Reba Das v. Court of Special Judge (Ayurved Scam Matter)
2016-04-13
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J. – Heard Shri Sharad Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Desh Mitra Anand, learned counsel for respondent no. 3. 2. This petition challenges the judgment and order dated 24.01.2011, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lucknow, whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent no. 3 against the order dated 19.03.2010, passed by the prescribed authority, under Section 21(1) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ' the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972') allowing the application moved by the petitioner and releasing the premises in question, has been set aside. 3. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 29.05.2012, passed on a Review Petition preferred by her for reviewing the order dated 24.01.2011. 4. The facts, which can be deduced from the pleadings available on record, are that the petitioner, who is the landlady, filed an application under Section 21 (1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 praying therein that the premises in question be released in her favour and respondent no. 3, who is a tenant, be evicted on the ground that the premises in question is bona fide required. In the said application, it was, inter alia stated by the petitioner that she is the landlady of House No. 592/73, Bangali Tola, Kharika, Telibagh, P.S.-Cantt., Lucknow, which was rented to the respondent no. 3 for a rent of Rs. 850/- per month. It was also stated by the petitioner in the said application that the petitioner's elder son (Kamlendu Das) got married on 24.11.2008 and as such on account of increase in size of the family, the space/accommodation available for use of the landlady is not sufficient and is creating problem. The said application also disclosed that the petitioner sent a notice to the respondent no. 3 on 12.01.2009 through her counsel for vacating the premises in question, however, no reply to the said notice was given to her. The petitioner has also disclosed that in her family, apart from her, her husband, two sons, namely, Kamlendu Das and Shyamlednu Das, one daughter, namely, Phalguni Talukedar and her daughter-in-law, namely, Mrs. Somadas, W/o Kamlendu Das, are living and further that her husband is a retired army personnel.
The petitioner has also disclosed that in her family, apart from her, her husband, two sons, namely, Kamlendu Das and Shyamlednu Das, one daughter, namely, Phalguni Talukedar and her daughter-in-law, namely, Mrs. Somadas, W/o Kamlendu Das, are living and further that her husband is a retired army personnel. In the application it was also stated that bona fide need for more accommodation to the family of the petitioner has arisen on account of marriage of her elder son and also on account of the fact that her daughter, namely Phalguni Das is also married and she quite often comes back to her parental house and resides with the family. It was also disclosed by the petitioner that except House No. 592/73, Bangali Tola, Kharika Telibagh, P.S. Cantt, Lucknow, the premises in question, she does not have any other house and hence on account of the fact that she is in bona fide need for more accommodation for accommodating the family members, the application moved by her under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 be allowed. 5. The respondent filed a written statement stating inter alia that the petitioner had wrongly stated in the application that she had only one house. It was further stated by the respondent no. 3 in his written statement that there are three houses other than House No. 592/73, Bangali Tola, Kharika Telibagh, Police Station-Cantt, Lucknow. In para 14 of the written statement under the heading of Additional Pleas, it was stated by the respondent no. 3 that, apart from House No. 592/73, Bangali Tola, Kharika Telibagh, Lucknow, the petitioner has another house bearing House No. 163 in 592/3-B, Gopal Nagar. In addition to the said house, as was averred by the respondent no. 3 in the written statement, the petitioner has two other houses, namely, House No. 592/18 situate in Bangali Tola, Lucknow and House No. 592/235 situate in the same locality of Bangali Tola. 6. Both the parties led their evidences and learned prescribed authority allowed the application moved by the petitioner by means of the judgment and order dated 19.03.2010, whereby the premises in question was released in favour of the petitioner and respondent no. 3 was directed to vacate the premises in question within thirty days and hand over the peaceful possession of the same to the petitioner. 7.
3 was directed to vacate the premises in question within thirty days and hand over the peaceful possession of the same to the petitioner. 7. Aggrieved by the said order dated 19.03.2010, an appeal was preferred by the respondent no. 3 before the appellate authority under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The appellate court/authority by means of the impugned judgment and order dated 24.01.2011 allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the prescribed authority dated 19.03.2010. The petitioner thereafter appears to have preferred a review petition before the appellate court, which too, has been dismissed by means of the order dated 29.05.2012. It is these two orders dated 29.05.2012 and 24.01.2011, passed by the learned appellate court below, which are under challenge before this Court in these proceedings. 8. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner while impeaching the judgment and order passed by the appellate court dated 24.01.2011 is that the findings recorded by the appellate court whereby the findings expressed by the learned prescribed authority has been reversed, is absolutely erroneous. He has also stated that no cogent reasons have been assigned by the appellate court while reversing the findings recorded by the prescribed authority, wherein on the basis of evidence available on record, it has categorically been held by the prescribed authority that the petitioner is in bona fide need of the premises in question. He has also contended that the alleged flaw as found by the appellate court in the judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority to the effect that the learned prescribed authority ought to have calculated and assessed the accommodation available in other two houses lying with the landlady is not sustainable for the simple reason that, in fact, the other two houses which find mentioned in the order of the appellate court do not belong to the petitioner which is abundantly clear from a perusal of Annexure No. 11 filed with this petition which is a document containing reply given by the Public Information Officer, Lucknow Nagar Nigam, which indicates that House No. 592/18 situate in Bangali Tola, Kharika Telibagh, Lucknow is recorded in the name of one Shri D.K. Singh, whereas the other house, namely, House No. 592/3-B/163 situate at Gopal Nagar, Kharika, Lucknow is recorded in the name of one Shri Rameshwar.
