JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal has been instituted against Judgment 18.4.2015 rndered by the learned Additional District Judge (III), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, HP in HMP No. 118-P/III/13/07. 2. “Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that marriage of appellant and respondent was solemnised on 4.12.2002 at Village Mohrain Amri, Post Office Kona, Tehsil Jaisingpur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh according to Hindu rituals and customs. Two children namely Kashap and Sourabh were born out of their wedlock. Appellant instituted a petition for dissolution of marriage by way of a decree of divorce under Section 13 (1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, against the respondent. According to the averments made in the petition, respondent misbehaved with the appellant and his parents and treated him with cruelty. She also filed a complaint to the Pradhan, Gram Panchayat and police that the parents of the appellant were demanding dowry. These complaints were found baseless and no case was registered. She had tried to consume poisonous substance but she was saved by the appellant and his parents. She used to beat up the appellant and his family members. She also threatened to kill the child and to commit suicide. She has made false complaint that the father of the appellant had molested her. 3. Petition was contested by the respondent. Allegations contained in the petition were denied. Appellant and his parents had treated the respondent with cruelty time and again. She was maltreated and beaten up for bringing insufficient dowry. She was given severe beatings by the appellants and his parents on 28.4.2003, snatched her ornaments and turned her out of house and forcibly sent her with brother-in-law Ravi Kumar. On 15.10.2003, appellant and his father again started giving beatings to her. On 16.7.2004, again the appellant and his parents gave severe beatings to the respondent and snatched her elder son who was 10 months old and turned her out of the matrimonial home. Since 21.8.2006, respondent was residing at parental house with her minor sons and appellant had not given any maintenance and had neglected them. 4. Issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 15.6.2011. Petition was dismissed on 18.4.2015. Hence this petition. 5. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that appellant has been treated with cruelty by the respondent. 6. Ms. Anita, Advocate has supported judgment dated 18.4.2015. 7. 4. Issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 15.6.2011. Petition was dismissed on 18.4.2015. Hence this petition. 5. Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that appellant has been treated with cruelty by the respondent. 6. Ms. Anita, Advocate has supported judgment dated 18.4.2015. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and also gone through the record carefully. 8. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. He has led his evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-1/A. Contents of the petition have been reproduced in the affidavit. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he was married to the respondent in December 2002. He denied the suggestion that on 28.4.2003, ornaments of respondent were taken away and she was sent to her parents house. In his further cross-examination, he admitted that his younger brother had gone to drop the respondent at her house. He also admitted that at the instance of the respondent they were called to the Police Station Bhawarna. Appellant held out promise to take back the respondent with him to his house. Report was also filed by the respondent in Police Station Bhawarna on 24.7.2005. He has admitted that respondent was medically examined. Compromise was arrived at vide Ext. P1. He took her back with him. He also admitted about the compromise arrived at on 19.10.2005 vide Ext. P2 as well as compromise dated 6.5.2006 Ext. P3. He has denied his signatures on Ext. P3. He has also admitted that he has not led any tangible evidence to prove that respondent has consumed any poisonous substance or that she was admitted to the hospital. No complaint was made by them against the respondent. 9. Sandhya Devi (PW-2) has also led her evidence by way of affidavit Ext. PW-2/A. She admitted that matter was compromised many times. She did not remember the date, month and year when respondent has threatened the appellant or his family members or has tried to take poison or attempted to kill her son. 10. Madho Ram (PW-3) is the father of the appellant. He has also led his evidence by way of affidavit Ext. PW-3/A. He has admitted that on 24.7.2005, report was lodged with Police Station Bhawarna which led to compromise Ext. P1. He has admitted that after compromise, respondent has gone to parents’ house. He also admitted the compromises Ext. P2 and Ext. P-3. 11. Respondent has appeared as RW-1. He has also led his evidence by way of affidavit Ext. PW-3/A. He has admitted that on 24.7.2005, report was lodged with Police Station Bhawarna which led to compromise Ext. P1. He has admitted that after compromise, respondent has gone to parents’ house. He also admitted the compromises Ext. P2 and Ext. P-3. 11. Respondent has appeared as RW-1. She has led her evidence by filing affidavit Ext. RW-1/A. She has specifically denied that she had implicated the appellant or his family members in a dowry case. She admitted the compromise entered into between the parties before the Panchayat. She admitted that she has filed complaint before the Women Cell at Dharamshala. She denied the suggestion that that on 23.8.2006, she left the house of the appellant on her own free will. 12. Balak Ram (RW-2) is the father of the respondent. He has also led his evidence by filing affidavit Ext. RW-2/A. He denied the suggestion that the behaviour of his daughter with her in-laws was not normal. He has admitted that so many times, compromise was arrived at before the fraternity. He specifically denied that his daughter has refused to live with the appellant. 13. Trilok Chand (RW-3) has led his evidence by filing affidavit Ext. RW-3/A. He deposed that in April, 2003, respondent was severely beaten by the appellant and his parents and respondent was turned out of the house. On the request of father of respondent, he alongwith respondent, Balak Ram, father of the respondent Shri Hoshiar Singh went to the house of appellant to settle the matter amicably between the parties but father of the appellant threatened, insulted and humiliated them. The appellant and his father refused to settle the matter. He insulted father of the respondent and said that they had not given anything in the marriage and to take whatever useless things had been given in the marriage. Despite repeated requests made by them, appellant and his father refused to keep the respondent in their house. He has gone to settle the matter at the instance of the Balak Ram. 14. What emerges from the analysis of the evidence discussed herein above is that marriage between the parties was solemnised on 4.12.2002. Two children Kashap and Saurabh were born out of the wedlock. Respondent was beaten up by the appellant and his family member repeatedly. He has gone to settle the matter at the instance of the Balak Ram. 14. What emerges from the analysis of the evidence discussed herein above is that marriage between the parties was solemnised on 4.12.2002. Two children Kashap and Saurabh were born out of the wedlock. Respondent was beaten up by the appellant and his family member repeatedly. She was beaten up on 28.4.2003, 15.10.2003 and 16.7.2004. She was thrown out of the house. Respondent was constrained to file complaint against appellant and his family members. Three compromises were arrived at between the parties on 24.7.2005 (Ext. P1), 19.10.2005 (Ext. P2) and 6.5.2006 (Ext. P3). Parties admitted signatures on the same. Appellant used to agree to take respondent with him, however, she was again repeatedly maltreated. Appellant and his family members chided the respondent for bringing insufficient dowry. It is the appellant who has treated the respondent with cruelty. Appellant can not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongs. Respondent was also beaten up severely. She was medically examined on 24.7.2005, which led to filing of complaint before the police authorities Bhawarna. She was forced to file a complaint before the Women Cell. Statement of PW-2 Sandhya Devi does not inspire confidence. She did not even know the date when respondent has misbehaved with the family members of the appellant. Similarly, PW-3 Madho Ram has also admitted about the compromise arrived at between the parties vide Exts. P1, P2 and P3. Father of the respondent has requested the appellant and his family members to stop maltreating the respondent. She is living at her parents’ house since 23.8.2006. RW-1 (respondent) in her cross-examination has deposed that appellant was not maintaining them. Appellant has failed to prove the allegations made in the petition. 15. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010 (1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore, to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However, continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However, in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julumidevi reported in (2010) 4 SCC 476, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. That possible explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial case are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p.660) “.. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p.660) “.. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.” 22. “ About the changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi at AIR p. 123, para 5 of the report: (SCC p.108, para 5) “5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties.” 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- "Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), VoL 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co- exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... " With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 18. In view of the discussion and analysis made herein above, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.