JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Anurag Narain, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 to 6. 2. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impeaches the validity of the judgment and order dated 12.2.2013, passed by the prescribed authority, whereby the application moved by respondent No. 3 under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972’) for eviction has been allowed. 3. The petitioner also challenges the order dated 8.3.2016, passed by the appellate Court, whereby the Rent Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of the prescribed authority, has also been dismissed. 4. The present dispute is in respect of a shop, namely, Shop No. 124/1, situate in Mohalla-Manglipurva, Hardoi. One late Ram Shankar was landlord of the premises in question, who executed the sale-deed in respect of Shop No. 124/3 in favour of father of opposite party No. 3 to 6. On 24.7.1992 opposite party Nos. 3 to 6 purchased the shops, namely, Shop No. 124/1 and 124/2. After the death of the father of opposite parties No. 3 to 6, a partition took place amongst three brothers and the shop in question i.e. Shop No. 124/1 came in the share of opposite party No. 3. 5. Opposite party No. 3 thereafter filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972 for releasing the said Shop No. 124/1 on the ground of bona fide need. The opposite party No. 3 in his application preferred by him before the prescribed authority under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act. 13 of 1972 inter alia stated that on account of the family partition which took place amongst three brothers on 25.12.1992, he is the owner of the premises in question and further that after the partition only one room and a store has come to his share. It was further pleaded by respondent No. 3 in the said application that he is a lawyer by profession having been registered with U.P. Bar Council in the year 1977. The registration number with Bar Council was also shown by the petitioner as 274/1977. It was further pleaded by respondent No. 3 in the said application that he is a lawyer by profession having been registered with U.P. Bar Council in the year 1977. The registration number with Bar Council was also shown by the petitioner as 274/1977. It was also stated by respondent No. 3 that the residential accommodation which had fallen in his share after the family settlement/partition is not enough to accommodate his needs and further that at his residential house there is no space available which he can use as chamber for his profession. Opposite party No. 3 further stated in the application that on 12.4.2007 a legal notice was also served on the petitioner for vacating the premises and since even after the receipt of the notice, the petitioner did not vacate the premises, the cause of action accrued to him, for filing the application under Section 21 (1)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972. 6. The claim of the opposite party No. 3 put forth by him in the said application was contested by the petitioner by filing a written statement wherein the averments made by the opposite party No. 3 in the application were denied and it was also suggested that the opposite party No. 3 is having enough land on the back side of the residential house where he can extend the residential house and get the requisite room constructed for running his chamber. The petitioner also denied that the claim of the opposite party No. 3 is based on any bona fide need. It was also averred by the petitioner that he did not receive any notice and the notice being relied on by the opposite party No. 3 is unlawful and on the basis of such defective notice, the application could not have been instituted by opposite party No. 3. 7. The prescribed authority after considering the material and evidence available on record allowed the said application moved by the opposite party No. 3 by means of the judgment and order dated 12.2.2013, whereby the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises in question within thirty days and hand over the possession thereof to opposite party No. 3. It was also directed that the respondent No. 3 shall pay rent for the period of six months to the petitioner. 8. It was also directed that the respondent No. 3 shall pay rent for the period of six months to the petitioner. 8. As observed above, the said order passed by the prescribed authority was appealed against by instituting the appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appellate Court while reiterating the findings recorded by the learned prescribed authority has rejected the Rent Appeal preferred by the petitioner by means of the judgment and order dated 8.3.2016. It is these two orders passed on 12.2.2013 and 8.3.2016 respectively by the prescribed authority and the appellate Court which are under challenge in these proceedings. 9. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner primarily is that the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act were instituted and initiated by the opposite party No. 3 before expiry of statutory period of notice as envisaged in the first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972, which clearly prohibits that any such application under the said provision shall not be entertained unless the landlord has given a notice in that behalf for the bona fide not less than six months before such an application. Submission of leaned counsel for the petitioner is that the period mentioned in the notice dated 12.4.2007 is thirty days and further that before expiry of the period of six months from the date of notice, the application for releasing of the premises in question was filed under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972 by the opposite party No. 3 on 20.8.2007 i.e. after expiry of a period of four months only. His submission, thus, is that since the proceedings by opposite party No. 3 under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 13 of 1972 were instituted and initiated before expiry of the period of six months from the date of notice as such the entire proceedings drawn and conducted by the learned prescribed authority is a nullity and hence, the judgment and order based on such proceedings are null and void and hence not sustainable. 10. Per contra, Shri Anurag Narain, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 10. Per contra, Shri Anurag Narain, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 has submitted that, in fact, the plea of instituting the proceedings by the opposite party No. 3 before expiry of the statutory period of notice of six months, though was taken in the written statement filed by the petitioner, however, the same was not pressed and as such the petitioner waived his right to press that plea and in these proceedings before this Court, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take the plea for the first time. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional District Judge, 1997 Law Suit (SC) 1564, has submitted that if there is a statutory prohibition for instituting the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act before expiry of the period of six months from the date of notice, the learned trial Court would not have proceeded on the application so preferred by respondent No. 3. He further argued that the present matter, any deviation thereof will render the proceedings nugatory and since statutory period of notice had not expired before the application was preferred by respondent No. 3, the proceedings ought to have been rejected by the prescribed authority on the said ground alone. 