ORDER : 1. Petitioner Kailash, a seeker of justice, in the instant misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has prayed for besetting impugned order (No.261-265) dated 20th of February 2016, passed by Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural, Jodhpur, as well as order dated 28th of April 2016 to the extent it has shown petitioner as history-sheeter. 2. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this petition, as depicted by the petitioner, are that he is a resident of Shergarh and by occupation an agriculturist. In the year 2010, he was elected as Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Bhateliya Purohitan and was succeeded by his father as Sarpanch in the year 2013 and thereafter in the year 2015 his wife was elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. Projecting his social profile as law abiding citizen, petitioner has pleaded in the petition that he was never involved in any anti social activities but for some criminal cases which were falsely foisted against him out of political vengeance and vendetta. While referring to the criminal cases, registered against him, petitioner has submitted in the petition that in almost 15-16 cases he has either been acquitted or discharged by a competent criminal Court. 3. In the petition, essentially, for ventilating his grievances against impugned action, petitioner has referred to Rajasthan Police Rules 1965 (for short, ‘Rules of 1965’) and Rajasthan Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 2006 (for short, ‘Act of 2006’). Assailing the impugned action of the respondents for entering his name in surveillance register No.8 and preparation of history-sheet/opening of history-sheet qua him, it is pleaded with full emphasis by the petitioner that said entry and action is dehors the provisions of Rule 4.4, 4.08 and 4.9 of the Rules of 1965. Positive assertion of the petitioner is that none of the impugned actions of the respondents are satisfying the requirements envisaged under the aforesaid Rules of 1965. An affirmative attempt is also made by the petitioner to assert that pursuant to FIR No.19 of 2016 a false case is foisted against him for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 448, 120-B IPC. It is categorically averred by the petitioner that although his name did not figure in the FIR but the respondents have falsely implicated him for initiating coercive action under the Act of 2006 solely on the basis of some call details. It is categorically averred by the petitioner that although his name did not figure in the FIR but the respondents have falsely implicated him for initiating coercive action under the Act of 2006 solely on the basis of some call details. In substance, petitioner has set out a case that the respondents sans any incriminating action of preventive detention by him have acted in clear derogation of provisions of the Act of 2006 as well as Rules of 1965. Petitioner has also asserted that under the Right to Information Act he made endeavour to obtain requisite information about preparation/opening of history-sheet against him but his that effort proved abortive inasmuch as Addl. Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural, Jodhpur declined to divulge any information to him in this behalf. It is also submitted by the petitioner that on inquiry it was revealed that history-sheet was opened against him at Police Station Balesar in clear negation of the Rules of 1965. With a view to assail the impugned action of respondents, petitioner has pleaded that the same has violated his fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. A ground is also set out to challenge the impugned action by urging that any action initiated under the Act of 2006, based on subjective satisfaction of the State Government, pre-supposes availability of cogent material for arriving at a conclusion that action of an individual is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Reference is also made in the penultimate paragraph of the petition that history-sheet, which was opened earlier at Police Station Balesar, has been transferred to Deputy Commissioner of Police (West), Jodhpur in an arbitrary and perfunctory manner and on that count alone the same merits annulment. 4. Respondents in their return have stoutly defended the impugned action. It is submitted in the reply that history-sheet against the petitioner was opened on 8th of December 2006 in strict adherence of the Rules of 1965 and therefore challenge thrown to the same by the petitioner after a lapse a decade is not sustainable. 4. Respondents in their return have stoutly defended the impugned action. It is submitted in the reply that history-sheet against the petitioner was opened on 8th of December 2006 in strict adherence of the Rules of 1965 and therefore challenge thrown to the same by the petitioner after a lapse a decade is not sustainable. Asserting with full emphasis in the return that since long petitioner is having his permanent abode at House No. 167, Mansarovar Nagar, Chopasani Housing Board, Jodhpur, which is falling within the jurisdiction of Police Station Chopasani Housing Board, respondents have pleaded that an administrative decision was rightly taken to transfer his history-sheet to Police Commissionerate, Jodhpur. Highlighting criminal activities and nefarious designs of the petitioner in perpetuation since long in entire Jodhpur, which include Jodhpur Rural and Jodhpur Metro, the respondents have submitted in their counter that all these activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Defending their action of preparation/opening of history-sheet against the petitioner, respondents have submitted in their reply that its object is to keep vigil over the criminal activities of the petitioner. The respondents have specifically pleaded that criminal antecedents of the petitioner are serious impediment in maintenance of public order inasmuch he was involved in serious offences like attempt to murder, dacoity, smuggling of contraband, demand of ransom, participation in unlawful assemblies and house trespass etc. It is further submitted that all these criminal activities of petitioner are in perpetuation and the same has necessitated opening of his history-sheet under the Act of 1965. 