ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant – State of Jharkhand [respondent in W.P.(S) No. 6464 of 2013] being aggrieved by the Judgment dated 02.02.2015 has preferred the instant appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court (as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court). Learned Single Judge, after referring to the Judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 258 of 2015 in the case of 'The State of Jharkhand through its Deputy Secretary, Home Department Vs. Kaliman Bibi and others' directed the Director Genral – cum – Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand to take a decision on the plea of the writ petitioner for payment of compensation in lieu of death of her father, a Chowkidar in Bhandara Police Station of Lohardaga, on 26.01.2001 during service period in extremist violence, relying upon the Resolution dated 21.03.2001 where under the compensation payable in such cases have been enhanced to Rs.10 Lac. instead of Rs.2.50 Lacs. as prevalent under the preexisting Resolution dated 05.03.1997. 2. The undisputed facts of the present case also is that the State Government sanctioned the amount of compensation of Rs.2.5 Lacs. vide order no. 857, dated 13.02.2002 i.e. after coming into force of Resolution dated 21.03.2001. Only thereafter, the writ petitioner was paid compensation by cheque dated 07.06.2002 on approval of the office of the Accountant General. In fact the decision to grant compensation was taken after coming into force of the Resolution dated 21.03.2001 in place of the earlier Resolution dated 05.03.1997. 3. The challenge to the Judgment passed by learned Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 258 of 2013, dated 23.01.2015 (Annexure-3 to the memo) has also been declined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (CC) No. 14639 of 2015, Judgment dated 17.08.2015 (Annexure-4 to the memo). The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the Special Leave Petition having found no legal and valid ground for interference however was pleased to set aside the cost awarded by Division Bench. There is no distinguishing feature in the present case from that of the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(S) No. 626 of 2003. L.P.A. No. 258 of 2013 arose from the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in the said case. In that matter husband of the writ petitioner died on 25.01.2001 while the decision to pay compensation of Rs.2.5 Lacs. There is no distinguishing feature in the present case from that of the Writ Petitioner in W.P.(S) No. 626 of 2003. L.P.A. No. 258 of 2013 arose from the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in the said case. In that matter husband of the writ petitioner died on 25.01.2001 while the decision to pay compensation of Rs.2.5 Lacs. was taken on 13.09.2001 and payment order upon approval of the Accountant General was issued on 13.02.2002. 4. Another striking feature which also needs to be noticed here is that the present writ petitioner is the daughter of one Late Sheikh Kareem @ Kareem Ansari who died in the same extremist violence of 25.01.2001 in which husband of Kaliman Bibi [petitioner in W.P.(S) No. 626 of 2003] had also suffered death. This fact is evident from perusal of the impugned order itself. Therefore, the instant appeal does not merit any interference on any counts. 5. It would be profitable to quote the opinion of the learned Division Bench on the scope and ambit of the Circular dated 21.03.2001. “11. In the aforesaid background, we consider it imperative that an approach which advances the course of justice and confers benefit conceived under the provisions of new scheme dated 21st March, 2001, be extended to the victim family of such an extremists violence like the writ petitioner whose case admittedly was decided on 13th September, 2001 and payments thereof were made by the office of Accountant General through payment order dated 13th February, 2002 i.e. after coming into force of new scheme on 21st March, 2001. The scheme of 21st March, 2001 was implemented with immediate effect and though it did not use the word supercession, but from the aims and objects and the language used therein it in effect replaced the earlier scheme of 5th May, 1997 which was in vogue on the same subject. Therefore, though the scheme of 21st March, 2001 cannot be said to have a retrospective effect but the claims arising out of such extremists violence not closed till coming into force of the new scheme would be definitely covered by its beneficial provisions. The contention of the appellant that the provisions of the scheme dated 21st March, 2001 has been made retrospectively applicable to the case of the writ petitioner is not correct. The contention of the appellant that the provisions of the scheme dated 21st March, 2001 has been made retrospectively applicable to the case of the writ petitioner is not correct. The analogy drawn by the counsel for the appellant to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 vis-a-vis the liability arising out in relation to an incidence covered under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are misplaced in view of the specific provisions of Repeal and Savings contained in such Act/Legislation i.e. Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In fact, Section 217 (4) also provides that mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act with regard to the effect of repeals. Therefore, the Patna High Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. reported in 1996 (2) PLJR 329 and in (1997) 1 BLJR 188 after considering the effect of repeal and savings as provided under Section 217 of the New Act and other relevant provisions came to a conclusion that the Insurance Company cannot be saddled with the liability beyond the statutory limit fixed under section 96(2) (b) of 1939 Act merely because on the date of passing of the order the Act of 1988 was came into force. The judgment on the same principles relied upon by the appellant in the case of K.S.Paripoornan Vs. State of Kerala and others reported in (1994) 5 SCC 593 (Supra) and in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 (Supra) are also inapplicable to the present case. In the instant case as has been found the scheme does not provide for any savings clause and has replaced an existing scheme of 5th May, 1997. Since the case of the writ petitioner was never decided under the old scheme, it is found to be covered under the new scheme, which came into force from 21st March, 2001. The new scheme, therefore does not operate retrospectively but governs the case of the petitioner which had never been decided under the old scheme which was replaced by new scheme of 21st March, 2001.” 6. Learned AAG Mr. The new scheme, therefore does not operate retrospectively but governs the case of the petitioner which had never been decided under the old scheme which was replaced by new scheme of 21st March, 2001.” 6. Learned AAG Mr. Ajit Kumar has not been able to make out any distinction in the present case from the Judgment rendered in the case of State of Jharkhand Vs. Kaliman Bibi and others (Supra). 7. Before parting it is indeed pertinent to observe that despite the fact that the issues stood clearly answered by the Judgment passed in the case of Kaliman Bibi (Supra) and upheld by the Apex Court in S.L.P.(CC) No. 14639/2015 (also enclosed in the memo of appeal as Annexure4), the appellant has chosen to assail the order directing them to decide representation of the writ petitioner in light of the law laid down in the aforesaid case. 8. There is huge delay of 391 days in preferring the instant appeal. However, on consideration of the matter, we condone the delay. 9. I.A. No. 4789 of 2016 stands disposed of. 10. In the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, this appeal stands dismissed. The appellant shall carry out the direction of the Ld. Single Judge in terms of the Scheme dated 21.03.2001 without any delay. Appeal dismissed