His submission, in such a situation, is that the very basis of the appellate court's verdict, whereby the matter has been remanded to the learned prescribed authority, being non-existent, hence, the impugned order passed by the appellate court cannot be permitted to be sustained. 9. Per contra, Shri Desh Mitra Anand, learned counsel representing the respondent no. 3 has submitted that the petitioner moved the application under Section 21 (1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 not only on account of bona fide need but also for mala fide reasons she wants to evict the respondent no. 3. He has also attempted to defend the consideration made by the learned appellate court to the effect that need of respondent no. 3 is more than the petitioner, who has three houses and that she is living comfortably with her two sons. Shri Anand has thereafter submitted that the learned appellate court has considered the comparative hardships of the landlady vis-a-vis the tenant in an appropriate manner and that the order does not require to any interference. His last submission is that since the matter has been remanded by the appellate court to the prescribed authority, the petitioner will again have ample opportunity to put forth her case before the prescribed authority and as such any interference by this Court in the order passed by the appellate court would not be warranted. 10. I have considered the arguments submitted by the learned counsel representing the respective parties. 11. Submission of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner primarily is in respect of the observations made by the appellate court regarding two houses allegedly owned by the landlady, namely, (i) House No. 592/18, Bangali Tola, Kharika Telibagh, Lucknow, and (ii) House No. 592/3-B/163, Gopal Nagar, Kharika. His submission is that both these two houses do not belong to the petitioner, neither the same are in use or occupation either of her or her other family members. 12. In fact, the very basis of the order passed by the appellate court remanding the matter to the prescribed authority for consideration of the application under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is the alleged availability of these two houses for use and occupation of the landlady and her family members.
12. In fact, the very basis of the order passed by the appellate court remanding the matter to the prescribed authority for consideration of the application under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is the alleged availability of these two houses for use and occupation of the landlady and her family members. The appellate authority has also taken into account that House No. 592/235 situate in Bangali Tola, Lucknow is also in occupation of the family of the petitioner which is owned by her husband, hence, without calculation of the total accommodation available in all these four houses for use and occupation of the entire family members of the petitioner, the prescribed authority has passed the order for releasing which cannot be permitted. It is to be noticed that the prescribed authority in its judgment and order dated 19.03.2010 has recorded a categorical finding that petitioner's elder son was married in the year 2008 and apart from other members, petitioner's daughter-in-law has also come to reside in the premises. The finding recorded by the prescribed authority is also to the effect that on account of the marriage of the elder son of the petitioner, the family size is bound to increase and hence the petitioner needs the premises in question bona fide. The aforesaid finding recorded by the prescribed authority has not been upset by the learned appellate court below. The learned appellate court has proceeded on the basic premise of the alleged non-calculation of the total accommodation which may be available to the petitioner and her family comprising of four houses, namely, (i) house in question in this case that is House No. 592/73 (ii) House No. 592/18 (iii) House No. 592/3- B/163 and (iv) House No. 592/235. 13. So far as House No. 592/18 situate in Bangali Tota, Lucknow is concerned, admittedly, as per the information provided to the petitioner under Right to Information Act by the Public Information Officer of Lucknow Nagar Nigam, the same is recorded in the name of one Shri D.K. Singh and not in the name of the petitioner and similarly as per the said information given to the petitioner by the Public Information Officer on 11.04.2011, the other house, namely, House No. 592/3-B/163 situate at Gopal Nagar, Kharika, Lucknow also does not belong to the petitioner and the same is recorded in the name of one Shri Rameshwar.
