JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. The challenge in this petition under Article-226 of the Constitution of India, is to the impugned orders dated 13.01.2006, passed by respondent No. 2, the order of penalty dated 31.08.2007, passed by respondent No. 1 and the order dated 13.10.2010/16.10.2010, passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal ("the Tribunal", for short), in Appeal No. 276/2007, whereby the order of penalty dated 31.08.2007 has been confirmed. 2. The factual background in which the petition has been filed is as below. 2.1. The petitioner was appointed as Accountant on 19.09.1989 in the time scale of Rs. 1200-2040, in the office of the Chief Conservator of Forests, Vadodara. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Head Clerk by an order dated 21.08.2010. It is stated in the petition that during the entire span of his career, no complaint has been received against the petitioner and his service career is without blemish. The petitioner was promoted to the next higher post by an order dated 21.08.2010. It is the case of the petitioner that for the purpose of construction/addition and alteration of his house, he applied for the withdrawal of an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- from his General Provident Fund (GPF) Account on 07.04.2003, asserting that he has a credit of Rs. 1,15,000/-. As a special case, the petitioner was accorded sanction for the withdrawal of Rs. 1,00,000/- from his GPF Account, by an order dated 17.04.2003. After the sanction order was passed by the Competent Authority, it was discovered by the concerned Clerk that there was an alteration in the amount of credit in the GPF Account of the petitioner from Rs. 1,15,000/- to Rs. 1,45,000/-. An inquiry was conducted into the matter. The petitioner rendered his explanation. By an order dated 22.07.2004, the Disciplinary Authority awarded a minor punishment to the petitioner, namely, the stoppage of one increment for three months. This punishment has been implemented and executed. After about eighteen months, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 13.01.2006, whereby the order dated 22.07.2004, inflicting minor punishment upon the petitioner was cancelled. The very same Disciplinary Authority then proceeded to issue a charge-sheet dated 25.01.2006 to the petitioner on the very same charges that the petitioner had faced earlier. This punishment has been implemented and executed. After about eighteen months, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 13.01.2006, whereby the order dated 22.07.2004, inflicting minor punishment upon the petitioner was cancelled. The very same Disciplinary Authority then proceeded to issue a charge-sheet dated 25.01.2006 to the petitioner on the very same charges that the petitioner had faced earlier. A departmental inquiry ensued and, ultimately, by the impugned order dated 31.08.2007, the Disciplinary Authority inflicted the punishment of reduction in salary by two stages for a period of two years with future effect, upon the petitioner. The petitioner challenged the order of penalty before the Tribunal, which has dismissed his appeal by the impugned order dated 13.10.2010/16.10.2010. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition. 3. Mr. D.A. Bambhania, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that, though there are several grounds on which the impugned order can be challenged, however, at this stage, the main ground being canvassed is that once the Disciplinary Authority has passed an order inflicting a minor punishment upon the petitioner on 22.07.2004, the very same Disciplinary Authority is not empowered to review his own order and cancel the same, that too without issuing notice to the petitioner. It is further submitted that as per Rule-23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 ("the Discipline and Appeal Rules", for short), the power of review vests only in the Appellate Authority and can be exercised within a period of six months from the date of the passing of the order but not later. In the present case, the Appellate Authority has not passed the order of review, but such power has been exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, which is not empowered by the Rules to exercise the power of review of its own order and that too after a period of eighteen months. It is further submitted that the actual effect of the order of penalty imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to the second round of proceedings, has been given on 17.05.2010, after a period of six years. 3.1. To buttress his submissions, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. 3.1. To buttress his submissions, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Kanhu Charan Majhi, reported in 2014 (2) SLR 664 (S.C.), wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with Rule-32 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962, which is pari materia to Rule-23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. It is submitted that, as the Disciplinary Authority has acted beyond the jurisdiction vested in him under Rule-23 and the proceedings thus initiated by him are dehors the said Rules, the said proceedings may be quashed and set aside. 3.2. It is further submitted that before the Tribunal as well, this aspect was pleaded by the petitioner. The Tribunal, in its impugned order, has not given any finding in this regard, but has merely glossed over the issue, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal may be set aside. 4. The petition has been strongly opposed by Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader, by submitting that though by virtue of Rule-23, the power of review is vested in the Appellate Authority. It deserves to be considered that the Vigilance Commissioner, vide his letter dated 30.11.2005, had directed the respondent to reinvestigate the case and had recommended major punishment as per Rules-9 and 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Accordingly, the order dated 22.07.2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority came to be cancelled and a fresh charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner, which culminated into a de-novo inquiry and the impugned order of penalty. It is submitted that the award of punishment is administrative in nature and looking to the gravity of the offence, the Higher Authority had reason to believe that the punishment earlier inflicted was insufficient. The Disciplinary Authority, therefore, has the right to review the case under Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. 4.1. It is further submitted that since the earlier order has been cancelled, the impugned order has been passed in a de-novo inquiry and therefore, Rule-23 would not be applicable. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition, the contents of the impugned orders and other documents on record. 6. 4.1. It is further submitted that since the earlier order has been cancelled, the impugned order has been passed in a de-novo inquiry and therefore, Rule-23 would not be applicable. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition, the contents of the impugned orders and other documents on record. 6. At the very outset, it would be pertinent to advert to Rule-23 of the Disciple and Appeal Rules, which reads as below: "23. Review of orders in disciplinary cases: The authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 6 lies may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the record of any proceeding under these rules and review any order passed in such a case and, may, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, pass such order as it deems fit as if the Government servant had preferred an appeal against such order; Provided that no action under this rule shall be taken after the expiry of a period of more than six months from the date of such order." 7. A perusal of the said rule makes it very clear that it is only the Appellate Authority before whom an appeal imposing an order of penalty specified in Rule-6 lies, that is empowered to call for the record and proceedings of the case and review the order passed in such case either suo motu or otherwise. The proviso to this rule clearly stipulates in mandatory language that no action under the "rule shall be taken after the expiry of a period of six months from the date of such order. 8. Insofar as the applicability of the proviso to Rule-23 to the case of the petitioner is concerned, it may be seen that the earlier order dated 22.04.2007, imposing the minor penalty upon the petitioner, was passed by the Disciplinary Authority. If the Appellate Authority was of the view that the penalty was insufficient, it was open to it to call for the record and proceedings and pass an appropriate order in exercise of the power under Rule-23. Only the Appellate Authority could have exercised such power and it was not for the Disciplinary Authority to have passed the order cancelling the earlier order. Only the Appellate Authority could have exercised such power and it was not for the Disciplinary Authority to have passed the order cancelling the earlier order. This power could only be exercised by the Appellate Authority and that too within a period of six months from the date of the passing of the order, not thereafter. A time limit has specifically been provided in the proviso to Rule-23 which has to be followed. 9. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority has itself reviewed its own order by cancelling the earlier order dated 22.04.2007, vide the impugned order dated 13.01.2006. Such procedure is unwarranted and alien to Rule-23. In effect, the Disciplinary Authority has exercised the power vested in the Appellate Authority. This amounts to usurpation of such power and is not permissible in law. Even the Appellate Authority could not have reviewed the order after a lapse of more than six months. In the present case, the order has been reviewed after a period of eighteen months and its effect given after six years on 17.05.2010. 10. In this context, it would be fruitful to refer to the judgment in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Kanhu Charan Majhi (supra), wherein Rule-32 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962 was in issue. This rule has been reproduced in the judgment and is found to be pari materia with Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules under consideration. The relevant extract of the judgment is as below: "15. So far as the exercise of power under Rule 32 of the Rules is concerned, it is very clear from the proviso to the Rule that no action can be taken under the said Rule after more than six months from the date on which the order to be reviewed was passed. By virtue of the order dated 4th September, 2000, the order dated 16th October, 1995 had been taken into review and as it was taken into review after more than six months, the order would be bad if it was passed under Rule 32 of the Rules. Thus, initiation of proceedings in pursuance of order dated 4th September, 2000 was bad and rightly held so by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. 