JUDGMENT : Indira Banerjee, J. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 30th August, 2011 passed by the Motor Accident Case Tribunal, Additional District and Sessions Judge, 5th Fast Track Court, Malda, in MACC No. 227 of 2010 being an application for compensation filed by the appellant claimants under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on account of the death of one Md. Majibur Rahaman in an accident caused by a truck No. WB73A-4580, owned by one Mamtaj Sk., the respondent No. 2 and covered by a policy of insurance issued by the Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the insurer. 2. By the judgment and award under appeal, the learned Tribunal awarded the claimants compensation of Rs. 6 lakhs along with interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum from the date of filing of the claim application on 9th August, 2010 till satisfaction of the awarded amount, as against Rs. 20 lakhs claimed by the appellant claimants along with interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum. 3. It appears that on 13th July, 2010, at about 9:30 A.M., Md. Majibur Rahaman, the victim of the accident, was proceeding towards Budhia Madrasa on his motor cycle, when his motor cycle was hit by the offending truck which was coming from the opposite direction. According to the appellant claimants, the accident took place due to rash driving and negligence on the part of the driver of the truck. 4. The insurer filed a written objection contesting the claim. In the written objection it was denied that any accident as alleged had taken place. It was denied that the truck was involved in any accident. The insurer claimed that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the truck. 5. The learned Tribunal on consideration of the evidence, found that the deceased victim was killed in an accident caused by the truck. The learned Tribunal also found that the accident took place due to negligence and rash driving on the part of the driver of the offending truck. 6. In course of proceeding in the learned Tribunal, it was proved that the deceased victim was, before his death, a teacher of Batna J.M.O. Senior Madrasa, his last take home salary being Rs. 25,514.50. 6. In course of proceeding in the learned Tribunal, it was proved that the deceased victim was, before his death, a teacher of Batna J.M.O. Senior Madrasa, his last take home salary being Rs. 25,514.50. From the driving licence of the deceased victim the learned Tribunal found that the date of birth of the deceased victim was 12th December, 1952. The learned Tribunal considering the take home salary of the deceased victim and his age at the time of his death, awarded to the appellant claimants lump sum compensation of Rs. 6 lakhs along with interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum, from the date of filing of the claim case, that is 9th August, 2010, till satisfaction of the awarded amount. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant claimants submitted that the learned Tribunal erred in law in awarding the appellant claimants lump sum compensation of Rs. 6 lakhs. The learned Tribunal has not given the break up of the compensation of Rs. 6 lakhs. 8. Section 163A of The Motor Vehicles Act 1988 provides as follows:- "163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule." 9. Section 163A provides for compensation in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule." 9. Section 163A provides for compensation in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. In this case, of course, compensation has been claimed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 10. It is true that there is a difference between computation of compensation under Section 163A, which is payable by the owner or the authorised insurer only in case of death or permanent disability, in an accident in course of use of a motor vehicle, irrespective of any fault or negligence on the part of the vehicle, and in the case of a claim under Section 166 where fault and negligence of the vehicle has to be established. Compensation under Section 166 is not restricted only to death or permanent disability unlike Section 163A. On proof of fault or negligence of the vehicle, its owner or driver and on proof of damages, loss or injury, compensation under Section 166 may be awarded in case of any injury whether permanent or not and also in case of damage to property, apart from death. It is well settled that even though the Second Schedule is not applicable to claims under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it may serve as a reasonable guideline for computation of compensation for pecuniary loss even under the said Section. 11. Under the Second Schedule, compensation is to be computed by multiplying the annual income of the deceased victim, at the time of the accident, with the multiplier applicable to the age group to which the victim belonged, as per the Second Schedule, deducting ?rd therefrom towards personal and living expenses of the victim. To the aforesaid amount is added a statutory amount of Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 2,500/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 5,000/- to the surviving spouse on account of loss of consortium. 12. However under Section 166, compensation is not restricted to the Second Schedule. Compensation may be awarded for mental agony, loss of amenities of life by reason of permanent disablement etc. apart from loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate and compensation for loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses need not be confined to the figures stipulated in the Second Schedule. 13. Compensation may be awarded for mental agony, loss of amenities of life by reason of permanent disablement etc. apart from loss of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of estate and compensation for loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses need not be confined to the figures stipulated in the Second Schedule. 13. In Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. reported in 2009 ACJ 1298 , the Supreme Court held : "9. Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death : (a) age of the deceased; (b) income of the deceased; and the (c) the number of dependents. The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are (i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income; (ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference of the age of the deceased. If these determinants are standardized, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well settled steps: Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand. Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased. Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the 'loss of dependency' to the family. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased. Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the 'loss of dependency' to the family. Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5,000/- to 10,000/- should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased. The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also added. .... 10. Generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation. The question is whether actual income at the time of death should be taken as the income or whether any addition should be made by taking note of future prospects 11. ..In view of imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. [Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words 'actual salary' should be read as 'actual salary less tax']. The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculations being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances." 14. In Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question of deduction of personal and living expenses of the deceased. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances." 14. In Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question of deduction of personal and living expenses of the deceased. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that it would be very difficult to prove personal and living expenses of a deceased victim and therefore found it necessary to standardise the deduction. The Supreme Court was of the view that half of the income i.e. 50% might be deducted if the deceased was a bachelor. In case the victim was married, ?rd might be deducted, the deduction of ?rd having got statutory recognition under the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court however made it clear that the percentage of deduction was not inflexible and in appropriate cases where the number of dependencies in the family was large, a lesser amount might be deducted towards personal and living expenses. The Supreme Court approved allotment of two units to each adult and one unit to each minor and then dividing the income by the different number of units to arrive at the personal and living expenses of the deceased. 15. In Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court held that the multiplier to be adopted should be as follows :- Age group of 15 to 20 Years 18 21 to 25 Years 18 26 to 30 Years 17 31 to 35 Years 16 36 to 40 Years 15 41 to 45 Years 14 46 to 50 Years 13 51 to 55 Years 11 56 to 60 Years 9 61 to 65 Years 7 Above 65 years 5 16. In this case, there is evidence of negligence on the part of the offending vehicle. In any case, there could be no question of awarding any compensation unless there was a clear finding of fault or negligence. A sum of Rs. 6 lakhs has been awarded by way of compensation. However, there is substance in the argument of counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Sahidur Rahaman that the learned Tribunal erred in awarding lump-sum compensation. 17. The Tribunal deciding a claim for compensation on account of death or disability in a motor accident is obliged to award just compensation. 6 lakhs has been awarded by way of compensation. However, there is substance in the argument of counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Sahidur Rahaman that the learned Tribunal erred in awarding lump-sum compensation. 17. The Tribunal deciding a claim for compensation on account of death or disability in a motor accident is obliged to award just compensation. Compensation can never be said to be just if it is an arbitrary lump-sum figure. 18. The appellant claimants proved with cogent evidence that the deceased victim was a teacher of Patna J.M.O, Senior Madras a with take home salary of Rs. 25,514.50 paisa. The victim was 57 years of age at the time of the accident. The applicable multiplier would therefore be 9 as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra). 19. The victim being a married man, ordinarily ?rd would have to be deducted towards personal and living expenses. However, in the event it was found that there were a large number of dependents, a lesser amount might be deducted towards personal and living expenses. 20. In this case, there are about five claimants. However, there is no evidence that all the five claimants were dependent on the deceased victim. In evidence, the first witness on behalf of the appellant claimants, Md. Kamruzzaman, son of the deceased victim, who was aged about 32 years deposed that they were three brothers and one sister and except his youngest brother, Hasanuzzaman, who was only 20 years of age, all the other brothers and sisters were married. There is not a whisper of whether any of the children were dependent on the deceased victim. However, it may be presumed that the youngest son who was only 20 years of age was possibly dependent on the victim apart from his widow. In our view, the award is liable to be enhanced, considering the fact that the deceased victim had take home pay of Rs. 25,514.50/-. 21. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the respondent insurer submitted that the compensation should be computed taking into account the pecuniary loss suffered by the family of the deceased victim by reason of his death. 22. As argued by Mr. Das, it is admitted that the widow of the deceased victim would be in receipt of family pension. Mr. 21. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the respondent insurer submitted that the compensation should be computed taking into account the pecuniary loss suffered by the family of the deceased victim by reason of his death. 22. As argued by Mr. Das, it is admitted that the widow of the deceased victim would be in receipt of family pension. Mr. Das strenuously contended that in computing compensation the family pension should be taken into account and deducted as the loss which the family would suffer, would be the take home pay, less personal and living expenses of the deceased, and less the family pension, which the family would to receive. Mr. Das also argued that the multiplier should correspond not with the age of the deceased victim but the remaining portion of his service career. 23. In support of his submission Mr. Das cited a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smritilekha Tewari and Ors. reported in 2014 ACJ 1406 where a Division Bench of this Court presided over by A.K. Banerjee, J., held that compensation should be computed by multiplication of the income of the deceased with the remaining years of his service before he reaches the age of superannuation. The judgment is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Varma (supra). 24. Mr. Das further argued and rightly, that in case of a motor accident, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is bound and obliged to award compensation which is just, fair and proper. The accidental death of a breadwinner should not be a bonanza or a windfall which enables the family to enrich itself. 25. In State of Haryana & Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur & Ors. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 484 , cited by Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the insurer, the Supreme Court held :- "It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense "damages" which in turn appears to it to be 'just and reasonable'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has be to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1998 SC 3191 )."" 26. However, the main question is what exactly is 'just compensation'. What is just to one may seem unjust to another. The Supreme Court has, therefore, advocated the imperativeness of standardisation of compensation. 27. Accordingly, in Sarla Varma (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the need to assess compensation by assessing the annual income of the victim at the time of his death multiplying the annual income with the multiplier corresponding to the age of the deceased, deducting from the aforesaid amount the personal and living expenses of the deceased which would ordinarily be 50 percent in the case of a bachelor and ?rd in case of a married man. Of course, in Sarla Varma (supra) the Supreme Court made it clear that the rule of deduction of ?rd was not an inflexible rule. Of course, in Sarla Varma (supra) the Supreme Court made it clear that the rule of deduction of ?rd was not an inflexible rule. Deduction of personal and living expenses would depend on the number of dependents. 28. In Vimal Kanwar And Ors. v. Kishore Dan and Ors. reported in 2013 ACJ 1441 the Supreme Court held :- "19. The first issue is "whether Provident Fund, Pension and Insurance receivable by claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as "Pecuniary Advantage" liable for deduction?" The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this Court in Helen C. Rebello (Mrs) and others v. Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corpn., 1999 ACJ 10 (SC). In the said case, this Court held that Provident Fund, Pension, Insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. are all a "pecuniary advantage" receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as "pecuniary advantage" liable for deduction. The following was the observation and finding of this Court: "35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event, viz., accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. No correlation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as "pecuniary advantage" liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there is no semblance of any correlation. The insured (deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no correlation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual." 29. In Lal Dei and Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Anr. Reported in 2008 ACJ 1107, the concerned Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal had, which awarding compensation, taking into consideration the family pension given to the family. In Lal Dei and Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Anr. Reported in 2008 ACJ 1107, the concerned Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal had, which awarding compensation, taking into consideration the family pension given to the family. The Supreme Court held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal as well as the High Court could not have deducted the amount of family pension given to the family while calculating the dependency of the claimants. 30. In Lal Dei and Ors. v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra) the Supreme Court referred to and approved its earlier judgment in Helen C. Rebello and Ors. v. Maharashtra State Transport Corporation and Anr. reported in 1999 ACJ 10 (SC) where the Supreme Court had specifically dealt with the question of whether family pension should be taken into account for computation of compensation in a Motor Accident Claims case and held that family pension was earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions and receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. There is no correlation between the two and therefore, the family pension amount paid to the family cannot be deducted while calculating the compensation awarded to the claimants. The order of deduction of the family pension was set aside by the Supreme Court. 31. Of course in Helen C. Rebello and Ors. v. Maharashtra State Transport Corporation and Anr. (supra), the main issue was whether any amount received by the claimants under Life Insurance policy of the deceased was deductible. The Supreme Court found that the amount that was receivable under the Life Insurance Policy. It was a contractual amount payable irrespective of accidental death in consideration of periodical contributions in the form of premium. However, in deciding the aforesaid issue, the Supreme Court held that the application of genuine principle under law of land and for the computation of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must correlate to the type of injury or death i.e. accidental injury or death. If pecuniary advantage from whatever source were to be interpreted to mean any form of death, it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. If pecuniary advantage from whatever source were to be interpreted to mean any form of death, it would dilute all possible benefits conferred on the claimant and would be contrary to the spirit of the law. Thus, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal adjudicating the claimants in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury, the victims would not include that amount which the claimant received on account of other forms of death which he would have received even apart from accidental death. 32. As observed above, the victim had monthly take home pay of Rs. 25,514.50/-. The annual income was therefore Rs. 3,06,174/-. Applying the multiplier 9, the amount would be Rs. 27,55,566/-. From the aforesaid amount, ?rd i.e. Rs. 9,18,522/- may be deducted towards personal expenses. 33. Annual income multiplied by 9' as per the Second Schedule:- (Rs.3,06,174 x 9) 27,55,566 Less : 1/3rd towards personal exp. 9,18,522 18,37,044 Add: Loss of Estate 2,500 Add: Funeral Exp. 2,000 Add: Loss of Consortium 5,000 18,46,544 34. The claimant appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till full payment, as per reducing balance. Mr. Das submits that the awarded amount has already been paid. The balance amount shall be released within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Urgent Photostat certified copy, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities.