JUDGMENT 1. - Accused-petitioners have preferred this misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., for quashing FIR No.315/2016 dated 26.08.2016 of Police Station Naya Sahar, District Bikaner. In the impugned FIR, besides petitioners, other incumbents are also attributed offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, 354, 382, 323, 341, 436, 427, 147, 148, 149 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. 2. Challenge is laid to the FIR on various grounds including the ground that it is based on absolutely false, frivolous and concocted facts. It is also pleaded in the petition that a bare reading of FIR makes it abundantly clear that happening of such an incident is highly improbable. In totality, the petitioners have submitted that continuing proceedings in the matter would result in abuse of the process of the Court. 3. At the threshold, notices were issued to the respondent-complainant and by order dated 20th of September, 2016, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, limited indulgence was granted to the petitioners. The petitioners were asked to join investigation, but for restricting coercive action against petitioner No.4 only. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, at the outset, submits that investigation in the matter is still going on and, in the interregnum, petitioners have sorted out their dispute with the complainant and a written compromise is also submitted before the Investigating Officer on 3rd of October, 2016 and, in view of compromise, now it is not desirable to allow investigation to continue. Substantiating the plea of compromise, learned counsel has also placed on record written compromise. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted a factual report in the matter and as per factual report, prima facie offences are made out against the petitioners. He, therefore, submits that it is not a fit case wherein FIR can be quashed. Learned counsel for the complainant, while agreeing with the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged that it was a private dispute and now the dispute has been settled between the parties and compromise has been arrived at and therefore, the complainant is not interested to pursue prosecution against the petitioners. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant and perused the materials available on record. I have also gone through the entire case diary of the case, which is submitted by learned Public Prosecutor. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant and perused the materials available on record. I have also gone through the entire case diary of the case, which is submitted by learned Public Prosecutor. 7. While it is true that offences attributed to the accused-petitioners are serious but then a very vital fact cannot be overlooked by this Court that initially there was a private dispute between the parties and subsequently parties have sorted out their dispute for arriving at the compromise. One more redeeming fact is that so far prosecution has not been launched inasmuch as investigation has not been completed. A very significant fact that complainant is now not inclined to prosecute the petitioners is also borne out from the compromise. That apart, in substance, the recitals of the compromise also indicate that complainant has completely absolved the petitioners from all the charges. A very significant fact that complainant is now not inclined to prosecute the petitioners is also borne out from the compromise. That apart, in substance, the recitals of the compromise also indicate that complainant has completely absolved the petitioners from all the charges. The recitals of the compromise submitted before the Investigating Officer in vernacular reads as under:- " 1 ;g fd izkFkhZ lR;ukjk;.k us Fkkuk iqfyl u;k'kgj esa izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ djokbZ gS fd eSa vius ifjokj ds lkFk vius ?kj ij Fkk tc 1&xksdqy nkl M+kxk fuoklh dydrk ,oa f'ko dqekj M+kxk] lat; M+kxk] 'kkafr M+kxk] c`teksgu M+kxk] fuoklh dksydrk ds dgus ij 1&jktk O;kl] 2&tfd'ku fo'uksbz] 3&x.ks'k eksgu] 4&pUnz eksgu csfld Ldwy okys] 5&eksgu 'kekZ] 6&'kadj csfld dk Vhpj] 7& fot; HkkVh] 8&Hkwnso ikjhd] 9&fd'kksj ikjhd] 10&fQjkst [kka] 11&/kujkt iaokj] 12&pUnz eksgu tks'kh] 13&es?kjkt iq= vkseizdk'k] 14&vkse izdk'k eksykfu;k NSP dkayst okyk ,oa csfld Ldwy dk LVkQ lfgr yxHkx 150 O;fDr tcjnLrh esjs ?kj esa ?kql x;s ftuds reUpk] /kjnkj gfFk;kjksa lfgr ?kj esa ?kqldj efgykvksa ds lkeus Qk;fjax dh xbZ] [kwu [kjkck fd;k x;k vkSj efgykvksa dh bZTtr ywVus dh dksf'k'k dh xbZ] diM+s QkM+ fn;s x;s vkfn vkSj efgykvksa ,oa eq>s vkSj esjs HkkbZ iq= vkfn dks Hkh /kkjnkj lfj;k] cNhZ] xSaph vkfn gfFk;kjksa ls ihVk x;k vkSj esjh xk; dks Hkh /kkjnkj gfFk;kjksa ls ihVk x;k vkSj tku ls ekjus dh /kedh nh xbZA yxHkx dkQh le; rd ?kj nhokj rksM+dj /kkjnkj gfFk;kjksa ls ihVk x;k ftlesa Jherh jsoarh nsoh] Jherh jk/kk nsoh] Jherh eSuk nsoh] xksfudk] lksuw] ukckfyx cfPp;ksa dh Hkh bZTtr ywVus dh dksf'k'k dh xbZ vkSj ihVk x;kA vuUryky] tsBkjke] ewykjke iztkir] vfHk'ksd O;kl] jk/ko ikjhd] fnus'k vkSj esjs Lo;a vkSj rqylh ds xaHkhj pksVsa vkbZ gSA ?kj ij ?kqldj ywVikV dj ?kj [kjhnus ds j[kh xbZ jde chl yk[k :i;s ,oa efgykvksa dh xys ls lksus dh pSu ,oa vU; s vkHkw"k.k Hkh ywV dj ys x;sA lkeku fc[ksj dj ?kj ij lkeku ,oa vU; vko';d dkxtkr dks vkx yxkdj tyk fn;s x;sA [kqyh fiLrksy ygjkrs gq, /kedh tku ls ekjus dh nsrs jgsA ;g ?kVuk vkt fnuakd 26@8@2016 nksigj 1 cts dh gSA lR;ukjk;.k ch- ds- Ldwy ds ikl Xokfy;k guqeku th eafnj dh xyh fnuakd 26@8@2016 jktk O;kl] t;fd'ku fo'uksbZ ftuds gkFk esa fiLrkSy Fkh] Qk;fjax dh xbZA mDr izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ ntZ gksus ds i'pkr~ izkFkhZx.k o vkjksihx.k ds e/; lekt ds ekSrchj yksxksa us vkil esa jkthukek djok fn;kA vc izkFkhZx.k vkSj vkjksihx.k ds e/; bl izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ la[;k 315@2016 ds ckc=~ dksbZ Hkh fookn 'ks"k ugha cpk gSA nksuska i{kdkjku us vkil esa fey cSBdj vius Hkfo"; dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, viuk Hkyk cqjk lkspdj jkthukek dj fy;k gSA izkFkhZx.k o vkjksihx.k o muds fj'rsnkj dksbZ QkStnkjh o nhokuh dk;Zokgh ugha pykuk pkgrs gSA 2 ;g fd izkFkhZx.k ds bl izdj.k esa 'kjhj ds fdlh Hkh Vital Part ij dksbZ izk.k?kkrd ;k xaHkhj pksVsa ugha vkbZ gS rFkk izkFkhZx.k ds vkXus; vL= ls Hkh dksbZ pksV ugha vkbZ gS rFkk izdj.k esa uketn vkjksfi;ksa esa ls fdlh us Hkh dkxtkr dks vkx ugha yxkbZ gSA izkFkhZ iqfyl fjiksVZ esa izkFkhZ rFkk ifjokj dh bl ?kVuk esa 20 yk[k :i;s vkSj lksus dh pSu ywV dh jiV fy[kkbZ Fkh D;ksafd ?kVuk ds ckn ;g lkeku esa ugha feys Fks ijUrq vc ?kj dh ryk'kh ysus ij ;g jde vkSj lksus dh pSu ?kj esa gh fey xbZ gSA 3 ;g fd bl izdj.k esa vuqla/kku ds nkSjku Fkkuk iqfyl u;k'kgj us dj.k ik.M+s iq= fd'kksj ik.M+s] fQjkst iq= Qy[k 'ksj] ft'kku vyh iq= eksbZuqnhu] Hkwnso ikjhd iq= bUnz pUn ikjhd] 'kadj vks>k iq= dfiynso vks>k] tlqukFk iq= /kUuk ukFk vkfn dks fxjQrkj dj U;kf;d vfHkj{kk esa fHktok;k tk pqdk gSA izkFkhZx.k mijksDr vkjksihx.k ds fo:) Hkh dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha djuk pkgrs rFkk 'ks"k uketn vkjksihx.k dks bl ekeys esa fxjQrkj ugha djokuk pkgrs gSA Fkkuk iqfyl u;k'kgj ;fn fxjQrkj'kqnk eqyfteku dks fjgk djuk pkgrk gS rks izkFkhZx.k dks dksbZ vkifr ugha gSA " 8. Supreme Court in case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has observed that inherent powers of this Court under 482 Cr.P.C. are distinct and different from power of a criminal court to compound offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C., and therefore, in appropriate cases, court can exercise inherent jurisdiction in quashing criminal proceedings in the wake of compromise being arrived between the complainant and the accused persons. While discussing threadbare inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., on the anvil of embargo envisaged under Section 320 Cr.P.C. for compounding of offences, Court held:- "Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hardand-fast category can be prescribed." Finally the Court summarized the power of High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and held:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 9. In Yogendra Yadav & Ors. In Yogendra Yadav & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2014) 9 SCC 653 , the Supreme Court, while relying on the decision in Gian Singh (supra) and taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, quashed the pending criminal proceedings in a case on the basis of compromise between the rival parties for offence under Sections 326 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The Supreme Court exercised the powers to bring peace and for securing ends of justice. The Court held:- "Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 IPC which are non-compoundable? Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed Gian Singh v. State of Punjab. (2012) 10 SCC 303 . However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace." 10. In Narinder Singh & Ors. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace." 10. In Narinder Singh & Ors. 2014 Cr.L.R. (SC) 351 , Supreme Court, while discussing the inherent powers threadbare, postulated guidelines for exercising such powers in appropriate cases in the event of compromise between the parties and held: "In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: (I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. (II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (iii) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. (iv) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (v) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. (vi) Offences under Section 307 Indian Penal Code would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (vii) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime. 11. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Basti Ram & ors. Here charge is proved under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime. 11. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Basti Ram & ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., decided on 19.03.2015 while placing reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in Gian Singh (supra), quashed the criminal proceedings wherein accused persons were facing trial for offence under Section 307 IPC on the strength of compromise between both the parties. 12. In view of legal position as emerges out from the aforesaid judgments, I have also made endeavour to examine the case diary threadbare. Upon examining the case diary, unhesitatingly, in my view, there are many mitigating circumstances, which are tilting balance in favour of accused-petitioners vis-a-vis offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Attribution of aforesaid offence cannot be taken on its face value sans requisite sting in the prima facie evidence in this behalf. 13. It is also noteworthy that parties have resolved their dispute perpetually at the threshold even before completion of investigation cannot lose sight of this Court for exercising inherent powers ex debito justitiae for doing real and substantial justice in the matter for the administration of which alone courts exist. 14. In view of compromise allowing investigation would be a futile exercise and same is likely to result in miscarriage of justice. The factum of compromise has also acquired significance for the reason that investigation is yet to be completed and in the changed scenario a situation has come to the fore where possibility of conviction of the petitioners is very remote and bleak. Therefore, continuation of proceedings may result in futile exercise and abuse of the process of the Court. 15. In view of above discussion and considering the peculiar fact that matter is at the investigation stage, I feel persuaded to rely on compromise between the rival parties for quashment of impugned FIR for bringing peace between the rival parties. Resultantly, the instant petition is allowed and the impugned FIR bearing No.315/2016 registered at Police Station Nayasahar, District Bikaner and further proceedings pursuant thereto are, hereby, quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.Petition allowed. *******