In respect of the fourth house, namely, house no. 592/235, there is no dispute that the same is recorded in the name of the husband of the petitioner-landlady. It is also noticeable that the contentions made in respect of the information supplied to the petitioner under Right to Information Act by the Public Information Officer, Lucknow Nagar Nigam, vide his letter dated 11.04.2011 has not been denied by the respondent no. 3 in the counter affidavit filed in these proceedings before this Court. What has been stated by the respondent no. 3 in respect of the averments made in para 22 of the writ petition, which mentions the reply given to the petitioner under Right to Information Act by means of the letter dated 11.04.2011, is that the petitioner has given references of only two houses whereas as per the information available to the respondent no. 3, there are some more houses and that the respondent no. 3 has filed some application under Right to Information Act where the reply is still awaited. The said affidavit was filed on 16.01.2015, however, no documents since then has been filed by the respondent no. 3 before this Court. Controverting the information available in the letter dated 11.04.2011 written by the Public Information Officer, Lucknow Nagar Nigam to one Shri Sushil Kumar Das in his response to his application made under the Right to Information Act. 14. There is no denial of the fact that the petitioner's elder son was married in the year 2008 and further that he along with his wife i.e. daughter-in-law are residing in the same premises. No pleadings were put forth by the respondent no. 3 before the courts below that both the sons of the petitioner along with other family members are residing elsewhere. The findings recorded by the learned prescribed authority in respect of the factum of marriage of the elder son of the petitioner and the possibility of family getting increased in size which will require more accommodation has not been upset by the appellate court.
The findings recorded by the learned prescribed authority in respect of the factum of marriage of the elder son of the petitioner and the possibility of family getting increased in size which will require more accommodation has not been upset by the appellate court. In respect of the very basic premises of the judgment passed by the appellate authority based on alleged availability of other accommodations, a detailed discussion has already been made above in this judgment wherein it has been held that the two other houses, namely, House No. 592/18 and 592/3-B/163 are not available to the petitioner or her family members for their use, neither the same are recorded in her name. In respect of the house recorded in the name of the husband of the petitioner, namely, House No. 592/235, it may only be observed that in absence of any pleading by the respondent no. 3 before the courts below that the said accommodation is available for the use of family members of the petitioner, nothing needs to be indicated herein. 15. After marriage of petitioner's son, it was for the petitioner landlady to decide in what manner she and her family members would be living. This Court in this case ofMadhu Garg & others v. Smt. Sumitra Devi, reported in [ 2015 (1) ARC 750 ], has quoted the earlier judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.C. Tamrakar v. Nidi Lekha, reported in [ AIR 2001 SC 3806 ], wherein it has clearly been held that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. 16. In the instant case, admittedly, petitioner's son has been married in the year 2008 and petitioner's daughter-in-law also resides in the same accommodation with them. After marriage the family size is likely to increase which will require more accommodation. Further, after the marriage of petitioner's elder son, a new relationship has developed with her in-laws. The needs of the newly wedded couple would increase and there cannot be any denial that more accommodation will be needed after the marriage, as her relations and friends and also the members of the family of the daughter-in-law are likely to regularly visit and come to the premises in question.
The needs of the newly wedded couple would increase and there cannot be any denial that more accommodation will be needed after the marriage, as her relations and friends and also the members of the family of the daughter-in-law are likely to regularly visit and come to the premises in question. In these circumstances, so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the need as pleaded by the petitioner is bona fide regarding which this Court does not have any doubt. 17. In respect of the other two houses, a clear finding has been recorded above that both houses are not available for use of the petitioner hence the terms of the remand order passed by the appellate court on 24.01.2011 will only lead to a futile exercise. 18. At this juncture, it may also be noticed that in a suit filed by respondent no. 3 seeking permanent injunction against the petitioner in respect of the same premises which is the subject matter of the present proceedings, a statement was made by respondent no. 3, wherein he himself has stated/admitted that landlady-Smt. Reba Das, W/o Sushil Kumar Das, has only one house. He has further stated in his deposition that her husband Sushil Kumar Das owned only one house bearing house No. 592/235ka and house number of the house owned by the petitioner Smt. Reba Das is 592/73. In the said statement made during his cross-examination, the respondent no. 3 has also stated that apart from these two houses the petitioner does not own any other house. 19. For the reasons disclosed above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The judgment and orders dated 24.01.2011, passed by the appellate court in Rent Appeal No. 21/2010 (Jandail Singh v. Smt. Reba Das), under Section 22 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the order dated 29.05.2012, passed in review petition by the appellate court below, are set aside. 21. The respondent no. 3 will vacate the premises in question and hand over the peaceful possession to the petitioner within a period of four months from today. He shall also pay entire rent which may be due against him. Any defiance or disobedience of this order may render the respondent no. 3 liable for Contempt of this Court. 22.
21. The respondent no. 3 will vacate the premises in question and hand over the peaceful possession to the petitioner within a period of four months from today. He shall also pay entire rent which may be due against him. Any defiance or disobedience of this order may render the respondent no. 3 liable for Contempt of this Court. 22. It is further provided that during these four months period, it will be open to the respondent no. 3 to apply for electricity connection and petitioner will have no objection if the electricity connection at the expenses to be borne by respondent no. 3 is provided by the appropriate authority of the U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. 23. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.