ORDER : Mr. Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. 1. The Additional Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, by order dated 31st October, 2006, with reference to the award dated 6th October, 2002, remanded the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer, Bayana, District Bharatpur, to make an award afresh for correct compensation, affording an opportunity of hearing to the interested parties. As a consequence thereof, the Land Acquisition Officer made an award dated 31st January, 2007 (Annexure-11); of which the petitioner is aggrieved of, and therefore, has instituted the present writ petition praying for the following relief(s): "(i) Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 31.10.2006 Annexure-9 and order dated 31.1.2007 Annexure-11; (ii) Direct the State Government/Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur to approve the award dated 8.5.2002 Annexure-7; (iii) Pass any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances, in favour of the petitioner." 2. Shorn off unnecessary details the essential skeletal material facts are that the State government issued a notification dated 2nd February, 1996, for acquiring the agricultural land bearing Khasra Number 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73 situated in Village Bayana, District Bharatpur. The notification was published in the State Gazette on 14th February, 1996. The land acquisition proceedings were initiated to acquire the land for the erstwhile Rajasthan State Electricity Board (for short "the RSEB"), for extension working of 132 K.V. Grid Sub Station at Bayana, District Bharatpur. Further, a notification under Section 17(4) read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act of 1894"), was issued on 29th May, 1997 and was published in the extraordinary State Gazette on 4th June, 1997. The Land Acquisition Officer determined 80% interim award vide award dated 4th 5 September, 1996, which was later on amended vide order dated 1st September, 1998. The petitioner deposited interim compensation amount with the Land Acquisition Officer, Bayana, on 17th September, 1998, but for khatedars - Kanhaiya and Shiv Lal, all other khatedars received the amount in terms of the compensation. 3. The petitioner deposited interim compensation amount with the Land Acquisition Officer, Bayana, on 17th September, 1998, but for khatedars - Kanhaiya and Shiv Lal, all other khatedars received the amount in terms of the compensation. 3. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the legality and validity of the order dated 31st October, 2006, made by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, for inherent lack of jurisdiction in the face of sub-section (1) of Section 11 so also Section 15(A) of the Act of 1894; however, learned counsel appearing for the respondents relying upon the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short "the Act of 2013"), emphatically argued that the writ petition has virtually become infructuous in view of the mandate of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and law declared by the Supreme Court while interpreting the contemplation under Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Reliance is placed on the opinion in the case of Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.: (2015) 3 SCC 355; Magnum Promoters Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors.: (2015) 3 SCC 327 and Soorajmull Nagarmull v. State of Bihar & Ors.: (2015) 10 SCC 270 , so also on a recent pronouncement in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors.: JT 2016 (9) 65. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 5. Indisputably, from the factual matrix as available on record, it is evident that the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Bharatpur, did not accord approval to the award dated 6th October, 2002, but remanded the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer for an award afresh affording an opportunity of hearing to the interested parties. It is also not in dispute that award made afresh on 31st January, 2007, is pending approval before the State Government and as such no award has been made till date. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. It is also not in dispute that award made afresh on 31st January, 2007, is pending approval before the State Government and as such no award has been made till date. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate, while resisting the plea as advanced on behalf of the respondents, in the backdrop of the contemplation under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, emphasized that the law declared by the Supreme Court would have no application to the case at hand in the face of the fact that the matter is pending adjudication before this Court, wherein an interim order was granted on 6th September, 2007, restraining the State Government from according approval to the enhanced award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Bayana, District Bharatpur, on 31st January, 2007. Further, the interim order was confirmed on 1st February, 2011, and therefore, the award made could not be accorded approval by the State Government. Hence, the opinions referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, have no application to the singular facts of the case at hand. 7. The argument raised may not detain this Court for long in view of the contemplation under the Act of 2013. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which reads thus: "24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,- (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 8. A glance of the contemplation of Section 24(1) (a) of the Act of 2013 would reveal that the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894, where no award under Section 11 of the Act is made, then, all provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of the compensation shall apply. Further, an analysis of Section 24(2) would reveal that where an award under Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. 9. In the case of Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with somewhat similar controversy in the backdrop of contemplation under Section 24(2), which did not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction granted by any Court. It will be useful to consider the text of paragraph 11, which reads thus: "11. It was faintly suggested by Mr. It will be useful to consider the text of paragraph 11, which reads thus: "11. It was faintly suggested by Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned AAG for the State of Tamil Nadu that the proviso may come to the rescue of the State and save the proceedings from suffering lapse if it is held that since there was an award leading to payment of compensation in respect of some of the land holdings only, therefore all the beneficiaries may now be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. This contention could have been considered with some more seriousness if physical possession of the land had been taken but since that has not been done, the proviso dealing only with compensation cannot be of any help to the State. Therefore, we are not required to go deeper into the effect and implications of the proviso which prima facie appears to be for the benefit of all the land holders in a case where the award is subsisting because the proceedings have not lapsed and compensation in respect of majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries. There is nothing in the language of the proviso to restrict the meaning of the words used in Section 24(2) mandating that the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed if the award is five years or more than five years' old but the physical possession of the land has not been taken over or the compensation has not been paid. The law is trite that when the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no effect so as to exclude from the main enactment by implication what clearly falls within its express terms, as held by Privy Council in the case of Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Company Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality, AIR 1944 PC 71 and by this Court in the case of C.I.T. v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 ." 10. From a glance of what has been held by the Supreme Court in the backdrop of contemplation under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, the interim order granted by this Court in the writ application on 6th September, 2007, and confirmed by the order dated 1st February, 2011, therefore, will have no effect for the delay even on that account would extinguish the acquisition proceedings by virtue of deeming clause. 11. In case of Soorajmull Nagarmull (supra) wherein the matter was considered by the Supreme Court in the circumstances where possession was already taken by the State under Section 17 of the Act of 1894; relief was accorded to the land owner in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar, (2015) 10 SCC 241 . While the acquisition proceedings with regard to subject land therein were declared to have lapsed; the Supreme Court directed the respondent-State to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or have any other action available to it in accordance with law within six weeks from the date of the order. At this stage, it will be relevant to consider the text of paragraph 9, 10 and 11, which reads thus: "9. We therefore conclude that the actions of the Respondent State have denied the Appellant just and fair compensation as envisaged and postulated in the L.A. Act, for its land from which it was dispossessed well over three decades ago. The 1981 acquisition is accordingly set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. We must hasten to reiterate the submission made by the learned Solicitor General to the effect that Section 11A, or the necessity to pass an Award, is not necessary in view of the exposition of the law in Satendra Prasad Jain. The 1981 acquisition is accordingly set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. We must hasten to reiterate the submission made by the learned Solicitor General to the effect that Section 11A, or the necessity to pass an Award, is not necessary in view of the exposition of the law in Satendra Prasad Jain. We may adumbrate, since it already been discussed by us in detail in Laxmi Devi, that the ratio of the Three judge bench in Satendra Prasad Jain is confined to the proposition that the errant Respondent State is precluded from endeavouring to have the acquisition set aside for its own failure to carry out compliance with Section 11A, and that once possession has been taken by the State Under Section 17 of the L.A. Act, it is no longer open to the State to relinquish or return the land to the legal entity who had been dispossessed from it. Accordingly, we refrain from passing any orders or directions interfering with the possession of the Respondent State over the subject land. 10. In this situation the current acquisition law needs to be analysed. We have already concluded that the 1981 acquisition had lapsed because of the failure of the Respondent State to pass an Award and secondly because it had launched upon a fresh acquisition in 1996. Section 24 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter 2013 Act) deserves to be placed here- 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),- (a) Where no award Under Section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said Section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition Under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 11. At first perusal, there seems to be an unexplained inconsistency between Section 24(1) (a), which allows an acquisition to stand despite a failure to pass an award while only requiring the compensation to be determined under the 2013 Act, and Section 24(2), which deems the acquisition to have lapsed for a failure to pay compensation or take physical possession of the land where an award has been passed over five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It appears that the State is in a better position in situations where it has been remiss in taking any action, towards publication of an award than in situations where it has taken partial steps towards the completion of the acquisition proceedings. However, it is possible that the reason behind this differentiation is that Section 24(2) gives the State the option to initiate fresh proceedings, as opposed to placing an obligation upon it to do so. To give the State the discretion to set aside an acquisition for its own error in not passing an award would be in the face of the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain. The Parliament has therefore sought to give the erstwhile landowner the benefit of enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act, while restraining the State from taking advantage of its own wrong. The Parliament has therefore sought to give the erstwhile landowner the benefit of enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act, while restraining the State from taking advantage of its own wrong. Section 24(2), on the other hand, seeks to allow the land to be returned to the landowner party in situations where there is genuinely no need for it, thus benefiting both the dispossessed landowner and the State. There still remains an incongruity, but which presently we are not burdened to unravel. Which provision in the 2013 Act governs a situation where the State has not progressed beyond making a Declaration Under Section 6; where possession of the land has not assumed by the State; where neither part nor whole of the compensation has been paid or tendered! However, since in this Appeal we do not have to traverse this legal labyrinth, we shall refrain from indulging in a more detailed discussion of it." 12. For the reasons and discussions herein above as well as in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 13. The land acquisition proceedings with regard to the land involved herein have lapsed for no award has been made. However, the respondent-State will be at liberty to initiate acquisition proceedings afresh or take any other action available to it in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented. 14. No costs.