ORDER 1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiff, which was admitted on following substantial question of law :- a. Whether the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is made out, is perverse in the state of evidence on record ? 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal briefly stated are that the appellant/plaintiff filed the suit seeking the relief of declaration, permanent injunction and possession. The trial Court dismissed the suit filed by plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 3.4.2007. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal on 16.7.2007 along with an application for condonation of delay, as the appeal was barred by 2 months and 8 days. In the application for condonation of delay, the appellant had stated that he could not receive the information about the judgment and decree dated 3.4.2007 passed by the trial Court as his mother was not well. The appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 7.1.2011 rejected the application on the ground that no sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is made out. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay was rejected and in the result, the appeal was dismissed. 3. It is well settled in law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice- that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It has further been held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. [See: State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [ (2000)9 SCC 94 ]. 4. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal position, facts of the case may be seen. In the instant case, the plaintiff No.1 was aged about 69 years and was not keeping well, who eventually expired on 15.11.2010. The plaintiff No.3 who is son was taking care of her mother and the appellant is a rustic villager, who resides in a village and could not receive information from his counsel about the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The plaintiff No.3 who is son was taking care of her mother and the appellant is a rustic villager, who resides in a village and could not receive information from his counsel about the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Even otherwise, for the fault committed by the counsel, a party should not be penalised. [See: Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another [ AIR 1981 SC 1400 ] and Secretary, Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh and another v. Raghu Raj [ AIR 2009 SC 514 ]. 5. For the aforementioned reasons, the substantial question of law“framed by this Court is answered in the affirmative. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The judgment and decree dated 7.1.2011 passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside. The lower appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal preferred by the appellant on merits expeditiously in accordance with law. In the result, the appeal is allowed.