12. Shri Anurag, on the other hand, relies on the same judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) and has submitted that the argument being advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be based on misreading of the said judgment. 13. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 3 to 6, I find that the submissions being made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are liable to be rejected and I am unable to agree with his contentions. 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) has considered the effect of prohibition enunciated in the first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and has clearly held that in a case where the plea of said prohibition is, though taken, but not pressed, it will amount to waiver of the plea by the tenant. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of waiver will have no application in the present case in view of the fact that the plea of the application being hit by non-compliance of the statutory period of notice was not taken by the tenant in this case before the prescribed authority, is also erroneous for two reasons; firstly in para of 28 of the written statement this plea has been taken that the notice was unlawful and secondly even if it is presumed that the plea was not taken, the same puts the case of the tenant in this matter at a worse footing than the case of the tenant in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) inasmuch as in Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) the tenant though had taken the plea but had subsequently not pressed and in this case, as is being submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this plea was not taken at all. 15. A careful reading of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) would convince that the ratio of the said judgment would have complete application so far as the facts of the present case are concerned in both the situations; (1) by either not taking the plea of institution of the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act before expiry of the period of six months from the date of notice or (2) by taking the plea and subsequently not pressing it. In both the exigencies, it would certainly amount to waiver of the plea as has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra). Hon’ble Supreme Court, no doubt, has held in the said case that the provision mentioned in the proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is mandatory in nature and if any such application is filed before expiry of the period of six months from the date of notice, the application has to be treated premature, however, elaborating further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has held that by not pressing the plea of the application being premature, the tenant had waived his right to take such a plea. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has also considered and reflected yet another very crucial and important aspect of the matter i.e. in case the plea of the application being premature is taken coupled with the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, the application could have been rejected by the prescribed authority at the outset which would have given liberty to the landlord to institute the proceedings afresh after expiry of the statutory period of notice as contemplated by the proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 16. For the reasons indicated above, in my considered opinion, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) is misconceived and the arguments based thereon, thus, merit rejection which are hereby rejected. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has also stated that a careful reading of the provisions contained in proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act indicates that in case the premises which is the subject-matter of these proceedings changes hands and subsequent purchaser or the subsequent landlord instituting the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act after expiry of a period of three years from the date of sale, the statutory period of six months notice looses its significance. 18. In this regard reference may be had to yet another judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan v. District Judge, Shahjahanpur and others, 2000 (18) LCD 403, wherein it has clearly been held that considering the language used in the ‘First Proviso’ and also keeping in view the object of providing for the said proviso, one fails to find any good reason for attaching the condition of six months notice even after three years period after purchase. Para 44 of the said judgment is quoted below : “Considering the language used in the ‘First Proviso’ and keeping in mind the object for providing the said proviso, one fails to find any good reason for attaching the condition of six months notice even after three years period after purchase, as suggested by the petitioner’s counsel. There could possibly be no object for providing such an objection on the landlord.” 19. Thus, the aforesaid submission of learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. There could possibly be no object for providing such an objection on the landlord.” 19. Thus, the aforesaid submission of learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 to 6 also assumes relevance to repell the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and to disagree with the same. 20. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner thereafter has submitted that the findings recorded by the learned prescribed authority as affirmed by the learned appellate Court in respect of the bona fide need and comparative of hardship are also not correct. 21. I am afraid while hearing the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in a matter where finding of facts are concluded by both the Courts below, this Court can interfere unless, of course, any apparent perversity in the findings can be pointed out. Having perused the judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority as well as the appellate Court, it cannot be said that the findings suffer from perversity to the extent that the same may be warranted to be interfered with in these proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. In the result, the petition deserves to be dismissed, which is hereby dismissed. 23. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner may be given adequate and appropriate time to vacate the shop in question and to hand over its peaceful possession to the respondent No. 3 as the petitioner will be required to shift his business. 24. Considering the said prayer, it is provided that the petitioner shall vacate the shop in question within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 30.10.2016 and shall also hand over the peaceful possession thereof to the respondent No. 3. He shall continue to pay the rent to the respondent No. 3 and shall also pay the amount in terms of the judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority. The respondent No. 3 will also pay the amount indicated by the Prescribed Authority to the petitioner. 25. It is further provided that any violation or disobedience of this order by the petitioner will render him liable for contempt of this Court. 26. There will be no order as to costs.