JUDGMENT Mrs. Sunita Agarwal,J. Heard Shri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sanjay Maurya, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By means of this petition, the orders dated 4.5.2015 and 17.11.2016 passed in SCC Suit No. 586 of 2013 and SCC Revision No. 135 of 2015 are under challenge; respectively. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was inducted as tenant in house no. 116/119 (hereinafter referred to as the suit premises) by Shri Kena Ram Banerjee, owner of the said premises. Shri Kena Ram Banerjee expired on 12.3.1992. After his death, one Shri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee claimed ownership right over the suit property on the basis of a will dated 28.11.1991. The notices dated 8.6.1992, 19.8.1992 and 31.10.1992 were sent to the petitioner by Sri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee demanding rent of the suit property. These notices were replied by the petitioner on 3.7.1992 and 19.8.1992. Last notice dated 16.3.1993 determining tenancy and raising demand of rent was finally served upon the petitioner which was replied on 17.4.1993. In reply, the petitioner raised dispute regarding title of Sri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee over the suit property. It was stated by the petitioner that one Smt. Indrawati Pandey also claimed ownership through a will deed dated 27.1.1992 and raised demand of rent. 4. Resultantly the eviction suit namely SCC Suit No. 67 of 1993 was filed Sri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee which was pursued by his heirs namely respondent nos. 2 to 5. In the written statement, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Sri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee and the petitioner was denied. In the meantime, a regular suit for declaration namely Original Suit No. 516 of 1997 was instituted by Smt. Indrawati Pandey. In the said suit a counter claim for cancellation of will in the name of Smt. Indrawati Pandey was filed Sri Amrendra Chatterjee. 5. Both the suits were tagged together and have been dismissed by a common judgment and order dated 13.5.2009 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court. The counter claim of Sri Amrendra Chatterjee in Original Suit No. 516 of 1997 was, however, dismissed being time barred. It was found by the trial court that the petitioner deposited the entire rent on 1.1.1992 i.e. on the first date of hearing of the suit and, therefore, was entitled for benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Rent Control Act. 6. It was found by the trial court that the petitioner deposited the entire rent on 1.1.1992 i.e. on the first date of hearing of the suit and, therefore, was entitled for benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Rent Control Act. 6. As far as the eviction of the petitioner on the ground of denial of title of the landlord pursuant to Section 20(2)(f) is concerned, the finding is that the tenant did not renounce his character as such, he has only denied the derivative title of the landlord and in a no way has set up the title of the landlord in himself. Mere mention of the title of Smt. Indrawati Pandey in his reply by the petitioner to the notice regarding determination of his tenancy would not amount to denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by him and hence cannot be a ground for his eviction within the meaning of Clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Rent Control Act. Granting benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act, the suit was dismissed. 7. The revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Act was filed in the year 2015 with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said application was allowed by order dated 4.5.2015 and ultimately the revision was allowed on 17.11.2015. The judgment and order dated 13.5.2009 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court in Original Suit No. 67 of 1993 was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the court below with the direction to decide afresh. The grounds for remittal is that the court below has erred in concluding that the entire arrears of rent have been deposited by the tenant and, therefore, was entitled for grant of benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. It has to further consider whether in view of denial of landlord's title, the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act could be granted to the petitioner. The will dated 28.1.1992 set up by Smt. Indrawati Pandey was not found genuine and the declaratory suit namely Original Suit No. 516 of 1997 filed by her was dismissed on 13.5.2009. 8. It has to further consider whether in view of denial of landlord's title, the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act could be granted to the petitioner. The will dated 28.1.1992 set up by Smt. Indrawati Pandey was not found genuine and the declaratory suit namely Original Suit No. 516 of 1997 filed by her was dismissed on 13.5.2009. 8. In view of the act of the tenant in setting up the landlord's title in a third party it is a case of denial of landlord's title so as to prejudice his interest in the suit property, the court below has illegally exercised its jurisdiction in coming to a different conclusion. 9. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revisional court has acted illegally in holding that the petitioner has denied the title of the landlord and, therefore, he is not entitled for benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Further the revisional court has erred in condoning inordinate delay of 4 ½ years in filing the revision that too on the plea of wrong advice of the counsel. 10. The order dated 4.5.2015 in allowing Section 5 application and in entertaining Revision against the judgment and decree dated 13.5.2009 though challenged in the present petition but there is no explanation as to why the petitioner did not challenge this order earlier. A perusal of the order dated 17.11.2015 goes to show that the revision was contested on merits by the petitioner. 11. In view thereof, this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not inclined to enter into the validity of the order dated 4.5.2015 in allowing Section 5 application to entertain the revision for decision on merits. 12. On the merits of the revisional order, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner needs to be examined considering the pleadings and the settled legal position that in case of denial of derivative title of the landlord, the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act is available to the tenant. The question would, however, remain as to whether the present case is of denial of title or derivative title of the landlord. 13. Admitted facts of the matter that Sri Kena Ram Banerjee was the original landlord. The question would, however, remain as to whether the present case is of denial of title or derivative title of the landlord. 13. Admitted facts of the matter that Sri Kena Ram Banerjee was the original landlord. The plaintiff Sri Amrendra Narh Chatterjee had derived his title from Sri Kena Ram Banerjee on the basis of will deed dated 28.11.1991. The plaintiff sent notices to the tenant informing him that he had stepped into the shoes of the landlord and the rent was to be paid to him. The demand of rent raised by him was denied by the petitioner setting up title in Smt. Indrawati Pandey. On the basis of another will deed dated 27.1.1992, Smt. Indrawati Pandey filed the Original Suit No. 516 of 1997 for declaration which was dismissed raising suspicion about the genuineness of the said will. A finding was also recorded by the trial court that the will set up by Sri Amrendra Nath Chatterjee is a genuine document and he is owner of the suit property. However, the counter claim for declaration of will set up by Smt. Indrawati Pandey as null & void document was rejected being barred by time. 14. Looking to the said finding, the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner on the validity of the will of the plaintiff or the claim of Smt. Indrawati Pandey to receive rent from the petitioner cannot be accepted. The rival claim of title set up by Smt. Indrawati Pandey has not been accepted by the court of competent jurisdiction. The Rent Controller Authority in its limited jurisdiction can not examine the issue of title of the landlord and is also not required to enter into this controversy in view of the findings of the trial court in the suit for declaration of title. 15. Now only question remains as to whether it is a case of denial of landlord's title or his derivative title and further whether the deposits made by the petitioner on the first date of hearing would entitle him to benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. 16. So far as the second question is concerned, the trial court is to examine the issue and record a finding of its own. 17. 16. So far as the second question is concerned, the trial court is to examine the issue and record a finding of its own. 17. As far as the question of denial of title is concerned, it can be seen that it is a case of denial of right of the plaintiff to receive rent who has derived title from the original landlord. 18. The question remains as to whether the denial by the tenant is bonafide denial so as to protect himself or has been made with a view to prejudice the interest of the landlord. 19. The Apex Court in A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons and others versus T. Palanisamy Gounder1 in Paragraph 39' has held that in such a case the Rent Controller has to decide (i) whether there was a dispute regarding the landlord's title raised by the tenant, and (ii) whether the dispute was bona fide. The Rent Controller could not have ignored the questions relating to the derivative title of the plaintiff. Though he had no jurisdiction to decide the title to the suit property, however, it can examine whether the denial of the plaintiff's title not bona fide. 20. Emphasis was added to Paragraph 18' of the Apex Court pronouncements in J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd and others versus M.R. Murali and another2 extracted as under: - "the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act which estoppes the tenant from denying the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy and the estoppel continues to operate so long as the tenant does not surrender possession over the tenancy premises to the landlord who inducted him in possession. The tenant is not estopped from denying the title of the landlord if it comes to an end subsequent to the creation of the tenancy nor is he estopped from questioning the derivative title of a transferee of his landlord. To operate against the tenant as providing a ground for eviction under Section 10 of the Act a mere denial of the title of the landlord is not enough; such denial has to be 'not bona fide'. 'Not bona fide' would mean absence of good faith or non genuineness of the tenant's plea." (emphasis added) 21. To operate against the tenant as providing a ground for eviction under Section 10 of the Act a mere denial of the title of the landlord is not enough; such denial has to be 'not bona fide'. 'Not bona fide' would mean absence of good faith or non genuineness of the tenant's plea." (emphasis added) 21. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has denied title of the plaintiff to demand rent in view of the fact that another person namely Smt. Indrawati Pandey has also set up her title through a will and asked the petitioner to pay rent. On account of demand raised by two persons claiming ownership on the basis of will of the original landlord, it was pleaded by him that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive rent. 22. In Sheela and others versus Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash3, it is held that the denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. The result of denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant are very serious as it would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted. The denial or disclaimer must be in clear and unequivocal terms. The tenant should have renounced his character and in clear and unequivocal terms settled title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bonafide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to earn protection made available to him by the Rent Control Act, cannot be said to have denied the landlord's title and disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant would not be a ground of eviction on the ground of denial of landlord's title within the meaning of the Act. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. 23. Such an act of the tenant would not be a ground of eviction on the ground of denial of landlord's title within the meaning of the Act. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. 23. From a careful reading of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the abovenoted pronouncements, it is discernible that the question as to whether in a given case the tenant had denied the title of the landlord setting up a title in himself or in a third party has to be examined on the pleadings made by him and in finding his intention whether to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord or to protect himself. It cannot be simply said that as the tenant has not set up title in himself or denied the title of the subsequent landlord, it would mean that it is a case of denial of derivative title of the landlord. 24. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is not inclined to enter into this issue at this stage for the reasons that the trial court has granted benefit of Section 20(4) to the petitioner by judgment and order dated 13.5.2009 only on the ground that the tenant has not claimed landlord's title in himself and has not renounced his character as tenant. 25. The revisional court, however, came to a different conclusion on account of dismissal of decleratory suit filed by Smt. Indrawati Pandey on the basis of will dated 28.1.1992 set up by her. The reason given by it is that the will was not found genuine and the revisionist has failed to establish title in third party namely Smt. Indrawati Pandey. This conclusion drawn by the revisional court is also not based on sound legal principles. 26. The question whether a bonafide dispute is raised by the tenant in denying the landlord's title is still to be decided by the trial court. The rejection of decleratory suit filed by third party claiming title in herself will not amount to denial of landlord's title by the tenant so as to affect him prejudicially within the meaning of Section 20(2)(f) of the Act. 27. The rejection of decleratory suit filed by third party claiming title in herself will not amount to denial of landlord's title by the tenant so as to affect him prejudicially within the meaning of Section 20(2)(f) of the Act. 27. The present petition is, therefore, being disposed of with the direction to the trial court namely SCC Court, Gorakhpur to decide the issue of applicability of Section 20(2)(f) of the Act independently applying the legal principles as discussed above and to record a finding whether the tenant is entitled for benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. 28. It goes without saying that this Court has not examined the pleadings of the parties and the trial court is to decide the matter after examining the pleadings on record without being influenced by the observations made by the revisional court or this Court on the merits thereof. With the above observations and directions, the petition is disposed of.