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2016 DIGILAW 144 (GAU)

Tokugha Chishi v. State of Nagaland

2016-02-26

SUMAN SHYAM

body2016
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Suman Shyam, J. 1. Heard Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Senior Government Advocate, Nagaland appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 as well as Mr. Z.N. Ngullie, learned CGC appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 3. 2. This Habeas Corpus petition has been filed by the writ petitioner, who is the elder brother of the detenue i.e. Shri Boto @ Aboto Chishi, challenging the order of detention dated 11.05.2015 as well as the consequential orders passed in respect thereto, approving the detention and also confirming the same. 3. The brief facts of the case, as apparent from the records, is that the detenue, namely, Boto @ Aboto Chishi was arrested on 27.04.2015 by the Dimapur Police from the Murgipatti Naga Bazar on the ground that he was in possession of demand notes amounting to Rs. 25,000/- and was, therefore, indulging in extortion activities. A Police Case bearing No. 0073/2015 was registered under Section 384 IPC read with 7 NSR. While the accused was injudicial custody in connection with the aforesaid case, the Commissioner of Police, Dimapur, Nagaland had written a letter dated 06.05.2015, requesting the District Magistrate, Dimapur to book the detenue under the provision of National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as NSA) as he was trying to commit the crime of extortion and his release from custody would be detrimental to the peace and security of the State. 4. While the accused was in police custody, lodged at the Dimapur Jail, the District Magistrate, Dimapur had passed an order of detention dated 11.05.2015, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the NSA, ordering that the accused Shri Boto be detained and kept in the Central Jail, Dimapur. Thereafter, the detention order along with the grounds of detention and the schedule appended thereto were furnished to the detenue through the Jail authorities for the purpose of permitting him to make a representation against the order of detention. On 14.05.2015, an order was passed by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland approving the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland. On 14.05.2015, an order was passed by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland approving the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland. Thereafter, on 29.06.2015 another order was passed by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland confirming the approval of the detention of the accused Boto @ Aboto Chishi by the Advisory Board, whereby, it was also indicated that the detention would continue up to 10.05.2016. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the detenue has been held in preventive detention since 11.05.2015 till date. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that there was no justifiable ground for the respondent-authorities to hold his brother Shri Boto in detention under the NSA. It has further been stated in the writ petition that on receipt of the order of detention, the detenue had requested the authorities to furnish him with a translated copy of the grounds of detention in vernacular "Sumi" dialect. However, despite such request, the same had not been furnished to the detenue as a result of which, an effective representation could not be made by him against the order of detention. That apart, the detenue was also not offered the assistance of a friend for representing his case before the Advisory Board. The petitioner has stated that the procedures followed by the respondent-authorities in passing the order of detention being in clear contravention of the constitutional safeguard available to the detenue under Article 22 (4) and (5) of the Constitution of India as well as the various judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India and of this Court, the same is liable to be set aside by this Court. 6. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have filed an affidavit sworn by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland wherein the facts appearing in the particulars appended to the detention order had been reproduced. It has been inter-alia, stated that the detenue had earlier joined NSCN (U) in the year 2011 and was later discharged on medical grounds. Thereafter, he started plying his elder brother's auto rickshaw for earning a livelihood and had also opened a liquor shop at Thilixu Village, Dimapur. In the affidavit, it has also been alleged that the detenue was involved in the killing of one Santosh Chetri, owner and Manager of Hotel Raj Villa. Thereafter, he started plying his elder brother's auto rickshaw for earning a livelihood and had also opened a liquor shop at Thilixu Village, Dimapur. In the affidavit, it has also been alleged that the detenue was involved in the killing of one Santosh Chetri, owner and Manager of Hotel Raj Villa. Although he was arrested by the police in connection with Dimapur RS Case No. 129/2014 under Section 302/34 IPC read with Section 25 (IB) (a) Arms Act, the accused was subsequently released on bail. It has also been mentioned in the affidavit that the detenue was apprehended while trying to commit the crime of extortion. In the aforesaid affidavit, although it has been stated that after being granted bail in connection with Dimapur P.S. Case No. 129/2014, the detenue had again joined NNC (NA) in the year 2015 as Section Officer. Yet, in paragraph 14 of the affidavit, it has also been categorically mentioned that the detenue has been detained under the NSA not because of his alleged links with the underground organisation but for his prejudicial activities. 7. The respondent no. 3 has also filed counter-affidavit stating that a report was called for and received by the Home Ministry as per the provision of Section 3 (5) of the NSA. Going through the aforesaid report, it was felt that there was no reason to interfere with the order of detention. In the affidavit filed by the respondent no. 3, it is further been mentioned that the Home Ministry has not received any representation filed by or on behalf of the detenue till date. 8. Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel vs. Union of India, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 427 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that all documents/statements and other materials forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority must be furnished to the detenue in a script or in a language which he understands. In another decision of this Court in the case of Prituo Solo vs. Union of India & Others, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 409, this Court has held that all materials envisioning the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at a subjective satisfaction in passing the order of detention must be furnished to the detenue in a language which he understands and that failure to do so, would amount to denial of valuable right of the detenue of making an effective representation against the detention order. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and despite the request made by and on behalf of the detenue, no such materials were furnished to him in the vernacular language (Sumi). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the detenu had attended School only up to class IX and as such, is not well conversant with the English language. The detenue could not understand the true implications of the ground of detention due to non-furnishing of the translated copies as a result of which an effective representation could not be made by the detenue against the order of detention thereby causing serious prejudice to his rights and interest in the matter. 9. By referring to a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Nameirakpam Inaotomba Singh vs. Union of India & Others, reported in 2007 (4) GLT 200, Mr. Zho, submits that it is settled law that the detenue has the right of assistance of a friend before the Advisory Board. However, in the instant case the detenue was not offered the assistance of a friend for representing his case before the Advisory Board. By referring to the grounds of detention, Mr. Zho, further submits that there is neither any materials available on record to indicate as to the basis on which the detaining authority had arrived at a subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention nor is there any affidavit sworn by the detaining authority to throw light on the aforesaid aspect of the matter. Zho, further submits that there is neither any materials available on record to indicate as to the basis on which the detaining authority had arrived at a subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention nor is there any affidavit sworn by the detaining authority to throw light on the aforesaid aspect of the matter. Questioning the competence of the Chief Secretary, Nagaland to swear the affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the deponent could not have sworn the affidavit narrating the grounds for arriving at a subjective satisfaction warranting preventive detention of the detenue in as much as the Chief Secretary, Nagaland would not be in a position to disclose before this Court as to the relevant consideration weighing in the mind of the detaining authority leading to the subjective satisfaction. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Zho has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Phukan Daimary @ Fungjarang vs. State of Assam & Others, reported in 1998 (4) GLT 40. 10. Mr. Zho, further submits that even assuming that the accused person is related to an offence punishable under the IPC, yet, the panel provisions as well as the criminal justice system in the State was sufficient to bring the accused to justice. He submits that there was no justifiable ground for the respondents-authorities to pass an order of preventive detention against the accused/detenue in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In support of his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Zho has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 , Arun vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1228 , Golam Hussian vs. Police Commissioner, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1336 , Kanu Biswas vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1656 and in the case of Garo vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1975 SC 473 to contend that the exceptions carved out by the Apex Court permitting an order of preventive detention in the aforementioned judicial pronouncements are not available in the present case and hence, the impugned order of detention as well as the consequential orders are all illegal and hence, liable to be set aside by this Court. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. K. Wotsa, learned Senior Government Advocate submits that the grounds, which led to subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority have been narrated in detail in the affidavit filed by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 and would be self evident. The learned Senior Government Advocate submits that the activities indulged by the accused in the past had clearly exposed the criminal mentality of the detenue. Having regard to the antecedents of the detenue, there were justifiable grounds to assume that he would indulge in acts prejudicial to the interest of the society by undertaking more such criminal activities if set free. Mr. Wotsa, further submits that the problems arising out of extortions carried out in the name of underground organisations have assumed menacing proportion in the State compelling the authorities to adopt stringent measures so as to curb such criminal activities bearing in mind the larger public interest. 12. Mr. Wotsa, further submits that the requirements for providing assistance of a friend before the Advisory Board is not provided by the Constitution of India or under the NSA and hence, the same is not a mandatory requirement. He further submits that English being the medium of instructions in the State of Nagaland, the accused/detenue cannot claim complete ignorance about the English language since he claims to have attended school up to the 9th standard. 13. Mr. Z.N. Ngullie, learned C.G.C appearing for the respondent No.3 submits that the Union Home Ministry has examined the record and has found the order of detention to be valid. 14. I have considered the submissions made by and on behalf of the parties and have also perused the materials available on record. 15. The detention order was issued in case of the petitioner on the following two grounds, namely, (a) security of the State of Nagaland and (b) maintenance of public order. 16. It transpires from the record that the accused/detenue was arrested on 27.04.2015 by the Dimapur Police while he was allegedly possessing demand slip for an amount of Rs. 25,000/- on behalf of NSCN (K) at Murgipatti Naga Bazar and thereafter, Dimapur P.S. Case No. 0073/2015 under Section 384 IPC read with 7 NSR had been registered. 16. It transpires from the record that the accused/detenue was arrested on 27.04.2015 by the Dimapur Police while he was allegedly possessing demand slip for an amount of Rs. 25,000/- on behalf of NSCN (K) at Murgipatti Naga Bazar and thereafter, Dimapur P.S. Case No. 0073/2015 under Section 384 IPC read with 7 NSR had been registered. It appears that during the course of interrogation, the accused/detenue has allegedly admitted his involvement in the criminal act of murdering one Santosh Chetri, which fact had been taken note of by the detaining authority while issuing the impugned order of detention. It further transpires from the grounds and particulars furnished along with the order of detention that the respondent no. 2 had also taken note of the fact that although the accused was earlier arrested by the Police in connection with Dimapur P.S. Case No. 129/2014 under Section 302/34 IPC read with 25 (IB) (a) Arms Act yet, he was released on bail in the year 2015. In paragraph 4 of the particulars appended to the grounds of detention, it has been mentioned as follows:- "4. That, the subject is presently under judicial custody but there is likelihood of him being released on bail and in the event of his release is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities unless an effective alternative measure is called for. On examination of the report forwarded by the sponsoring authority, the case of the subject is found fit to be booked under the National Security Act. 1880. Hence in order to prevent them from indulging in activities prejudicial to the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of the public order, the undersigned has ordered the detention of the subject under the said Act." 17. From a perusal of the materials available on record it is evident that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the accused/detenue was in the judicial custody. It also appears that the order of detention was passed on an assumption that the accused will be released on bail although admittedly and evidently there was no bail application filed by the accused seeking his release. It also appears that the order of detention was passed on an assumption that the accused will be released on bail although admittedly and evidently there was no bail application filed by the accused seeking his release. The first question that would, therefore, arise for determination by this Court in the present petition is as to whether there was any material available before the detaining authority for passing the impugned order of detention in respect of an accused who was already in judicial custody in connection with a criminal case. 18. While dealing with the issue of power of the authority to pass an order of detention in respect of a person who is already in custody in connection with a criminal case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh vs. State of Manipur, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 181 , as under:- "9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detanu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order, (3) In view of above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. In case either of these facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforementioned settled legal proposition." 19. In the case of Rekha vs. State of Tamilnadu, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 the Apex Court being confronted with a question of similar nature, had observed that:- "10. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforementioned settled legal proposition." 19. In the case of Rekha vs. State of Tamilnadu, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 the Apex Court being confronted with a question of similar nature, had observed that:- "10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practise of most Courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored." 20. In the case of Rekha (supra) the 1100 x 16 Apex Court had further observed as follows:- "27. In our opinion, there is real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will he illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a co-accused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most Courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed." 21. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenue being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most Courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed." 21. While dealing with the question of sufficiency of materials enabling the detaining authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that there is likelihood of release of the detenue on bail, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Konsam Inaocha Singh @ Jack Konsam @ JK vs. District Magistrate, Imphal East & Others, reported in 2012 (2) GLT 9 has observed as follow:- "11. The Apex Court in a case from this Bench of the Gauhati High Court, i.e. Nongthombam Ongbi Leima Devi vs. State of Manipur & Others in Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 2012 in clear terms held that there should be cogent materials for coming to the satisfaction that there is likelihood of release of the detenu on bail and only when there are reasons to believe on the materials placed before the Detaining Authority, the Detaining Authority may come to the satisfaction that there is possibility of his release on bail." 22. Again in the case of Union of India vs. Paul Manickam & Another, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 , the Apex Court had held and observed as follows:- "14. So far as this question relating to procedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authority should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenue by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority reasonably satisfied on cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1989 SC 2027 , Dharmendra Suganchand vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 ). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1640 . The principles were set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed, (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody, (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him; (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand, the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail." 23. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand, the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail." 23. In a recent decision in Yumnam Ongbi Lembi Leima vs. State of Manipur & Others, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 176 , the Hon'ble Apex Court had reiterated the established principles on the subject as follows: "13. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the extra-ordinary powers of detaining an individual in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution was not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds of detention do not disclose any material which has before the detaining authority, other than the fact that there was every likelihood of Yumnam Somendro being released on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, to support the order of detention. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except, according to procedure established by law. In the instant case, although the power is vested with the concerned authorities, unless the same are invoked and implemented in a justifiable manner, such action of the detaining authority cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, such a detention order is an exception to the provisions of Article 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution." 24. In another decision of this Court rendered in the case of Hatkhoneng vs. State of Manipur & Another, reported in 2012 (1) GLT 139, a Division Bench of this Court had made the following observations:- "15. What crystallizes from the aforementioned authorities is that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction should not ordinarily be questioned. At the same time, if the inference of the detaining authority that there is imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail is ipse dixit of the detaining authority, unsupported by any material, whatsoever, the detention order can be struck down." 25. At the same time, if the inference of the detaining authority that there is imminent possibility of the accused coming out on bail is ipse dixit of the detaining authority, unsupported by any material, whatsoever, the detention order can be struck down." 25. What follows from the aforementioned authorities is that in case of a person who is already in judicial custody in connection with a criminal case, an order of preventive detention can be passed subject to the condition that the detaining authority was aware that the person was in judicial custody and that there was likelihood of his imminent release from custody in view of which, the authority felt it necessary to pass an order of detention so as to prevent him from indulging in such activities. The subjective satisfaction of the authority on the chances of release of the accused must be based on cogent materials. Howsoever grave the charges against the accused or genuine the apprehension in the mind of the authority may be, it is not the potency of such apprehension but the existence of cogent materials forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of release of the accused that would have a determinative value in deciding the validity of the order of detention. 26. In the present case, the detenue had not moved any bail application after his arrest on 27.04.2015 in connection with Dimapur P.S. Case No. 0073/2015. The bail order apparently relied upon by the detaining authority was from a different FIR and had no concern with the arrest of the accused made on 27.04.2015. The release of the accused on bail granted in connection with Dimapur RS. Case No. 129/2014 did not have any bearing, whatsoever, in the chances of the detenue being released on bail in the present case. Therefore, this is a case where there was no material available on record so as to generate the apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of the accused being released from the custody and the order of detention was based on nothing but mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority. Therefore, this is a case where there was no material available on record so as to generate the apprehension in the mind of the detaining authority regarding the likelihood of the accused being released from the custody and the order of detention was based on nothing but mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority. The present is therefore a case where the order of detention dated 11.05.2015 has been passed in clear contravention of the condition No. (2) as set out in the paragraph 9 in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh (Supra) and as such, is liable to be set aside by this Court on such count alone. 