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2016 DIGILAW 1387 (JHR)

Employers in relation to the management of Captive Power Plant of M/s. Central Coalfields Limited v. Their workmen being Represented by Shri Keshav Singh Yadav, Area Secretary, Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union

2016-09-16

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2016
JUDGMENT : APARESH KUMAR SINGH, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By the notification dated 17th April, 1999 made by the Central Government, Ministry of Labour under clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section 2(A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the following dispute was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal: “Whether 92 workmen whose names appearing in the Annexures who are engaged by Sub-Contractor of BHEL, namely, Bihar General Works for working at Kathara Captive Power Plant shall be treated as an employee of M/s. Central Coalfields Ltd.? If yes, whether their demand for regularisation in C.C.L. is justified? If yes, then what direction should be given?” It has been answered by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad by the impugned Award dated 30.08.2006 passed in Reference No. 52 of 1999 in favour of the workmen. It has held that the plea of the management of M/s. CCL that the concerned persons whose names find place in the list of workers worked in Kathara Captive Power Plant enclosed with the term of reference are not employees of the management is not correct and they should be reinstated in service and regularised in due course. The management was directed to implement the Award within 30 days from the date of publication. 3. The sponsoring Union raised an industrial dispute for regularisation of 92 workmen referred in the terms of reference on the ground that they have been working at Kathara Captive Power Plant of M/s. CCL from the year 1988 continuously to the satisfaction of the management in different permanent nature of job under the direct control and supervision of the management and their attendance was more than 240 days in each calender year. Annoyed with their demand for regularisiation and payment of wages under NCWA, they were stopped from attending duty. After their representations failed to redress the grievances they were compelled to raise the industrial dispute. 4. The management in its written statement took the plea that there was no relationship of employer-employee between M/s. CCL and the concerned persons. M/s. Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. (BHEL) was under an agreement with CCL Ltd. dated 19.01.1989 for construction of a Captive Thermal Power Station. 4. The management in its written statement took the plea that there was no relationship of employer-employee between M/s. CCL and the concerned persons. M/s. Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. (BHEL) was under an agreement with CCL Ltd. dated 19.01.1989 for construction of a Captive Thermal Power Station. As per the contract, it was required to complete design of the Captive Thermal Power Station after approval of the Company and carry out the engineering jobs for its construction. It was required to supply all equipments, materials and goods for construction, erection and all incidental jobs in connection with Captive Thermal Power Plant. It was also required to undertake testing and trial for some period after commissioning the Plant and to satisfy the CCL. Management pleaded that BHEL engaged some petty contractors for carrying on some civil construction jobs and for carrying on fabrication jobs. The contractor was required to select its own men to recruit them, to exercise control over them, to supervise their jobs and to make payment to them. They also made payments to them. The workmen of the sub-contractors were recruited by it. Therefore, there was no relationship of any employer-employee with M/s. CCL. The work was for a temporary period for construction of Power Plant at Kathara. The Management further took a plea that recruitment under CCL, a Public Sector Undertaking is as per the laid down procedure and after recruitment appointment letters are issued. For the purpose of identification, Identity Cards are also issued. Pay Slips for payments are also issued month-to-month to each and every workmen. None of these ingredients are made out by the workmen in question. 5. Two witnesses each of Management and the Workmen, were examined in support of their rival claims. The Management exhibited only one document as Exhibit-M-1 being contract agreement and workmen witness exhibited series of service documents which was marked as Exhibit-W-1 Series. The learned Tribunal took note of the Certificate of Registration of M/s. BHEL under Section 7(2) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as CLRA) dated 08.06.1988. It also took note of the ignorance of the management witness about any licence maintained by sub-contractor in terms of Section 12 of the Act of 1970. The learned Tribunal took note of the Certificate of Registration of M/s. BHEL under Section 7(2) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as CLRA) dated 08.06.1988. It also took note of the ignorance of the management witness about any licence maintained by sub-contractor in terms of Section 12 of the Act of 1970. Learned Tribunal upon consideration of Exhibit-W-1 Series came to the opinion that the workmen appeared to be working on different nature of jobs under some petty contractor at Kathara Captive Power Plant from different dates for more than two years, some of them even more than three years. It also came to the finding that before stoppage of their work, there was no notice under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act nor any mention of the compensation paid in view of retrenchment. The learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Management of M/s. CCL was duty bound as a principal employer to see that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 are complied with. No licence of petty contractor was evidenced on their behalf. On arriving with such finding of violation of provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act it concluded that M/s. CCL had wrongly terminated/retrenched these workmen from service and they are liable to reinstate them. It also came to the conclusion that since the sub-contractors were not possessing any licence, the concerned persons were deemed to be employee of management of CCL. Accordingly, the Award was rendered in favour of the workmen. 6. In the aforesaid factual matrix on record before the learned Tribunal it is to be taken note of at the outset that neither are there any pleading nor are any evidence to suggest that any prohibition Notification was issued in terms of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. It is well settled in the Judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Dena Nath and Others vs. National Fertilisers Ltd. and Others, (1992) 1 SCC 695 , para-22 thereof, that the only consequence provided in the Act where either the principal employer or the labour contractor violates the provision of Section 7 and 12 respectively is penal as envisaged under Sections 23 and 25 of the Act. The Apex Court was of the firm view that merely because the contractor or the employee has violated the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the Court could not issue any mandamus for deeming the contract labour as having become the employees of the principal employer. The learned Tribunal has in its findings also not proceeded on the lines that there was a prohibition notification barring engagement of workmen through a contractor in a nature of work which is permanent or perennial in nature by the principal employee. Had that been the case, the learned Tribunal was also under an obligation to examine the case of the parties whether such an arrangement or contract was a camouflage or ruse. If such a finding was arrived at on the basis of materials on record, it also was required to satisfy itself of the conditions enumerated under para 125 and 126 of the Judgment in the case of SAIL vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . That issue not being germane to the controversy herein, neither been delved upon by the learned Tribunal, is wholly unnecessary for this Court to go into to test the legality and propriety of the impugned Award on those lines. 7. Now independent of the aforesaid issue it is to be seen from available materials on record and pleadings of the parties before the learned industrial adjudicator whether the learned Tribunal was justified in arriving at a finding of reinstatement and regularisation of these workmen on the well settled principles of industrial jurisprudence. As has been taken note of in the preceding paragraphs one witness each were examined by the management as well as the workmen. Workmen made demand for regularisation. The reference as worded in the language referred to herein-above was for rendering an award on the question of regularisation of 92 workmen in the employment of M/s. CCL on their claim that they were engaged by sub-contractor of BHEL namely Bihar General Works who worked for Kathara Captive Power Plant. In this regard it is therefore, relevant to first refer the evidence of the only workman whose name finds in the terms of reference. He has deposed on behalf of the workmen concerned. He claims to have identified all the workmen. In this regard it is therefore, relevant to first refer the evidence of the only workman whose name finds in the terms of reference. He has deposed on behalf of the workmen concerned. He claims to have identified all the workmen. It is important to mention here that deposition of WW-1 however does not disclose that each of these 91 workmen were identified by WW-1 in the proceedings before the learned Industrial Tribunal. He has stated that he was working in Captive Power Plan, Kathara from the September, 1986 and was appointed by BHEL. He claims to have continuously worked under BHEL up to the year 1994. He further states that after handing over of the Captive Power Plant by BHEL, he worked under CCL up to September, 1996. He has further stated that workmen have continuously worked from 1994 to 1996 till they were stopped. They have attended work in each calender year for more than 240 days. He has adduced Exhibit W-1 series as Certificate of the concerned workmen which, according to him, bear signature of the officials of the CCL. In his cross examination he has accepted that CCL has not given the appointment letter. He claims ignorance on the question whether in the written statement he has stated whether they were appointed by BHEL. He also states that he has not filed any document to show that the workmen were being paid wages by CCL. He also states that it is not known to him that BHEL had engaged several petty contractors at the time of construction of Captive Power Plant. He denies that Ext. W1 are the certificates granted by the contractor. He further states that he does not know whether the certificates granted to Dinesh Rabidas, one of the workmen was granted by Bihar General Works. He further states that it is not known to him whether the other certificates have been granted by A.K. Singh, Project Manager of Bihar General Works. He has deposed that it is not a fact that all the certificates (Ext.-W-1 Series) which they have filed, have been granted by the contractor of BHEL. He has finally denied the suggestion that the workmen have never worked under CCL nor were appointed by CCL and that they were contract workers. 8. He has deposed that it is not a fact that all the certificates (Ext.-W-1 Series) which they have filed, have been granted by the contractor of BHEL. He has finally denied the suggestion that the workmen have never worked under CCL nor were appointed by CCL and that they were contract workers. 8. The Management Witness No. 1-N.K. Sinha, a Personnel Manager in Kathara Captive Plant, in his deposition has stated that work for construction of Power Plant was awarded to BHEL, an undertaking of Government of India. The entire work was going on under the management of BHEL. The CCL Management has not engaged any other contractor other than BHEL. CCL Management has not engaged any employee during construction of said Power Plant. He further stated that Power Plant has not come in operation till date. He has denied the assertion of the workmen that they were retained by the management of CCL and further stated that claim for regularisation of these workmen is not justified. In his cross examination he has pleaded ignorance about floating of any tender notice before allotment of work to M/s. BHEL. He further states that the agreement was entered into in the year 1989 and completed in the year 1993. He has also pleaded ignorance whether the Management was registered for engaging a contractor for raising captive plant and if the contractor was a licencee under Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act. He has further stated in his cross examination that no contract was entered into by the CCL with Samal, Eastern Construction Co., M/s. H.L. Ray, Raj Kumar & Brothers, Avai Builder, Bells Construction for the construction, maintenance and running of the plant. He has also stated that he cannot say that these workmen had worked there from the month of September, 1986 to September, 1996. Lastly he has stated that contention of the workmen that after completion of the Power Plant in the year 1993, they were working directly in the Management of CCL is not correct. Ext.-1 Series, which are service certificates of the workmen in question have been relied upon both by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner as well as workmen in support of their own submissions. Perusal of none of the certificates show that they have been issued by the management of M/s. CCL. Ext.-1 Series, which are service certificates of the workmen in question have been relied upon both by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner as well as workmen in support of their own submissions. Perusal of none of the certificates show that they have been issued by the management of M/s. CCL. Some of them have been issued by BHEL, some of them by Bihar General Works. Apart from that, these certificates have been issued in respect of the individual workmen by agencies such as Reunion Engineering Co. Ltd., Eastern Construction Company Ltd., M/s. H.L. Roy, Bells Controls Ltd., Larsen & Toubro Limited, Sunrise Engineering Industries, General Industrial Builders, Avni Builiders (P) Ltd., Western Enterprises, Naicker & Sons Enterprises, M/s. Rajkumar & Brothers, K.C. Samal etc. These service certificates in more or less similar terms referred to the engagement of individual workmen for different periods under the respective agencies at Captive Power Plant working at Kathara. Some of these certificates or identity cards which have been relied by learned Senior Counsel for the workmen, refer to the principal employer as M/s. CCL and their engagement at Captive Power Plant, Kathara for certain periods. These employment cards however are issued by some of these agencies like M/s. Awani Builders and neither by BHEL nor by management of CCL. M/s. BHEL has issued five certificates. The terms of reference as noted herein-above were as to whether the engagement of these 92 workmen under the sub-contractor – Bihar General Works of M/s. BHEL were entitled for regularisation in CCL. In order to establish the connection of employer – employee relationship on the part of the workmen, as per the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Hussainbhai vs. The Alath Factory Tezhilali Union and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1410 , it was indeed important to establish that the management of M/s. CCL exercised supervisory control upon these workmen and that payments of their wages were also made through them. The workmen have in their evidence have not been able to establish these facts nor led any evidence to that effect. The Industrial Tribunal has also not rendered any findings on these issues though it has come to a conclusion that the Management of M/s. CCL was the principal employer of the workmen in question. These findings of the learned Tribunal are, therefore, without any evidence in the eye of law. The Industrial Tribunal has also not rendered any findings on these issues though it has come to a conclusion that the Management of M/s. CCL was the principal employer of the workmen in question. These findings of the learned Tribunal are, therefore, without any evidence in the eye of law. 9. Learned Senior counsel for the workmen have relied upon the agreement entered into between M/s. CCL and BHEL in support of submission that it was in the nature of a service contract as well as for construction of Power Plant itself. M/s. CCL has been described as purchaser while M/s. BHEL has been described as the contractor. This nature of relationship under the agreement itself is sufficient to show that M/s. CCL had also entrusted M/s. BHEL to provide the service by engaging the workmen like the present 92 workmen towards completion of the works relating to Captive Power Plant as also for its operation. This contention of the learned Senior counsel for the workmen however dehors any evidence on record as noticed herein-above, cannot be accepted to uphold the conclusion of the learned Tribunal that there existed employer-employee relationship between these workmen and M/s. CCL as the principal employer. The workmen have also not been able to show any material on record under which their engagement by such petty contractors was through the principal employer under the terms of agreement. The number of agencies under which the workmen claim to have been engaged for different period in itself shows that they were not working under one petty contractor i.e. Bihar General Works the basis of their demand for regularisation with M/s. CCL as the principal employer. In any such claim for regularisation, certain ingredients are required to be established i.e. employer employee relationship, the continuous engagement for more than 240 days under the principal employer or under a camouflage through a petty contractor proved by cogent evidence. In the instant reference except W.W.-1 who claims to be one of the workmen, no other workmen has come forward to establish such claim. As a matter of fact, W.W.-1 in his deposition has stated that no appointment letter have been issued by M/s. CCL in favour of any of the workmen nor there are any evidence, voucher etc. of payment by M/s. CCL to any of these workmen. As a matter of fact, W.W.-1 in his deposition has stated that no appointment letter have been issued by M/s. CCL in favour of any of the workmen nor there are any evidence, voucher etc. of payment by M/s. CCL to any of these workmen. The learned Tribunal in absence of such materials on record has, therefore, definitely fallen in error to come to the finding of employer-employee relationship. It has also rendered an erroneous finding of illegal retrenchment on the part of the principal employer as being in teeth of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Its finding that M/s. CCL is liable to be treated as a principal employer as it has failed to produce any licence of the petty contractor under whom these workmen were engaged for the period shown through service certificate is also contrary to the settled position in law as held in the case of Dena Nath (Supra). As has been observed herein-above, the penalty which follow for not having registration or licence to carry out a work through a contractor is prosecution in terms of Section 23 and 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. However, in the present reference, it is case of neither parties that there was any Notification issued by the Central Government in terms of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 prohibiting the nature of work carried out by M/s. CCL through its contractor BHEL or through any of its subcontractor. The evidence and consequently the award for that matter is lacking in these vital aspect. The finding are on the face of it also cryptic. 10. Learned counsel for the workmen has endeavoured to rely upon the Judgments rendered by the Apex Court which lays down the principles under which writ court under powers of judicial review is suppose to test the legality of the findings rendered in an Award under industrial jurisprudence. Reliance has been placed on the Judgments rendered in the case of Indian Overseas Bank vs. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, 2000 (4) SCC 245 (Para 17 and 20) and Employers in Relation to the Management of Angar Pathra Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 2002 (3) JCR 398 (Jhr). Reliance has been placed on the Judgments rendered in the case of Indian Overseas Bank vs. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, 2000 (4) SCC 245 (Para 17 and 20) and Employers in Relation to the Management of Angar Pathra Colliery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 2002 (3) JCR 398 (Jhr). Reliance has also been placed on the Judgment rendered in the case of Their Workmen Represented by Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union vs. Employers in Relation to the Management of Balihari Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Another in Civil Appeal No. 3962 of 2006 (Para 7) and in the case of G.M., O.N.G.C. Shilchar vs. O.N.G.C. Contractual Workers Union, 2008 AIR SCW 3996 (Para 16, 18). Learned Sr. Counsel for the workman has submitted that the industrial adjudicator is bound to examine the real issue in the background of the language of the reference to come to a proper finding of the real controversy between management and the workmen. She has relied on the Judgment rendered in the case of Hussainbhai Calicut vs. Alath Factory Tezhilali Union, Kozhikode and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1410 , which prescribe the principles to judge the employer and employee relationship. Learned senior counsel has placed the Judgments rendered in the case of Calcutta Port Shramik Union vs. Calcutta River Transport Association and Others, 1988 (Supp) SCC 768; Sheelam Ramesh and Another vs. State of A.P. 2000 Cr. L.J. 51 (SC) : 2005 (10) SCC 792 and Bishnu Biswas and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2014 (2) JLJR 276 in support of the submission that if the finding of the industrial adjudicator are fully supported by proper appreciation of evidence, the writ court should not enter into an exercise of re-appreciation of this evidence. Even if there are two views on the basis of materials, evidence before the industrial adjudicator, the writ court would not substitute its opinion to that of industrial court. Even if there are two views on the basis of materials, evidence before the industrial adjudicator, the writ court would not substitute its opinion to that of industrial court. On the point of violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and the consequences therefrom, reliance has also been placed on the Judgment reported in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha and Another, 2015 AIR SCW 35; Range Forest Officer vs. S.T. Hadimani, 2002 (3) SCC 25 ; Workmen of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. vs. Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. 2006 (3) SCC 297 : 1978 (1) SCR 591 and Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Company Limited vs. A. Sankaralingam, 2008 (10) SCC 698 and certain other Judgments which only support the same view. Reliance has also been placed on the Judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of SAIL vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . It is submitted that the industrial adjudicator had satisfied itself in the present reference that the engagement of these workmen through a Contractor was a mere camouflage or ruse by CCL. Therefore, CCL has rightly been held to be the principal employer. Reliance has been placed on the Judgment in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. Chandigarh vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others, 1990 (3) SCC 682 : 1997 (2) PLJR 51 (SC) : 2013 (4) JBCJ 308 and other Judgments in support of the aforesaid contention. Learned counsel has also defended the impugned Award on the ground that if the deposition of one witness is sufficient in quality to make out the case of workmen, no inference should be made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the impugned Award being guided only by that consideration. Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 2000 Cr. L.J. SC 51 has also been relied upon in that regard. Learned Senior counsel for workmen has laboured to impress that certificates enclosed by the workmen as W-1 Series are sufficient proof of the fact that even after completion of the Project i.e. Captive Power Plant in the year 1993, these workmen have been continuously in engagement till 1996. L.J. SC 51 has also been relied upon in that regard. Learned Senior counsel for workmen has laboured to impress that certificates enclosed by the workmen as W-1 Series are sufficient proof of the fact that even after completion of the Project i.e. Captive Power Plant in the year 1993, these workmen have been continuously in engagement till 1996. It is only thereafter that they have been retrenched without conforming to the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act on the part of CCL. The learned Industrial Tribunal has, therefore, on consideration of the entire materials and evidence on record rightly come to the finding about the employer – employee relationship. Learned senior counsel for the workmen has also relied upon the Judgment reported in case of Bank of Baroda vs. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari, (2005) 10 SCC 792 on the principle that the onus shifts upon the employer to dispel the presumption of employer-employee relationship once the workman has been able to show continuous engagement for more than 240 days or more in a calender year. 11. The legal points and precedents urged in support have been considered by this Court with due relevance to the facts of the present case. This Court is conscious of the contour within which the findings of the learned Industrial Court are subject to judicial review. It goes without saying that in any industrial adjudication the industrial adjudicator which is a creature of statute is required to answer the reference in terms whereof the industrial dispute has been raised. It has been already noticed hereinabove that reference raised was in respect of regularisation on the ground of engagement of 92 workmen under sub- contractor of M/s. BHEL namely Bihar General Works. The workmen, however, have proceeded to establish their case on the basis of their engagement with several other such petty contractors which were never covered under the terms of reference. The findings of the Learned Tribunal have completely failed to take notice of such a vital lacunae in the case set up by the workmen seeking regularisation under principal employer-CCL. 12. As observed in the foregoing paras, the learned Tribunal has also failed to base its conclusion on any cogent evidence at all so far as the question of employer-employee relationship of these 92 workmen with M/s. CCL is concerned. 12. As observed in the foregoing paras, the learned Tribunal has also failed to base its conclusion on any cogent evidence at all so far as the question of employer-employee relationship of these 92 workmen with M/s. CCL is concerned. The direction of the learned Tribunal for regularisation suffers from serious error of law and is in teeth of ratio rendered by Apex Court in the case of M/s. Dena Nath and Others vs. National Fertilizer Ltd. (1992) 1 SCC 695 , para-22 as it has held that M/s. CCL should be treated as the principal employer on account of fact that it has failed to produce any contractor licence issued under Section 12 of the Act of 1970. These findings, therefore, are such which go to the root of the matter. Therefore, the Judgment relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel for the workmen do not come to the aid of the work in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above. An industrial adjudicator while answering the reference was required to pose the correct question and answer them accordingly. A writ of certiorari in such circumstances is therefore wholly warranted. It is profitable to quote the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64 : AIR 1964 SC 477 on the nature and scope of writ of certiorari. “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, Nagandra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh. 8. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, Nagandra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam and Kaushalya Devi vs. Bachittar Singh. 8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.” 13. This Court on consideration of cumulative facts, discussion and reasons recorded herein-above, is of the firm view that the impugned award suffers from serious error of law and on facts. The findings of employer-employee relationship in fact are based on no evidence in the eye of law. In that sense, the Award suffers from perversity also. The impugned award in such circumstances cannot be upheld in the eye of law. Accordingly, the Award dated 30.08.2006 passed in Reference No. 52 of 1999 by Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad is quashed. 14. This writ petition is accordingly allowed.