5. Quoting a recent incident wherein petitioner has illegally and unauthorizedly occupied one residential house of a widow situated in Chopasani Housing Board area, Jodhpur, the respondents have averred in the reply that in that connection pursuant to FIR No. 19/2016 under Section 420, 467, 448, 120-B IPC, after investigation charge-sheet has been filed against him before a competent Court. As per the respondents, out of 33 criminal cases registered against the petitioner, 16 are registered at various police stations falling within the jurisdiction of Police Commissionerate, Jodhpur and that being so, it became imperative in administrative exigency to transfer his history-sheet to Police Commissionerate, Jodhpur. While referring to the powers to transfer history-sheet, it is specifically pleaded in the return that Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural is competent authority to affect such transfer. 6. While referring to the powers to transfer history-sheet, it is specifically pleaded in the return that Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural is competent authority to affect such transfer. 6. Joining issue with the petitioner, in his pursuit to invoke inherent powers of this Court, the respondents have submitted in the reply that in want of proof for abuse of the process of Court, no interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is warranted. While referring to the checkered history of the petitioner, it is pleaded in the return that petitioner is involved in criminal activities affecting the public order unabatedly since last more than a decade i.e. from the year 2003. Taking a dig at tall claims of the petitioner that he has been acquitted in many cases, it is submitted by the respondents that acquittal in these cases was not honorable and in most of the cases it was handed down by the Court as a consequence of his compromise with the complainant. Refuting the allegation that false cases are lodged against the petitioner out of political vengeance, respondents have pleaded that all these insinuations against the respondents are hurled by the petitioner to camouflage his criminal activities and mislead the Court. With reference to the provisions of the Act of 2006, the respondents have submitted in their reply that the same are not attracted in the present case. 7. In substance, the respondents while defending their impugned action have submitted that for preparation of history-sheet against the petitioner there was cogent material and the said history-sheet is in vogue since 2006. It is also submitted in the return that opening of history-sheet against the petitioner is in strict adherence of the provisions of the Rules of 1965 and therefore no interference in the matter is warranted. 8. Mr. Mahesh Bora, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S.P. Joshi, has strenuously urged that the impugned action of the respondents is per se arbitrary and unreasonable inasmuch as it is dehors Rule 4.4, 4.7 and 4.8 of the Rules of 1965. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that impugned action of the respondents is in gross violation of Rule 4.9 of the Rules of 1965 and therefore it is a glaring example of abuse of the process of the Court. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that impugned action of the respondents is in gross violation of Rule 4.9 of the Rules of 1965 and therefore it is a glaring example of abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that in most of the cases petitioner has been acquitted and in the criminal jurisprudence there is no distinction between honorable acquittal and acquittal by extending benefit of doubt, which ought to have been properly construed by the respondents before initiating impugned action. Learned counsel has also urged that sans requirements envisaged under Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965 opening of history-sheet against the petitioner under Rule 4.9 of the Rules of 1965 is clearly vitiated in law and when the action of the respondents is dehors the law at its very inception, transfer of the history-sheet, on the face of it, is vulnerable. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner has also assailed the impugned action on the anvil of it being violative of freedom of life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. For substantiating his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on following legal precedents: Ramgopal Jain Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2013Cri.L.J.3160). K. Suresh Babu Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Anantapur District and Ors. ( 2015 6 ALT 556 ), decided on 24.08.2015. Omprakash Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.399/2013, decided on 22.08.2013) Sohanlal Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.588/2014, decided on 08.01.2015) Sohanlal Vaishnav Vs. State & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2548/2013, decided on 11.12.2011) Harsukh Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1618/2006, decided on 24.11.2008). Haji Menu Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.1956/2012, decided on 01.03.2013). 9. Per contra, Mr. S.K. Vyas, learned Addl. Advocate General, with Mr. V.S. Rajpurohit, learned Public Prosecutor, has vehemently argued that opening of history-sheet against the petitioner is in consonance and conformity with the Rules of 1965 and therefore no interference with the impugned action of the respondents is warranted in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. 9. Per contra, Mr. S.K. Vyas, learned Addl. Advocate General, with Mr. V.S. Rajpurohit, learned Public Prosecutor, has vehemently argued that opening of history-sheet against the petitioner is in consonance and conformity with the Rules of 1965 and therefore no interference with the impugned action of the respondents is warranted in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that entry of the petitioner in the Surveillance Register and opening of history-sheet is founded on subjective satisfaction of the competent authority under sub-clause (b) of Clause 3 of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965 and therefore the same cannot be made subject matter of judicial scrutiny in exercise of inherent powers. Learned Addl. Advocate General has vehemently argued that the term “habitual offender” cannot be construed in a narrow sense and one who is repeatedly, persistently and frequently involved in criminal activities, facing criminal trials, can be construed as habitual offender for keeping him under surveillance and opening of history-sheet. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that transfer of history-sheet is in accordance with law precisely for the reason that for long petitioner is living within the jurisdiction of Police Commissionerate, Jodhpur, therefore, challenge to transfer of the history-sheet is not sustainable. Lastly, learned Addl. Advocate General would urge that keeping surveillance on the activities of the petitioner and opening of history-sheet has not violated fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the action of the respondents is based on subjective satisfaction for maintenance of public order. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on following legal precedents: Tirlok Singh Gurdit Singh Rajput Vs. The Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore (AIR 1959 Punjab & Haryana 323) Dhanji Ram Sharma Vs. Superintendent of Police, North District, Delhi Police & Ors. ( AIR 1966 SC 1766 ). 10. I have bestowed my considerations to the arguments advanced at Bar and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 11. Before examining the afflictions of the petitioner, I feel inclined, at the threshold, to explicate the very object of keeping surveillance on activities of an individual and opening of history-sheet against him. Under Criminal Jurisprudence, jurists have propounded many theories of punishment. 11. Before examining the afflictions of the petitioner, I feel inclined, at the threshold, to explicate the very object of keeping surveillance on activities of an individual and opening of history-sheet against him. Under Criminal Jurisprudence, jurists have propounded many theories of punishment. In India, in courses and curriculum, mainly four theories of punishment are discussed; viz., Retributive Theory or vengeance theory, deterrent theory of punishment, reformative theory of punishment and preventive theory of punishment. The impugned action against the petitioner, in the present case, is essentially founded on preventive theory of punishment. This theory of punishment is lauded and advocated by even utilitarian like Jeremy Bentham and is an effective preventive remedy, which tend to prevent offences. Preventive philosophy is the best mode of punishment because it serves as effective deterrent and also useful preventive measure. The theory, as such, is based on the proposition “not to avenge but to prevent it”. Its objective is to deprive the offender either temporarily or permanently of the power to repeat the offence through some effective measures. Recidivism or habitual relapse into crime is obviously a cause of grave and serious concern and at times its ill effects on society at large and public order are alarming. The Home Department of the State is primarily responsible for maintaining law and order and it owes a duty to public at large for providing a peaceful and congenial environment to the citizens so that they may not experience any problem/difficulty in their day to day life. Keeping surveillance on activities of an individual or preparation/opening of history-sheet are some of the remedial measures to prevent or control crimes. If someone is under constant vigil of police department, this sort of action can effectively incapacitate that individual from committing further offence or going back to a previous behavior especially criminal behavior. Therefore, such remedial measures cannot be categorized as arbitrary or regressive. Keeping in view larger public interest and in furtherance of cherished mission of a welfare State to provide a crime-free society, or at-least a society where citizens can live a dignified life, the legislature in its wisdom has therefore promulgated the Rules of 1965. 12. Switching on to the afflictions of the petitioner, it is imperative for the Court to examine the background of the petitioner. 12. Switching on to the afflictions of the petitioner, it is imperative for the Court to examine the background of the petitioner. As per information divulged by SHO, Police Station Balesar, District Jodhpur Rural, dated 28th of April 2016, 27 cases are registered against the petitioner at various police stations from year 2003 to 2013. 12. Switching on to the afflictions of the petitioner, it is imperative for the Court to examine the background of the petitioner. As per information divulged by SHO, Police Station Balesar, District Jodhpur Rural, dated 28th of April 2016, 27 cases are registered against the petitioner at various police stations from year 2003 to 2013. The report, in vernacular, reads as under: ^^dk;kZy; Fkkukf/kdkjh iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj ftyk tks/kiqj xzkeh.k Øekad& 2367 fnukad 28-4-16 lsok esa Jheku yksd lwpuk vf/kdkjh ,oa vfrfjDr iqfyl v/kh{kd ftyk tks/kiqj xzkeh.k fo"k;%& lwpuk vf/kdkj vf/kfu;e 2005 ds rgr dSyk'k iq= jkepUnz tkfr fo'uksbZ fuoklh HkkVsykbZ iqjksfgrku }kjk pkgh xbZ lwpuk ckcrA izlax%& Jheku ds vkns'k Øekad 1676&91 fnukad 20-04-2016 dh ikyuk esaA egksn;th] mijksDr fo"k; ,oa izlax ds lUnHkZ esa fuosnu gS fd dSyk'k iq= jkepUnz tkfr fo'uksbZ fuoklh HkkVsykbZ iqjksfgrku iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj gky ekuljksoj dkWyksuh iqfyl Fkkuk pkSikluh gk¡Åflax cksMZ tks/kiqj ds fo:) ntZ izdj.k dh lwpuk fuEu is'kkuh esa is'k gSA Ø-la- eq- ua- o"kZ /kkjk uke Fkkuk fu.kZ; vnkyr 01 330@17-10-2003 147] 148] 341] 323 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk ckluh is.Mhx Vªk;y 02 76@11-07-2004 143] 341] 323] 452] 307@149 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk yksgkoV nks"k eqDr 14-12-2007 03- 71@22-06-2005 147] 148] 149] 341] 323] 379] 327] 386 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk yksgkoV is.Mhx Vªk;y 04- 111@29-08-2005 341] 323@34 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj jkthukek 15-01-2010 05- 117@11-09-2006 147] 148] 336] 427] 307 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj nks"k eqDr 19-12-2009 06- 149@27-11-2006 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj is.Mhx Vªk;y 07 187@26-11-2006 384] 385] 386] 387 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk yksgkoV jkthukek cjh 07-03-2011 08- 387@22-09-2006 143] 341] 323] 307] 325] 147] 148] 149] Hkknl Fkkuk mn;efUnj nks"k eqDr 25-11-2009 09- 38@25-05-2007 143] 341] 323] 307 Hkknl Fkkuk Hkkstklj jkthukek cjh 18-01-2014 10- 95@08-05-2007 147] 148] 149] 452] 307] 395] 397] 323] 324] 325 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk QykSnh nks"k eqDr 12-10-2009 11- 96@08-05-2007 147] 148] 149] 341] 323] 427] 425] 307 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk QykSnh is.Mhx Vªk;y 12- 97@2007 147] 148] 149] 452] 307] 395] 397] 323] 324] 325] 427 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk QykSnh nks"k eqDr 12-10-2009 13- 122@21-10-2007 354] 147] 148] 149] 307] 427] 324] 325] 326] 457] 323] 397] 459] 212] 216 Hkknl o 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj cjh 27-02-2009 14- 131@31-12-2007 147] 148] 149] 307] 394] 341] 323] 307] 120 ch Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk >oj nks"k eqDr 26-11-2014 15- 320@2007 229 , Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk QykSnh nks"k eqDr 02-02-2011 16- 234@06-05-2008 147] 148] 149] 342] 323] 307 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk mn;efUnj is.Mhx Vªk;y 17- 165@01-08-2009 143] 149] 449] 323] 324] 325 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk e.Mksj jkthukek cjh 11-10-2009 18- 411@29-11-2009 147] 148] 323@149 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk ljnkjiqjk jkthukek 29-10-2012 19- 98@30-06-2010 147] 148] 149] 307] 341] 323] 3967] 427 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk >oj is.Mhx Vªk;y 20- 99@01-07-2010 147] 148] 149] 341] 323] 324] 325] 326 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk >oj is.Mhx Vªk;y 21- 144@01-06-2010 147] 148] 149] 323] 341] 325] 307 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk 'kkL=huxj tks/kiqj is.Mhx Vªk;y 22- 192@24-04-2010 8@29 ,u Mh ih ,l ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk fuEckgsM+k is.Mhx Vªk;y 23- 25@29-02-2012 147] 148] 149] 353] 323] 427] 307] Hkknl o 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj is.Mhx Vªk;y 24- 207@14-06-2012 147] 148] 149] 332] 353] 307] 224] 225] 120 ch Hkknl o 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk mn;efUnj is.Mhx Vªk;y 25- 417@04-09-2013 379] 411] 472] 473] Hkknl o 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk izrkiuxj tks/kiqj is.Mhx dksVZ 26- 52@27-09-2013 147] 148] 149] 307] 323] 324@147] 120 ch Hkknl o 3@25 vkeZl ,DV iqfyl Fkkuk dY;k.kiqj ckM+esj is.Mhx dksVZ 27- 02@02-01-2012 420] 419] 406 Hkknl iqfyl Fkkuk cTtq fcdkusj is.Mhx dksVZ 2- dSyk'k iq= jkepUnz tkfr fo'uksbZ fuoklh HkkVsykbZ iqjksfgrku tks Fkkuk ckyslj dk fgLVªh'khVj Fkk ftlus viuk fuokl cnydj ekuljksoj dkWyksuh pkSikluh gkÅflax cksMZ tks/kiqj jgus ls fgLVªh'khV o O;fDrxr i=koyh Jheku iqfyl v/kh{kd tks/kiqj xzkeh.k ds vkns'k Øekad 261&65 fnukad 20-02-2016 ds vxzhe dk;Zokgh gsrq iqfyl mik;qDr if'pe tks/kiqj dks izssf"kr dh xbZ gSA Hkonh; ,l Mh Fkkukf/kdkjh iqfyl Fkkuk ckyslj ftyk tks/kiqj xzkeh.k^^ 13. Out of 27 cases, mentioned supra, it is also noteworthy that petitioner has been acquitted in case No. 22 & 24 respectively. 