JUDGMENT : C. V. BHADANG, J. 1. By this petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the judgment and order dated 10/11/2014, passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Goa in Panchayat Election Petition No.24/2012. By the said judgment, the Election Petition filed by the first respondent has been allowed, by which the election of the petitioner (the respondent before the Administrative Tribunal) from Ward No.VI of Bandora Village Panchayat, has been declared void. 2. Brief facts, necessary for the disposal of the petition, may be stated thus : That the petitioner and first respondent were the contesting candidates for the election to Ward No.VI of Bandora Village Panchayat, Taluka Ponda. The election was held on 16/05/2012. The results were declared on 17/05/2012, wherein, the petitioner was declared elected. The election of the petitioner was challenged by the first respondent before the Administrative Tribunal. The case made out in the petition was that the petitioner is a registered Government Contractor and has executed several Government contracts. One such contract was for construction of a footpath near Naga Masjid at Kurti in Ponda Constituency, which contract was subsisting on the date of filing of the nomination i.e. on 26/04/2012. The date of completion of the work as per the said contract was 17/06/2012. It was, thus, contended that the petitioner was disqualified to contest the election in view of Section 10A of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Act of 1994, for short) read with Section 9A of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 ('Act of 1951', for short). 3. The petitioner contested the matter. It was contended that the Election Petition was not maintainable as the dispute as regards disqualification under Section 10 of the Act of 1994 has to be decided by the Election Commission. It was contended that Section 9A of the Act of 1951 was not applicable to a local body. It was further contended that the civil work of construction of the footpath undertaken by the petitioner was within the limits of Village Panchayat Kurti-Khandepar, Taluka Ponda, whereas he had contested the election from Ward No.VI of Bandora Village Panchayat. The material contention was that the contract was not subsisting as on the date of filing of the nomination, as the civil work of construction of the footpath was completed by the end of February, 2012. The material contention was that the contract was not subsisting as on the date of filing of the nomination, as the civil work of construction of the footpath was completed by the end of February, 2012. It was contended that the measurement of the work was carried out and the bill was prepared by PWD on 07/03/2012. In short, it was contended that the petitioner has discharged all the obligations under the said contract before the end of February, 2012 and as such, there was no subsisting contract as on the date of filing of the nomination. 4. On the basis of rival pleadings, the Tribunal raised the following issues : "1. Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent no.1 is disqualified for being chosen as member of Village Panchayat of Bandora under Section 10(a) of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 r/w Section 9A of the representation of the Panchayat Act, 1951' 2. Whether the petitioner proves that there was subsisting contract of the respondent no.1 with the Government for execution of work undertaken by the Government at the time of Panchayat Election; 3. Whether the respondent proves that the contract was concluded before filing of nomination of Panchayat Election; 4. Whether the respondent proves that the petition is not maintainable and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same; and 5. What prayer, what relief." 5. The petitioner and the first respondent examined themselves in respect of their respective contentions. 6. The Tribunal found that the Election Petition was maintainable. It was further found that there was a subsisting contract, as on the date of the nomination and the petitioner had failed to establish that the contract stood concluded as on that date. In that view of the matter, the petition was allowed, declaring the election to be void. 7. I have heard Shri Bhobe, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Pangam, the learned Counsel for the first respondent and Shri Joshi, the learned Counsel for the third respondent. 8. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act of 1994, a dispute as to disqualification has to be dealt with by the Election Commission and cannot be a subject matter in an Election Petition. 9. 8. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that under Section 20(1)(a) of the Act of 1994, a dispute as to disqualification has to be dealt with by the Election Commission and cannot be a subject matter in an Election Petition. 9. It is next submitted that the civil work under the contract was completed by the end of February, 2012 i.e. much before filing of the nomination on 26/04/2012. He submitted that the contract cannot be said to be subsisting as on the date of filing of the nomination. The learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner was not allowed to bring the relevant material on record to show that the measurements were taken on 07/03/2012, which would be apparent from the entries from the measurement book. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on Section 9A of the Act 1951, in order to submit that the disqualification shall continue only as long as the contract with the Government subsists. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the explanation to Section 9A of the Act of 1951, in order to submit that where the contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract, either wholly or in part. It is submitted that the civil work having been completed and as the PWD had taken the measurement of the same on 07/03/2012, it has to be held that the contract was concluded and there was no subsisting contract as on the date of filing of the nomination. The learned Counsel was at pains to point out that the disqualification has serious civil consequence and a declaration of the election, being void, cannot be granted lightly. It is, thus, submitted that such a declaration can be granted only when there is a clear case made out and substantiated. 10. On the contrary, the learned Counsel for the first respondent has supported the impugned judgment. It is submitted that in a case where the elected candidate was disqualified as on the date of the filing of nomination/ election, the same can be subject matter of Election Petition. He submits that the contention on behalf of the petitioner is without any merit. 11. It is submitted that in a case where the elected candidate was disqualified as on the date of the filing of nomination/ election, the same can be subject matter of Election Petition. He submits that the contention on behalf of the petitioner is without any merit. 11. The learned Counsel has pointed out the cross-examination of the petitioner, in which he has admitted that on the date of filing of the nomination of election, the responsibility to answer or to make good any defect, if found, in the said work, was on the petitioner. He, therefore, submits that the liability under the contract was subsisting as on the date of filing of nomination/ election. The learned Counsel submits that the petitioner did not issue any reply to the letter dated 25/05/2012 (Exh.A3) and it was not the case set up in the Election Petition that the work, as referred to in the said letter, was a different work than the laying of the footpath near Naga Masjid at Kurti, Ponda. In such circumstances, the Administrative Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner was disqualified on account of the subsisting contract. 12. The second respondent is a formal party. 13. I have carefully considered the rival circumstances and the submissions made. 14. It would be first necessary to deal with the contention about the maintainability of the Election Petition based on Section 20 of the Act of 1994, to the extent relevant, which reads thus : "20. Grounds for declaring election to be void. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the prescribed authority is of opinion, - (a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen as member under this Act; or (b) ….. (c) ….. (d) ….. the prescribed authority shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. (2) ….." 15. The Election Petition filed by the first respondent is under Section 16 of the said Act. Subsection (1) of Section 16, which is relevant for the purpose, reads thus : "16. Election Petition. (c) ….. (d) ….. the prescribed authority shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. (2) ….." 15. The Election Petition filed by the first respondent is under Section 16 of the said Act. Subsection (1) of Section 16, which is relevant for the purpose, reads thus : "16. Election Petition. - (1) No election to fill a seat or seats in a Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition prescribed on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 20 and section 21 to such authority as may be prescribed, by any candidate at such election or by any voter qualified to vote at such election together with a deposit of five hundred rupees as security for costs, within thirty days from, but not earlier than, the date of declaration of the result of the election of the returned candidate at the election, and if the dates of declaration of the results of their election are different, the last of these dates." 16. It can, thus, be seen that, under Section 20 of the Act of 1994, the prescribed authority, can take action, on satisfaction and on formation of opinion, as contemplated under clauses (a) to (d) of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the said Act. The Election Petition under Section 16 of the Act of 1994 is an independent remedy, which can be resorted to by any candidate at such election (as in the present case) or by any voter qualified to vote at such election. Thus, the power of the prescribed authority, under Section 20 being an independent power, cannot come in the way of the Administrative Tribunal (which is the Prescribed Authority) to entertain an Election Petition under Section 16 of the Act of 1994. The contention, therefore, has no merit and cannot be accepted. 17. This takes me to the merits of the matter. It is undisputed that the date of nomination was 26/04/2012 while the polling was held on 16/05/2012. The results were declared on 17/05/2012. It is further undisputed that the petitioner was awarded Government contract for laying of the footpath, as per the work order dated 06/12/2011 and the date of the completion of the contract was 17/06/2012. It is undisputed that the date of nomination was 26/04/2012 while the polling was held on 16/05/2012. The results were declared on 17/05/2012. It is further undisputed that the petitioner was awarded Government contract for laying of the footpath, as per the work order dated 06/12/2011 and the date of the completion of the contract was 17/06/2012. It can, thus, be seen (going by the date of the work order and the completion date) that the contract would normally be subsisting, during the entire election process. The case made out by the petitioner is that he completed the work in February, 2012 and the PWD Authorities had taken measurements on 07/03/2012 i.e. much before the date of filing of nomination. On this basis, it is claimed that the contract was not subsisting as on the date of the filing of nomination. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to the cross-examination of the petitioner, in which he has stated that on completion of the contract, there was no maintenance period. He further stated that at the time of filing of the nomination and election, it was his responsibility "to answer or make good if any defect is found in the said work and it is required to be cured." Although it was tried to be contended that the letter dated 25/05/2012 (Exh.A3), (in which the petitioner was informed about certain defects in the work), was received, it was contended that the letter pertains to some other work by another contractor. The petitioner has neither issued any reply to the said letter nor any such case was made out before the Tribunal. It is trite that no amount of evidence can be allowed or can help in the absence of relevant pleadings. That apart, in my considered view, this aspect would also be inconsequential. This is because, what is relevant is the subsistence of the liability under the contract. Thus, even assuming that there was no defect found in the work, which was undertaken by the petitioner, that cannot derogate from the fact that, as on the date of the nomination, the petitioner was responsible to make good any defect, if found. This liability is the crux of the matter and not the actual incident for its exercise. Thus, even assuming that there was no defect found in the work, which was undertaken by the petitioner, that cannot derogate from the fact that, as on the date of the nomination, the petitioner was responsible to make good any defect, if found. This liability is the crux of the matter and not the actual incident for its exercise. In my considered view, even assuming that the petitioner had physically completed the civil work, the question is about any subsisting liability under the contract. 18. It would now be necessary to notice Section 9A of the Act of 1951 reads thus : "9A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc. - A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part." 19. It is trite that any contract involves reciprocating rights, duties and obligations, which are to be mutually performed. The physical completion of civil work and the subsisting responsibility to either maintain or to make good the damage/ loss within a specified period are two aspects, which are the obligation of the petitioner under the contract. The payment of consideration would be the responsibility of the Government. Taking note of the explanation to Section 9A, because the payment is not received (which would be an act to be performed by the Government), the contract cannot be said to be subsisting. However, as long as the liability to make good the loss or damage, (if noticed), in the work is concerned, that was the liability of the petitioner and if such liability was in existence on the date of the nomination, then, it is difficult to accept that the contract stood concluded. In my considered view, it has to be held that the contract was subsisting. 20. Section 10(a) of the Act of 1994 reads thus : "10. Disqualification for membership. In my considered view, it has to be held that the contract was subsisting. 20. Section 10(a) of the Act of 1994 reads thus : "10. Disqualification for membership. - - A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Panchayat if, - (a) he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of the elections to the State Legislature: Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years;" Thus, on a conjoint reading of Section 10(a) of the Act of 1994 and Section 9A of the Act of 1951, the petitioner would be disqualified on account of the fact that the contract was subsisting. 21. I would now briefly refer to the submission that the petitioner was not allowed to produce secondary evidence. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, during the course of arguments at bar, stated that the petitioner wanted to produce certain documents to show that the measurements were taken on 07/03/2012 and the work was complete. I have considered this aspect. As noticed earlier, the physical completion of the civil work and the continuing responsibility to make good the damage are distinct aspects of the obligations of the petitioner under the contract. Therefore, even assuming that the civil work was completed in February, 2012, the liability to make good the damage was subsisting. Thus, I do not find that any different conclusion can be reached by sending the matter back to the Administrative Tribunal. I have carefully gone through the impugned order and I see no infirmity in it, so as to warrant interference. The petition is without any merit and it is dismissed, with no order as to costs.