JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. The challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 04.06.2008, passed by respondent No. 1 (Disciplinary Authority) as well as the order dated 24.11.2010, passed by respondent No. 2 (Appellate Authority), whereby the penalty of the stoppage of one increment, with future effect, for a period of one year, has been imposed and the recovery of Rs. 79,440.90 paise, has been directed to be made from the petitioner. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: 2.1 The petitioner joined services as Assistant Manager under respondent No. 2, on 04.01.1984. A private complaint for the commission of offences punishable under Sections408, 465, 468 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, came to be filed against the petitioner for alleged irregularities committed by him during the period from 05.01.1984 to 12.01.1986. Upon investigation by the Investigating Officer, no prima-facie material was found against the petitioner, therefore, a 'C' Summary was filed. Such summary was not accepted by the Trial Court and after a full-fledged trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the competent Criminal Court, vide judgment and order dated 07.09.2007. Respondent No. 2 had also instituted Special Civil Suit No. 8 of 1987 against the petitioner, for the recovery of Rs. 3,16,751.83 paise, for alleged irregularities committed by him from 05.01.1984 to 12.01.1986. The said Suit also came to be dismissed by the Civil Court, vide judgment and order dated 31.03.2000. The Court is informed that an appeal against the dismissal of the Suit is pending before the concerned District Court. On 12.08.1986, the petitioner was suspended from service on the ground of the pendency of the criminal prosecution. On 30.10.1999, respondent No. 2 revoked the suspension order. After the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case, he made an application dated 12.12.2008 to respondent No. 2, for the regularisation of the period of suspension with effect from 12.08.1986 to 30.10.1999 as the suspension was based solely on the ground of the pendency of the criminal prosecution. The petitioner requested for the inspection of necessary documents and for the copies of the same. However, nothing further was heard from the respondent authorities for a couple of years. In September, 1991, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner for the alleged irregularities committed by him during the period from 05.01.1984 to 12.01.1986. The petitioner requested for the inspection of necessary documents and for the copies of the same. However, nothing further was heard from the respondent authorities for a couple of years. In September, 1991, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner for the alleged irregularities committed by him during the period from 05.01.1984 to 12.01.1986. The documents on which the charge-sheet was based were not provided to the petitioner. On 23.10.1991, the petitioner requested the concerned authorities to furnish him the copies of the documents relied upon by them. However, no documents were provided. Even prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet in June, 1991, the petitioner was directed to remain present before the Inquiry Officer. During the course of the Departmental Inquiry as well, the petitioner had, time and again, requested the authorities to supply him copies of the documents which were sought to be relied upon against him. On 19.01.1998, a few documents sought by the petitioner were provided to him but the rest of the documents which, according to the petitioner, are important, were not provided, on the ground that they were lying with the Civil Court. On 10.08.1999, the petitioner gave a detailed representation to the Inquiry Officer. On 31.08.1999, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report, holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved. Nothing more was heard from the authorities by the petitioner for a period of more than eight years. Suddenly, on 24.01.2008, a Show-cause Notice was issued to the petitioner, along with a copy of the Inquiry Report dated 31.08.1999. The petitioner responded to the Show-cause Notice in writing, on 10.03.2008. The Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty of the stoppage of one increment for one year, with future effect, upon the petitioner vide the impugned order dated 04.06.2008. A sum of Rs. 79,440.90 paisa was ordered to be recovered from the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the above order before respondent No. 2, being the Appellate Authority. On 11.05.2010, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation during the personal hearing of the appeal. By the impugned order dated 24.11.2010, the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner is before this Court. 3. Mr. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the above order before respondent No. 2, being the Appellate Authority. On 11.05.2010, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation during the personal hearing of the appeal. By the impugned order dated 24.11.2010, the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner is before this Court. 3. Mr. Vaibhav A. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has elaborately raised several grounds of challenge, which are briefly encapsulated as below: 3.1 No documents were supplied to the petitioner either with the Show-cause Notice, in order to enable him to reply effectively, or with the charge-sheet, despite the fact that the charge-sheet is based upon documentary evidence. The petitioner demanded copies of the documents by his representations dated 13.04.1986, 10.06.1986, 15.07.1986, 29.07.1986, 23.10.1991, 10.12.1991 and 13.12.1997, at different stages of the departmental inquiry. Only a few documents were supplied to the petitioner, but the vital documents that are crucial to establish the defence of the petitioner, namely, the Stock Registers, were not supplied to him. That the main allegation against the petitioner is that there was a shortfall in the Gas Cylinders, Regulators and other items as per the Stock Register. It is the case of the petitioner