14. Although aforementioned chart shows 27 cases but in the written submissions, respondents have shown 33 cases including the latest FIR No.19 of 2016, registered at Police Station, Chopasani Housing Board, Police Commissionerate, Jodhpur, wherein after investigation police has submitted charge-sheet against petitioner besides 3 others for offences under Section 420, 406, 448 and 120-B IPC. Essentially, learned counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on the term “habitual offender” to question the impugned action and relied on the aforesaid term, as defined under Section 2 (a) of the Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act 1953. The term “habitual offender” has not been defined under the Rules of 1965 and these rules are framed in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 45 and 46 of the Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861) and has applied to Ajmer area and the pre-reorganisation State of Rajasthan read with Sections 41 & 42 of the Madhya Bharat Police Act, Samvat 2007, as applicable to Sunel area. Therefore, it is rather difficult to comprehend that the term “habitual offender” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 has any ramification vis-à-vis Rules of 1965. Be that as it may, under Rule 4.4, even if it is assumed that the connotation of term “habitual offender” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 is to be applied mutatis mutandis under the Rules of 1965, then too, I am at loss to say that it is not pre-requisite for making necessary entries of a person in Surveillance Register No.8 under Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965. Moreover, for preparation of history-sheets, Rules 4.8 and 4.9 of the Rules of 1965 nowhere envisage previous conviction of an individual for taking appropriate action in accordance with these rules. With a view to clarify the legal position of clause 3(b) of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965, Rule 4.4 of Rules is reproduced as under: “4.4. Moreover, for preparation of history-sheets, Rules 4.8 and 4.9 of the Rules of 1965 nowhere envisage previous conviction of an individual for taking appropriate action in accordance with these rules. With a view to clarify the legal position of clause 3(b) of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965, Rule 4.4 of Rules is reproduced as under: “4.4. Surveillance Register No.8 – (1) x x x (2) x x x (3) In Part II of such register may be entered at the discretion of the Superintendent- (a) x x x (b) persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not; x x x 15. A bare reading of the above quoted provision makes it abundantly clear that legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the Superintendent of Police to enter name of an individual in Surveillance Register No.8 if he has reasons to believe that the incumbent is habitual offender. As such, it is subjective satisfaction of the Superintendent of Police, which is sufficient to facilitate entry of an individual in Surveillance Register No.8 under Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965. It is also noteworthy that Clause 3(a) of Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965 envisages a separate category vis-à-vis persons who have been convicted twice or more than twice of the offences mentioned in Rule 8.22 so as to attract the definition of habitual offender within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 for the offences mentioned in the table appended to Rule 8.22 of the Rules of 1965. That apart, Rule 4.9 of the Rules of 1965, if harmoniously construed then it would ipso facto reveal that for opening history-sheet against an individual no pre-condition of his being habitual offender is necessitated by the legislature. The complete text of Rule 4.9 with emphasis on sub-clause (2) reads as under: "4.9 History Sheets when opened.- (1) A history sheet, if one does not already exist, shall be opened in Form 4.9 for every person whose name is entered in the surveillance register, except conditionally released convicts. The complete text of Rule 4.9 with emphasis on sub-clause (2) reads as under: "4.9 History Sheets when opened.- (1) A history sheet, if one does not already exist, shall be opened in Form 4.9 for every person whose name is entered in the surveillance register, except conditionally released convicts. (2) A history sheet may be opened by, or under the written orders of a police officer not below the rank of Inspector for any person not entered the surveillance register who is reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such person. (3) The Government Railway Police will maintain the history sheet of criminals known or suspected to operate on the railway in accordance with Police Rule 4.8. They will open history sheets themselves for criminals living in railway premises, who have been absent from their original homes so long that the railway premises may be regarded as their permanent residence. They may also open history sheets for wandering strangers reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime on the railway, whose original homes cannot be traced." 16. Upon churning out the law governing the province of entry of an individual in the Surveillance Register and opening of history-sheet, its judicial scrutiny in the backdrop of legal precedents is desirable. 17. In Ramgopal Jain (supra), although Rule 4.4 of the Rules of 1965 is interpreted by the learned Single Judge of this Court but, in all, 10 cases were registered against the individual and out of which in five cases he was acquitted. If the case history of the petitioner is examined in that background, then it would ipso facto reveal that since year 2003 as many as 27 cases are registered against him at various police stations for serious offences like under Sections 307, 379, 386, 387, 397, 452, 457 IPC, 8/29 NDPS Act and 3/25 Arms Act etc. and some of the cases are under trial and the latest case in which he is facing trial is for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 448 and 120-B IPC. Therefore, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, same is clearly distinguishable. 18. and some of the cases are under trial and the latest case in which he is facing trial is for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 448 and 120-B IPC. Therefore, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, same is clearly distinguishable. 18. In K. Suresh Babu (supra), High Court of State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, the question of opening of rowdy sheet is examined and the Court was pleased to quash the same by observing that involvement of an individual in a solitary criminal case is not sufficient to term him “habitual offender” under the relevant provision governing the same. The Court has also found that even in that case, the incumbent has been acquitted. Therefore, taking note of peculiar facts of the case, Court has quashed rowdy sheet opened against the petitioner. Thus, the ratio of that case cannot render any assistance to the petitioner and it is clearly distinguishable. 19. In Omprakash (supra), the incumbent petitioner was involved in four cases and in all of them he was acquitted. Therefore, taking note of these facts, Court has allowed the petition and quashed history-sheet. Thus, the case in hand is clearly distinguishable from that case. 20. In Sohanlal (supra), the Court has essentially examined the rigor of Rule 8.22 of the Rules of 1965 and after recording its satisfaction about non-fulfilment of the requirement of Rule, quashed history-sheet, as such, this judgment too cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioner. 21. Similarly, in Sohanlal Vaishnav (supra) only three cases were pending against the incumbent petitioner and in the remaining cases he was acquitted. That apart, the Court has also taken note of the fact that since 2008 no case was registered against the petitioner and therefore granted indulgence by quashing history-sheet. As such, this judgment is also distinguishable. 22. In Harsukh Ram, the petitioner in that case was not convicted for any offence and only one case was pending against him for minor offence under Sections 323 and 341 IPC and therefore the Court proceeded to quash history-sheet. In the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, this case too is clearly distinguishable. 23. 22. In Harsukh Ram, the petitioner in that case was not convicted for any offence and only one case was pending against him for minor offence under Sections 323 and 341 IPC and therefore the Court proceeded to quash history-sheet. In the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, this case too is clearly distinguishable. 23. Lastly, in Haji Menu (supra), the conviction of the incumbent was of 1996 and on that basis history-sheet was sought to opened after 16 years and therefore the Court granted indulgence and quashed history-sheet. Contrary to the fact situation in that case, the petitioner is still facing trial in many cases wherein he is charged for serious offences as mentioned at Serial No.3, 6, 11, 16, 19 to 21, and 25 to 27 respectively. That apart, he is also facing trial in a recent case for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 448 and 120-B IPC. 24. The legal precedents, on which learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance also require consideration in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case. 25. In Tirlok Singh Gurdit Singh Rajput (supra), a learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court has upheld the entry of name of an individual in the Surveillance Register and preparing history-sheet after recording its satisfaction about his character and other antecedents that he is of bad character. The Court has further observed that such entry and confidential surveillance nowhere infringe right of an individual. 26. In Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra), Three Judges Bench of Supreme Court has deduced the true purport of words “habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime”. The Court observed that one who is a criminal by habit or by disposition or by repetition of crimes, is a habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime. The Court was examining the question relating to opening of history-sheet under the Punjab Police Rules 1934. The Court opined that conviction is not necessary for holding an individual habitual offender and held: “Under S. 23 of the Police Act, 1861, the police is under a duty to prevent commission of offences and to collect intelligence affecting the public peace. The Court was examining the question relating to opening of history-sheet under the Punjab Police Rules 1934. The Court opined that conviction is not necessary for holding an individual habitual offender and held: “Under S. 23 of the Police Act, 1861, the police is under a duty to prevent commission of offences and to collect intelligence affecting the public peace. For the efficient discharge of their duties, the police officers are empowered by the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 to open the history sheets of suspects and to enter their names in police register No. 10. These powers must be exercised with caution and in strict conformity which the rules. The condition precedent to the opening of history sheet under R. 23.9 (2) is that the suspect is a person "reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime or to be an aider or abettor of such person''. Similarly, the condition precedent to the entry of the names of the suspects in Part II of police register No. 10 under R. 23.4 (3) (b) is that they are "persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not''. If the action of the police officers is challenged, they must justify their action and must show that the condition precedent has been satisfied. A habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime is one who is a criminal by habit or by disposition formed by repetition of crimes. Reasonable belief of the police officer that the suspect is a habitual offender or is a person habitually addicted to crime is sufficient to justify action under Rr. 23.4 (3) (b) and 23.9 (2). Mere belief is not sufficient. The belief must be reasonable, it must be based on reasonable grounds. The suspect may or may not have been convicted of any crime. Even apart from any conviction, there may be reasonable grounds for believing that he is a habitual offender. The question, therefore, is whether the respondents had reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant was a habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime. The appellant was charged with crime on three occasions for the offence of forging railway tickets and receipts. In the first case, he was discharged for want of evidence. The question, therefore, is whether the respondents had reasonable grounds for believing that the appellant was a habitual offender or a person habitually addicted to crime. The appellant was charged with crime on three occasions for the offence of forging railway tickets and receipts. In the first case, he was discharged for want of evidence. In the second case, he was convicted by the trial Court, but the conviction was set aside by the High Court. In the third case, the appellant was discharged by the Court on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case. So far, the appellant has not been convicted of any crime. But the second respondent filed an affidavit stating that the police administration has definite information about the unlawful activities of the appellant and on such information the respondents reasonably believed that he was a habitual offender indulging in the neafarious trade of forging railway tickets and receipts The first respondent filed a supporting affidavit adopting this statement. The grounds of this belief are to be found in the information collected in the history sheet of the appellant. The history sheet was referred to in the affidavits, and the respondents swore that from the information at their disposal they reasonably believed the appellant to be a habitual offender. On the special facts of this case, the High Court accepted this statement and did not think it necessary to call upon the respondents to supply the details of their information or to produce the history sheet. We are unable to say that the High Court erred in the appreciation of evidence, or that its judgment should be reversed.” (emphasis supplied) 27. Supreme Court, in Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar [ (1984) 3 SCC 14 ], defined the expression “habitually” by observing “the expression, ‘habitually’ means ‘repeatedly’ or persistently. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. The same view is further reiterated by the Supreme Court in Amanullah Khan Vs. State of Gujarat [ (1999) 5 SCC 613 ]. 28. In State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. The same view is further reiterated by the Supreme Court in Amanullah Khan Vs. State of Gujarat [ (1999) 5 SCC 613 ]. 28. In State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Mehamud [ (2007) 12 SCC 358 ], Supreme Court has revisited the expression “habitually” in the light of Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords Bootleggers and Drug offenders Act, 1981 (Act of 1981) and overturned the conclusion of the High Court that there must be a conviction before it can be said that the detenue habitually commits offences. The Court held: 11. “7. [Habitual] The meaning of the words ‘habit’ and ‘habitually’ as given in Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn.), by P. Ramanatha Aiyar is: ‘Habit.—Settled tendency or practice, mental constitution. The word “habit” implies a tendency or capacity resulting from the frequent repetition of the same acts. The words by “habit” and “habitually” imply frequent practice or use. * * * Habitual.— Constant; customary; addicted to a specified habit.’ 8. This Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar considered the question of a habitual criminal and in para 31 the expression ‘habitually’ was explained as follows: (SCC p. 34) ‘The expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.’ 9. Therefore, the expression ‘habitual’ would mean repeatedly or persistently and implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repeated acts. An isolated default of rent would not mean that the tenant was a habitual defaulter.” (emphasis in original) (See Vijay Amba Das Diware v. Balkrishna Waman Dande, SCC pp. 128-29, paras 7-9.) 