27. Coming to the next question of denial of right to the detenue to submit proper representation against the grounds of detention on account of non-furnishing of the translated copy of the same to the detenue, it would be pertinent to mention herein the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lallubhai (supra):- "20. It is an admitted position that the detenue does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that Shri C.L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu. But, that is not sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be "communicated" to the detenu "Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the "grounds" to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the "grounds" are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22 (5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22 (5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Karikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and Hadibandhu Das vs. District Magistrate." 28. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22 (5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Karikisan vs. State of Maharashtra and Hadibandhu Das vs. District Magistrate." 28. In another decision in the case of Prituo Solo vs. Union of India & Others, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 409, a Division Bench of this Court has held that failure on the part of the detaining authority to furnish all materials included in the grounds of detention which have influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at the subjective satisfaction would amount to denial of valuable right of making an effective representation against the detention. 29. Again in the case of Nameirakpam Inaotomba Singh vs. Union of India, reported in 2007 (4) GLT 200, this Court has observed that right of assistance of a friend before the Advisory Board is a valuable right of the detenue and denial of such right would amount to violation of the safeguards available to the detenue under the law. In another reported judgment of this Court in the case of Jutika Chakraborty vs. State of Nagaland & Others, reported in 2013 (5) GLT 785, this Court has held that the detaining authority had a duty to inform the detenue about his right of being represented by his next friend before the Advisory Board. 30. In the instant case, it is the admitted position of fact that neither the grounds of detention have been furnished to the detenue in a language which he understands nor had the detaining authority informed him about his right to assistance of a friend before the Advisory Board. In a given case it may be the case that the accused is found to have a history of being involved in heinous crimes. However, the law is settled that even in such cases the safeguards available to a detenue within the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to him by the authority. It has been reiterated by the Apex Court in a number of judicial pronouncements that the personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and is of such high constitutional value that the detaining authority would be under an obligation to show that the detention is in strict compliance with the procedure established by law. It has been reiterated by the Apex Court in a number of judicial pronouncements that the personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and is of such high constitutional value that the detaining authority would be under an obligation to show that the detention is in strict compliance with the procedure established by law. Needless to mention herein that the detention of the detenue in the present case, on the face of the record, appears to be in utter breach of such established procedural rights and safeguards that were available to the detenue under the law. 31. In the case of Kamlesh Kumar Ishwardar Patel vs. Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 51 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "....we are not unmindful of the harmful consequences of the activities in which the detenues are to be alleged involved. But while discharging our constitutional obligation to enforce the liberty, we cannot allow ourselves to be influenced by these considerations. It has been said that history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. The Framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court. Their rigour cannot be modulated on the basis of the nature of the activities of a particular person. We would, in this context, reiterate what was said earlier by this Court while rejecting a similar submission: (SCC para 4). May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus (See Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1981) 45 SCC 48)." 32. In the present case, as has been mentioned before, there is no material on record to indicate any valid and justifiable grounds for passing the order of detention dated 11.05.2015. In the present case, as has been mentioned before, there is no material on record to indicate any valid and justifiable grounds for passing the order of detention dated 11.05.2015. From a perusal of the record it further appear that the impugned order of detention is also vitiated by total non-application of mind by the detaining authority in as much as the order of detention merely reproduces the grounds mentioned in the letter dated 06.05.2015 issued by the sponsoring authority without there being any trace of independent application of mind of the Detaining Authority. Similar was the approach of the Approving Authority in the matter. Accordingly, it is held that the impugned order of detention dated 11.05.2015 is based on the ipse dixit of the Detaining Authority and hence not sustainable in law. Consequently, the order of detention dated 11.05.2015 as well as the approval order dated 14.05.2015 and the confirmation order dated 29.06.2015 are held to be illegal in the eye of law and hence, stands interfered with by this Court. 33. The detenue in this case, namely, Shri Boto @ Aboto Chishi would be released from detention forthwith unless his custodial detention is required in connection with any other cases. 34. This pf