16. Thus, initiation of proceedings in pursuance of order dated 4th September, 2000 was bad and rightly held so by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. 16. Upon perusal of both the aforestated Rules, it is clear that an order, passed by the Government Authorities, can be reviewed. So far as Rule 32 of the Rules is concerned, in a disciplinary case the Appellate Authority can review the order but the Authority can review the order within six months from the date of passing of that order and thereafter the order cannot be reviewed as specified in the proviso to Rule 32 of the Rules." 11. In light of Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules and the judgment of the Supreme Court, this Court finds that the action of the Disciplinary Authority in reviewing its own order beyond a period of six months, definitely falls foul of Rule-23 and the proviso. Even though a submission was made in this regard before the Tribunal, it has failed to address this aspect which goes to the very root of the matter. 12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that the cancellation of the earlier order of penalty dated 22.04.2007, by the impugned order dated 13.01.2006 and the issuance of a fresh charge-sheet, amounts to the initiation of de-novo proceedings. The question is not whether the respondents are precluded from initiating de-novo proceedings, or not. The issue hinges on the question regarding which authority has the power to review the order and/or initiate fresh proceedings. In the present case, if the Appellate Authority was of the view, based on the letter of the Vigilance Commissioner, that the earlier order imposing minor penalty was insufficient, it could have reviewed the order within the prescribed time limit and thereafter taken appropriate action in accordance with law. However, the Appellate Authority has done no such thing. Instead, the Disciplinary Authority, which is the author of the order imposing minor penalty, has itself reviewed its own order and cancelled it much after the permissible time limit. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded to issue a fresh charge-sheet. The manner in which the power under Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules has been exercised by the Disciplinary Authority is absolutely contrary to the said Rule and the proviso. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority has proceeded to issue a fresh charge-sheet. The manner in which the power under Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules has been exercised by the Disciplinary Authority is absolutely contrary to the said Rule and the proviso. The Disciplinary Authority has acted beyond its jurisdiction and all such action that is taken without jurisdiction is null and void and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 13. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has attempted to submit that the present case is one of a de-novo inquiry and Rule-23 is not applicable. This submission is contradictory to the earlier submission to the effect that the awarding of penalty is administrative in nature and looking to the gravity of the case, if the Higher Authority has reason to believe that the punishment is insufficient, the Disciplinary Authority has a right to review the case under Rule-23 of the Rules. This stand has also been taken in paragraph-11 of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents. On one hand, a stand is taken that the Disciplinary Authority has a right to review the case under Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, which stand is, itself in conflict with the Rule, and on the other hand a stand is taken that Rule-23 is not applicable. Such contradictory stands are untenable and do not take the case of the respondents any further. Nowhere has the stand been taken in the affidavit-in-reply that it is a de-novo inquiry. Even assuming that was the intention, nothing prevented the respondents from acting in accordance with the provisions of Rule-23 and the proviso. The power vested in the Appellate Authority cannot be exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, as has been done in the present case. 14. Considering the matter from every possible angle in light of Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, this Court arrives at the inescapable conclusion that the action of the Disciplinary Authority in reviewing its earlier order and conducting a fresh inquiry, thereafter, is unsustainable in law. All consequential action, therefore, also stands vitiated. 15. 14. Considering the matter from every possible angle in light of Rule-23 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, this Court arrives at the inescapable conclusion that the action of the Disciplinary Authority in reviewing its earlier order and conducting a fresh inquiry, thereafter, is unsustainable in law. All consequential action, therefore, also stands vitiated. 15. In light of the above discussion and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the following order is passed: The order dated 13.01.2006, passed by respondent No. 2-Disciplinary Authority, the impugned order of penalty dated 31.08.2007, passed by respondent No. 1 as well as the order dated 13.10.2010/16.10.2010, passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal in Appeal No. 276/2007, are hereby quashed and set aside. 16. The petition is allowed, in the above terms. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs.