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2016 DIGILAW 1459 (GUJ)

South Gujarat University v. Prakash P. Popat

2016-07-25

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2016
JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners call in question the legality and validity of the order dated 27.8.2003, passed by the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad in Application No. 29/03, filed by the respondent No. 1 herein. 2. The facts of this case may be summarized as under:- 2.1 The respondent No. 1 was appointed on 9.8.2002 as the Chief Accounts Officer in the set-up of the South Gujarat University, on probation for a period of two years. The appointment was pursuant to a Resolution dated 8.8.2002, passed by the Syndicate of the University. It was noticed by the University that the performance of the respondent No. 1 was not satisfactory. Accordingly, the Syndicate in its meeting convened on 26.5.2003, passed a Resolution to put an end to the services of the respondent No. 1 as the Chief Accounts Officer. The impugned order or rather the Resolution reads as under:- "It is hereby resolved that having considered the performance of Shri P.P. Popat, serving as the Chief Accounts Officer of the University, the period of probation be brought to an end immediately i.e. with effect from 21.5.2003." 3. Being dissatisfied with such decision of the University, the respondent No. 1 preferred an Appeal, which was registered as Appeal No. 2 of 2003 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, by its judgment dated 27.8.2003, allowed the appeal declaring the termination of the respondent No. 1 as illegal and ordered reinstatement in service with full backwages and also with benefit of continuity of service. Hence, this petition. 4. Mr. Dhaval Dave, the learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Pritviraj Jadeja for the petitioners vehemently submitted that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is perverse and contrary to law. According to Mr. Dave, the Tribunal failed to consider an important question that the termination of the respondent No. 1 was not by way of any punishment or penalty, but it was a termination simplicitor having regard to his performance during the period of probation. Mr. Dave submitted that in such circumstances, the Tribunal could not have relied upon Section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act, 1983. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Dave prays that there being merit in this petition, the same may be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 5. Mr. Dave submitted that in such circumstances, the Tribunal could not have relied upon Section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act, 1983. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Dave prays that there being merit in this petition, the same may be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 5. On the other hand, the respondent No. 1 appearing in person vehemently opposed this petition and submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal, warranting any interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and also the respondent No. 1 appearing in person, and also having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Tribunal committed any error in passing the impugned order. 7. On 20th October, 2003, the following order was passed:- "The South Gujarat University and another, petitioners, have filed this petition challenging the judgment and order dated 8.10.2003 passed by the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal, Ahmedabad in application No. 29 of 2003. The learned Judge by his impugned judgment was pleased to allow the application of original applicant Prakash P. Popat and hold that the order terminating the services of the applicant is found wrong, unlawful or otherwise unjustified and the same is quashed and set aside. Mr. Dhaval Dave, learned advocate, has invited my attention to the impugned order which is on page 22 dated 21.5.2003. He submitted that the petitioner was a probationer and simple order of removal has been passed without any enquiry or without casting any stigma in this behalf. He has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pavenendra Narayan v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Science and Another reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 as well as the decision of this Court in the case of Maharaja Sayajirao University v. Ram Mangaram Mirchandani reported in (2002) 1 GLR 861 . In view of the same, Rule. 2. As regards interim relief, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the order dated 21.5.2003 removing the petitioner from service is still continued even during the pendency of this petition. In view of the same, interim relief in terms of para 15(B). In view of the same, Rule. 2. As regards interim relief, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the order dated 21.5.2003 removing the petitioner from service is still continued even during the pendency of this petition. In view of the same, interim relief in terms of para 15(B). Notice as to interim relief returnable on 4.11.2003. Mr. Shah, learned advocate for the respondent waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 1." 8. On 29th June, 2004, the following order was passed:- "Heard the learned advocates on interim relief. Ad-interim order is confirmed on condition that any appointment made to the post of Chief Accounts Officer pending this petition shall be ad-hoc and subject to the result of this petition. Such appointment shall not create equity in favour of the person appointed as Chief Accounts Officer pending this petition." 9. In my view, the impugned order of the Tribunal is not only illegal, but also perverse. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was on probation for a period of two years. Before the period of probation could come to an end, the performance of the respondent No. 1 was assessed and found to be not satisfactory, and therefore, the Syndicate decided to put an end to the period of probation. In that regard, a Resolution was passed, which I have quoted above. By no stretch of imagination it could be said that the discontinuance of the respondent No. 1 in service was in any way stigmatic. It was a case of putting an end to the services of a probationer simplicitor. 10. I fail to understand how Section 14 of the Act could have been invoked by the Tribunal. Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983, reads as under:- "14. (1) No University employee shall be discharged or removed from University service or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the University except after an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a University employee who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year or an employee appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for the period of such vacancy." 11. In my view, the Tribunal fell in serious error in relying on Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983. This issue is squarely covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Gujarat Vidhyapith v. Becharbhai Nagajibhai Bharwad, reported in 2005 (1) G.L.H 236 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has explained the true purport of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act, 1983. I may quote the relevant observations:- ""10. From the reading of section 14(1) of the said Act, it is clear that it provides that no employee shall be dismissed or removed from University service or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the changes against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. In sub-section (2) of section 14, it is provided that no penalty other than the penalty referred to in sub-section (1) shall be imposed unless the employee concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Under sub-section (3) of section 14, an aggrieved employee by an order of penalty imposed on him under sub-section (1) is permitted to make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 10.1 It can thus be seen that section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act deals with the penal actions of the University against the employee concerned. It is in this context provided that no such action of dismissal, removal from service, reduction in rank or otherwise that of termination be taken except after holding an inquiry informing the employee of the charges against him and giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. As noted earlier, sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act provides for penalty other than those envisaged under sub-section (1) of section 14. The order that may be passed by the University under sub-section (1) of section 14 has been made appealable to the Tribunal at the instance of the employee. The entire section, therefore, deals with the action of the University of taking penal action against the employee. The order that may be passed by the University under sub-section (1) of section 14 has been made appealable to the Tribunal at the instance of the employee. The entire section, therefore, deals with the action of the University of taking penal action against the employee. While sub-section (1) of section 14 deals with the penal action of dismissal, removal from service or reduction in rank or otherwise terminating the service, sub-section (2) of section 14 deals with imposition of penalty other than those specified in sub-section (1) of section 14. Seen from this angle, in my view, the procedure prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 14 has relevance only for a penal action taken by the University and would not apply to a case where the services of the employee are sought to be terminated by way of simpliciter termination. The words "otherwise terminated" may however pose some difficulty. It can be urged, as has been done by the counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the term "otherwise terminated" must be construed as termination simpliciter and cannot be a penal action proposed by the University. 10.2 In service jurisprudence, term "termination" signifies severance of master and servant relation by an action of the master. When used in juxtaposition to the term "dismissed" or "removed", it signifies simpliciter termination and not a penal termination. Instances are, however, not unknown nor uncommon where termination is founded on allegations of misconduct and if such terminations are not preceded by an inquiry, have always been struck down by courts as being opposed to the principles of natural justice. Thus, it is not impossible to envisage the action of the employer to terminate the services of the employee by way of penalty. 10.3 In the decision of P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had while discussing the question of nature of termination whether being simpliciter or punitive made the following observations: "The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra). A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra). Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art. 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1995 I SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 . In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (supra), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Art. 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing.' If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment." From the above observations, it can be seen that in service jurisprudence concept of penal termination is not unknown. In that view of the matter, one has to interpret the term "otherwise terminated" as appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. Viewed in the context of Section 14 of the said Act, only possible view is that it refers to a penal action of the employer and has no reference to the simpliciter termination sought to be brought about by the University. Unless viewed from this angle, the subsequent words appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act, namely, "..... be otherwise terminated by the University except after an inquiry in which the employer has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges" cannot be reconciled. The procedure required to be followed as noticed earlier for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the employee is to hold an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The procedure required to be followed as noticed earlier for dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the employee is to hold an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Thus, the action has to be preceded by an inquiry in which the employee has been informed of the charges against him and also of giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard with respect to such charges. In light of this clear language of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act, words "otherwise terminated" used in the sub-section cannot be construed as a simpliciter termination and has to be understood as a termination sought to be brought about by the employer by way of a penalty to be imposed against the employee. Sub-section (2) of section 14 further fortifies this position when it provides for a somewhat different procedure to be followed for imposition of penalties other than those referred to in subsection (1). Thus, reading of sub-section (2) of section 14 also makes it further clear that what is envisaged in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act is a penal action of the employer. Sub-section (3) of section 14 once again provides for an appeal to the Tribunal to an employee who is aggrieved by an order of penalty imposed upon him under subsection (1) of section 14. Thus, language of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the said Act further lends support to this interpretation since it refers only to the penal action imposed upon the employee under sub-section (1) of section 14. Viewed from this angle, I have no manner of doubt that the words "otherwise terminated" appearing in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the said Act refer to a penal action of termination proposed to be taken by the employee. 11. In the decision in the case of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, AIR 2004 SC 1418 , while discussing the principles of interpretation of statute, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made following observations:- "24. In Reserve Bank of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc., 1987 (1) SCC 424 while dealing with the question of interpretation of a statute, this Court observed: "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. In Reserve Bank of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc., 1987 (1) SCC 424 while dealing with the question of interpretation of a statute, this Court observed: "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the contest. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place." 11.1 In the decision of Prakash Nath Khanna v. I.T. Commr., 2004 AIR SCW 3692, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a heading of a section or marginal note may be relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioners has pointed out that in the decision in the case of Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 , while considering the effect of the headings prefixed to section or set of sections, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, the headings certainly helps the Court to resolve that doubt. 12.1 On the basis of this principle also and considering the heading of Chapter III in which the said section 14 is to be found, one gets added support for the conclusion that section 14(1) of the said Act deals with only the penal actions of the University. 13. Keeping in mind the above judicial pronouncements on the interpretation of the statute, in my view it is now necessary to examine the contention of the learned counsel for the employees whether the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. Section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, reads as follows:- "36.(1) No person who is appointed as a headmaster, a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager until - (a) he has been given by the manager a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board. Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. (2) The officer referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall communicate his decision within a period of forty-five days, from the date of receipt by him of the proposal under the said clause (b) and if such decision is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period the action proposed to be taken under the said clause (b) shall be deemed to have been approved by the said officer. (3) Where a head master, a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him, the fact of such suspension together with the grounds therefor, shall be immediately communicated by the manager to an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the said officer within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of the communication in this behalf by such officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the said officer within such period, the suspension under reference shall cease to have effect on the expiry of such period. (4) Where a head master, a teacher or a member of the non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school desires to submit his resignation, the resignation shall be tendered by him in person to the District Education Officer concerned and shall not be accepted by the manager unless it is so tendered and forwarded to him by such officer duly endorsed. The acceptance of any such resignation tendered in contravention of this sub-section shall be ineffective. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order of the authorised officer under clause (b) of subsection (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the decision of the authorised officer." Section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act reads as follows:- "40B.(1)(a) No teacher of a recognised private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated until - (i) he has been given by the manager an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, has been approved in writing by the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the private primary school is situate: Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a teacher who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year or a teacher appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for a period less than a year. Explanation - A teacher who is appointed temporarily for a period of less than a year or a teacher who is appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for a period of such vacancy shall not be deemed to be a teacher appointed temporarily for such period, if he has at any time prior to such appointment served as a teacher either in the same private primary school or in another private primary school under the same management and the aggregate of the period of such post service and the period of service for which he is appointed exceeds one year. (b) The administrative officer shall communicate to the manager of the school in writing his approval or disapproval of the action proposed, within a period of forty five days from the date of the receipt by the administrative officer of such proposal. (2) Where the administrative officer fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of forty five days specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the administrative officer on the date of the expiry of the said period. (3) No penalty being the penalty other than that referred to in sub-section (1) shall be imposed on a teacher of the private primary school unless such teacher has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) Where a teacher of a private primary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him the fact of his suspension together with the grounds therefore shall be communicated within a period of seven days, after such suspension by the manager to the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the school is situate, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the administrative officer within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of communication in this behalf by the administrative officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the administrative officer within such period, the suspension of such teacher shall cease to have effect on the expiry of the said period: Provided that a teacher shall, during the period of suspension, be entitled to such subsistence allowance, and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. (5) Any teacher aggrieved by the order of the administrative officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) may make an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date on which the administrative officer has approved or deemed to have approved the action. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, and section 40C - (a) "manager" in relation to a private primary school means a person or body of persons in charge of the control or of management of the school; (b) "teacher" mans a teacher of a recognised private primary school; (c) "Tribunal" means a Tribunal constituted under section 40F." One may notice that in sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, it is provided that no person who is appointed as a head-master, a teacher, or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor his services be otherwise terminated until (a) he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken and (b) the action proposed to be taken has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board. Sub-section (5) of section 36 gives any person aggrieved by an order of the authorized officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) a right to appeal to the Tribunal. 13.1 In clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, it is provided that no teacher of a recognised private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor his services be otherwise terminated until (a) he has been given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken and (b) the action proposed has been approved in writing by the Administrative Officer of the School-Board. Sub-section (5) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act gives a teacher aggrieved by the order of the Administrative Officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) a right of appeal to the Tribunal. Sub-section (5) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act gives a teacher aggrieved by the order of the Administrative Officer under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) a right of appeal to the Tribunal. 13.2 It can thus be seen that sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act unlike in the case of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act do not refer to requirement of informing the employee of the charges against him nor does it provide for an opportunity of being heard being given in respect of those charges. In my view, the vital difference between the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act on one hand and the relevant provisions of sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and sub-section (1) of section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act on the other is the requirement of informing the employee of the charges against him and being given an opportunity of being heard with respect to those charges as found in sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. In my view, this is a material difference and changes the entire complexion of the scheme of the said section. The words "otherwise terminated" have been used in section 14 of the said Act in entirely different context as compared to section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret the said words ignoring the context in which they are used in the said Act. As noted above, the intention of the Legislature in my view is only to cover the penal actions of the employer under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act. In view of this material difference, I find that the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 14. In view of this material difference, I find that the provisions of section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act are not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act. 14. In the decision in the case of Babu Khan v. Nazim Khan, (2001) 5 SCC 375 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret a provision of an enactment following the decisions rendered on a similar provision of an enactment when two statutes are not in pari materia. In the decision in Jagatram Ahuja v. Commr. of Gift Tax, (2000) 8 SCC 249 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations:- "23. We find that Kantilal Trikamlal case supports the view taken in Getty Chettiar case. Added to this, Section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act, defining "property" came up consideration in Kantilal Trikamlal case. We may state here itself that the words and expressions defined in one statute as judicially interpreted do not afford a guide to construction of the same words or expressions in another statute unless both the statutes are pari materia legislations or it is specifically so provided in one statute to give the same meaning to the words as defined in other statute. The main and object of the two legislations, the Gift Tax Act and the Estate Duty Act are not similar." 15. In view of the above judicial pronouncements and in view of the conclusions that I have reached to the effect that section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act is not in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act or section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, it is not possible to follow the decisions of the learned single Judge in the case of Chhaganbhai P. Oza (supra) and Mahuva Kelavani Sahayak Samaj (supra) since the said decisions are rendered in the background of the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act respectively. 16. 16. It may be noted that in a decision dated 8th March, 1979, rendered by the learned single Judge of this High Court in Special Civil Application No. 652 of 1979 in the case of Sharda Education Trust v. Kiritkumar Chimanlal Shelat, the learned single Judge of this High Court had taken a view that the procedure as laid down in section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act would have to be followed even in case where termination of a teacher is concerned on account of closure of the school. It may be also be noted that the decision of the learned single Judge was upheld by a Division Bench of this High Court in a decision dated 25.7.79 while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal No. 174/79. One may also note that finding that the provisions of section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act are in pari materia with the provisions of section 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, a learned single Judge of this High Court had while disposing of Special Civil Application No. 3271 of 1992 by a judgment dated 29th July, 1994 followed the said view in case of the provisions of section 40-B of the Bombay Primary Education Act also. 17. However, in view of my conclusion that the provisions of Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act cannot be compared in this regard with the provisions of other two statutes, it is not possible for me to follow the ratio laid down in the above mentioned decisions which have been rendered in the background of the respective provisions of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act and Bombay Primary Education Act. 18. At this stage, counsel for the employees pointed out from the impugned decision of the Tribunal that the Tribunal had adjudicated only upon a single point of violation of the provisions of section 14 of the said Act and rest of the contentions though raised by the applicants i.e. employees concerned, were not adjudicated upon and liberty was granted to those employees to raise the same in future if necessity arises. 19. 19. In view of my conclusion that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the action of termination of the employees was in violation of the procedure laid down in section 14 of the Gujarat Universities Services Tribunal Act and consequently since I in inclined to set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and as noted above, the Tribunal had not adjudicated upon other contentions of the employees, the matter shall have to be remanded to the Tribunal for further consideration of the remaining surviving contentions raised by the employees."" 12. Mr. Dave, the learned advocate also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Maharaja Sayajirao University v. Ram Mangaram Mirchandani, reported in 2002 (1) GLR 861 , wherein the decision of the University to put an end to the services of the respondent therein during the period of probation was questioned A learned Single Judge of this Court, after an exhaustive discussion of various decisions of the Supreme Court, ultimately ruled as under:- "14. Mr. Shukla has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and others, (2000) 3 SCC 239 . It has been held by the Supreme Court that a probationer like a temporary servant is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. However, in my view, in the instant case, the University has merely tried to find out the suitability of the respondent for the purpose of his confirmation on the post in question and, therefore, whatever enquiry the University had held on their own was only with the object to see whether the respondent was required to be confirmed in the post or not after completing the probation period. It was not the basis for establishing the guilt or finding any fault against the respondent. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, cannot be said to be applicable looking to the facts of the case, especially when it cannot be said that there is a stigmatic or punitive order or that any misconduct was the foundation for passing the order of termination against the respondent. 15. Mr. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, cannot be said to be applicable looking to the facts of the case, especially when it cannot be said that there is a stigmatic or punitive order or that any misconduct was the foundation for passing the order of termination against the respondent. 15. Mr. Shukla has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. R.D. Teredesai and another, 1969 (2) SCC 157, which is under Article 311 of the Constitution. It is argued that, in view of the aforesaid judgment, enquiry officer's report was required to be made available to the respondent-employee. However, in the instant case, no regular departmental enquiry was initiated. In fact, there was no question of holding enquiry against the respondent and the nature of the so-called enquiry, which has already been narrated above, was confined only to find out the suitability of the respondent for the post in question. It is also required to be noted that, in the instant case, it was open for the University even to terminate the services of the respondent straight away on the ground that his performance was not satisfactory during the probationary period. However, in order to reach a definite conclusion as to whether really the respondent is to be confirmed in the post in question, the University made some enquiry and it is true that, in that process, certain letters were addressed to the respondent. It is required to be noted that no show cause notice or charge-sheet was issued nor was any enquiry, in fact, held in order to find out the guilt of the respondent, as it was not required to be done, in the instant case, as stated earlier, and the entire exercise of the University was only within the limited sphere of finding out the suitability of the respondent for the post in question. 16. Mr. Shukla has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh and others, AIR 1972 SC 2083 , to substantiate his say that whenever there is an order of removal, rules of natural justice are required to be followed and that the order in question should be a speaking order. 16. Mr. Shukla has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh and others, AIR 1972 SC 2083 , to substantiate his say that whenever there is an order of removal, rules of natural justice are required to be followed and that the order in question should be a speaking order. However, in the instant case, the order cannot be said to be passed by way of penalty or it cannot be said to be a punitive order, as such, and in view of the Resolution of the Syndicate, of which reference is made earlier, it was decided not to confirm the respondent in the post in question. Therefore, there is no question of informing the charges to the respondent or giving detailed reasons as to why the respondent was not required to be confirmed on the post of Lecturer in the subject of Archaeology. 17. Mr. Shukla has relied upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Parmeshwari Dayal Saxena v. The President, U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh and others, 1993 Education & Service Cases 42. The aforesaid judgment was in the context of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. Relying on the said judgment, it was argued by Mr. Shukla that when the respondent was permitted to withdraw the earlier suit, with a liberty to file a fresh suit, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if there was any delay, the same was required to be condoned. In my view, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the case. Further, when liberty to file a fresh suit is granted, the second suit is also required to be filed within the original limitation period, i.e. from the date of original cause of action, and simply because liberty to file such fresh suit is given, it can never be said that the period of limitation for filing the suit based on the original cause of action cannot be taken into consideration. 18. 18. Under the aforesaid circumstances, though the Registrar has communicated the order against the respondent, which gives an impression as if some charges against the respondent were proved, the Registrar has not properly communicated the order, which is, in fact, passed by the Syndicate and there was an error in drafting the said order by the Registrar, who is merely a communicating authority and if the original Resolution of the Syndicate is taken into consideration, it cannot be said that the order in question is punitive in nature. Even otherwise, as stated earlier, the wordings in the order themselves are not indicative factors and the entire material is required to be taken into consideration by lifting the veil. It is clear that the basis for passing the order was non-suitability of the respondent for the post in question and there were no other grounds for terminating his services. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that since the respondent was not confirmed on the post because he was not found to be suitable, there was no question of holding any enquiry and the order in question cannot be said to be punitive in nature in any manner. It is accordingly also declared that the order in question is not to be treated as a punitive order in any manner and, naturally, it will not come in the way of the respondent in getting employment elsewhere. Therefore, it is not to be treated as stigmatic and accordingly, the impugned order is to be treated to be an order passed for not confirming the respondent on the post of Lecturer since he was not found suitable for the aforesaid post and his performance during the probationary period was not found satisfactory. The order in question is to be treated only in the aforesaid context." 13. Thus, the law is well settled. Generally speaking, when a probationer's appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking the stigma is implicit in the termination, yet a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order, which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. Although strictly speaking the stigma is implicit in the termination, yet a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order, which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Even if an inquiry is held prior to the order of termination, the same would not turn otherwise an innocuous order as one of punishment. An employer is entitled to satisfy itself as to the competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and for this purpose satisfy itself fairly as to the truth of any allegation that may have been made about the employee. 14. In the case in hand, there was no inquiry of any nature with regard to any allegations of misconduct etc. All that was assessed was the overall performance of the respondent No. 1, which was found to be unsatisfactory and therefore, none other than the Syndicate of the University thought fit to put an end to the services of the respondent No. 1. 15. For the foregoing reasons, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is hereby ordered to be quashed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs.