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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1412 (GUJ)

Multimantech International Pvt. Ltd. v. R. K. Gupta

2016-07-20

K.M.THAKER

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner, and Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In this petition, the petitioner company has prayed, inter alia, that:- "12(a) To pass an order setting aside the communication dated 13.10.2008 sent by the Appellate Authority, Ahmedabad under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 returning the appeal and direct the Appellate Authority to consider and adjudicate the appeal on merits and in accordance with law;" 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 13.10.2008 passed by the appellate authority appointed under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 whereby the appellate authority did not entertain the appeal filed by present petitioner on the solitary ground of delay. By communication dated 13.10.2008, the authority, without even considering the submissions by the appellant and without even issuing notice for hearing, dismissed the appeal by conveying the petitioner that since the appeal is filed after prescribed period of limitation, the appeal is not entertained. 4. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record that the controlling authority passed order dated 31.3.2008 in favour of the original claimant i.e. present respondent and directed present petitioner company to pay Rs. 76,330/- towards gratuity. 4.1 It appears that after the petitioner received the said order, the petitioner filed review application before the controlling authority on the ground that though the learned advocate was present on the scheduled date of hearing and an application seeking adjournment was submitted with no objection from other side, the impugned order was passed as a result of which the petitioner did not get opportunity of hearing and that the impugned order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice. It was claimed that the order dated 31.3.2008 is an ex-parte order and that therefore, it may be recalled and the matter may be heard after granting opportunity to the petitioner company. 5. At this stage, it is relevant to note that, Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the respondent, disputed the contention that the said order dated 31.3.2008 can be termed as an ex-parte order. He tried to submit that the company had filed appearance, its advocate had also attended the proceedings and filed reply and contested the matter and that therefore, the order cannot be said to be ex-parte. 6. The said Misc. He tried to submit that the company had filed appearance, its advocate had also attended the proceedings and filed reply and contested the matter and that therefore, the order cannot be said to be ex-parte. 6. The said Misc. Application seeking review of the order dated 31.3.2008 came to be rejected by the controlling authority vide order dated 6.6.2008. In the said order, the controlling authority has not recorded contentions by either side and has also not recorded any conclusion with regard to the contentions of the contesting parties. Without recording any reasons and without recording any conclusion, the controlling authority rejected the said Misc. Application only on the ground that against the order passed by the controlling authority, review application cannot be filed. 7. As mentioned earlier, the application was filed on the ground that the order was passed ex-parte. In this context, it is relevant to take into account the provision under Rule 11(5) which provides that in case of ex-parte order, an application for review (request to recall ex-parte order) is maintainable on such application can be filed. In the event, the controlling authority is of the view that the application is without merits and the order cannot be termed as ex-parte, then also, appropriate conclusion should be recorded after hearing he parties while deciding the Misc. Application seeking review of the order. The authority may reject the application on the ground that the order was not ex-parte and/or that the application is without merits, however, even such conclusion should be recorded and should form part of the order which, in turn, should be passed after hearing the parties. However, in present case, the order dated 6.6.2008 does not contain any discussion much less any conclusion with regard to the rival contentions. To that extent, the said order dated 6.6.2008 is defective. 7.1 Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 6.6.2008, the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority. 7.2 It is not in dispute that the appeal was filed on 1.9.2008. 8. According to the provisions under sub-section (7) of Section 7, an appeal can be filed within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. The appellate authority is conferred with the power to condone the delay, upon being satisfied about sufficient cause, upto limit of 60 days. 8. According to the provisions under sub-section (7) of Section 7, an appeal can be filed within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order. The appellate authority is conferred with the power to condone the delay, upon being satisfied about sufficient cause, upto limit of 60 days. Consequently, if the appellant is able to satisfy the appellate authority with regard to sufficient cause for delay caused in filing the appeal, then, the appeal which is filed within period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the order can be entertained by the appellate authority. In present case, the appeal was filed within 90 days from the order dated 6.6.2008. Since the review application is maintainable in light of the provisions under Rule 11(5) of the Act against the order which is passed ex-parte, the Misc. Application ought to have been taken into consideration by the appellate authority. However, without recording any details or reasons as to how the period of limitation was considered and/or without granting any opportunity of hearing to enable the appellant to make out a case for sufficient cause and without recording reasons and conclusions for not condoning the delay and/or as to why the delay could not have been condoned, the appellate authority passed the impugned communication dated 13.10.2008 and did not entertain the appeal. 9. Since the said order is passed without hearing the parties and without taking into account the period consumed in pursuing the review application (it appears that the said review application was filed somewhere in April 2008) it was necessary that the appellate authority ought to have recorded reasons and conclusion with regard to the decision viz. not condoning the delay after considering the fact that the appellant had pursued remedy of review and whether the said fact could have been or could not have been taken into account, however, without dealing with the said issues, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal. 10. The foregoing discussion brings out the fact that the appeal deserves to be reconsidered by the appellate authority who should pass fresh order after granting opportunity of hearing to the appellant who can make out sufficient cause. 10. The foregoing discussion brings out the fact that the appeal deserves to be reconsidered by the appellate authority who should pass fresh order after granting opportunity of hearing to the appellant who can make out sufficient cause. If the appellant fails to make out sufficient cause to condone the delay or if the appellate authority, after taking into account the fact that the petitioner had, in the interregnum, pursued remedy of review application, comes to the conclusion that the appeal would still not be maintainable and the same is barred by limitation, the appellant authority may pass appropriate order after hearing the appellant and after recording reasons. For that purpose, the case deserves to be remitted to the appellate authority, which in turn would require that the Appellate Authority's order should be set aside for remitting the matter. 11. At this stage, Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the workman, submitted that if the proceedings are remitted to the appellate authority it would consume further time and may result into further litigation as well. Having regard to the said aspect, Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the workman, came out with suggestion/offer to put final end to the litigation. According to the learned advocate for the respondent workman, the dispute between the parties is with regard to workman's claim for additional 2 years' gratuity, inasmuch as the respondent's claim for gratuity for 5 years is not even disputed by the petitioner. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner company, submitted that there is certain anomaly in respect of the calculation for gratuity payable in accordance with formula under the Act, inasmuch as certain amounts paid towards perquisites cannot be taken into account while calculating payable amount of gratuity. 13. After taking into account the said submission by learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the respondent workman, after taking instructions from the workman submitted that the petitioner has deposited a sum of Rs. 12,000/- with the controlling authority. He also submitted that the concerned workman has reached advance age and presently he is about 73 years old and he is not interested in continuing litigation further and that therefore, he is ready to forgo sum of Rs. 12,000/- with the controlling authority. He also submitted that the concerned workman has reached advance age and presently he is about 73 years old and he is not interested in continuing litigation further and that therefore, he is ready to forgo sum of Rs. 7,500/- which may be refunded/repaid to the petitioner and the balance amount may be given to the original claimant and accordingly, entire dispute may be put to an end. 14. Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that so far as the issue related to amount is concerned, the petitioner may not have much reservation, however, so far as the impugned orders are concerned, the same deserves to be set aside since the said orders may be cited as precedent, which may create difficulty for the petitioner in other cases. 15. Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate for the respondent workman, submitted that in light of the said apprehension of the petitioner, the respondent has no objection if it is clarified that the order dated 31.3.2008 will not be treated as precedent. 16. On examination of the impugned order dated 31.3.2008, it comes out that the controlling authority prima facie appears to have taken into account the amount paid towards conveyance and retainer charge while quantifying the gratuity payable to the respondent. Actually, the objections against the said quantification by the petitioner ought to have been considered by the controlling authority, however, in the impugned award, the controlling authority does not appear to have addressed said objections of the petitioner. To that extent, the impugned order is unreasoned and non-speaking order. Therefore, it is appropriate to clarify that the said order is passed in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and it may not be treated as precedent in subsequent litigation. 17. In view of the submissions and statement by Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate, for the respondent, which is accepted by Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner, present petition is disposed of with following observations and clarifications. 17.1 The order dated 6.6.2008 and the communication dated 13.10.2008 are set aside. 17. In view of the submissions and statement by Mr. Chaudhari, learned advocate, for the respondent, which is accepted by Mr. Nanavati, learned advocate for the petitioner, present petition is disposed of with following observations and clarifications. 17.1 The order dated 6.6.2008 and the communication dated 13.10.2008 are set aside. Instead of remanding the matter to the appellate authority for reconsideration after hearing the parties, the proceedings are terminated at this stage and in view of the stipulation and declaration by the learned advocate for the respondent to the effect that out of the amount deposited by the petitioner (which is already withdrawn by the respondent workman), it is directed that Rs. 7,500/- will be returned by the respondent to the petitioner. With aforesaid observations and directions, present petition stands disposed of.