that when he took over the charge from his predecessor, 209 Gas Cylinders were already short. This aspect was intimated by him to the Inquiry Officer and is recorded in the order of penalty. The Stock Registers were, therefore, very important to establish the case of the petitioner and admittedly, the copies of the said Stock Registers have not been supplied to him. This has resulted in grave prejudice to the petitioner, as he has been unable to point out that there is no discrepancy in the Stock Registers as compared to the actual stock available when he took over the charge. It is admitted by the respondents, themselves, that the documents could not be supplied to the petitioner as they were lying with the Civil Court. This aspect is noted by the Disciplinary Authority in the order of penalty. As the petitioner has suffered prejudice due to the non-supply of vital documents, the proceedings are vitiated and deserve to be quashed and set aside. This aspect is noted by the Disciplinary Authority in the order of penalty. As the petitioner has suffered prejudice due to the non-supply of vital documents, the proceedings are vitiated and deserve to be quashed and set aside. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others V. Saroj Kumar Sinha reported in AIR 2010 SC 3131 . 3.2 That the original record was not produced even before the Inquiry Officer, as it was stated to be lying with the Civil Court, where the proceedings for recovery were going on. The Inquiry Officer has recorded findings without referring to the original documents. The entire inquiry is held on the basis of secondary evidence. 3.3 No witnesses have been examined by the department in support of their stand. It follows that the documents on the basis of which the inquiry has been conducted have not been proved in accordance with law. 3.4 There has been a gross delay in the initiation of the departmental inquiry, which has not been explained. The Show-cause Notice was issued to the petitioner on 21.03.1986. Nothing further was done by the respondents thereafter. In September, 1991, after a period of five years, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. There is no explanation for the delay from the year 1986 to 1991. The Inquiry Report was submitted in the year 1999 and the second Show-cause Notice for the imposition of penalty was issued by the Disciplinary Authority on 24.01.2008. There is again no explanation for the intervening period of delay. It is apparent that the respondent authorities were not serious about the departmental inquiry which was carried on in a casual manner. 3.5 There is a marked element of bias against the petitioner, which has vitiated the inquiry. This is proved by the fact that the Inquiry Officer was appointed even before the charge-sheet was issued. Normally, the procedure is that the charge-sheet is issued first, after which the delinquent files a reply in his defence, which is then considered. It is only thereafter that an Inquiry Officer is appointed. The action of the respondents in appointing the Inquiry Officer even before the charge-sheet was issued, shows their bias against the petitioner, in addition to a predetermined mindset. It is only thereafter that an Inquiry Officer is appointed. The action of the respondents in appointing the Inquiry Officer even before the charge-sheet was issued, shows their bias against the petitioner, in addition to a predetermined mindset. In the support of the above submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and others reported in AIR 2001 SC 343 . 3.6 That a criminal case was filed against the petitioner on the very same set of facts for which the departmental inquiry was initiated. In the said criminal case, the petitioner has been honourably acquitted by the Trial Court as the charges against him have not been proved. The appeal of the respondents against the judgment of acquittal has been dismissed. The honourable acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case was required to be considered and taken note of by the respondents in the departmental inquiry. However, this aspect has been totally ignored. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 . Another judgment on this issue relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and another reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 . 3.7 That the period of suspension with effect from 12.08.1986 to 30.10.1999, ought to have been regularised, as the suspension was only on account of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner, in which he was honourably acquitted. In view of the said acquittal, that has been confirmed in appeal, there is no reason for the refusal of the respondents to regularise the said period of suspension. 3.8 That the order of recovery is also required to be set aside as the Civil Court has rejected the Suit instituted by the respondents against the petitioner for the purpose of recovery. The order of the competent Civil Court ought to be considered and respected by the respondents. When the suit itself has been dismissed, no ground remains for passing of the order of recovery. 3.9 On the above grounds, it is prayed that the petition be allowed. 4. Mr. The order of the competent Civil Court ought to be considered and respected by the respondents. When the suit itself has been dismissed, no ground remains for passing of the order of recovery. 3.9 On the above grounds, it is prayed that the petition be allowed. 4. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the respondents, has strongly opposed the petition by submitting that the petitioner has been granted reasonable opportunities of hearing by the Inquiry Officer and only after considering the evidence on record has the Inquiry Report been submitted. That all the relevant documents which were relied upon by the Inquiry Officer during the departmental inquiry have been supplied to the petitioner, therefore, the plea that no documents were supplied to him is not correct. 4.1 The petitioner has not been prejudiced by the non-supply of any documents as no prejudice has been proved by him. The petitioner was given photocopies of the available documents as the original documents were lying before the Civil Court. In the absence of any prejudice being caused to the petitioner, his stand that the departmental proceedings are vitiated due to the non-supply of documents, may not be accepted. 