JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. 1. 300 grams of Charas and 250 grams of opium are alleged to have been recovered from the conscious possession of accused Shyam Lal on 13.7.2004. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution has examined 13 witnesses. Independent witnesses examined in the Court have not supported the prosecution case. Finding the testimonies of the police officials to be not inspiring in confidence, accused stands acquitted of the charge framed under the provisions of Sections 18 & 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. State has appealed against the judgment dated 7.4.2009, passed by learned Special Judge, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, in NDPS Case No.7 of 2005, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Shyam Lal, challenging the acquittal of respondent Shyam Lal (hereinafter referred to as the accused). 3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 13.7.2004, when ASI Gautam Chand (PW-13), alongwith HC Jasbir Singh (PW-10), Constable Sunil Kumar (PW- 11), Constable Razak Mohammed (PW-12), Ram Singh and Om Prakash, was on patrol duty at Bus Stand Chowk, Diara, Bilaspur, he received a secret information that accused, who was travelling in a white coloured TATA Sumo No.PB-01-4507, was in possession of a psychotropic substance. Accordingly, by associating independent witnesses Hans Raj (PW-4) and Satish Kumar, a raiding party was constituted. Simultaneously, report under the provisions of Section 42 of the Act (Ex. PW-6/A) was sent through Constable Sunil, which was received by Smt. Rani Bindu (PW-6) in the office of the Dy.S.P. At about 1.30 am, when the vehicle reached the spot, it was signaled to stop. Accused Shyam Lal was found sitting on the seat adjacent to driver Rakesh Kumar (PW-8). After informing the accused of his statutory rights and obtaining his consent (Ex.PW-13/A), he was searched. Prior thereto, police party gave its search to the accused. Accused had concealed an envelope underneath his pant, which contained Charas in the shape of Battis and Tikkis. Another envelope was also recovered from the body of the accused, which contained opium. From the shop of Sanjeev Kumar (PW-2), scales and weights were brought. When weighed, opium was found to be 250 grams and Charas to be 300 grams. Two samples, each weighing 25 grams, from each of the contraband substances, were drawn. Samples as also the remaining stuff were sealed separately. From the shop of Sanjeev Kumar (PW-2), scales and weights were brought. When weighed, opium was found to be 250 grams and Charas to be 300 grams. Two samples, each weighing 25 grams, from each of the contraband substances, were drawn. Samples as also the remaining stuff were sealed separately. NCB form (Ex.PW13/M & 13/O) was filled up on the spot and the seal was handed over to the respective witness. Rukka (Ex.PW-13/F) was sent to Police Station, Sadar (Bilaspur), through Constable Ram Singh (not examined), on the basis of which FIR No.218/04, dated 13.7.2004 (Ex.PW-5/A), for commission of offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 of the Act, was registered, by Balbir Singh (PW-5), who was officiating SHO of the Police Station. With the completion of proceedings of the spot, accused was arrested and alongwith the case property produced before the SHO, who resealed the case property with his own seal of impression 'K'. Whereafter, the case property was entrusted to MHC Jai Ram (PW-9), who, through Constable Raj Kumar (PW- 3), sent the sealed samples for analysis to the Chemical Laboratory. On receipt of the report of the Chemical Examiner and with the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 4. Accused was charged for having committed an offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 18 & 20 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was also recorded, in which he took the following defence: "I am innocent. I have not committed any offence. I have been implicated in a false case by the police and passengers of the vehicle. I was coming alongwith other passengers in a vehicle from where I was taken from the vehicle and brought to the City Police where false documents were prepared and obtained my signatures. Noting was recovered from me." 6. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 7. We have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General; Mr. Noting was recovered from me." 6. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 7. We have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General; Mr. Kush Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General; and Mr. J.S. Guleria, learned Assistant Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Dheeraj Vashist, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 8. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 9. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of justice." " 10. Version of police officials HC Jasbir Singh and ASI Gautam Chand of having associated independent witnesses, in whose presence, the contraband substance was recovered from the conscious possession of the accused, stands belied on record. Hans Raj simply states that on 13.7.2004 at about 10.30 a.m., police called him from the Taxi Stand and obtained his signatures. The witness was extensively cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor. However, from his unrebutted testimony, it has also come on record that none of the parcels were sealed in his presence nor the contents of the documents, which he had signed, read over to him. He is categorical that no recovery of the contraband substance took place in his presence. He has explained the circumstances under which he signed the documents, for being a taxi driver, he is prone to be harassed by the police. 11. What is significant is as to why did police associate a taxi driver as a witness. After all, information of the accused being possessed with the contraband substance was already there with the police and respectable persons from the locality could have been associated. The place where the naka was set up is inhabited not only by respectable persons but also Government officials could have been summoned. Even the Judicial Officers reside in close vicinity. Residences of the Deputy Commission and the Superintendent of Police are also close by. The place where the naka was set up is inhabited not only by respectable persons but also Government officials could have been summoned. Even the Judicial Officers reside in close vicinity. Residences of the Deputy Commission and the Superintendent of Police are also close by. Since there was definite information, police ought to have associated someone else and not a taxi driver, who, in any case, is prone to be subjected to harassment by the police. 12. Non-associating of reliable independent witnesses gains significance, in the light of the unrebutted testimony of Rakesh Kumar (PW-8), driver of the vehicle, who has also not supported the prosecution. In fact, he is categorical that all the passengers (8-10) sitting in his vehicle were searched by the police and no recovery was effected from the accused in his presence. He is certain that after the vehicle was checked, police took the accused to the Police Station where the witness was asked to stand outside. After some time, police called him and obtained his signatures. He is categorical that the contents of the documents were neither read over nor explained to him nor did any proceeding take place in his presence. 13. HC Jasbir Singh and ASI Gautam Chand want the Court to believe that proceedings were conducted on the spot. Significantly, they refer the same to have been conducted on the parapet near a hotel. Now, why none from the said place was associated, remains unexplained by them. 14. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 398 ,; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 102 ,; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 11 SCC 186 ;, Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., 2009 (16) SCC 98 ; and (Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 . 15. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 16. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 18. From the testimony of Sanjeev Kumar (PW- 2), another independent witness, we find that the police party was already aware that Charas and opium was in possession of the accused. How is it that the police came to know about such fact, for till such time, the contraband substance stood analyzed by the Laboratory, such fact could not have been known any everyone. Possibility of falsely implicating the accused cannot be ruled out. 19. Be that as it may, even otherwise we do not find testimonies of the relevant prosecution witnesses, i.e. the police officials, to be inspiring in confidence. There are improvements, contradictions, exaggerations and embellishments, impeaching their credit, rendering them not to be trustworthy witnesses. 20. Version of Constable Sunil and ASI Gautam Chand of having sent the information to the Superior Officer through Constable Dev Raj (PW-1) does not inspire confidence at all. Smt. Rani Bindu (PW-6), who received the special report in the office of the Dy.S.P. also states that there is no entry of the special report in the register. Careful perusal of testimonies of these witnesses establishes that no entry with regard thereto was recorded in the office of the Dy.S.P. Also, no register with regard thereto was ever maintained or produced in Court. All this renders the genesis of the prosecution case to be doubtful. 21. There is contradiction in the testimony of Balbir Singh (PW-5) with regard to the number of seals on the parcels produced before him for resealing. He talks of five seals on the bulk parcel and eight seals on the samples. He further states that he embossed seal 'K' on the parcels so entrusted to him. But then, he does not produce the seal in Court. He talks of five seals on the bulk parcel and eight seals on the samples. He further states that he embossed seal 'K' on the parcels so entrusted to him. But then, he does not produce the seal in Court. However, what renders the prosecution case to be extremely doubtful is non-mentioning of factum of resealing in the NCB forms. Also, the witness admits that the sealed parcels did not bear the signatures of the accused. In fact Ex. P-3, one of the samples, produced before the Court, was found to be open from one side (perhaps eaten by the rats) and even in this sample there is no reference of the contraband substance. Also, in the malkhana register there is no reference of seal impression 'A'. 22. Constable Raj Kumar is the witness to who took the samples to the Laboratory for testing. According to him, samples were sealed with nine seals of impression 'A' and 'K', but however, samples (A-1 & B-1) bore only five seals of seal impression 'A' and one seal of seal impression 'K'. He has not even produced the Road Certificate, which would have established that samples sent to the Laboratory bore how many seals as also the number of seal embossed after analysis. 23. ASI Jai Ram (PW-9) is the MHC, who admits that column No.3, which belongs to the person who deposited the contraband substance, is empty. Why so? has not been explained. This further renders the prosecution case to be doubtful. After all, case property was entrusted to him by Balbir Singh, after it was resealed. Though he knew the name of the person, yet he did not comply with the procedure. The reason is obvious, for he contradicts the prosecution case by stating that it was ASI Gautam Chand who had deposited the case property with him. Significantly, he also admits absence of reference of NCB form in the malkhana register. But what is crucial is his admission to the effect that the samples, which were sent for chemical examination, were not marked as 'A' and 'B' and also there is no reference thereof in the malkhana register or Road Certificate, thus belying the case of the Investigating Officer. 24. But what is crucial is his admission to the effect that the samples, which were sent for chemical examination, were not marked as 'A' and 'B' and also there is no reference thereof in the malkhana register or Road Certificate, thus belying the case of the Investigating Officer. 24. In the light of the aforesaid, contradictions and improbabilities in the testimonies of the police officials who conducted the search and seizure operations stand magnified, rendering their testimonies to be absolutely unbelievable and unreliable. 25. From the material placed on record, prosecution has failed to establish that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence, he has been charged with. The circumstances cannot be said to have been proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the accused does not stand proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. The chain of events does not stand conclusively established, leading only to one conclusion, i.e. guilt of the accused. Circumstances when cumulatively considered do not fully establish completion of chain of events, indicating to the guilt of the accused and no other hypothesis other than the same. 26. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused was found in conscious and exclusive possession of Charas and Opium. 27. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. 28. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.