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2016 DIGILAW 143 (GAU)

State of Mizoram v. K. Chhawnthuama

2016-02-26

M.R.PATHAK

body2016
JUDGMENT : M.R. Pathak, J. Heard Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor, Mizoram appearing for the petitioner and Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. H. Lalmalsawmi, learned counsel appearing for the accused respondent. 2. Brief fact of the case is that on 13.12.2013 the informant (present Chief Minister of the State) lodged a written FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of Aizawl Police Station stating that around 07:00 pm on 11.12.2013, he received a malicious SMS from a Mobile Phone No. 8575891878' alleging that he indulged in certain malpractices during the last concluded Mizoram Assembly Election and by the said FIR the informant requested the O.C. concerned to take appropriate legal action against the perpetrator of the said serious crime. Accordingly, the said FIR was registered on 14.12.2013 and was numbered as Aizawl PS Case No. 373/2013 under Sections 171G IPC read with Sections 66A (a) & (b) of the Information Technology Act. During investigation, a mobile handset of NOKIA E72 bearing IMEI No. 353784040626139 from which said malicious SMS was presumed to be sent as per the investigating authority was seized from the house of the accused respondent on 13.12.2013 and later, on 17.12.2013 the said accused was arrested in connection with the said case. On completion of the investigation, police vide number 64/2014 dated 06.03.2014 filed the Charge-sheet in the said Aizawl PS Case No. 373/2013 under Sections 201/204/506/507 IPC read with Sections 66A (a) & (b) of the IT Act against the accused/appellant. 3. After hearing the Public Prosecutor for the prosecution and the counsel for the defence and after consideration of the matter, finding prima facie materials in the said Charge-sheet, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Aizawl, the Trial Magistrate by its order dated 26.05.2014 passed in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 arising out of said Aizawl PS Case No. 373/2013, framed charges under Section 201 IPC read with Sections 66A (a) & (b) of the I.T. Act against the accused respondent, but at the same time the Trial Magistrate came to an opinion that the Charge-sheet does not disclose any prima facie materials to frame the alleged charges of guilty of offences under Sections 201/506/507 of the IPC and accordingly dropped those charges against the accused respondent. 4. 4. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the Trial Magistrate, the Petitioner State preferred a Criminal Revision Petition under Section 399 Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge, Aizawl, which was registered as Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 with a prayer to set aside the said order of the Trial Magistrate dated 26.05.2014 with regard to the dropping of Sections 201, 506 & 507 of the IPC against the accused respondent. The said matter on being transferred was taken up for consideration by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl. 5. The Revisional Court after hearing the parties, going through the records, Charge-sheet etc. and following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1965 SC 1413 came to a finding that there is a material ground to charge the accused respondent under Section 201 IPC but upheld the decision of the Trial Magistrate with regard to the discharge of the Sections 506 & 507 IPC and hence, came to a conclusion that the order dated 26.05.2014 of the Trial Magistrate requires interference. Accordingly, the Revisional Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl by its Order dated 23.02.2015 passed in said Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 set aside the order dated 26.05.2014 of the Trial Magistrate passed in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 and directed him to frame charges against the accused respondent under Sections 201/204 of IPC and Sections 66A (a) & (b) of the I.T. Act, 2000. 6. The Petitioner State not being satisfied with the aforesaid decision of the learned Revisional Court preferred this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Sections 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside both, the Order dated 26.05.2014 passed by the Trial Magistrate in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 as well as the Order dated 23.02.2015 passed by the Revisional Court in said Criminal Revision No. 27/2014. 7. Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Petitioner State contended that both the Trial Magistrate as well as the Revisional Court without applying their judicial mind, in a very casual manner dropped Sections 506 & 507 IPC against the respondent accused without going through the materials & documents submitted by the prosecution. Mr. 7. Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Petitioner State contended that both the Trial Magistrate as well as the Revisional Court without applying their judicial mind, in a very casual manner dropped Sections 506 & 507 IPC against the respondent accused without going through the materials & documents submitted by the prosecution. Mr. Rokhum further submitted that the Investigating Officer of the case on the basis of the findings and available materials on record considering the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the accused respondent levelled the charges under Sections 506 & 507 IPC against him, which the Courts below without observing the details of the offences committed by the said accused respondent dropped those sections merely on technical ground without going through its merit. 8. Mr. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor in support of his arguments placed reliance on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (i) (1978) 1 SCC 118 [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)] and (ii) (1980) Suppl SCC 92 (V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI) & which are perused and considered. 9. Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel for the accused respondent submitted that the present petition being the 2nd revision petition is not maintainable against the Order dated 23.02.2015 passed in Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl and, as such, prayed for dismissal of the same forthwith. In this regard, Mr. Lianhrima, learned senior counsel relying on the Judgment in the case of State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu reported in (1979) 1 SCC 328 submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case observed that - the High Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court and the Sessions Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction when there was no error of fact or law arrived at by the trial Court or the Court of Sessions Judge. 10. Relying on the Judgment of State of Kerala v. Puttamana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri reported in (1999) 2 SCC 452 , Mr. 10. Relying on the Judgment of State of Kerala v. Puttamana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri reported in (1999) 2 SCC 452 , Mr. Lianhrima submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case have held that the revisional jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice and said Revisional Court cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated as a 2nd appellate jurisdiction and as such prayed that in such circumstances, the present criminal revision petition being not maintainable and sustainable, should be dismissed. 11. Chapter XXX of the Cr.P.C. contains Sections 395 to 405 that relates to Reference & Revision. Section 397 Cr.P.C. provides for calling for records to exercise powers of revision and sub-Section 3 of said Section 397 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: "397 (3). If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them." 12. Section 399 Cr.P.C. provides for Sessions Judge's Powers of Revision and the sub-Section 3 of said Section 399 reads that - "399 (3). Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other Court." 13. In the case of Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 241 , a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court have held that - "9. The inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by the Code. The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. As seen, under sub-section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any person" but the Code has not defined the word "person". The object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. As seen, under sub-section (3) of Section 397, revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by "any person" but the Code has not defined the word "person". However, under Section 11 of the IPC, "person" includes any company or association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not. The word "person" would, therefore, include not only natural person but also juridical person in whatever form designated and whether incorporated or not. By implication, the State stands excluded from the purview of the word "person" for the purpose of limiting its right to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Code for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offender, is enjoined to conduct prosecution on behalf of the society and to take such remedial steps as it deems proper. The object behind criminal law is to maintain law, public order, stability as also peace and progress in the society. Generally, private complaints under Section 202 of the Code are laid in respect of non-cognisable offences or when it is found that police has failed to perform its duty under Chapter XII of the Code or to report a mistake of fact. In view of the principle laid down in the maxim ex debito justitiae, i.e., in accordance with the requirements of justice, the prohibition under Section 397(3) on revisional power given to the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision under Section 401. So the State is not prohibited to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code." 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 655, have held that - "It is trite that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not." 15. In the case of Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 41 , Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - "While it is true that availing of the remedy of the revision to the Sessions Judge under Section 399 does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482, it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a Second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter. The High Court should interfere only where it is satisfied that if the complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of process of court or that the interests of justice otherwise call for quashing of the charges. If there are specific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredients of the offence taken cognisance of, it is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere." 16. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere." 16. In view of the above, the present revision petition filed by the State, being excluded from the purview of the word 'person', is maintainable and the Court on the basis of said backdrop and the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decides to proceed with this matter. 17. Perused the records of the Court below including the Charge-sheet of the Aizawl PS Case No. 373/2013 involved in this case. 18. From the perusal of the final report, the Trial Magistrate observed that the whole investigation relates to the sending of the alleged offensive and intimidating message through mobile phone which is an offence under Information Technology Act. The Trial Magistrate from the said final report also found that the accused respondent has been Charge sheeted under Sections 506 & 507 of the IPC, the general Act as well as under Sections 66A (a) & (b) of the I.T. Act, 2000, which is a special Act. After considering the entire matter and the final report of the police filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. available before him, the Trial Magistrate was of the view that the alleged offences against the respondent accused can be regulated and adequately dealt with under the provisions of the I.T. Act and if the accused respondent is allowed to be prosecuted under both the IPC and the IT Act, it will amount to multiple punishments for the same offence. Being prima facie satisfied, the Trial Magistrate decided to prosecute and try the accused respondent for the offence of criminal intimidation with mobile phone under one Act, the Information Technology Act, 2000 and charged him under Section 66A (a) & (b) of the I.T. Act and decided not to charge the accused under Sections 506 & 507 IPC. The Revisional Court also by its decision rendered on 23.02.2015 in Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 uphold the said decision of the Trial Magistrate. 19. Section 503 IPC defined Criminal intimidation and the charging section is Section 506 IPC. Section 503 IPC defines criminal intimidation and it reads as follows: "503. Criminal Intimidation. The Revisional Court also by its decision rendered on 23.02.2015 in Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 uphold the said decision of the Trial Magistrate. 19. Section 503 IPC defined Criminal intimidation and the charging section is Section 506 IPC. Section 503 IPC defines criminal intimidation and it reads as follows: "503. Criminal Intimidation. - Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation-A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section." 20. Section 506 IPC provides for punishment for the offence of Section 503 IPC that relates to criminal intimidation and it reads as follows: "506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. - Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.- And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." 21. Section 507 IPC is a provision of punishment to the offender committing the offence of criminal intimidation by anonymous communication and it reads as follows: "507. Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication. - Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the person form whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment provided for the offence by the last preceding section." 22. The essentials of Section 503 IPC are that - (1) threatening to a person with any injury - (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested and (2) the threat must be with intent - (i) to cause alarm to that person or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitle to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 23. From the reading of Section 506 IPC, it can be seen that the first part of said Section provides for imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both and the second part deals with a graver form of the offence of criminal intimidation which is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both if the threat to cause death or grievous hurt or to cause destruction of any property by fire or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or to impute chastity to a women. 24. Further essential ingredients of Section 507 IPC are that (i) the accused committed the offence of the criminal intimidation and (ii) he did so by anonymous communication or having taken precaution to conceal the name and abode the person from whom the threat comes. 25. Section 66A of the IT Act [as it was then prior to it was struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India decided in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, decided on 24th March 2015 reported in (2015) 5 SCC 1 relates to punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service etc. which reads as follows: 66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. which reads as follows: 66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. - Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,- (a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or (b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or (c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message. It is to be mentioned herein that both the impugned orders dated 26.05.2014 passed by the Trial Magistrate in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 as well as the order dated 23.02.2015 passed by Revisional Court in Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 was prior to 24th March 2015. 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Century Spinning. & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1972) 3 SCC 282 , with regard to framing of charge by trial magistrate have held that - "If upon consideration of all the documents referred to in Section 173 Cr.P.C., and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused and if after considering the documents and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that if there is no ground for presuming the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges. This necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the Magistrate is entitled and indeed has a duty to consider the entire material referred to referred to in Section 173 Cr.P.C. If, on this material, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it can appropriately consider the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused. The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." 27. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." 27. A three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 have held that - "Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., provides that: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or other wise to secure the ends of justice." In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. That in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. That in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. It is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on the record, if un-rebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. 28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 142 , have held that - "the Magistrate is first required to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and examine the accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard. If on such consideration, examination and hearing the Magistrate finds the charge groundless he has to discharge the accused in terms of Section 239 Cr.P.C.; conversely, if he finds that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable by him he has to frame a charge in terms of Section 240 Cr.P.C." 29. In the case of State of Orissa v. Habibullah Khan, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 129, the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to framing of charge under Cr.P.C. have held that - "It is not necessary to always accept the final report. It depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of State of Orissa v. Habibullah Khan, reported in (2003) 12 SCC 129, the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to framing of charge under Cr.P.C. have held that - "It is not necessary to always accept the final report. It depends on facts and circumstances of each case. There can and has to be an independent examination and application of mind by the judicial officer. On examination of facts, the judge has to decide to accept or not to accept the conclusion of the police that there is no material to prove the charge. The decision of the judge, at this stage, is of course prima facie." 30. From the perusal of the written complaint/FIR dated 13.12.2013 lodged by the complainant/informant, it can be seen that it does not contain any specific allegation against the sender of the anonymous SMS received from the mobile number 8575891878' that the sender threatened the complainant with injury to his person, reputation or property or it caused any alarm and since the said FIR dated 13.12.2013 of the informant, involved in this case, does not contain any ingredients of Sections 506 & 507 IPC, the learned Trial Magistrate rightly did not frame charge under the Sections 506 & 507 of IPC against the accused respondent. 31. From the above, it can safely be observed that the Trial Magistrate on consideration of the reports and documents available before him, being prima facie satisfied, did not frame the charge under Sections 506 & 507 of IPC against the accused respondent since a criminal Court would frame charge only if to his prima facie satisfaction there are grounds for presuming that the accused have committed the offence alleged against him. It is seen that the Trial Magistrate have it applied its judicial mind at the stage of framing charges to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence under Sections 506 & 507 of IPC by the accused respondent. 32. It is seen that the Trial Magistrate have it applied its judicial mind at the stage of framing charges to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence under Sections 506 & 507 of IPC by the accused respondent. 32. Though this petition has been filed by the State on 20.05.2015 after the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 24th March 2015 passed in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (supra) striking down Section 66A of the I.T. Act but they did not made any prayer before the Court or to approach the appropriate Court to alter the charge against the respondent accused. 33. It is a settled law that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code are to be exercised only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or it is necessary to pass orders in order to secure the ends of justice. Where Courts have exercised their discretion in a legal manner and have found that the Trial Magistrate by applying his judicious mind did not frame the charge under Sections 506 & 507 IPC, it would not be appropriate to exercise inherent powers in such a situation and to set aside the impugned orders. 34. It is seen that the Trial Magistrate while issuing the impugned Order dated 26.05.2014 in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 considered all the materials available before him carefully. After considering the submissions, the reasoning of the Trial Magistrate, this Court is of the considered opinion that the approach adopted by the Trial Magistrate cannot be termed as either materially irregular or contrary to law. Therefore, the Court is of the view that it would not be justified either to exercise its inherent power or to exercise its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned orders dated 26.05.2014 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Aizawl in Criminal Trial No. 2195/2013 in not framing charges under Sections 506 & 507 IPC against the accused respondent as well as the order dated 23.02.2015 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Criminal Revision No. 27/2014 by which it upheld the said decision of the Trial Magistrate. 35. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. 36. 35. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. 36. Registry shall send down the LCRs forthwith.