4.2 That the fact that the Inquiry Officer was appointed before the issuance of the charge-sheet has no relevance, particularly for the reason that the said Inquiry Officer was replaced by another Inquiry Officer. Even otherwise, there is nothing in law that prohibits the appointment of an Inquiry Officer prior to the issuance of a charge-sheet, especially when a Show-cause Notice had already been issued to the petitioner. 4.3 That criminal proceedings and a departmental inquiry are different in nature, having different standards of proof. In criminal proceedings, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required whereas, in departmental proceedings, the preponderance of probability is to be considered. Hence, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings can have no bearing in the departmental inquiry. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 . Hence, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings can have no bearing in the departmental inquiry. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Samar Bahadur Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 . 4.4 In reply to the contention of the petitioner regarding the non-supply of documents, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Panchmahal Vadodara Gramin Bank and others v. D.M. Parmar reported in (2011) 15 SCC 310, by submitting that non-supply of documents to the petitioner would not result in the violation of the principles of natural justice as the said documents have no bearing on charges levelled against the petitioner. 4.5 Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the scope of interference by the Court in a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. This Court may, therefore, refrain from reappreciating the evidence or interfering with the conclusions arrived at in the inquiry proceedings, especially when the same has been conducted in accordance with law. In support of this submission, reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. P. Gunashekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 . 4.6 Regarding the regularisation of the suspension period, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 10.06.2016, passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2783 of 2010 in Special Civil Application No. 10238 of 1998, wherein the Division Bench refused to grant the relief prayed for by the appellant therein, regarding treating the duration of suspension and dismissal as on duty. 4.7 On the basis of the above submissions, it is urged that the petition be dismissed. 5. In rejoinder, Mr. Vaibhav A. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has distinguished the judgment of the Division Bench dated 10.06.2016 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2783 of 2010, relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents by drawing the attention of the Court to Paragraph-10 of the said judgment and submitting that in the case before the Division Bench, the appellant therein had remained in custody for a period of forty-eight hours. In the present case, no FIR has been filed against the petitioner as the criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of a private complaint. There is, therefore, no question of the petitioner remaining in custody. Moreover, the appellant before the Division Bench had been convicted of offences by the Lower Court whereas, in the present case, the petitioner was honourably acquitted by the Trial Court and his acquittal has been confirmed by the High Court by a judgment dated 08.05.2013, passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 214 of 2008. 6. In the backdrop of the above factual and legal submissions, this Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition, contents of the impugned order and other documents on record. This Court has also accorded thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the Bar and the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respective parties. 7. The first issue raised by the petitioner is that several vital documents were not supplied to him either with the Show-cause Notice, so as to enable him to reply to it effectively, or with the charge-sheet, in order to enable him to put up a proper defence. It is further the case of the petitioner that though certain documents were supplied later on during the departmental proceedings, they were not so vital or crucial as the copies of the Stock Registers, which were not supplied, and which formed the basis of the charges against the petitioner. As per the petitioner, the failure to supply the vital documents has prejudiced his defence. This ground is required to be examined in light of the charges levelled against the petitioner. In the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner with the covering letter dated 01.10.1991, there are nine charges, in all. All the charges are based on documentary evidence. The main charge against the petitioner is Charge No. 1, which is to the effect that when the petitioner was posted as Assistant Manager (Gas), Palanpur from 05.01.1984 to 12.01.1986, he allegedly committed certain irregularities in respect of the Gas Cylinders inasmuch there was a shortfall of Gas Cylinders, Regulators, Rubber Tubes and Stoves, as compared to the Stock Register. Charges Nos. 2, 3 and 4 pertained to the year 1983, which period is before the petitioner took over charge as Assistant Manager. Charges Nos. 2, 3 and 4 pertained to the year 1983, which period is before the petitioner took over charge as Assistant Manager. However, the said charges have been found to be proved against the petitioner. All the other charges are consequential upon the first and main charge and need not be gone into in detail. 8. Insofar as the first charge is concerned, it pertains to the shortfall of the items indicated above, as compared to the Stock Register. According to the petitioner, when he took over charge, he found that there was already a shortfall of 209 Gas Cylinders and 77 Regulators. The Inquiry Officer did not consider this aspect at all. However, the Disciplinary Authority, in the impugned order dated 04.06.2008, has taken note of this submission of the petitioner and reduced the amount to be recovered from him to that extent. 9. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondents are themselves unsure of the number of Gas Cylinders, Regulators and Rubber Tubes that are in shortfall as different authorities have given different figures in this regard. This aspect has been highlighted by the petitioner in his defence brief before the Inquiry Officer. However, no note of it has been taken. The petitioner, time and again, has made several representations to the respondents, requesting them to supply him copies of the documents relied upon against him. It is an admitted position, as also recorded in the order of the Disciplinary Authority, that only some documents were supplied to the petitioner, but not all. The other documents were said to be with the Civil Court. In the representation dated 10.12.2011, the petitioner has demanded as many as thirty-seven documents. The petitioner has made several representations requesting for the same documents time and again. In the letter dated 19.01.1998, the respondents have informed the petitioner that out of the documents requested by him, only those at Serial Nos. 1 to 18 could be made available. The other documents could not be supplied to him as they were lying before the Civil Court. It is stated that as and when the documents are available, they would be supplied to him. 1 to 18 could be made available. The other documents could not be supplied to him as they were lying before the Civil Court. It is stated that as and when the documents are available, they would be supplied to him. It is an undisputed position that copies of the Stock Registers, which were crucial to the defence of the petitioner in order to point out that there was no shortfall in the items named after he took over charge, have not been supplied to him. As the main charge against the petitioner revolves around the shortfall in the said items, the copies of the Stock Registers would be the most relevant documents in the absence of which, it can be said, that the defence of the petitioner has been prejudiced. 10. The above view of the Court gains support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and others V. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), wherein it has been held as below: "21. We have noticed at some length the sequence of events and the efforts made by the respondent to receive copies of the documents which were relevant for the preparation of his defence in the departmental inquiry. As noticed earlier all the requests made by the respondent fell on deaf ears. In such circumstances, the conclusions recorded by the High Court were fully justified. 22. Copies of the documents which formed the foundation of the charge sheet against the respondents have been denied to the respondent on the lame excuse, as projected in the pleadings of the appellant, at different stages before the High Court as well as this Court, that the respondent, at the relevant time, was posted in the same division and the documents could have been received by him and the reply could have been given. According to the appellant all the concerned documents were with the Division in which the petitioner (respondent herein) was posted as Executive Engineer. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court it is specifically mentioned that the documents pertain to the same division in which the respondent had been posted as Executive Engineer and therefore he being in knowledge and custody of the said documents, there was no requirement for the said documents to be supplied to the respondent. In the counter-affidavit filed in the High Court it is specifically mentioned that the documents pertain to the same division in which the respondent had been posted as Executive Engineer and therefore he being in knowledge and custody of the said documents, there was no requirement for the said documents to be supplied to the respondent. The very same submission has been reiterated before us by the learned Counsel of the Appellants. In our opinion, the submission is without any basis as the respondent had been suspended on 5.2.2001. Even if the respondent had continued in the same department it would not have been possible for him to take the custody of the documents as he would no longer be in charge of the office. Furthermore, it is evident from the letter dated 19.11.2003 that the documents had to be collected from different offices and made available to the respondent. This fact is so mentioned in the letter of the Executive Engineer. In such circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that it was possible for the respondent to make an effective representation against the charge-sheet. 23. *** *** *** 24. A bare perusal of the aforesaid charges shows that the three charges were based on official documents/official communications. We have earlier noticed the relentless efforts made by the respondent to secure copies of the documents, which was sought to be relied upon, to prove the charges. These were denied by the department in flagrant disregard of the mandate of Rule 7 sub-rule 5. Therefore the inquiry proceedings are clearly vitiated having been held in breach of the mandatory sub-rule (5) of Rule 7 of the 1999 Rules. 25. *** *** *** 26. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-Rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation to the charge sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the Government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the enquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. Since the Government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross examination of the witnesses. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the enquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge sheet. Since the Government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross examination of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the enquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the enquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a Judge. Enquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents. 27. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the employee. 28. When a department enquiry is conducted against the Government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service. In the case of Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 US 206 (1953) (Jackson, J.), a Judge of the United States Supreme Court has said "procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied." 11. In the case of Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 US 206 (1953) (Jackson, J.), a Judge of the United States Supreme Court has said "procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied." 11. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the failure to supply some of the documents to the petitioner cannot vitiate the inquiry, as the petitioner has not shown what prejudice has been caused to him. This submission is required to be rejected outright, as the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the departmental proceedings that have been conducted without supplying the necessary documents to him is, in itself, a proof of the prejudice suffered by him. The petitioner has been maintaining, from the very beginning, that he requires the documents in order to put up a valid and effective defence. It is not as though the petitioner did not agitate to obtain the copies of the documents from the beginning. He has maintained throughout the inquiry proceedings that he be supplied with copies of the documents requested for by him, in order to put up an effective defence. Under the circumstances, the possibility cannot be ruled out that had the documents requested for by the petitioner been supplied to him, the result of the departmental proceedings could have been different. 12. Another glaring aspect of the matter is that the entire departmental proceedings have been conducted without any original documents. Only the Photostat copies of the documents available to the authorities, which do not constitute all the relevant documents, have been produced. No witnesses have been examined by the authorities, therefore, it cannot be said that the documents produced have been proved. Even though strict rules of evidence are not required to be followed in department proceedings, however, the basic rules of procedure require that the authenticity and genuineness of the documents used against the delinquent is established in accordance with law. 13. It can, therefore, be said that in the absence of original documents or any witnesses providing the Photostat copies of the available documents, there was no legally acceptable evidence from the Inquiry Officer on the basis of which he could have recorded the findings against the petitioner. 14. 13. It can, therefore, be said that in the absence of original documents or any witnesses providing the Photostat copies of the available documents, there was no legally acceptable evidence from the Inquiry Officer on the basis of which he could have recorded the findings against the petitioner. 14. One of the grounds raised by the petitioner is that of bias and a predetermined mindset formed by the authorities against him. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the Inquiry Officer has been appointed before the charge-sheet was even issued. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that this fact, in itself, would not prove bias, as the petitioner had already been issued a Show-cause Notice. Considering the seriousness of the consequences on the employee, it is expected that every departmental inquiry must be conducted as per the established procedure, which is that after the issuance of a charge-sheet, the defence of the delinquent employee is to be taken into consideration. If the defence is found to be satisfactory, no further proceedings are required to be undertaken. However, if the Disciplinary Authority finds the defence to be unsatisfactory, the Inquiry Officer would be appointed to initiate the departmental proceedings. In the present case, no such procedure has been followed. The appointment of the Inquiry Officer before the issuance of the charge-sheet would certainly indicate a predetermined mindset bent upon proceeding against the petitioner, even before the charges have been framed. This predetermination cannot be said to be bonafide, therefore, it discloses a biased attitude against the petitioner. 15. In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and others (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with just such a situation, in the following terms: "34. The High Court while delving into the issue went into the factum of announcement of the Chief Minister in regard to appointment of an Inquiry Officer to substantiate the frame of mind of the authorities and thus depicting bias - What bias means has already been dealt with by us earlier in this judgment, as such it does not require any further dilation but the factum of announcement has been taken note of as an illustration to a mindset viz. : the inquiry shall proceed irrespective of the reply - Is it an indication of a free and fair attitude towards the concerned officer? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. : the inquiry shall proceed irrespective of the reply - Is it an indication of a free and fair attitude towards the concerned officer? The answer cannot possibly be in the affirmative. It is well settled in Service Jurisprudence that the concerned authority has to apply its mind upon receipt of reply to the charge-sheet or show-cause as the case may be, as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative - the inquiry follows but not otherwise and it is this part of Service Jurisprudence on which reliance was placed by Mr. Subramaniam and on that score, strongly criticised the conduct of the respondents here and accused them of being biased. We do find some justification in such a criticism upon consideration of the materials on record." 16. We may now examine the question regarding the effect of acquittal in a criminal case upon the departmental proceedings. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the criminal case against him was based on the same set of facts and evidence as the departmental inquiry. After a full-fledged trial, the Criminal Court has acquitted the petitioner honourably, as there was no material to prove the allegations against him. The said acquittal ought to have been given due weight-age in the departmental proceedings. In this regard, it would be fruitful to refer to the judgment in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, wherein the Supreme Court has held as below: "31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." 17. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." 17. In the present case as well, there is an honourable acquittal in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment would be applicable. 18. In the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and another (supra), after noticing the entire law on this issue, including the judgment in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others (supra), the Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed that the appellant therein be compulsorily retired, on the ground that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings were based on similar facts and evidence and the honourable acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court ought to have been considered for the same charges by the Tribunal and the High Court. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as below: "25. The High Court has not considered and examined this legal aspect of the matter while setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has also not considered the same. We have examined this important factual and legal aspect of the case which was brought to our notice in these proceedings and we hold that both the High Court and Tribunal have erred in not considering this important undisputed fact regarding honourable acquittal of the appellants on the charges in the criminal case which are similar in the disciplinary proceedings." 19. Insofar as the aspect of the recovery is concerned, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Civil Suit instituted by the respondents against the petitioner for the purpose of recovery has been dismissed. The facts and evidence remaining the same, a different conclusion could not have been arrived at by the respondents regarding the recovery. The initial amount directed to be recovered from the petitioner was Rs. 2,46,106.80 paise, which was reduced by the Disciplinary Authority to Rs. 79,440.90 paise, taking into consideration the submission of the petitioner that when he took over charge, there was already a shortfall of 209 Gas Cylinders and 77 Regulators. The initial amount directed to be recovered from the petitioner was Rs. 2,46,106.80 paise, which was reduced by the Disciplinary Authority to Rs. 79,440.90 paise, taking into consideration the submission of the petitioner that when he took over charge, there was already a shortfall of 209 Gas Cylinders and 77 Regulators. The fact that the Disciplinary Authority has reduced the amount of recovery on the basis of the submissions of the petitioner would indicate that had the relevant documents, such as the copies of the Stock Registers, been supplied to the petitioner, he may have been in a position to prove that there was no discrepancy in the Stock, as is being maintained by him, from the very beginning. In that event, the amount of recovery would have further reduced or even been wiped out, if the petitioner had succeeded in proving his defence. The recovery has been calculated on the basis of the material pertaining to the Stock Registers in which the number of Gas Cylinders, Regulators and Rubber Tubes have been entered. When the charge against the petitioner is based upon documentary evidence, it follows that the recovery, if any, would also depend on the said documentary evidence. The entire gamut of the departmental inquiry, including all the charges against the petitioner, are based upon documentary evidence. Having arrived at the conclusion that the failure to supply vital documents, such as copies of the Stock Registers, to the petitioner has prejudiced his defence, it stands to reason that the prejudice would also extend to the issue of recovery which would also depend upon the same documentary evidence. The direction to effect recovery is a part and parcel of the impugned order, whereby the penalty has been imposed upon the petitioner. There cannot be different standards to judge the legality and validity of the departmental inquiry sans the supply of relevant documents and another standard for the recovery. The view of the Court that the petitioner has been prejudiced on account of the failure on the part of the respondents in supplying the copies of the vital documents on which the charges are based that were necessary to prove his defence, would also extend to the order of recovery, thereby vitiating the impugned order in its entirety. 20. The view of the Court that the petitioner has been prejudiced on account of the failure on the part of the respondents in supplying the copies of the vital documents on which the charges are based that were necessary to prove his defence, would also extend to the order of recovery, thereby vitiating the impugned order in its entirety. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent has brought to the notice of this Court, a judgment of the Division Bench dated 10.06.2016, passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2783 of 2010, to buttress the submission that the period of suspension of the petitioner with effect from 12.08.1986 to 30.10.1989, is not required to be treated as on duty. Having perused the said judgment, this Court has noticed that the factual matrix of the case before the Division Bench was very different to that obtaining in the present case. In the case before the Division Bench, the appellant therein had been convicted by the lower Court, though acquitted by the High Court. He had also remained in custody for more than forty-eight hours. In the present case, no FIR has been filed against the petitioner as the criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of a private complaint. There is no question of the petitioner having remained in custody, at all. Moreover, the petitioner has been honourably acquitted by the Trial Court and the said acquittal has been confirmed by this Court, by the judgment dated 08.05.2013, passed in Criminal Revision Application No. 214 of 2008. The facts of the case before the Division Bench may have led to the conclusion that the suspension period of the appellant therein ought not to be treated as on duty. However, considering the entirely different facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that the period of suspension of the petitioner deserves to be treated as on duty. This is especially so, because the petitioner was placed under suspension for the sole reason that there were criminal proceedings against him. Now that this reason no longer exists after his honourable acquittal, there is no justification for not considering the regularisation of the period of suspension of the petitioner. 21. This is especially so, because the petitioner was placed under suspension for the sole reason that there were criminal proceedings against him. Now that this reason no longer exists after his honourable acquittal, there is no justification for not considering the regularisation of the period of suspension of the petitioner. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), in order to highlight the aspect that the standard of proof in criminal cases is different from that in departmental proceedings. There can be no dispute regarding this proposition of law. However, as held by the Supreme Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others (supra) and S. Bhaskar Reddy and another v. Superintendent of Police and another (supra), where the criminal proceedings end in an honourable acquittal, the judgment of the Criminal Court cannot be overlooked or ignored in departmental proceedings. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that considerable delay has occurred in the initiation and conclusion of the departmental proceedings and this delay has remained unexplained. Though it has not been argued on behalf of the petitioner that any prejudice has been caused to him due to the delay, however, it cannot be overlooked that the proverbial "Sword of Damocles", in the shape of the departmental inquiry, has remained hanging over the head of the petitioner from the year 1986 upto 2006. The respondents have taken their own sweet time in conducting the departmental proceedings. The pendency of the departmental proceedings over the period of about twenty years would have naturally caused great stress and strain to the petitioner. The respondent authorities appear to have treated the departmental inquiry as a casual exercise, oblivious to the fact that serious consequences can ensue to an employee, whose entire career can be marred. 23. The pendency of the departmental proceedings over the period of about twenty years would have naturally caused great stress and strain to the petitioner. The respondent authorities appear to have treated the departmental inquiry as a casual exercise, oblivious to the fact that serious consequences can ensue to an employee, whose entire career can be marred. 23. Insofar as the scope of judicial review of the disciplinary proceedings by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondents on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. P. Gunashekaran (supra), wherein it has been held that in exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot venture into re-appreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in inquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law. Neither can the High Court go into the reliability or adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on which findings are based, or correct an error of fact. Further, it is held that the Court may not go into the proportionality of the punishment, unless it shocks the conscience of the Court. 24. The above, well-established principles of law cannot be disputed by this Court. Applying the same to the facts of the present case, it emerges that the Court has neither re-appreciated the evidence or interfered with the conclusion in the inquiry proceedings, nor has it pronounced upon the reliability or adequacy of the evidence or reduced punishment on the ground that it is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has stated that the High Court can only consider whether the inquiry that has been held by the competent authority is in accordance with the procedure established by law and the principles of natural justice or whether irrelevant or extraneous considerations and/or exclusion of admissible or material evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence have influenced the decision, rendering it vulnerable (see Paragraphs-12 to 19 and 6 to 8 of the reported judgment). In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner cannot be said to have been validly conducted in accordance with the procedure established by law, as certain crucial and vital documents, on which the effectiveness of the defence of the petitioner hinged, have admittedly not been supplied to him. This has also led to the violation of the principles of natural justice. Under the circumstances, the interference by this Court would be in consonance with the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. 25. The above discussion, as also the reasons stated hereinabove, leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that the impugned order dated 04.06.2008, passed by respondent No. 1 (Disciplinary Authority) and the impugned order dated 24.11.2010, passed by respondent No. 2 (Appellate Authority), cannot be sustained in law and deserve to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, both the said orders are hereby quashed and set aside. 26. The respondents are directed to take a fresh decision with regard to the period of suspension from 12.08.1986 to 30.10.1999, in light of the observations made by this Court, as expeditiously as possible but not later than a period of three months from the date of the receipt of a copy of this judgment. 27. The petition is allowed, in the above terms. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs.