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Tripura High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 142 (TRI)

Md. Jamir Ali v. Md. Liyakat Ali

2016-07-15

S.C.DAS

body2016
JUDGMENT : This second appeal under Section 100 read with Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 10.08.2011 and 11.08.2011 respectively passed by learned District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Title Appeal No.15 of 2011, whereunder, the learned District Judge set aside the judgment and decree dated 06.04.2011 and 08.04.2011 respectively, passed by learned Civil Judge, Sr. Division, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Title Suit No.11 of 2010. 2. The second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the appellant as plaintiff acquired title by adverse possession to the suit land?” 3. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Deb, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. Ratan Dutta for the appellant and learned counsel, Mr. P. Roy Barman and Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharjee for the respondents. 4. The appellant as plaintiff(hereinafter mentioned as plaintiff) instituted Title Suit No.11 of 2010 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, North Tripura, Kailashahar seeking declaration that he acquired right, title and interest in the suit land, RSA NO.68 OF 2011 Page 3 of 24 described in the Schedule of the plaint, by way of adverse possession. It is contended by the plaintiff that the suit land originally belonged to one Firuz Ali, the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 5 and the plaintiff entered into possession of the suit land on 08.02.1990 and constructed two huts and a sanitary latrine in the suit land, planted various fruit trees and possessing the same continuously and uninterruptedly denying right, title and interest of the original owner within the full knowledge of the defendants and other people of the neighbourhood. It is alleged by the plaintiff that he is in possession of the suit land for more than twenty years uninterruptedly and that on 15.01.2010 the defendants made an attempt to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land and hence he instituted the suit seeking declaration of his right, title and interest by way of adverse possession in the suit land. 5. The defendant-respondents(hereinafter mentioned as defendants) by filing a common written statement pleaded that Firuz Ali, the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 5 purchased the suit land along with other land by a registered deed dated 06.03.1969 from one Sona Miah and thereafter he sold 0.40 satak of land to Rehana Begum by a registered deed dated 03.03.1980. 5. The defendant-respondents(hereinafter mentioned as defendants) by filing a common written statement pleaded that Firuz Ali, the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 5 purchased the suit land along with other land by a registered deed dated 06.03.1969 from one Sona Miah and thereafter he sold 0.40 satak of land to Rehana Begum by a registered deed dated 03.03.1980. After the death of Firuz Ali, his legal heirs also sold 0.20 satak of land to Md. Abruch Ali, the defendant No.6. There was mutation of the land in the name of the parties pursuant to the sale transactions. It is also contended by the defendants that the plaintiff has a plot of land by the side of the suit land and in the year 2000 the plaintiff requested the defendants to use the suit land by making his house temporarily until he constructed his house in his own land. The defendants allowed the plaintiff to temporarily stay in the suit land and it was in the year 2000 but thereafter the plaintiff did not construct his house in his own land and hence the defendants asked the plaintiff to vacate the suit land and the village Pradhan also requested the plaintiff but the plaintiff did not vacate the suit land and possessing the suit land. It is emphatically denied by the defendants that the plaintiff has been possessing the suit land by constructing his hut since 08.02.1990, denying the right title of the defendants. 6. The trial Court considering the pleadings framed following four issues: “1. Has the plaintiff his cause of action for instituting the present suit? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to get declaration to the fact that he has right, title and interest in the suit land on the basis of adverse possession? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to get any other relief/relieves in the suit?” 7. In course of trial the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and also examined two more witnesses, namely PW2, Azab Ulla and PW3 Masuk Ali. In support of his case the plaintiff also proved Khatian No.128 and Khatian No.525 of Mouza Pakhirbada marked as Exbt.1 and Exbt.2. 8. The defendants in their turn examined three witnesses, namely DW1 Md. Sahid Miah, S/O original owner Sona Miah, DW2 Abruch Ali and DW3 Liyakat Ali. In support of his case the plaintiff also proved Khatian No.128 and Khatian No.525 of Mouza Pakhirbada marked as Exbt.1 and Exbt.2. 8. The defendants in their turn examined three witnesses, namely DW1 Md. Sahid Miah, S/O original owner Sona Miah, DW2 Abruch Ali and DW3 Liyakat Ali. The defendants also proved Exbt.A i.e. Khatian No.128 and Exbt.B i.e. Khatian Nos.525. 9. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 10. Aggrieved, the defendants preferred Title Appeal No.51 of 2011 in the Court of District Judge and the learned District Judge by impugned judgment and decree dated 10.08.2011 and 11.08.2011 respectively reversed and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and hence this second appeal. 11. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration of right, title and interest by way of adverse possession. Burden heavily lies on the plaintiff to prove that he acquired title over the suit land by way of adverse possession. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land belonged to Firuz Ali, the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 5 and Abruch Ali, the defendant No.6, who were/are the owners of the suit land. Exbt.1 and Exbt.2 and Exbt.A and Exbt.B are the same khatians in the names of Firuz Ali and defendant No.6 which show that the suit land was mutated in their names after their respective purchase. 12. It is a settled proposition of law that possession follows title(Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K. C. Alexander : AIR 1968 SC 1165 ). It is ordinarily to be presumed that the possession is with the rightful owner. If somebody claims possession denying title of the rightful owner, burden heavily lies on him to prove that he has acquired hostile title as against the rightful owner. 13. Possession must be distinguished from mere occupation or detention. Possession in the eye of law consists of the fact of physical occupation and dominion and control as well as the consciousness of mind of the person having dominion over an object that he has it and can exercise it. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting “possession” in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting “possession” in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. Legal possession is occupation with the intention of exercising the right of ownership in respect of it. Mere acts of user which do not interfere and are consistent with the owner’s title, are not sufficient to constitute dispossession of the owner or start adverse possession in favour of the occupant. Whether in particular circumstances, the acts of the occupation means to possession and whether such possession is on behalf of the legal owner or in opposition to his title are matters of inference to be drawn from proved facts. 14. The concept of ‘adverse possession’ contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others right but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Here, burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that his possession is hostile under a colour of title, actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the coexistence of two distinguished ingredients; first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for a full statutory period. 15. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb has submitted that the plaintiff clearly stated about his claim of adverse possession in his pleadings and evidence. The trial Court therefore rightly considered the pleadings and the evidence and decreed the suit. According to Mr. Deb, the muffosil pleadings should be liberally construed and he referred the case of Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram reported in (2007) 9 SCC 641 (paragraphs 11 and 17). 16. On the other hand Mr. The trial Court therefore rightly considered the pleadings and the evidence and decreed the suit. According to Mr. Deb, the muffosil pleadings should be liberally construed and he referred the case of Des Raj v. Bhagat Ram reported in (2007) 9 SCC 641 (paragraphs 11 and 17). 16. On the other hand Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel has submitted that there is nothing in the plaint as to how the plaintiff entered into the possession of the suit land and whether the defendants agreed or resisted at the time when he entered into possession of the suit land. There is no such pleading or evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim. The defendants contended that the plaintiff has his own plot of land by the side of the suit land and the plaintiff requested the defendants to use the suit land for his temporary stay until he constructs his house in his own land and they allowed it in the year 2000. When the plaintiff was not vacating the suit land the defendants demanded the plaintiff to vacate the suit land but the plaintiff denied and then the suit has been instituted. 17. The pleadings of the plaintiff claiming title by adverse possession stated substantially in paragraph 2 of the plaint which reads as follows: “2) That, the suit land originally belonged to one Firoje Ali who was the father of the defendant Nos.1-5 and the original recorded owner but the plaintiff is in absolute possession over the suit land, and has been using and enjoying the suit land by constructing 2 two Nos of dwelling huts with two kitchen and by constructing Sanitary latrine and by planting many valuable and fruit bearing trees therein since 1990 A.D. i.e. since 8/2/1990 by exercising all the acts of possession and living with his family members continuously, uninterruptedly and denying the right, title of the original owner with full knowledge of the defendants and the people of neighbourhoods. It is mentionable here that, the real owner Firoje Ali has died about 20 years ago leaving behind the defendant Nos.1 to 5, further mentionable here that, some land including the part of suit land has been recorded in the name of defendant No.6 any how without knowledge of the plaintiff.” The evidence of the plaintiff to establish his adverse possession reads thus- “2) That, the suit land originally belonged to one Firoj Ali who has died about 20 years ago, leaving behind the defendants Nos 1-5. I have been using and possessing the suit land Adversely denying the right, title of the real owners since 8-2-1990 A.D. by constructing 2 Nos. of dwelling huts, two(2) Kitchens and sanitary latrine and by planting valuable trees and fruit bearing trees Viz:- Jackfruits, coconuts, mango, etc. within the suit land, continuously and uninterruptedly and without any hindrance from the side of the defendants are the locality.” There is nothing in the above pleadings or evidence of the plaintiff that on 08.02.1990 he entered in the possession of the suit land denying the title of rightful owner. On the other hand, the clear and unambiguous stand of the defendants is that in the year 2000 the plaintiff was allowed to use the suit land temporarily till his own house is constructed in his land, situated by the side of the suit land and when the defendants demanded the suit land the plaintiff refused to vacate it and thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit. 18. The plaintiff claimed title by way of adverse possession w.e.f. 08.02.1990 and according to the plaintiff the defendants made an attempt to dispossess him on 15.01.2010. Admittedly, the suit filed on 22.02.2010. 19. Article 64 of the Limitation Act prescribes provision to bring a suit for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title. One has to file the suit within twelve years from the date of dispossession. Article 65 prescribes that one can bring a suit for possession of immovable property based on title within twelve years from the date the possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the person claiming title by adverse possession. So the burden heavily lies on the plaintiff to come with clear pleadings and evidence in support of his hostile assertion of right in the suit land. The plaintiff is the person claiming title by adverse possession. So the burden heavily lies on the plaintiff to come with clear pleadings and evidence in support of his hostile assertion of right in the suit land. The plaintiff actually stated nothing in his pleadings or evidence as to how he entered in possession of the suit land and under what circumstances. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land belonged to the defendants. It is the case of the defendants that they allowed the plaintiff to use the suit land temporarily in the year 2000. It is the case of the plaintiff that he entered in the possession on 08.02.1990, obviously, the question arises as to how he entered and in what circumstances he entered in the possession? Whether the defendants raised any objection or not and whether he denied such objection at the time when he entered in the possession? Mere continuous possession for twenty years does not in any way confer hostile title of the plaintiff in the suit land. The Apex Court in the case of Des Raj(supra) in paragraphs 11 and 17 held thus- “11. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants herein affirming the said view holding that “no arrangement was arrived at between the co-sharers” to the effect that the respondents would be cultivating the land on behalf of other co-sharers stating: "Be it noticed that no such arrangement was shown to have been ever agreed by the parties nor have the contesting defendants pleaded any such arrangement in the written statement. The arrangement contemplated in tankih(Ext.P-2] with regard to denial of the share of Bhagat Ram in the joint land of Village Punjoh, was a reason for Bhagat Ram to claim an exclusive title in the disputed land situate at Village Samleu and the offer itself was not a part of any mutual arrangement. Since the contesting defendants did not allow Bhagat Ram to have a share in the joint land of Punjoh, Bhagat Ram staked his claim of exclusive ownership in the disputed land situated at Samleu Pargna Chuhan and did not allow the contesting defendants to have any share in the disputed land of Samleu for that reason. Since the contesting defendants did not allow Bhagat Ram to have a share in the joint land of Punjoh, Bhagat Ram staked his claim of exclusive ownership in the disputed land situated at Samleu Pargna Chuhan and did not allow the contesting defendants to have any share in the disputed land of Samleu for that reason. This was a clear and open denial of the title of the contesting defendants in the disputed land, may be for the reason that the contesting defendants had not allowed the plaintiff to have a share in the joint land of Village Punjoh. So, it is not correct that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land under some mutual arrangement." It was further held that repudiation of title of the defendant by the plaintiff was open and hostile. Xxxxxxxxxxxxx 17. It may be true that in his plaint, the plaintiff did not specifically plead ouster but muffosil pleadings, as is well known, must be construed liberally. Pleadings must be construed as a whole.” The above observation of the Apex Court, in my considered opinion does not in any way support the case of the plaintiff. So, this argument advanced by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb is of no help at all. 20. This High Court in the case of Basanta Kumar Ghosh v. Premananda Nama reported in (2014) 2 TLR 83 in para 24 held thus “24. Learned counsel also referred the decisions of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jamila Begum & Ors. V. Sudhir Chandra Paul and Ors., reported in (2013) 1 TLR 896 and the case of Tapasi Rani Das & Ors. V. Sajal Das, reported in (2013) 2 TLR 992. Both the judgments were scribed by me (S. C. Das, J.). In both the cases, it has been held that by “adverse possession” is meant possession which is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the co-existence of two distinct ingredients: first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for the full statutory period. Adverse possession is made out by the co-existence of two distinct ingredients: first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for the full statutory period. In both the reported decisions the nature of possession, which should be considered as adverse possession has been categorically discussed.” 21. In the case of Gopal Krishna Deb & Ors. v. Jagadindra Kishore Dev Barma & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 Tripura 21, the Court has held that to prove title to any land by adverse possession it is not sufficient to show that some acts of possession have been done. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is adverse to the owner. In other words, the possession must be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued during the time necessary to create a bar under the statute of limitation. In the facts of that particular case, the Court has held that where the defendants had remained in permissive possession for a few years and their application for the land being settled to them was rejected and they had prayed for time to vacate on account of rainy season but they did not plead adverse possession they could not be deemed to be in adverse possession as against the real owner and the real owner would be deemed to have remained in possession. 22. In the case of Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak & Ors. v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 376 the Supreme Court has held thus :- “To establish ouster in cases involving claim of adverse possession the defendant has to prove three elements namely, hostile intention; long and uninterrupted possession; and exercise of the right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the owner. In cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but it commences from the date when the defendant’s possession became adverse.” 23. In the case of S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Supreme Court has held that the claim of adverse possession must be clearly pleaded. In the case of S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Supreme Court has held that the claim of adverse possession must be clearly pleaded. The Court has held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. In that reported case, there was no evidence when possession became adverse, if at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession “several 12 years” or that the plaintiff had acquired “an absolute title” was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. 24. Referring to S.M. Karim (supra), the Supreme Court in Balkrishan v. Satyaprakash reported in (2001) 2 SCC 498 in para 7 has observed thus- “7. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three nec-nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent. In S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina : AIR 1964 SC 1254 speaking for this Court Hidayatullah, J.(as he then was) observed thus: “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.” 25. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Durai v. Muthu & Ors., reported in (2007) 3 SCC 114 has held thus: “7. The change in the position in law as regards the burden of proof as was obtaining in the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-à-vis the Limitation Act, 1963 is evident. Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act,1963. Once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession.” 26. Once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession.” 26. It is argued by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land which is an admitted position. The appellate Court has ignored the provision of Section 27 of the Limitation Act and arrived at a wrong finding that the plaintiff could not prove his hostile title in the suit land. Section 27 of the Limitation Act reads as follows: “27. Extinguishment of right to property.-At the deter mination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." 27. To get advantage of the above provision the plaintiff has to prove his own case without taking any support from elsewhere that he is in possession of the suit land denying the title of the rightful owner with a hostile assertion in continuity and with the intention all along that he denied the right of the rightful owner. There is neither pleading nor evidence to that effect, rather, I find that defendant No.6 purchased the part of the suit land by registered deed on 26.09.1999 and got possession over the suit land. That fact is not disputed by the plaintiff. Firuz Ali, the predecessor of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and defendant No.6, Abruch Ali got mutation of the suit land in their names as reflected in Exbt.1 and Exbt.2 and Exbt.A and Exbt.B, which are same khatians in the names of Firuz Ali and Abruch Ali. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court perhaps did not notice the fact that in both the khatians the mutation case number has been mentioned. Khatian No.128 in the name of Firuz Ali shows that mutation was done vide M.R. No.126/1993 and 297/2000. Khatian No.525 shows that mutation in the name of Abruch Ali was done vide M.R. No.297/2000. It is therefore clear that khatian in the name of Firuz Ali i.e. the predecessor of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 was prepared after his purchase of the suit land vide M.R. No.126/1993 and when the part of the suit land was sold to defendant No.6, the khatians were prepared afresh vide M.R. No.297/2000. It is therefore clear that khatian in the name of Firuz Ali i.e. the predecessor of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 was prepared after his purchase of the suit land vide M.R. No.126/1993 and when the part of the suit land was sold to defendant No.6, the khatians were prepared afresh vide M.R. No.297/2000. Those are finally published khatians as per Section 43 of the TLR & LR Act and the entries made in the khatians is to be presumed as correct until contrary is proved. There is entry in the khatian that Firuz Ali and Abruch Ali were the permanent raiyat and there is no entry in the khatian that the plaintiff was in possession of the land belonged to Firuz Ali and Abruch Ali. While those khatians were prepared in the year 2000 under a mutation case and had the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land before 2000, at the time of mutation, his name ought to have been reflected in the khatian. The pleadings and the evidence of the defendants that the plaintiff was allowed to temporarily stay in the suit land in the year 2000 till his house was constructed in his own land is strengthened by this documentary evidence. 28. In the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors., reported in (2009) 16 SCC 517 the Supreme Court has observed that the law of adverse possession which ousts a owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law should not place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. The law should not place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. The Court in paras 14 and 23 has observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. 29. It is argued by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that the observation made in Hemaji Waghaji Jat(supra) is a wishful thinking of the Hon’ble Judges and it is not reflecting the correct law in position in India in respect of extinguishment of right by elapse of time. He has also referred the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham reported in [2002] 3 All ER 865 and has submitted that the said decision was basically based on the principles of human rights and according to Mr. Deb while the limitation law is still in force and it is clearly prescribed that the right will be extinguished if a person is not in possession, cannot be ignored until and unless the law is changed. He has also submitted that the decision in the case of Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala reported in (2014) 1 SCC 669 also flows from the same principle which should be appreciated in the context of the existing law and not in derogation of the same. In the case of Gurdwara Sahib (supra) the Apex Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment has observed thus: “8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and without RSA NO.68 OF 2011 Page 20 of 24 any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” 30. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.” 30. Learned counsel, Mr. Roy Barman has also referred the case of State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in 2012 AIR SCW 276 and in that case the Apex Court has relied on Hemaji Waghaji Jat(supra) as well as the other reported cases and ultimately in paragraphs 42 to 51 observed thus: 42. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the British. The Parliament may consider abolishing the law of adverse possession or at least amending and making substantial changes in law in the larger public interest. The Government instrumentalities - including the police -in the instant case have attempted to possess land adversely. This, in our opinion, a testament to the absurdity of the law and a black mark upon the justice system's legitimacy. The Government should protect the property of a citizen - not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property. While it may RSA NO.68 OF 2011 Page 21 of 24 be indefensible to require all adverse possessors - some of whom may be poor - to pay market rates for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser amount would be realistic in most of the cases. The Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the equities of a given case. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. 43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. 44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse possession, the Parliament might simply require adverse possession claimants to possess the property in question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension would help to ensure that successful claimants have lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title. 45. Reverting to the facts of this case, if the Police department of the State with all its might is bent upon taking possession of any land or building in a clandestine manner, then, perhaps no one would be able to effectively prevent them. 46. It is our bounden duty and obligation to ascertain the intention of the Parliament while interpreting the law. Law and Justice, more often than not, happily coincide only rarely we find serious conflict. The archaic law of adverse possession is one such. A serious re-look is absolutely imperative in the larger interest of the people. 47. Adverse possession allows a trespasser - a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law - to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 49. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. 48. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. 49. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. 50. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No Government Department, Public Undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case. 51. In our considered view, there is an urgent need for a fresh look of the entire law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to immediately consider and seriously deliberate either abolition of the law of adverse possession and in the alternate to make suitable amendments in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.” 31. The plaintiff in the present case has utterly failed to establish his claim of adverse possession. The documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff as well as the defendants shows that in the year 2000 under a mutation case the khatians in the name of Firuz Ali and defendant No.6 was prepared, whereas, there was no entry in the khatian that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit land from 08.02.1990 or from any date whatsoever. It is the clear case of the defendants and not disputed by the plaintiff that defendant No.6 purchased the part of the suit land in the year 1999 and thereafter mutation of the land of Firuz Ali as well as defendant No.6, Abruch Ali was made vide M.R. No.297/2000 and that entry in the records of right has to be presumed as correct until contrary is proved as prescribed under Section 43 of the TLR & LR Act. The plaintiff utterly failed to make out any case of adverse RSA NO.68 OF 2011 Page 24 of 24 possession and the trial Court committed wrong by decreeing the suit which has been correctly interfered by the appellate Court. 32. The present appeal, therefore, stands dismissed with costs. The judgment and decree dated 10.08.2011 and 11.08.2011 respectively passed by learned District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Title Appeal No.15 of 2011 are upheld. 33. Send back the LCRs along with a copy of this judgment.