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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1437 (HP)

Aditya Birla Finance Ltd. v. Daljit Kaur Gorwara

2016-07-20

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. Both the aforementioned petitions are being disposed of by a common order as common question of facts and law are involved in them. 2. Accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara is a Director of M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd., and of M/s Arvind Trade Links Pvt. Ltd.. Both the companies hold manufacturing activities within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of Police Station Haroli, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, Himachal Pradesh. The entities aforesaid purportedly secured from the complainant a loan/cash credit facility respectively constituted in sums of Rs. 5 crores and Rs.3 crores. The aforesaid loans/cash credit facility secured by the entities aforesaid wherein accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara held the position of a Director was for facilitating theirs manufacturing parts of tractors for M/s Intentional Traders Ltd., M/s Dana India Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Mahindra and Mahindra Pvt. Ltd., besides other entities. The relevant aforesaid assignments of manufacturing activities by the aforesaid entities vis-a-vis the entities wherein accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara along with other co-accused holds the position of a Director, were subsequently detected to be forged besides fictitious. In sequel, an omnibus stain of fictitiousness stood ingrained in the sums of money borrowed by M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd. And M/s Arvind Trades Links Pvt. Ltd., from the complainant M/s Aditya Birla Finance Ltd.. An FIR stood lodged with Police Station, Haroli, District Una, H.P. against M/s Casting Pvt. Ltd. And M/s Arvind Trades Links Pvt. Ltd., through its directors qua theirs obtaining loans/cash credit facility from the complainant company by committing forgery of relevant documents. The FIR aforesaid stood lodged on 19.05.2014. However, on its standing lodged, none of the Directors of M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd and of M/s Aditya Birla Finance Ltd., rendered prompt cooperation to the police authorities concerned. Consequently, accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara and co-accused Arvinder Singh on look out notices issued by the Himachal Pradesh Police, stood detained at Calcutta Air Port on 12.12.2014 by the Calcutta police. Even thereat one co-accused Amrender Singh Gorwara remained unarrested. He preferred an application before this Court for grant of anticipatory bail which stood dismissed by this Court. The SLP preferred by him before the Hon'ble Apex Court wherein he assailed the order of this Court dismissing his bail petition also stood rejected on 15.07.2014 by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Even upto date he is under absconsion. 3. He preferred an application before this Court for grant of anticipatory bail which stood dismissed by this Court. The SLP preferred by him before the Hon'ble Apex Court wherein he assailed the order of this Court dismissing his bail petition also stood rejected on 15.07.2014 by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Even upto date he is under absconsion. 3. The custody of co-accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara and Arvinder Singh Gorwara was taken on 15.12.2014 by the police officials of Police Station, Haroli, from the court of ACJM, Bairkpur. The custody of co-accused Sahil was taken on 6.11.2014 by the police officials of Police Station, Haroli from the Court of learned ACJM, Ambala, whereafter he was produced before the ACJM, Una on 7.11.2014, in sequel whereto he was ordered to suffer both police besides judicial incarceration for 90 days. However, since the Investigating Officer concerned did not institute the relevant report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “Cr.P.C.”), before the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction hence, by statutory operation of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., he inconsonance therewith was afforded by the JMIC, Una the benefit of statutory bail. Daljit Kaur Gorwara was produced before the JMIC, Una on 17.12.2014. She thereat suffered police remand for two days. On conclusion whereof, she preferred an application under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.1, Una, District Una, H.P. The application aforesaid stood allowed by the JMIC concerned. The complainant/petitioner herein stands aggrieved by the rendition comprised in Annexure P-1, whereby the facility of bail stands accorded to accused Daljit Kaur. 4. The vestment of jurisdiction in this Court, to, dehors the order impugned hereat standing not assailed by the petitioner/complainant by its constituting a petition under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. or dehors its not preferring an apposite petition before the Court concerned which pronounced the rendition comprised in Annexure P-1, claiming therein relief para meteria vis-a-vis the one canvassed hereat, yet adjudicate upon the petition at hand stands firmly rested by a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Kanwar Singh Meena vs. State of Rajasthan and another, AIR 2013 SC 296 , the relevant paragraph No.7 whereof reads as under:- “7. In Gurcharan Singh and Ors. Etc. In Gurcharan Singh and Ors. Etc. v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978)1 SCC 118 , the Appellant Gurcharan, who was Superintendent of Police, was charged along with other police personnel Under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. During the preliminary inquiry six alleged eye-witnesses, who were police personnel, did not support the prosecution case. However, after the FIR was lodged during the course of investigation, seven witnesses including the said six police personnel gave statements implicating Appellant Gurcharan Singh. One eye witness ASI Gopal Das made statement under Section 164 of the Code in favour of the prosecution. Learned Sessions Judge released Appellant Gurcharan Singh on bail after observing that there was little to gain by him by tampering with witnesses who had, themselves already tampered with their evidence by making contradictory statements. Learned Sessions Judge further observed that after reviewing the entire material he was of the opinion that there was little probability of Appellant Gurcharan Singh feeing from justice of tampering with the witnesses. He noted that having regard to the character of evidence he was inclined to grant bail. The prosecution moved the High Court under Section 439(2) of the Code for cancellation of the said order. The High Court inter alia observed that considering the nature of the offence and the character of the evidence, the reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with and all other relevant factors, he had no option but to cancel the bail. The high Court observed that learned Sessions Judge did not exercise his judicial discretion on relevant well recognized principles. An appeal was carried from the said order to this Court. This Court observed that the power of the High Court and the Sessions Court under Section 439(1) of the Code are much wider than those conferred on a court other than the High Court and Sessions Court in respect of bail. However, certain considerations which have to be taken into account are common to all courts. This Court observed that the power of the High Court and the Sessions Court under Section 439(1) of the Code are much wider than those conferred on a court other than the High Court and Sessions Court in respect of bail. However, certain considerations which have to be taken into account are common to all courts. This Court noted that gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused feeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardizing his own life being faced with a grim prospect of a possible conviction in the case; of tampering witnesses; the history of the case as well as its investigation and such other relevant grounds will have to be taken into account. To ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused, character of the evidence will have to be considered. While confirming the High Court's interference with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Court, this Court expressed its displeasure about the unwarranted premature comments made by the Sessions Court on the merits of the case when at that stage it was only called upon to consider whether prima facie case was made out under against the accused our not. This Court particularly referred to statement of ASI Gopal Dass, recorded under Section 164 of the Code and observed that this witness had made no earlier contradictory statement and the taint of unreliability could not be attached to his statement at that stage as was done by the Sessions Court. This Court found that the Sessions Court was not alive to legal position that there was no substantive evidence recorded against the accused until the eye-witnesses were examined in the trial. Serious note was taken of the fact that the Sessions Court had not focused its attention on relevant considerations. The approach of the Sessions Judge was viewed as suffering from serious infirmity and cancellation of bail was endorsed.” 5. The aforesaid view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision supra stands reiterated in a decision rendered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 350 of 2010, titled as Anil Kumar Bansal versus State, decided on 4.7.2011, relevant paragraph No. 17 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “17. The aforesaid view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its decision supra stands reiterated in a decision rendered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 350 of 2010, titled as Anil Kumar Bansal versus State, decided on 4.7.2011, relevant paragraph No. 17 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “17. The present petition has been admittedly fled by the petitioner as a revision petition. An order granting bail is an interlocutory order (Refer to Amar Nath Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 ). Similarly, an order refusing bail or an order cancelling bail has been held to be an interlocutory order. This a view expressed by Orissa, Allahabad and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. It may be pertinent here to refer to a Division Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court in Durga Prasad Sao Vs. State of Orissa, 1983 Cri LJ 1590, where the question as to whether the order regarding granting, refusing or cancelling a bail are interlocutory orders or not has been dealt with and it has been held that all these orders are essentially interlocutory orders. The reasons for holding this view is that the grant or the cancellation of a bail does not determine the guilt or the innocent of the accused nor does it terminate the trial and conversely successive bail applications lie at the stage of investigation or trial provided that there is a change in circumstances or new facts are discovered. If that be so, then on account of statutory bar under Section 397(2) Cr.PC, it has been held that the orders granting, refusing or canceling the bail being interlocutory orders cannot be subject matter of revision by the superior Courts.” 6. Further in Bhimshi Rambhai Gojiya versus State of Gujarat & 1, Criminal Misc. Application No. 20757 of 2014, the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat has analogously held as under:- “8. It is manifest on a plain reading of Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code that the jurisdiction to direct that any person, who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Code, be arrested and committed to the custody, is vested both in the Court of Sessions and the High Court, even though the bail order may have been made by a Magistrate. Even a bare reading of the provision leaves no doubt as to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions and the High Court is a concurrent jurisdiction and there is nothing in the provision itself even remotely suggesting that the High Court cannot entertain an application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code directly, that is, without an approach having been first made to the Court of Sessions in that behalf. It is also not brought to out notice that a practice has grown in our High Court whereby an application for cancellation of bail is not directly entertained by the High Court and if somebody makes such an application directly to the High Court he is asked to approach the Sessions Court first or that such an application directly made to the High Court is transmitted down to the concerned Sessions Judge for hearing and disposal. In face, we were told at the bar that all along such application for cancellation of bail are directly entertained by the High Court even though the bail order might have been made by a judicial Magistrate.” 7. A perusal of the order impugned herebefore by the complainant unfolds the factum of the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Una proceeding to afford to accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara the facility of bail merely on the ground of hers being a woman. Though statutory tenacity to the ground aforesaid constituted in the impugned order embodied in Annexure P-1 generates from the provisions engrafted in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C., provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- 437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. – 1. Though statutory tenacity to the ground aforesaid constituted in the impugned order embodied in Annexure P-1 generates from the provisions engrafted in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C., provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- 437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. – 1. When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but- (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but not less than seven years]: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail it such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that It is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court.] 2. If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his 1 guilt the accused shall, subject to the provisions of section 446A and pending such inquiry, be released on bail] or at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided. 3. When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1), the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary- (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) otherwise in the interests of justice. 4. ................................” 8. Nonetheless the ascription of a signification by the learned Magistrate concerned to the phrase “may direct” occurring in the relevant proviso, a, tinge of mandatoriness whereupon he proceeded to hold of his per se given the factum of the accused being a woman holding an inviolable jurisdiction to release her, palpably spurs from his imputing an erroneous signification to the phrase “may direct” as exists therein. The appropriate signification borne by the phrase “may direct” occurring in the proviso to Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. is contrarily of the Magistrate concerned while standing seized with a petition constituted before him under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. his merely holding discretion to order for the release of the accused, on evident material surfacing before him of the accused being under the age of 16 years or being a woman or being sick or infirm. The discretion to be exercised by him qua the aforesaid categories of persons enumerated in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C., neither is statutorily enjoined to be peremptorily exercisable by him on mere upsurgings of the factum aforestated rather is enjoined to be guided by attendant material personifcatory of the enjoined legal necessity of the relevant categories, rendering the appropriate cooperation to the Investigating Officer concerned for enabling him to unearth the truth of the penal misdemeanors ascribed to him/her by the Investigating Officer concerned. If the attendant circumstances unfold qua the dire necessity of the relevant category embodied in the relevant proviso suffering police remand, whereupon, alone the truth qua the incriminatory role ascribed to him/her by the Investigating Officer would stand unearthed besides whereupon the dire necessity qua effectuation of recoveries from him/her would stand satiated, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate concerned to not within its ambit afford him/her the benefit of the contemplations manifested in the proviso aforesaid, more so when this court holds of the phrase “may direct” occurring therein holding a parlance of it not meteing a peremptory mandatory injunction upon the Magistrate concerned to qua the categories of persons embodied therein per se purveying the facility of bail to them. However for reasons assigned hereinabove the learned Court concerned has made short shift qua the aforesaid dire necessity, of, the accused given the gravity of offence committed by her, suffering police remand for a period longer than the one to which she stood subjected whereupon alone the necessary recoveries would stand