Vighneshwari v. Forest Secretary, State of Uttarakhand, Dehradun
2016-04-01
SERVESH KUMAR GUPTA
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. 1. Mr. Prabhat Pande, Advocate, for the appellant. 2. Mr. I.P. Kohli, Brief Holder, for the respondent no. 1. 3. Smt. Seema Sirohi, Advocate, for the respondents no. 2 and 3. 4. Having heard the rival contentions, it transpires that Mukesh Rana lost his life on 27.1.2006 under the employment of the respondents. While performing his official duties on that day, he fell down from the tree and passed away. Case No. WCA 11/2006 was heard by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and, vide the judgment and order dated 27.10.2008, he awarded the compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,16,672/- to the wife of the deceased (appellant herein). It was further directed that the respondents shall deposit such amount within a period of 30 days from the date of order, otherwise interest @ 12 per cent per annum w.e.f. the date of order shall be exigible from the employer on the said amount of compensation. The respondents deposited this amount in the office of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation on 19.11.2008. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of a Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court, rendered in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata & Another, AIR 1976 SC 222 , wherein it has categorically been held that the amount of compensation shall be deemed to have fallen due on the date of accident which was relevant to determine as to when the cause of action arose. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down as under: “Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer’s liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if "personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub-section (5) of section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment.
The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner's order dated May 6, 1969 under section 19. What the section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is therefore nothing to justify the argument that the employer's liability to pay compensation under section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. It was the duty of the appellant, under section 4A(1) of the Act, to pay the compensation at the rate provided by section 4 as soon as the personal injury was caused to the respondent. He failed to do so. What is worse, he did not even make a provisional payment under sub-section (2) of section 4 for, as has been stated, he went to the extent of taking the false pleas that the respondent was a casual contractor and that the accident occurred solely because of his negligence. Then there is the further fact that he paid no heed to the respondent's personal approach for obtaining the compensation. It will be recalled that the respondent was driven to the necessity of making and application to the Commissioner for settling the claim, and even there the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and prevailed on the respondent to file a memorandum of agreement settling the claim for a sum which was so grossly inadequate that it was rejected by the Commissioner. In these facts and circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty.” 6. The above law still holds the field and it has been followed time and again.
In these facts and circumstances, we have no doubt that the Commissioner was fully justified in making an order for the payment of interest and the penalty.” 6. The above law still holds the field and it has been followed time and again. Hon’ble Apex Court has followed this judgment in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siby George & Others, III (2012) ACC 367 (SC), which also pertained to the Workmen’s Compensation Act and, wherein, it was determined that the rate of interest shall be calculated w.e.f. the date when the cause of action arose. 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Van Vikas Nigam/respondents (employer) has urged that a cross-appeal was also filed against the dependent of the deceased with the averment that Mr. Mukesh Rana (deceased) was not the employee of the respondents, but such appeal was dismissed on merits by the Court. So, the question whether the deceased was in employment of the respondents or not goes beyond consideration for this Court. 8. In view of what has been set forth hereinabove, this appeal is allowed. The respondents are directed to calculate the interest @ 12 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation, indicated above, w.e.f. 27.1.2006 till 19.11.2008. The interest so calculated, along with the amount of compensation, already deposited, shall be released directly to the appellant Smt. Vighneshwari or the same shall be deposited in the office of Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, which, in turn, will release that amount in favour of the said appellant. 9. Let LCR, along with a copy of this judgment, be sent back to the concerned office of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation.