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Allahabad High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1427 (ALL)

RADHA SOAMI SATSANG BEAS v. STATE OF U. P.

2016-04-19

SHAMSHER BAHADUR SINGH, SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2016
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Ritesh Khatri assisted by Sri Kartikeya Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh for respondent Nos. 1 and 3. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed by Radha Soami Satsang (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Society’), a religious society registered with Registrar of Societies, at Jullundar under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1860”). Society purchased a piece of land measuring 4.53 acres in Khasra Nos. 733 to 742 from Malkhan Singh and Vikram Singh vide registered sale-deed dated 13th August, 1991. It further proposed to purchase another piece of land measuring 4.9110 acres in Khasra Nos. 730, 731, 732, 737, 743, 744, 745, 747 and 846 in Village Baraula, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad pursuant to agreements for sale dated 23.12.1991 and 29.1.1992. 3. Uttar Pradesh Legislature enacted U.P. Industrial Development Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1976”) and thereunder constituted an Industrial Development Authority, Ghaziabad named as “New Okhla Industrial Development Authority” (hereinafter referred to as “NOIDA”). Notifications dated 17th April,1978 and 18th May, 1978 under Act, 1976, were issued whereunder, besides others, land purchased and possessed by petitioner, stated above, was brought within authority of NOIDA. Subsequently by notification dated 11th July, 1989 village Baraula itself was brought within the authority of NOIDA. 4. For the purpose of planned industrial development in Ghaziabad, NOIDA intended to acquire certain land in various villages including village Baraula. On the requisition sent by NOIDA, State Government initiated proceedings for acquisition of land under provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,1894). In furtherance of above, a notification dated 6.1.1992 under Section 4(1) of Act,1894 was published in Gazette dated 15.2.1992 and in daily newspaper “Amar Ujala”, Meerut on 1.2.1992. The State also invoked Section 17(1) & (4) of Act,1894 and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5A of said Act. This writ petition was filed initially challenging Notification dated 6.1.1992 published under Section 4(1) of Act, 1894 and this Court while entertaining the same, passed an interim order on 14th February, 1992 to the following effect: “Sri Awasthi has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent No. 2. He prays for and is granted three weeks’ time to file counter-affidavit. Learned Standing Counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3. He prays for and is granted three weeks’ time to file counter-affidavit. Learned Standing Counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3. He also prays for and is granted a month’s time to file counter-affidavit. List this petition after expiry of the aforesaid period. Meanwhile the petitioner shall not be dispossessed in pursuance of notification dated 6.1.1992 from the disputed plots. However, this order shall not preclude the respondents for taking further proceeding in the matter.” 5. Subsequently the writ petition was amended by inserting para 15A and amendment of relief clause. The amendment became necessary for reason that Notification dated 20.4.1992 under Section 6 of Act,1894 was also published in Gazette dated 11.7.1992. To assail the same para 15A was added and in prayer, relief in respect of Notification dated 20.4.1992 was also added. 6. State of U.P. filed counter-affidavit, pointing out that acquired land is an agricultural land and its nature and user cannot be changed by petitioner. It justified acquisition stating that for planned industrial development it was necessary and entire procedure followed by State is strictly in accordance with provisions of Act, 1894. 7. Rejoinder-affidavit was filed by petitioner in October, 1994 stating that possession of disputed land has not been taken by respondents in view of interim order passed by this Court and petitioner is continuing in possession thereof. 8. Since then matter has been pending and twice it was dismissed for want of prosecution i.e. on 7.8.2007 and 24.3.2015 but restored by orders dated 18.2.2008 and 18.9.2015, respectively. In the meantime, we find from record that petitioner has filed three supplementary-affidavits and respondent No. 1 has filed a supplementary counter-affidavit. 9. First supplementary-affidavit sworn on 9th March, 2014 has been filed to reiterate that petitioner is in possession and occupation of land in use for religious purposes, holding spiritual discourse twice in a week i.e. Thursday and Sunday. It further referred to Section 24(2)of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,2013”) and states that in view of said provision, acquisition has lapsed. Second supplementary-affidavit dated 5.8.2014 reiterates the same facts as stated in first supplementary-affidavit. It further referred to Section 24(2)of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,2013”) and states that in view of said provision, acquisition has lapsed. Second supplementary-affidavit dated 5.8.2014 reiterates the same facts as stated in first supplementary-affidavit. Besides that, it is said that award has been passed long back and more than 5 years have lapsed but no compensation has been paid to petitioner-society and the requirement of Section 31 of Act, 1894 has not been complied with. It is also said that petitioner-society is having continuous, actual and physical possession. Reliance is also placed to a decision in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014)3 SCC 183 . 10. Third supplementary-affidavit is dated 8th October, 2015. It brings on record copy of award dated 31st October, 1996, delivered by Additional District Magistrate(Land Acquisition), Ghaziabad/Special Land Acquisition Officer (in short “SLAO”). 11. Respondent No. 1 in its turn has filed a supplementary counter-affidavit sworn by Sri Kamta Prasad Singh, Additional District Magistrate(Land Acquisition), Gautam Budh Nagar on 17th February, 2016. It is said that possession of entire acquired area excluding land possessed by petitioner was taken and handed over to NOIDA on 9.7.1994. Land possessed by petitioner could not be taken in possession by respondents due to interim order dated 14th February, 1992 passed by this Court in this writ petition. It is also admitted that award was given, determining compensation on 31st October,1996 by SLAO and acquisition proceedings thus have completed in 1992 as well as in 1996. 12. Sri Ritesh Khatri, Advocate assisted by Sri Katikeya Saran have appeared for petitioner and confined their argument only to the extent that neither compensation has been paid nor possession of disputed land has been taken by respondents, therefore, acquisition in question so far as disputed land is concerned, has lapsed by operation of Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 and petitioner is entitled to such declaration that disputed land is no more subject to acquisition under Notifications dated 6.1.1992 and 20.4.1992 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Act,1894 respectively. 13. 13. Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, Advocate who has appeared on behalf of NOIDA, contended that possession could not be taken due to interim order passed by this Court and there was no fault on the part of respondents, hence proceedings of acquisition cannot lapse and Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 has no application in the case. He has further submitted that as per own admission of petitioner, land measuring 4.9110 acres of Khasra Nos. 730, 731, 732, 737, 743, 744, 745, 747 and 846 was not owned by it when acquisition notification under Section 4 of Act, 1894 was issued/published. If sale-deeds were executed subsequently, petitioner is a mere subsequent purchaser, hence cannot challenge acquisition of aforesaid land which has not been objected by original owners of said land and to that extent no benefit of Act, 2013 can be allowed since erstwhile owners of land are not before this Court and they have not challenged acquisition at all. 14. We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused record as also studied relevant statutory provisions and judicial authorities on the subject. 15. From record, certain facts, evident are, that acquisition of land measuring 146-18-18 bighas (91.840 acres) in village Baraula, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad was proposed for which notification dated 6.1.1992 under Section 4(1) was published in U.P. Gazette dated 15th February, 1992. It was published in two newspapers on 1.2.1992 and 4.2.1992 and public information was given on 10th March, 1992. Thereafter Notification under Section 6 (1) of Act, 1894 dated 20.4.1992 was published in U.P. Gazette dated 11.7.1992. Possession of acquired land was taken on 9th July, 1994. Except disputed land and some more measuring 16-10-10 bigha (10.32 acres), remaining land was taken in possession. The disputed land remained in possession of petitioner in view of interim order dated 14th February, 1992 passed in this writ petition. SLAO heard objections under Section 9 on 8th February, 1993 and delivered award determining compensation on 31st October, 1996. Compensation payable to petitioner, however, is neither paid nor deposited in Court. 16. Petitioner has claimed purchase of land in two steps. In first step, 4.53 acres of land was purchased vide sale-deed dated 13.8.1991 and in second step it claimed to have owned 4.9110 acres of land pursuant to agreements for sale dated 23.12.1991 and 29.1.1992. Compensation payable to petitioner, however, is neither paid nor deposited in Court. 16. Petitioner has claimed purchase of land in two steps. In first step, 4.53 acres of land was purchased vide sale-deed dated 13.8.1991 and in second step it claimed to have owned 4.9110 acres of land pursuant to agreements for sale dated 23.12.1991 and 29.1.1992. It is not stated anywhere in writ petition or rejoinder-affidavit or various supplementary-affidavits that pursuant to agreements for sale dated 23.12.1991 and 29.1.1992 any sale-deed was actually executed between owners of land and proposed buyer i.e. petitioner till the date of notification issued under Section 48 of Act, 1894. 17. One of the questions which has cropped up is, “whether on the date when acquisition proceedings commenced with notification dated 6.1.1992 issued under Section 4 of Act, 1894, petitioner can be said to be owner of 4.9110 acres of land.” 18. It requires us to examine the effect and consequence of agreements for sale i.e. “whether an agreement for sale would result in transfer of title from vendor to prospective vendee.” Thus we have to examine legal status and consequences flowing from document, namely, agreement for sale or contract for sale. 19. The agreement for sale or contract for sale, by itself is not an instrument giving effect to sale of immoveable property. The title to property agreed to be sold continued to vests in the vendor, in case of agreement for sale, but in case of sale, title or property vests with purchaser. In other words an agreement for sale is an executory contract whereas sale is an executed contract. An agreement for sale does not create an interest in the proposed vendee in the suit property but only creates an enforceable right in parties. An agreement for sale of property, and promise to transfer the property convey the same meaning and effect in law. A promise to transfer property is an agreement for sale of property. 20. In Maung Shwe Goh v. Maung Inn, 1917(1) Bom LR 179, Court considered Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”) and said that a contract for sale by virtue of Section 54 creates no interest in or charge upon the land. 21. 20. In Maung Shwe Goh v. Maung Inn, 1917(1) Bom LR 179, Court considered Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1882”) and said that a contract for sale by virtue of Section 54 creates no interest in or charge upon the land. 21. Again in Rupchand Balmukund Aharwala v. Jankibai Kanhyalal, AIR 1926 Bom 24, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court said that an agreement executed between the parties to divide property at the expiration of litigation would not create any interest on property under the provisions of Section 54 of Act, 1882. A temporary arrangement with regard to profits during litigation is nothing but a system evolved by parties amongst themselves for management of property during litigation and does not mean that it has created any right or interest in property itself. Court relied on an earlier decision of Privy Council in Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyarta, ILR (1922) Mad. 373, where a document, i.e., a memorandum regarding secession of jointness of parties making a declaration that from that timeforth the parties became entitled to possession and enjoyment of their properties in separate shares and further providing for execution of further deed effectuating partition would mean that document/memorandum itself did not create or declare or assign or limit or extinguish any right or interest in immovable property. 22. In English Law, there is recognition of two classes of ownership, legal and equitable but this has not been recognized in Indian Law. Here the Legislature has recognized, in its wisdom, only one owner. There has been a catena of authorities including that of Privy Council in Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah and others, AIR 1931 PC 196 , where it was observed that Indian Law does not recognize legal and equitable estates. Privy Council referred to and relied on earlier decisions in J.M. Tagore v. G.M. Tagore, (1872) IA Sup. Vol. 47 and Webb v. Macpherson, (1904) 31 Cal 57. Privy Council further said that by that law there can be only one owner. 23. It is thus evident that the law as it stands is very clear that contract for sale would not make proposed purchaser/vendee to be owner in equity of estate so long as the sale-deed is not executed and registered. Privy Council further said that by that law there can be only one owner. 23. It is thus evident that the law as it stands is very clear that contract for sale would not make proposed purchaser/vendee to be owner in equity of estate so long as the sale-deed is not executed and registered. Mere execution of contract for sale by itself would not create any right or interest in property. 24. In Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra and others, AIR 1967 SC 744 , it was held that a contract for sale does not create any interest in property. A three Judge Bench of the Court noticed distinction in law as it was prior to enactment of Act, 1882 and thereafter, in para 14 of the judgment, it said, that an agreement for sale entered into, prior to passing of Transfer of Property Act, could have resulted in creating an interest in land itself, in favour of purchaser. Thereafter Court referred to the change resulted with enactment of Act, 1882, and in para 17, said as under: “. . . . . a mere contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the immovable property and it therefore follows that the rule of perpetuity cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption even though there is no time limit within which the option has to be exercised.” (emphasis added) 25. Court also noticed, when agreement itself recited that sale-deed would be executed within three years, the purchaser had a right to sue for specific performance and this by itself means that agreement for sale does not create any right or interest in property. 26. In Jiwan Das v. Narain Das, AIR 1981 Delhi 291, a Single Judge in para 10 and 11 of the judgment, following Rambaran Prosad (supra) said: “10. . . . . . . the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate, No privity in estate can be deduced there from which can bind estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. 11. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed.” (emphasis added) 27. In Sujan Charan Lenka and others v. Smt. Pramila Mumari Mohanty and others, AIR 1986 Ori 74 , Court in para 7 of judgment said that a bare contract for sale of immoveable property does not create any interest in immoveable property. Referring to Section 54 of Act, 1882, it says: “7. . . . . . a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind the estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed.” (emphasis added) 28. A Division Bench in Dewan and sons Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1997 Delhi 388, said: “6. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as a result of agreement to sale dated 1st May. 1970 in respect of the properly in question, entered into between the petitioner and M/s. Goodwill India Limited, the petitioner had acquired a ‘vested right’ not only in the property in question bill also to claim a ‘No Objection Certificate’ on that basis, is devoid of substance. . . . . . In Kanaya Ram v. Rajender Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 371 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in cases where after oral sales mutation of lands was effected in favour of the transferees even then i.e. after the mutation of properties, no rights accrued in favour of the transferees in respect of such lands as the purported sales and the subsequent mutation based on those sales did not create any right or title in favour of the transferees as the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act were not complied with-their being no registered sale-deeds. In the present case too the agreement to sell dated the 1st May, 1970 in the absence of any registered sale-deed by itself would not be sufficient to create any right or title in favour of the petitioner in respect of the property in question. The registered sale-deed, admittedly, in respect of the property in question, was executed on 13-2-90 and thus the petitioners acquired a right and a title in respect of the property in question only after the execution of the registered sale-deed on 13-2-90.” (emphasis added) 29. The registered sale-deed, admittedly, in respect of the property in question, was executed on 13-2-90 and thus the petitioners acquired a right and a title in respect of the property in question only after the execution of the registered sale-deed on 13-2-90.” (emphasis added) 29. A person who has contracted to buy land is not the owner of any interest in the land and is, therefore, not competent to apply to set aside an execution sale of the same land. 30. Section 54 itself says that a contract for sale does not create any interest in or charge upon such property. This is what has been noticed by this Court in Indira Fruits and General Market, Meerut v. Bijendra Kumar Gupta, AIR 1995 All 316 . 31. In other words, a person having an agreement for sale in his favour does not get any right in the property except the right of litigation on that basis. Sometimes it is also described that a contract for sale is merely a document, creating a right to obtain another document. 32. In Imtiaz Ali v. Nasim Ahmed, AIR 1987 Del 36 , it was said that in absence of a registered sale-deed, nobody can call himself as owner by purchase on the basis of agreement for sale and power of attorney executed by alleged vendor in favour of prospective purchaser cum attorney. The agreement for sale, therefore, by itself does not create any status upon petitioner to enter into shoes of owner of property in dispute. 33. This Court has also taken similar view that an agreement to sell does not confer any right or interest in immovable property in Vinod Kumar Agarwal v. The XVIIIth A.D.J., Allahabad and others, 2013 (98) ALR 353 and Mam Chand and others v. Pramodini Srivastava and others, 2014(5) ADJ 231 . 34. In respect of land measuring 4.9110 acres no document of title has been placed on record to show that before commencement of acquisition proceedings, petitioner had a title on the said land. The owners of said land have not come to Court. Petitioner not being owner also cannot be heard to claim that it is entitled to receive compensation. In our view, petitioner has no right to challenge acquisition or claim land in respect of Khasra Nos. The owners of said land have not come to Court. Petitioner not being owner also cannot be heard to claim that it is entitled to receive compensation. In our view, petitioner has no right to challenge acquisition or claim land in respect of Khasra Nos. 730 to 732, 737, 743 to 745, 747 and 846 which constitute 4.9110 acres and to that extent writ petition has to fail as petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the same. 35. This question can further be examined from another angle though not so canvassed by petitioner. Even if we assume that subsequently or at some later point of time any sale-deed is executed, that would not make any difference inasmuch as a sale-deed executed after commencement of acquisition proceedings by publication of notification dated 6.1.1992 in Gazette dated 15.2.1992 under Section 4 of Act, 1894 will place the petitioner in respect to the land measuring 4.9110 acres in the category of “subsequent purchaser”. If that be so, even then exposition of law is very clear that as a subsequent purchaser one cannot challenge acquisition and limited right a subsequent purchaser has, is to claim compensation of land acquired by State. 36. Question as to what locus standi, a “subsequent purchaser” has to challenge acquisition proceedings under Act, 1894, has been considered time and again and some of such authorities may be noticed hereat. 37. This question came to be considered in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd., 1996 (3) SCC 124 , where Court observed in para 3 of judgment, as under: “3. ... It is well-settled law that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property.” (emphasis added) 38. In Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P., 1996 (7) SCC 426 , the Court said: “5. .... It is settled law that any person who purchases land after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. The object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to enter upon the land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any alienation of land after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title in the land is acquired thereunder.” (emphasis added) 39. In Ajay Krishan Shinghal etc. v. Union of India and others, 1996 (10) SCC 721 , Court in para 13 of judgment, referring to its earlier decisions in State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 2025 ; Gian Chand v. Gopala and others, 1995 (2) SCC 528 ; Mahavir and another v. Rural Institute, Amravati and another, 1995 (5) SCC 335 and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute, 1995 (3) SCC 583 , held that it is a settled proposition that after Notification under Section 6 is published, property under acquisition cannot be transferred and any such transaction is void. The subsequent purchaser at the best can only claim compensation of acquired land, claiming limited interest in the land, which his predecessor-in-title had. 40. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others, 1996 (11) SCC 698 , Court reiterated the aforesaid exposition of law. The aforesaid authorities were followed in Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others, 2008 (9) SCC 177 and in para 21 of judgment, Court said as under: “21. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is by now well-settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the compensation.” 41. In view of the aforesaid decisions it is by now well-settled law that under the Land Acquisition Act the subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would be only entitled to get the compensation.” 41. Thus the above discussion makes it clear that, petitioner, if is only a prospective vendee on the basis of agreements for sale dated 23.12.1991 and 29.1.1992 a subsequent purchaser, in view of any subsequent sale-deed, which is not disclosed or brought on record by petitioner, executed after commencement of acquisition proceeding, in either of situations, he has no right to challenge notifications, acquiring land under Act, 1894 and writ petition to that extent is bound to fail. 42. Now we proceed to consider petitioner’s challenge of acquisition proceedings in respect of land measuring 4.53 acres in Khasra Nos. 733 to 742 which he claims to have purchased vide registered sale-deed dated 13.8.1991. 43. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that in the present case, award has been made on 31st October, 1996 but physical possession of land of petitioner has not been taken and compensation has also not been paid. Therefore, under Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013, by operation of law, acquisition proceedings, vis-a-vis land of petitioner stand deemed lapsed. 44. It is an admitted case of respondents that neither possession has been taken nor compensation has been paid. 45. Award is on record. We find that petitioner’s land is not covered therein. Referring to interim order passed by Court in present writ petition, SLAO has observed that in respect of petitioner’s land matter shall be considered in the light of decision of writ petition. However, this observation is only in respect of possession but with respect to compensation SLAO has determined compensation of Rs. 31991271-58 in the aforesaid award. Referring to interim order passed by Court in present writ petition, SLAO has observed that in respect of petitioner’s land matter shall be considered in the light of decision of writ petition. However, this observation is only in respect of possession but with respect to compensation SLAO has determined compensation of Rs. 31991271-58 in the aforesaid award. Relevant portion in the award may be noted as under: {ks=Qy nj izfr oxZ xt izfrdj e; lEifRr 30 izfr'kr lksysf’k;e 12 izfr'kr vfrfjDr izfrdj ;ksx 130&8&1 ch?kk 69-42 27383938-19 8215181-46 7661500-73 ;k ifjlEifRr 1137157-75 341147-32 &&&&&& 394467-56259 oxZ xtZ LFkxu ls izHkkfor **    ** 3470175-64 1041052-69 &&&&&&& 4]92]50]153]78 Hkwfe16&10&10 ch?kk ;ksx%146&18&11 &&&&& 31991271-58 9597381-47 7661500-73 4]92]50]153]78 Area Rate per square yard Compensation including property 30% Solatium 12% Additional Compensation Total 130-8-1 Bigha or 394467.56259 square yard 69.42 Asset 27383938.19 1137157.75 8215181.46 341147.32 7661500.73 —————— Land affected by Stay 16-10-10 Bigha "  " 3470175.64 1041052.69 —————— 4,92,50,153,78 Total: 146-18-11 ———— 31991271.58 9597381.47 7661500.73 4,92,50,153,78 (English Translation by the Court) 46. Thus from award, what is evident, is that possession of petitioner’s land was not taken but in respect of entire land, compensation was determined besides solatium. Despite determination of compensation, it has not been paid to petitioner and a period of 19 years and more has lapsed in the meantime. It is also admitted that compensation payable to petitioner has also not been deposited in Court. That be so, apparently Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 would be attracted. 47. We shall examine effect of Section 24 of Act, 2013 in the light of above facts. Section 24 reads as under: “24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,189, - (a) Where no award under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” (emphasis added) 48. Section 24 (1)(a) states, if acquisition proceeding is initiated under Act,1894 but no award under Section 11 has been made, then provisions of Act, 2013, relating to determination of compensation, shall apply. Section 24 (1)(b) shall be attracted when acquisition proceedings were initiated under Act, 1894 and award under Section 11 has been made. However, sub-section (2), as an exception has non-obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where acquisition was initiated under Act, 1894, award was also made under Section 11, but 5 years or more period had passed prior to the commencement of Act, 2013 and physical possession of land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed with liberty to Government, if it so decides, to initiate fresh proceedings of acquisition under Act, 2013. 49. Proviso to Section 24(2) is applicable wherein award has been made but compensation in respect of majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries and it says that in such circumstances all beneficiaries, specified under notification of acquisition under Section 4 of Act, 1894, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with Act, 2013. 50. Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 came to be considered by a Three Judge Bench in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014)3 SCC 183 . 50. Section 24(2) of Act, 2013 came to be considered by a Three Judge Bench in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014)3 SCC 183 . Court held that Section 24(2) deals with non-ostante clause which has overriding effect over Section 24(1). If either of two contingencies is satisfied wherein award has been made 5 years or more prior to commencement of Act, 2013 i.e. (i) physical possession of land has not been taken or (ii) compensation has not been paid, Court held that such acquisition proceeding would be deemed to have lapsed. Court further considered that deposit of amount of compensation in Government Treasury cannot be treated equivalent to payment of compensation to land owner or any such person interested therein. For this purpose, it relied upon its earlier decisions in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 71 and Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes and others v. State of Goa and another, (2011) 11 SCC 506 , wherein Court categorically held that deposit of amount of compensation in State’s Revenue Department is of no avail and liability of interest subsists till amount is not deposited in Court. 51. An argument was also raised in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (supra) that land acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under Act, 1894 and they are not affected at all in view of Section 114 (2) of Act, 2013 but it was also rejected by observing that Section 114 (2) makes Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to provisions under Act, 2013. Since Section 24(2), by legal fiction provides that acquisition would be deemed to have lapsed, as soon as conditions mentioned therein are satisfied, applicability of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, is subject to satisfaction of Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013. 52. A two Judges’ Bench in Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 (6) SCC 586 (decided on 4.2.2014) again had occasion to consider Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013. Therein also admitted case was that award was made but neither possession was transferred nor compensation was paid to the land owners. 52. A two Judges’ Bench in Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 (6) SCC 586 (decided on 4.2.2014) again had occasion to consider Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013. Therein also admitted case was that award was made but neither possession was transferred nor compensation was paid to the land owners. In this view of the matter, Court held that Section 24(2) would apply and acquisition proceedings so far as appellant, Bharat Kumar is concerned, are deemed to have lapsed. Court permitted State to initiate appropriate proceeding for acquisition of land afresh in accordance with provisions of Act, 2013. Relevant extract of judgement reads as under: “Sub-section (2) of Section 24 commences with a non obstante cause. It is a beneficial provision. In view of this provision, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken by the acquiring authority though the award is passed and if the compensation has not been paid to the landowners or has not been deposited before the appropriate forum, the proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act is deemed to have been lapsed. 7. Keeping the aforesaid provisions in view, we have specifically looked into the assertions made by the appellant and the way it is countered by the respondents. In our opinion though the award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, they have not taken the physical possession of the land and have not paid the compensation to the appellant or had deposited the said compensation before an appropriate forum. 8. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, sub-section(2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act squarely applies to the appellant’s case and the appellant is entitled to relief sought for in their petition.” (emphasis added) 53. Learned Standing Counsel then submitted that possession could not be taken due to interim order passed by Court and, therefore, it could not be taken a ground for attracting Section 24 (2) of Act, 2013 inasmuch as respondents were not at fault in not taking possession but it is the interim order passed by Court which deprived them from taking possession. Applying principle of maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ i.e. ‘an act of Court shall prejudice no man’, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents submitted that no benefit should be given to petitioner on the ground that possession of land has not been taken by respondents. 54. Applying principle of maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ i.e. ‘an act of Court shall prejudice no man’, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents submitted that no benefit should be given to petitioner on the ground that possession of land has not been taken by respondents. 54. This question has been considered in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (2015) 3 SCC 353 (judgement is dated 10th September, 2014). Court in para 11 of judgement has said: “11.From a plain reading of Section 24 of the 2013 Act it is clear that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceeding might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any Court. In the same Act, proviso to Section 19(7) in the context of limitation for publication of declaration under Section 19(1) and the Explanation to Section 69(2) for working out the market value of the land in the context of delay between preliminary notification under Section 11 and the date of the award, specifically provide that the period or periods during which the acquisition proceedings were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court be excluded in computing the relevant period. In that view of the matter it can be safely concluded that the Legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) even if the proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a Court of law or for any reason. Such casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court in view of law on the subject elaborately discussed by this Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of T.N.” (emphasis added) 55. Following above dictum, same view has been taken in Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana and others, (2015) 3 SCC 341 . 56. Learned Standing Counsel then placed a G.O. dated 30th January, 2015 issued by Suresh Chandra, Principal Secretary, addressed to all Secretaries, Director (Land Acquisition), Commissioners and District Magistrates in State of U.P. referring to proviso inserted by Ordinance No. 9 of 2014. 56. Learned Standing Counsel then placed a G.O. dated 30th January, 2015 issued by Suresh Chandra, Principal Secretary, addressed to all Secretaries, Director (Land Acquisition), Commissioners and District Magistrates in State of U.P. referring to proviso inserted by Ordinance No. 9 of 2014. Even the effect of this Ordinance has been considered in Radiance Fincap Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 677 and it has been held that right conferred under Section 24(2) is a statutory right and cannot be taken away by Ordinance by inserting proviso to the said subsection, without giving retrospective effect to the same. Court relied upon its earlier decision in Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2015) 3 SCC 327 and said that proviso to Ordinance would make no difference. It is prospective in nature and cannot be applied to a case where Section 24(2) of Act, 2013, as enacted, has already come into operation and by operation of law acquisition has deemed lapsed before insertion of aforesaid proviso. To the same effect is the decision in Arvind Bansal and others v. State of Haryana and others, (2015) 3 Scale 200. 57. Similar view has been reiterated in Rajiv Choudhrie HUF v. Union of India and others, 2015 (3) SCC 541 (decided on 10.12.2014); Rajiv Chaudhrie HUF v. Union of India and others (decided on 6.2.2015) reported in 2015(3) Scale 203 and Karnail Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2015 (3) SCC 206 . 58. In view of above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that acquisition pursuant to impugned notifications dated 6.1.1992 and 20.4.1992 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Act, 1894 in respect to petitioner’s land measuring 4.53 acres in Khasra Nos. 733 to 742 has already lapsed and acquisition notifications, therefore, cannot be availed to deprive petitioner of aforesaid land. So far as land measuring 4.9110 acres in Khasra Nos. 730 to 732, 737, 743 to 745, 747 and 846 is concerned, petitioner has no title over the same when acquisition proceedings commenced and thus has no right to challenge acquisition proceedings in respect thereof. Hence in respect thereto, it is not entitled for any relief. 59. The writ petition is partly allowed. Impugned acquisition notifications dated 6.1.1992 and 20.4.1992 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Act, 1894, in respect of petitioner’s land measuring 4.53 acres in Khasra Nos. Hence in respect thereto, it is not entitled for any relief. 59. The writ petition is partly allowed. Impugned acquisition notifications dated 6.1.1992 and 20.4.1992 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Act, 1894, in respect of petitioner’s land measuring 4.53 acres in Khasra Nos. 733 to 742 are quashed, having deemed lapsed under Section 24 (2) of Act,2013. 60. No costs.