effectuated by the Investigating Officer at her instance concomitantly also the curtailment of the police remand by the order impugned hereinbefore is grossly unjust. Having wrested the trite issue of hence a pervasive stain of illegality imbuing the impugned rendition of the learned Magistrate concerned arising from the factum of his merely on the anvil of accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara being a woman his proceeding to afford to her the facility of bail besides, given the factum of the gender of accused Daljit Kaur, his drawing an erroneous conclusion of the proviso within whose domain, he exercised the discretion of bail in her favour, holding a peremptory statutory mandatory injunction upon him qua his thereupon, standing enjoined to afford the facility of bail to her. As a corollary with falsity hence ingraining his conclusion spurring from a gross fallacious ascription lent by him qua the signification borne by the phrase “may direct” constituted in Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. also when thereupon, he relegated in the realm of oblivion, the gravity of the offence ascribed by the Investigating Officer to her also the opposition therebefore of the Assistant Public Prosecutor concerned qua the facility of bail standing afforded to her, opposition whereof stemmed from the imperativeness qua the effectuation of the recoveries from her person, whether hereat it is imperative for this Court to order for accused Daljit Kaur standing subjected to police remand. The imperativeness of the accused Daljit Kaur standing ordered to face police remand, in sequel to this Court quashing the impugned rendition of the Magistrate concerned would arise only when firm material stands evinced hereat in portrayal of the accused/respondent holding possession of the relevant items, recovery whereof can stand effectuated in a mode not other than hers standing ordered to be subjected to police remand. 9. Even before proceeding to pronounce upon the facet aforesaid, the learned counsel appearing for the accused/respondent has with vigour contended of co-accused, Sahil besides accused Daljit Kaur both during the course of theirs suffering police remand disclosing to the Investigating Officer concerned of absconding accused Amrender Singh Gorwara holding possession of the relevant items, obviously recoveries thereof warranting theirs standing effectuated from his person, concomitantly, rendering unnecessary any effectuation of their recoveries by the Investigating Officer at the instance of co-accused Sahil besides at the instance of accused Daljit Kaur. He contends thereupon of with accused Daljit Kaur not holding possession of any of the relevant items, recovery whereof is imperative would render unnecessary hers being ordered to stand subjected to police remand. He also contends of with the Investigating Offer completing the investigations into the offences, the concert at this stage of the Investigating Offer to beget effectuation of recoveries at her instance of the relevant items is merely an illusory exercise. He also contends of with the Investigating Offer completing the investigations into the offences, the concert at this stage of the Investigating Offer to beget effectuation of recoveries at her instance of the relevant items is merely an illusory exercise. The submission addressed hereat by the learned counsel appearing for accused Daljit Kaur, to oust the contention of the petitioner/complainant besides to discount the espousal of the learned Additional Advocate General, who conjointly, along with the counsel for the petitioner/complainant seeks an order from this Court for subjecting accused Daljit Kaur to police remand, holds no vigour as it stands erected on the mere factum of her son co-accused Amrinder Singh who purportedly holds possession of the relevant items, hence rendering their recoveries being concerted to be effectuated from her person during hers suffering police remand being wholly meaningless is a submission rather to mis-navigate the investigation besides to preclude the Investigating Officer to effectuate the apposite recoveries from their person prominently when his absconsion per se stands generated by active connivance with him by accused Daljit Kaur besides by accused Sahil. Furthermore, the aforesaid apposite disclosures made by accused Daljit Kaur besides by co-accused Sahil to the Investigating Offer during the course of theirs standing subjected to interrogation while theirs respectively suffering police remand qua the absconding accused holding the possession of the relevant items appears to stand reared by the absconsion of co-accused Amrinder Singh besides theirs standing ingenuously invented by them for preempting the Investigating Officer to withhold his concert to effectuate the recovery of the relevant items from their respective persons. Even otherwise, the conduct aforesaid of the accused persons subsequent to the lodging of the FIR is reprehensible. Moreover, given the gravity of the offence committed by the accused besides the stealth employed by the co-accused to baulk the Investigating Officer to uncover the truth of the entire case, constrains this Court to conclude of the order impugned hereat warranting its standing quashed and set aside. 10. Consequently, the order impugned before this Court comprised in Annexure P-1, appended to Cr.MMO No. 38 of 2015 is quashed and set aside. The Investigating Officer is directed to take accused Daljit Kaur in custody forthwith. 11. Even at this Stage, Mr. 10. Consequently, the order impugned before this Court comprised in Annexure P-1, appended to Cr.MMO No. 38 of 2015 is quashed and set aside. The Investigating Officer is directed to take accused Daljit Kaur in custody forthwith. 11. Even at this Stage, Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate appearing for accused Daljit Kaur has with great fervor made a address before this Court of the companies aforesaid wherein accused Daljit Kaur holds the position of a Director being in the process of liquidating the loan liability towards the complainant company, factum whereof denudes her penal culpability. Even, if some loans borrowed by the companies aforesaid wherein accused Daljit Kaur holds the position of a Director, are in the process of liquidation of loan amounts vis-a-vis the complainant company, yet the aforesaid apposite process of liquidation of loans by the respondent/accused towards the complainant company would not either subtract or erase the effect of the purported forgery committed by the respondent/accused to secure loan/cash credit facility from it. Cr.MMO No. 132 of 2015. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended of with the entire financial transactions occurring at Chandigarh renders the lodging of a FIR at Police Station, Haroli, District Una to be in detraction of the mandate of Section 177 of the Cr.P.C., provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “177. Ordinary place of inquiry or trial.- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.” He contends that with the offences ascribed by the prosecution to the accused standing hence committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the criminal courts located at Chandigarh, the FIR lodged at Police Station, Haroli, District Una, H.P. besides initiation of consequential proceedings in sequel thereto suffer from want of jurisdiction. He urges thereupon of the FIR besides, consequential proceedings in sequel thereto standing ordered to be quashed and set aside. 13. However, the aforesaid submission holds no vigour given the disclosure made before this Court by the Investigating Offer, who is present before this Court today, of M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Arvind Trades Links Pvt. Ltd, wherein accused Daljit holds the position of a Director, standing located within the territorial limits of Police Station Haroli also his making a discloser of both the entities aforesaid holding manufacturing activities thereat. Since, the entities aforesaid borrowed loan/cash credit limit facility from the complainant company for facilitating theirs under forged assignments of M/s International Traders Ltd., M/s Dana India Pvt. Ltd and M/s Mahindra and Mahindra, theirs purportedly holding thereat the relevant manufacturing activities for them, renders the lodging of the FIR at Police Station, Haroli to be not outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. Even if assumingly any of the financial transactions occurred at Chandigarh yet with a mandate standing engrafted in Section 177 of the Cr.P.C., of Criminal Courts of competent jurisdiction whereat the consequences of penal misdemeanors attributed to the accused “ensue” also holding jurisdiction to try the offences, trial whereof would occur only on the police station concerned lodging an apposite FIR, for enabling cognizance thereupon by the Court concerned besides for facilitating the trial of the offenders/accused named in FIR, when construed in harmony with the factum of the consequences of borrowings or of the availment of cash credit limit by the accused from the complainant company in the capacity of hers being a Director of M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Arvind Trades Links Pvt. Ltd., for the latter's benefit, would “ensue” within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of Police Station Haroli, more so, constituted by the factum of the accused companies holding the relevant manufacturing activities thereat renders the lodging of the FIR at Police Station, Haroli, District Una, H.P., to be jurisdictionally valid. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also submitted with vigour before this Court of the inculpation of the accused/respondent being meritless as she has not derived any personal benefit from the borrowings made by the accused company from the complainant company. However, the aforesaid submission has no force as with the material on record unfolding of hers in the capacity of a Director of M/s Arvind Casting Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Arvind Trades Links Pvt. Ltd., securing in pursuance to apposite resolutions of which she is signatory, the loan facility from the complainant company. In aftermath, she is to be concluded to be holding connivance besides complicity with other co-accused in the purported penal misdemeanors of hers along with them forging documents for availing for the benefit of the accused companies wherein she holds the position of a director, finance/cash credit facility from the complainant company. 15. In aftermath, she is to be concluded to be holding connivance besides complicity with other co-accused in the purported penal misdemeanors of hers along with them forging documents for availing for the benefit of the accused companies wherein she holds the position of a director, finance/cash credit facility from the complainant company. 15. For the foregoing reasons, Cr.MMO No. 38 of 2015 is allowed and the impugned order, Annexure P-1, appended thereto, whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned granted bail to accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara is quashed and set aside. She is directed to be forthwith taken into custody by the Investigating Officer. However, Cr.MMO No. 132 of 2015, preferred at the instance of accused Daljit Kaur Gorwara for the cancellation of FIR is dismissed. However, it is open to accused Daljit Kaur subsequent to hers standing taken into custody by the Investigating Officer, to move for grant bail before the appropriate court of law and the court concerned shall decide her application in accordance with law its remaining uninfluenced by any findings recorded by this Court.