination order straightaway before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution which was dismissed by another learned Single Judge of this court (R.R. Tripathi, J.) in view of the observations made by the learned Single Judge in his order passed in Special Civil Application No. 10947 of 1995 by holding that the petitioner will have to go before the Civil Court. This order dated 5th April, 2000 passed by the learned Single Judge of this court dismissing Special Civil Application No. 8718 of 1998 is challenged in this appeal. 3. It is true that while allowing the earlier Special Civil Application No. 10947 of 1995 filed by the present respondent? Panchayat, the learned Single Judge of this court observed that the petitioner? Teacher will have to go before the Civil Court. But, it may be stated that in that petition, judgment and award passed by the Labour Court declaring her termination bad was challenged by the Panchayat on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. 4. It was conceded by Ms. Shah for the appellant? petitioner that the petitioner had alternative remedy of going to the Civil Court against her termination order but that remedy was no more available to her in view of the fact that because of the pendency of the writ petition before this court, the period of limitation of filing suit before the Civil Court against her termination order came to expire. In that view of the matter, though the petitioner had alternative remedy available to her by way of suit before the Civil Court, practically, she had no alternative remedy and, therefore, we are of the opinion that on this ground alone, the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed her Special Civil Application No. 8718 of 1998. 5. It is no doubt true that the petitioner had the alternative remedy of suit before the Civil Court but because of the pendency of the petition, that remedy was no more available to the petitioner. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the writ petition of the appellant? petitioner was required to be decided on merits by the learned Single Judge instead of dismissing it on the ground of alternative remedy. In view of the above discussion, this appeal is allowed and the order dated 5th April, 2000 passed by the learned Single Judge (R.R. Tripathi, J.) in Special Civil Application No. 8718 of 1998 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge for deciding the same on merits in accordance with law. 6. Before parting, we must state that without going into the merits of the case and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, this petition is allowed and it will be open to both the learned counsel for the parties to raise all the contentions raised in this appeal as well as in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. With these observations, this appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. Civil Application is disposed of as the main appeal itself is allowed." 9. In view of the order passed by the Division Bench, the matter has come up again for fresh consideration. 10. Ms. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant would submit that gross injustice has been done with her client, who as on date is about 67 years of age. Ms. Shah submitted that the termination of her client was in violation of the Government Resolution dated 1.4.1991, which is at page 36. The said Resolution provides that an employee cannot be dismissed or terminated from service by the Panchayat without prior sanction of the District Primary Education Officer. Ms. Ms. Shah submitted that the termination of her client was in violation of the Government Resolution dated 1.4.1991, which is at page 36. The said Resolution provides that an employee cannot be dismissed or terminated from service by the Panchayat without prior sanction of the District Primary Education Officer. Ms. Shah pointed out that in fact, the District Primary Education Officer, vide his communication dated 26.2.1993, addressed to the Sarpanch of the Panchayat had directed to allow the writ-applicant to resume her services. However, the instructions issued by the District Primary Education Officer were brazenly ignored by the Panchayat. She also pointed out that once again vide communication dated 3.3.1993, the Panchayat was informed by the Taluka Development Officer that the writ-applicant be permitted to resume her services, however, such instructions were again ignored by the Panchayat. She also submitted that no adequate opportunity of hearing was given to her client before terminating her services. 11. None appears for the respondents, although this matter has been called out twice. It appears that an affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the Panchayat, inter-alia stating as under:- "16. It is submitted that the petitioner is estopped from filing the aforesaid petition in view of the facts that she failed to avail of the opportunities given to her to join duties and practically abandoned her duties without any reason or justification. The petitioner jeopardized the interest of the children and for months together the Panchayat patiently waited for her to improve. It is submitted that the petitioner did not look at the interest of the children studying in the Balmandir. It is submitted that in the circumstances, the petitioner has no right to invoke the Article 226 of the Constitution. 18. With reference to para 2 of the petition, it is denied that the petitioner was employed as a maid servant. It is submitted that the petitioner was employed as a Teacher. It is respectfully submitted that since many years the Panchayat is not getting grant for paying the salary of the petitioner and the Panchayat was managing the expenses itself. 19. It is denied that the services of the petitioner were terminated without following any procedure. It is submitted that the petitioner was given an opportunity to improve; but she hardly showed any interest in performing the duties and practically abandoned work. 19. It is denied that the services of the petitioner were terminated without following any procedure. It is submitted that the petitioner was given an opportunity to improve; but she hardly showed any interest in performing the duties and practically abandoned work. It is denied that there is any violation of principles of natural justice or violation of Articles 14, 16 or 21 of the Constitution of India. 23. With reference to para 9 and 10, it is denied that the service conditions of the petitioner have been protected as alleged or otherwise or that the Notification dated 1.4.1991 is applicable or that it gives any legal right to the petitioner or that any prior permission is required to be taken as alleged or otherwise. It is submitted that the petitioner has misconstrued the Notification dated 1.4.1991. The petitioner has also misconstrued the nature of the Notification. It is submitted that the impugned Notification is inapplicable to the facts of the case and it has no statutory and mandatory force. Our counsel will deal with the nature of the Notification at the time of hearing." 12. Having heard Ms. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Panchayat committed any error in passing the impugned order of termination from service. 13. Having perused the Government Resolution dated 1.4.1991 of the Education Department, which is at page 37 (Annexure "E"), I have no hesitation in accepting the submission of Ms. Shah that the Panchayat could not have terminated the services of the writ-applicant without prior approval and sanction of the District Primary Education Officer. This is precisely the reason why the District Primary Education Officer thought fit to inform the Panchayat vide communication dated 26.2.1993 to permit the writ-applicant to resume her services. Even the Taluka Development Officer informed the Panchayat that in view of the instructions issued by the District Primary Education Officer, the writ-applicant should be permitted to resume her services. However, it appears that the Panchayat, very high-handedly ignored such instructions and did not allow the writ-applicant to resume her services. 14. Although it is the say of the Panchayat in the reply that opportunity of hearing was given to the writ-applicant before passing the impugned order, yet it appears that the same was just an eye-wash. However, it appears that the Panchayat, very high-handedly ignored such instructions and did not allow the writ-applicant to resume her services. 14. Although it is the say of the Panchayat in the reply that opportunity of hearing was given to the writ-applicant before passing the impugned order, yet it appears that the same was just an eye-wash. The two notices which are referred to in the impugned Resolution nowhere states as to why the services of the writ-applicant should be terminated. 15. Unfortunately, this writ-application of the year 1998 is being taken up for final hearing today after almost 19 years and that too after being listed for 45 times. The writ-applicant is aged 67 as on date. In view of the above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Resolution passed by the Panchayat terminating the services of the writ-applicant deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed. 16. The only question that now remains is what relief should be granted to the writ-applicant. I am told that the writ-applicant is a widow. She has children but they have all settled in life and are residing independently. Having not worked, or rather not allowed to work from 1992 onwards, it is difficult for me to grant the relief to pay full salary for the interregnum period. I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if some lump sum amount is awarded to the applicant, in lieu of the salary payable to the applicant. The Panchay at is directed to pay an amount of Rs.4 lac (Rupees four lac only) to the writ-applicant by way of an A/c payee cheque, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.