12. In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, it was held that: “The expression ‘habit’ or ‘habitual’ has not been defined under the [Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985]. The word ‘habitually’ does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, it was held that: “The expression ‘habit’ or ‘habitual’ has not been defined under the [Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985]. The word ‘habitually’ does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of a practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a ‘dangerous person’ unless there is material suggesting his complicity in such cases which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal.” (SCC p. 238b-c) “The word ‘habitually’ means ‘usually’ and ‘generally’. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the word ‘habit’ in Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary, 10th Edn., p. 485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts.” (SCC pp. 243-44, para 8) 13. “The expression ‘habitually’ is very significant. A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes. It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be a continuity in the commission of those offences.” (See Ayub v. S.N. Sinha, SCC p. 555, para 5.) 14. As the order of detention shows the detenu was involved in fourteen cases and several cases were pending which related to offences punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII IPC and Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short “the Arms Act”). Considering the nature of the jurisdiction which the detaining authority exercises, the conclusion of the High Court that there must be a conviction before it can be said that the detenu habitually commits offences is clearly unsustainable. 29. If the ratio decidendi of the judgment in Mehamud (supra) is examined in the light of facts and circumstances of the instant case, then it would ipso facto reveal that the Court has not found conviction pre-requisite for preventive detention of an individual under the Act of 1981 while construing the expression “habitually”. 29. If the ratio decidendi of the judgment in Mehamud (supra) is examined in the light of facts and circumstances of the instant case, then it would ipso facto reveal that the Court has not found conviction pre-requisite for preventive detention of an individual under the Act of 1981 while construing the expression “habitually”. The impugned action in the instant case is simple entry of the petitioner in the Surveillance Register and opening of history-sheet, which from no stretch of imagination can be equated with preventive detention inasmuch as it is meant only for the purpose of keeping vigil over his activities with confidentiality. Therefore, the ratio of the judgment clearly clinches the issue in favour of the respondents. 30. While reiterating that the legal precedents relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are clearly distinguishable in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, it is also noteworthy that in all these verdicts, judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in Dhanji Ram Sharma (supra) and Mehamud (supra) have not been considered or discussed. 31. In view of foregoing discussion and the law laid down by Supreme Court, I am afraid, instant one is not a case wherein respondents have abused the process of the Court in entering petitioner’s name in the Surveillance Register and in opening history-sheet in terms of Rule 4.4 and 4.9 of the Rules of 1965. The checkered history of the petitioner clearly goes to show that petitioner has developed a tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behavior especially relapse into criminal behavior, which has rightly persuaded the respondents to keep vigil on his activities and open history-sheet by pressing into service preventive theory of punishment to maintain public order. 32. Challenge laid by the petitioner to the transfer of history-sheet and power to transfer is per se superfluous and not sustainable for the reason that respondents came out with a specific case that petitioner is having his permanent residence at Jodhpur since long. As regards transfer of history-sheet, suffice it to observe that the same is permissible in administrative exigencies by an order of competent authority. Therefore, sans cogent foundation in the petition to assail the said action of the respondents, no interference is called for in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 33. As regards transfer of history-sheet, suffice it to observe that the same is permissible in administrative exigencies by an order of competent authority. Therefore, sans cogent foundation in the petition to assail the said action of the respondents, no interference is called for in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. 33. The plea of the petitioner that he is victim of political vengeance and vendetta is bereft of any factual foundation and therefore this jejune plea merits outright rejection. 34. Even if the impugned action of the respondents is tested on touchstone of fundamental right of life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, in my considered opinion, the same being in consonance and in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1965 cannot be termed as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in the larger public interest to maintain public order. 35. Thus, I feel disinclined to interfere with the impugned action of the respondents as the same has not resulted in miscarriage of justice. 36. Upshot of the above discussion is that the instant petition fails and same is hereby dismissed.