JUDGMENT : Mr. Arun Bhansali, J. This appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) CPC is directed against order dated 07.02.2014 passed by Additional District Judge, Churu, whereby, the application filed by appellant under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC has been rejected and it has been directed that the appellant shall pay Rs. 50,000/- as interim compensation. 2. A suit for permanent injunction was filed by the appellant indicating himself as Manager, S.R. Shopping Mall, Sardarshahar, District Churu. It was, inter alia, claimed that the plaintiff has a registered institution S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd., which is registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) whose Directors are – Rajkumar Soni (plaintiff’s father), Indra Devi, plaintiff, Pooja Devi, Sunil Kumar Soni and Mamja Devi; Firm is registered under the Trade Mark Act as S.R. Group whose registration number is 2769947 dated 25.07.2012; the plaintiff in the capacity of Manager of S.R. Group is looking after and doing all the work; the Firm is engaged in construction, repair and building and arranges material for construction of buildings. It was claimed that plaintiff’s firm S.R. Group, S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. have constructed S.R. Palace Hotel, S.R. Plaza, S.R. Complex in Sardarshahar and have got good reputation in the market; on account of such reputation and registration the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 contacted plaintiff’s father and gave oral contract for conducting business as S.R. Shopping Mall at their plot of land on 24.12.2010 by constructing commercial building, offices and residential flats in the name of S.R. Shopping Mall. It was then alleged that defendants entered into contract in the month of December, 2011 with plaintiff’s father Rajkumar Soni for construction of four storied building and it was agreed that the defendants would not spend any money on the construction, demolition of existing construction, excavation of the underground and the entire amount would be spent by the plaintiff; when plaintiff and his father sought a written agreement, they were assured that they would not be cheated; it was then claimed that agreement was entered by Bhagu Ram for demolition of the existing construction, with Surja Ram for excavation of the land and it was agreed that the amount for the said work would be paid by partner of S.R. Building – Indra Devi Soni. The construction work was given to Kanheya Lal and he was paid Rs. The construction work was given to Kanheya Lal and he was paid Rs. 3,00,000/- in cash as advance payment. It is claimed that the plaintiff continued to work and got the existing construction demolished, excavation done and started raising construction and spent a sum of Rs. 71,01,876/-. As soon as the construction was started, customers started approaching and agreements were executed with them. It was claimed that when the defendants started executing agreement with third parties without the consent of the plaintiff, the plaintiff insisted for putting the agreement on table, which resulted in the defendants getting excited and told that neither the plaintiff nor his father would be permitted to enter the construction site and that they have no relation to the premises; it was claimed that by oral agreement the plaintiff was told to be given 50% of the profit, construction charges and the name of the premises was kept as S.R. Shopping Mall, where after, allegations were made regarding the conduct of the respondents in seeking to ease out the plaintiff. Based on the said averments, the following reliefs were sought in the plaint:- ^^vr% oknk oknh is'k dj fuosnu gS fd nkok oknh cgd oknh f[kykQ izfroknh fuEu izdkj fMdzh Qjek;k tkosa& d & tfj;s fMdzh fpjLFkk;h O;kns'k izfroknhx.k la0 1 rk 3 dks oftZr fd;k tkos fd izfroknhx.k la0 1 rk 3 okn i= dh en la0 1 esa of.kZr vkl&ikl ds ifjlj ,l0vkj0 'kkWfiax ekWy okds okMZ ua0 31 fiukjk xyh ljnkj 'kgj ftlds mRrj esa jkLrk vke] nf{k.k esa gosyh tequknkl VkafV;k] iwoZ esa xyh can] if'pe esa gosyh o tehu 'kqHkdj.k Qqljkt] vkapfy;k o rksykjke ikf.M;k fLFkr gS] ds fdlh Hkh Hkkx ij fuekZ.k ugha djok;s ,oa mls oknh dh lgefr] lEefr] gLrk{kjksa ds fcuk fodz;] cU/kd] fxV ifjR;kx bR;kfn ugha djsa u dCtk gLrkUrj.k djsa u yht ij nsosa uk fdjk;s ij nsosa] uk vuqKk ij nsosa ,oa ,l0vkj0 'kkWfiax ekWy ds uke dk uktk;t bLrseky ugha djsa ,oa bl fufeZr Hkw[k.M esa fdlh izdkj dk ifjorZu] ifjorZu ugha djs rFkk ,l0vkj0 'kkWfiax ekWy tks ,l0vkj0 xzqIl ds rgr fuekZ.kk/khu gS ds uke dk nq:i;ksx ugha djsa ftlls oknh ds fof/kd vf/kdkjksa ij foijhr vlj iM+rk gksA [k & tfj;s vkKknk;h O;kns'k izfroknh la0 4 dks vknsf'kr fd;k tkos fd izfroknh la0 4 okn 1 dh en la0 1 esa of.kZr vkl&ikl ds ifjlj ,l0vkj0 'kkWfiax ekWy okds okMZ ua0 31 fiukjk xyh ljnkj 'kgj ftlds mRrj esa jkLrk vke] nf{k.k esa gosyh tequknkl VkafV;k] iwoZ esa xyh can] if'pe esa gosyh o tehu 'kqHkdj.k Qqljkt vkapfy;k o rksykjke ikf.M;k fLFkr gS ij fcuk Hkou fuekZ.k Lohd`fr izkIr fd;s djok;s x;s uktk;t rksM+&QksM+ o fuekZ.k ds lEcU/k esa fof/k vuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsa ,oa fcuk fuekZ.k Lohd`fr ds djok;k x;k fuekZ.k foLekj djok;s ,oe~ vkxkeh fuekZ.k ugha djus gsrq ikcan djsaA x & tfj;s fpjLFkk;h O;kns'k izfroknh la0 5 dks oftZr fd;k tkos fd og okn i= dh en la0 1 esa of.kZr vkls&ikls ds ifjlj ,l0vkj0 'kkWfiax ekWy okds okMZ ua0 31 fiukjk xyh] ljnkj 'kgj ftlds mRrj esa jkLrk vke] nf{k.k esa gosyh tequknkl VkafV;k] iwoZ esa xyh can] if'pe esa gosyh o tehu 'kqHkdj.k Qqljkt vkapfy;k o rksykjke ikf.M;k fLFkr gS] ds fdlh Hkw&Hkkx dks fodzhr djus ds fy, izfroknhx.k la0 1 rk 3 }kjk ;fn dksbZ bdjkjukesa] fdjk;sukesa] yht MhM] fxV MhM] fodz; i=] ifjR;kx i= ,oa vU; dksbZ gLrkUrj.k nLrkost fy[kdj iathc) djokus gsrq izLrqr fd;s tkus dh n'kk esa mudk iath;u ugha ds ftlls oknh ds fof/kd vf/kdkjksa ij foijhr vlj iM+rk gksA ?k & [kpkZ eqdnek oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyok;k tkosA** 3. Along with the suit an application seeking temporary injunction was also filed, wherein, the relief identical to relief (d) as quoted hereinbefore was sought. 4. The respondents filed reply to the application and denied any communication whatsoever with the plaintiff; it was claimed that the entire construction was raised by them and the present value of the construction and its related works at the current market value as per DLC rate of Rajasthan Government at Rs. 600/- per square feet was Rs. 1,42,98,900/-; various objections were raised regarding the plea raised by the plaintiff and discrepancies in the claim made were also sought to be pointed out; it was claimed that the mall has been named as Shri Ram Shopping Mall and contention to the contrary were incorrect; the locus standi of the plaintiff based on the averments made in the suit were also questioned. 5. A replication to the reply was also filed by the appellant. 6. The trial court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that prima facie existence of oral agreement was not believable and indicated several reasons in support of its conclusion and based on its conclusion found that there was no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff; it was found that balance of convenience was in favour of the defendants as the work of the mall was incomplete and there was no reason to prevent the defendants from using their property; similarly the issue pertaining to irreparable injury was also held against the appellant. 7. The trial court also came to the conclusion that on the application of the plaintiff, interim order was passed on 18.03.2013, which was in currency and was granted without there being any reasonable ground at the instance of the plaintiff and in view of the prayer made by the defendants, under the provisions of Section 95(1) CPC, in the interest of justice for compensating the defendants, imposition of damages was found appropriate and while dismissing the application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 CPC cost of Rs. 50,000/- was imposed. 8. 50,000/- was imposed. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court committed error in rejecting the application seeking injunction by the appellant; with reference to various documents said to have been entered into in connection with the demolition of existing construction, excavation at the site and raising of further construction as well as large number of vouchers, it was submitted that the appellant pursuant to the oral agreement between the parties executed the work, which is proved on record and, therefore, the trial court committed error in coming to a contrary conclusion on totally non-existent grounds. It was submitted that the reasons given by the trial court for not recognising the agreements pertaining to the work relating to the shopping mall is on account of absence of signatures of the defendants, which signatures were not necessary as the said agreements were in nature of sub contracts, which do not require the signatures of the third party and, therefore, the finding in this regard is vitiated. It was further submitted that the capacity of the plaintiff has been indicated in para 7 of the plaint and, therefore, the objections raised by the defendants and found favour with the trial court has no basis. 9. With reference to the response filed by the appellant to an additional affidavit filed by the respondents pertaining to filing of a balance-sheet and other documents (Form 23AC), wherein, the expenditure on part of the Company was not shown, it was submitted that the expenditure was incurred by Smt. Indra Devi plaintiff’s mother and her income tax return was placed on record as Annexure-22. It was submitted that the trial court committed error in recording various findings, which were in nature of determination of the suit finally, which action of the trial court, vitiates the order impugned. 10. With reference to imposition of cost of Rs. 50,000/- it was submitted that the imposition of cost purportedly under Section 95 CPC was without jurisdiction as there was no written application and no determination of the said aspect and that the provision could only be invoked at the final determination of the suit and not at the stage of deciding temporary injunction application. Submissions were made that long standing orders, should not be disturbed while deciding temporary injunction application and on that count also the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 11. Submissions were made that long standing orders, should not be disturbed while deciding temporary injunction application and on that count also the order impugned deserves to be set aside. 11. Reliance was placed on Representative Aam Janta, village Berdo Ka Bas v. Gramin Vikas Vigyan Samiti, Jelu Gagadi, 2006 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 421 and Rehmanbux & Ors. v. Dhaloo Mal & Ors., AIR 1963 Raj. 177 . 12. Vehemently opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondents with reference to the various pleadings made by the plaintiff-appellant, submitted that a bare look at the relief sought by the plaintiff would reveal that the plaintiff has neither sought any declaration, possession nor accounts and, therefore, the suit itself was not maintainable; the suit was filed by Anil Kumar only claiming himself as Manager of S.R. Shopping Mall, the name of neither S.R. Group nor S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. is indicated in the cause title and, therefore, it cannot be said that the suit was on behalf of the Company/Board, ever as per the plaint averments, the alleged agreement was with father of Anil Kumar, who is also not a party. 13. In the appeal a plea has been raised that the plaintiff has wrongly described the Company as a Firm and has then reiterated that the suit was filed by him as Manager of S.R. Shopping Mall. It was submitted that the suit could only be filed by the Company if at all it had anything to do with the subject matter of the suit. 14. Various contradictions in the plaint averments were pointed out and it was submitted that the plaintiff has sought same relief in the temporary injunction application, which relief has been sought in the suit itself, which cannot be granted at the interim stage. The trial court has elaborately dealt with the documents sought to be relied on by the appellant and the same do not call for any interference. 15. Various stands taken by the plaintiff regarding involvement of the Company and S.R. Group were also questioned pointing out that even as per the alleged material produced by the appellant, no work has been given by the Company, the Company was not involved, even with the S.R. Group, the Company has nothing to do as the registration stands in the name of Raj Kumar Soni, as proprietor. The documents relied on by the plaintiff have no connection whatsoever with the construction in question. It was submitted that the appellant has indulged in making false assertions and, therefore, besides the fact that the trial court was justified in dismissing the application filed by the appellant, the appeal also deserves to be dismissed on this ground. 16. With reference to the imposition of damages by impugned order it was submitted that a specific prayer was made in the written statement seeking an order for payment of compensation and provisions of Section 141 CPC specifically provide that procedure provided in the code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction and, therefore, the trial court was justified in imposing the compensation. 17. Reliance was placed on Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1944 SC 74, Smt. Yogeshwari Kumari v. Sh. Srvind Singh Mewar & Ors., S.B. Civil Misc. Application No. 47/2012 decided on 12.12.2012, Mohd. Mehtab Khan & Ors. v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan & Ors., (2013) 9 SCC 221 , Ramjas Foundation & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2010) 14 SCC 38 and Sciemed Overseas Inc. v. BOC India Limited & Ors., (2016) 3 SCC 70 . 18. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 19. At the outset, it may be noticed that though it is well settled that while deciding an application for temporary injunction any finding which tends to affect the outcome of the suit should not be recorded. However, the facts and status of pleadings in the present case are such that analysis thereof and arriving at a conclusion, though may affect the suit itself, the same cannot be avoided. 20. As already noticed herein before, the plaintiff-appellant filed the suit/appeal, in his capacity as 'Manager, S.R. Shopping Mall'. However, neither in the entire plaint nor in the entire appeal the appellant has given out any basis for assuming the said position i.e. Manager, S.R. Shopping Mall. 20. As already noticed herein before, the plaintiff-appellant filed the suit/appeal, in his capacity as 'Manager, S.R. Shopping Mall'. However, neither in the entire plaint nor in the entire appeal the appellant has given out any basis for assuming the said position i.e. Manager, S.R. Shopping Mall. The plaint contains reference to various institutions/ constitutions/individuals i.e. S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd., S.R. Group, S.R. Building (a partnership firm), Raj Kumar Soni, Indra Devi Soni etc., however, the plaintiff-appellant has failed to indicate his status qua all other institutions/constitutions/individuals except indicating that he is Director of S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. ('the Company') and as Manager of S.R. Group he looks after the entire work. As to what possible connection the said Company or S.R. Group have with the disputed property, has nowhere been indicated. The claim in the plaint starts with an oral agreement with Raj Kumar Soni, plaintiff’s father. Where after, the payments have been shown to have been made for the purpose of demolition of existing construction and excavation by Indra Devi Soni, Partner of S.R. Building. Large numbers of documents, which have been produced on record, have been executed on letter heads of Hotel S.R. Palace and the various bills/vouchers have been shown to have been issued in the name of S.R. Shopping Mall. As to how the plaintiff-appellant entered into the scene/has any cause with respect to the present subject matter has not at all been indicated except as already noticed herein before claiming himself to be Manager of S.R. Shopping Mall. 21. Interestingly, when the present appeal was filed, in para 1 of the appeal the appellant with respect to the S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. indicated that plaintiff wrongly described the said Company as a Firm and in ground (M) claimed that in the income tax returns of the plaintiff’s Company an amount of Rs. 71,01,876/- has been shown to have been incurred by the Company and in ground (O) claimed that the trial court erred in not appreciating that plaintiff is simply a Director of the Company, which owns the said Shopping Mall. The grounds (M) and (O) read as under:- “(M) That the learned trial court has erred in law in not appreciating that in the income tax returns of the plaintiff’s company, an amount of Rs. 71,01,876/- has been shown to have incurred by the company towards construction of the mall. The grounds (M) and (O) read as under:- “(M) That the learned trial court has erred in law in not appreciating that in the income tax returns of the plaintiff’s company, an amount of Rs. 71,01,876/- has been shown to have incurred by the company towards construction of the mall. These documents are beyond doubt and the defendants have not produced anything on record so as to meet with these documents, however the learned tribunal has failed to adjudicate the temporary injunction application keeping the income tax returns of the plaintiff’s company in consideration and the order impugned therefore, has resulted in manifest illegality and failure of justice qua the plaintiff. (O) That the learned trial court has erred in law in not appreciating that the plaintiff is simply a Director of the company M/s. S.R. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. which owns the said shopping mall. .................” 22. The said grounds (M) and (O) clearly brought out the assertion of the appellant as if the expenditure was incurred by the Company and, therefore, the Mall was owned by it. However, when the respondents in their additional affidavit dated 06.07.2015 contradicted the said stand by filing Form 23AC obtained from the Registrar of Companies, which pertains to filing of the balance-sheet and other documents with the Registrar for the relevant period and balance-sheet of the Company was absolutely silent qua the alleged expenditure made by the Company rather the balance-sheet indicated that the share capital of the Company was only Rs. 6,00,000/-. In response to the said additional affidavit, the plaintiff-appellant filed reply dated 13.07.2015 and filed an additional affidavit, inter alia, again indicating in para 2 and para 4 of his affidavit as under:- “2. ………………. the present suit has been filed by the petitioner as manager of S.R. Shopping Mall for the property in dispute. 4. …………. It is reiterated the suit has been filed by the petitioner as manager of S.R. Shopping Mall. Thus since the petitioner and its family have themselves invested more than 70 lacs towards construction of this mall therefore, there is no present need of seeking recovery or any other relief except to prevent the respondents for alienating the suit property.” 23. It is reiterated the suit has been filed by the petitioner as manager of S.R. Shopping Mall. Thus since the petitioner and its family have themselves invested more than 70 lacs towards construction of this mall therefore, there is no present need of seeking recovery or any other relief except to prevent the respondents for alienating the suit property.” 23. However, shockingly enough along with the said affidavit the plaintiff filed an income tax return for the assessment year 2013-14 belonging to Smt. Indra Devi, mother of the plaintiff and the balance-sheet therein indicated an investment in S.R. Shopping Mall at Rs. 71,01,876/-. 24. From the above, it is apparent that the petitioner appellant has failed to show his locus standi to file/maintain the present proceedings. Various assertions, which have been made in the plaint, appeal and affidavits, even if any one of them is taken as correct, the plaintiff-appellant has no basis and/or authority to file the present application/appeal. If the assertion regarding expenses having been incurred by the Company towards construction of the Mall is correct, the suit/application could only be filed by the Company as Company being a artificial person can sue or be sued in its own name and in absence of the Company, the suit/application cannot be maintained; if the assertion regarding Raj Kumar Soni, plaintiff’s father having entered into an oral agreement is taken on its face value, said Raj Kumar Soni has chosen neither to file the application nor to give authority to the plaintiff to file the application; if the assertion pertaining to the investment having been made by Smt. Indra Devi as evidenced by the income tax return is correct, the said alleged investment having been made by her in individual capacity and she has also chosen not to file the application and/or give authority to the plaintiff for filing the application, the plaintiff cannot maintain the present proceedings. 25. The assertions regarding various other institutions/constitutions/ individuals cannot by itself arm the appellant with a right to file the present proceedings. 26. 25. The assertions regarding various other institutions/constitutions/ individuals cannot by itself arm the appellant with a right to file the present proceedings. 26. During pendency of the present appeal, an application was filed by the appellant seeking to withdraw the suit itself allegedly “in order to avoid any formal defect or otherwise with a liberty to file a fresh and proper suit on behalf of the person concerned having sufficient cause of action”, however, on the application being opposed by the respondents, by order dated 29.08.2016 the application was dismissed as misconceived and being contrary to the provisions of Order 23 CPC as the appellant sought liberty for any other plaintiff to file a fresh suit in view of the above state of affairs. 27. So far as claim of the appellant regarding filing of the proceedings as Manager of the S.R. Shopping Mall is concerned, as already noticed hereinbefore, besides the fact that appellant has failed to show existence of any such status, the various contradictory, vacillating and baseless assertions made by the plaintiff regarding the expenditure having been incurred by the Company etc., even the said stand has been sought to be forsaken by the appellant on Company being confronted with the baselessness of its claim, where after, reiteration of the stand regarding filing of the suit as Manager of S.R. Shopping Mall, which conduct clearly indicates that the said stand is totally baseless. 28. So far as various assertions, documents and other material produced by the appellant is concerned, in absence of any locus to project interest of any of the assumed parties having interest, the same are not required to be examined. 29. So far as the plea raised by the respondents regarding the relief sought in the plaint is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant has only sought an injunction pertaining to the subject matter of the suit and has chosen not to claim any declaration, possession, accounts or any further relief. Even if, the suit filed by the plaintiff was to succeed, the relief of injunction only as sought by the plaintiff even otherwise cannot be granted and the very fact that the appellant choose not to seek any further relief also shows the fact that appellant himself has in fact no interest in the property so as to seek further relief. 30. 30. The other issues, which were extensively argued by both learned counsel for the parties regarding the validity and the connection of the documents with the subject matter of the suit/application and the various prima facie findings recorded by the trial court are concerned, the same does not call for any determination in view of what has been found by this Court hereinbefore. 31. The reliance placed on the judgment in the case of Representative Aam Janta, village Berdo Ka Bas (supra) is misplaced, in the said case the order of status quo was passed in the year 1988 and the same continued till 28.08.2001 when the same was vacated and was again granted on 15.09.2001, by the appellate Court which continued till 21.02.2006 i.e. for over 18 years, the said precedent cannot be applied to the facts of the present case especially in view of the finding recorded hereinbefore. 32. So far as the challenge to the imposition of compensation under Section 95 CPC is concerned, the provision provides for compensation in any suit, in which, a temporary injunction has been granted and it appears to the Court that injunction was applied for on insufficient grounds, the defendant may apply to the Court and the Court may upon such application award against the plaintiff by its order such amount as it deems a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the injury or expenses caused to him. 33. The provision no where restricts the passing of the order only at the stage of passing of decree in the suit as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant. A Court need not wait till deciding the suit for ordering payment of compensation, if while deciding an application seeking injunction, the Court comes to a conclusion that the injunction was applied for insufficient grounds. 34. So far as the requirement of applying in writing for the compensation is concerned, in the reply to the application filed by the appellant under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2CPC the respondents had claimed compensation for harassment etc., though the claim was made under Section 35A CPC, merely because the compensation was sought by indicating provisions of Section 35A CPC in reply, it cannot be said that the Court could not have granted compensation under the provisions of Section 95 CPC. 35. 35. The judgment of this Court in Rehmanbux (supra) does not deal with any of the aspects sought to be projected by learned counsel for the appellant regarding provisions of Section 95 CPC. 36. In view of the fact that appellant indeed without any sufficient grounds had sought injunction against the respondents, which is writ large on record of the case, the imposition of compensation by the trial court does not call for any interference. 37. In view of the above discussion, the appellant cannot claim to have any prima facie case in his favour as he has failed to disclose any locus standi in relation to the subject matter of the suit. As a result, no question of balance of convenience and irreparable injury to the appellant arises. 38. In view of the above discussion, there is no substance in the appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed.