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2016 DIGILAW 1474 (BOM)

Dahiben wd/o Manoharbhai Patel v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur

2016-08-12

A.S.CHANDURKAR

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JUDGMENT : A.S. Chandurkar, J. In view of notice for final disposal, the learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length by issuing Rule and making the same returnable forthwith. The facts in brief are that one Smt. Jankibai, the predecessor of the respondent Nos. 3A to 3D had moved an application on 16/03/2004 under provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). In the said proceedings, it was prayed that the sale deed dated 29/04/1965 executed by her husband in favour of the petitioner be declared void as the same was executed by a Tribal in favour of a non-Tribal. The Tahsildar on 26/12/2013 allowed the application and directed restoration of the land in question in favour of the Tribal. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 6 of the said Act before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The notice issued to Smt. Jankibai was returned with an endorsement that said respondent had expired. On making enquiry it was learnt that Smt. Jankibai had expired on 13/09/2011 even before the Tahsildar had decided the proceedings. On that basis the petitioner moved an application below Exhibit 27 seeking setting aside of the order dated 26/02/2013 passed by the Tahsildar on the ground that the same was passed in favour of a dead person. The legal heirs of Smt. Jankibai opposed the said application and by the impugned order, the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejected the said application and directed adjudication of the appeal on merits. Being aggrieved the said order has been challenged in the present writ petition. 2. Shri A. Vastani, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Tahsildar on 26/12/2013 was in favour of a dead person inasmuch as the original applicant Smt. Jankibai who had initiated the proceedings had expired on 13/09/2011. He submitted that the legal heirs of the original applicant ought to have been brought on record before the Tahsildar but the same was not done. According to him, the proceedings held under Section 3 of the said Act before the Tahsildar were judicial proceedings inasmuch as the same contemplated adjudication of rights of the parties and he referred to the expression "judicial proceedings" as explained in Law Lexicon by Ramnatha Aiyar. According to him, the proceedings held under Section 3 of the said Act before the Tahsildar were judicial proceedings inasmuch as the same contemplated adjudication of rights of the parties and he referred to the expression "judicial proceedings" as explained in Law Lexicon by Ramnatha Aiyar. He relied upon various provisions of the said Act as well as provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) to support his submissions. He further placed reliance upon the following judgments : (i) Kishun @ Ram Kishun (Dead) through LRs v. Bihari (Dead) by LRs., 2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 1 . (ii) Jiviben Kavji Raganath v. Jadavi Devshankar and Ors. AIR 1978 Gujrat 32 (iii) Dhani Ram Etc. v. Sub Divisional Judge, Theog and Ors. AIR 1965 Himachal Pradesh 25 (iv) Anand Brothers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 212 . It was therefore urged that without considering these aspects of the matter, the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejected the application filed by the petitioner. 3. Shri J.B. Kasat, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.3A to 3D supported the impugned order. According to him, the enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar under provisions of Section 3 of the said Act was of a summary nature. This enquiry could not be equated with judicial proceedings. Even if the original applicant had expired before the proceedings were decided by the Tahsildar, the same would not have any effect on the said adjudication considering the fact that the provisions of the said Act were beneficial in nature and were intended to restore lands to the tribals. The provisions of the Civil Code Procedure, 1908 were not applicable. The undertaking that was required to be obtained from the tribal in terms of Rule 3(6) of the said Rules had been given by the son of the original applicant and therefore all necessary compliance had been done. According to him the learned Member rightly refuse to hold that the proceedings were not maintainable. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of learned Single Judge in Punichand s/o Ramsing Chavan v. The State of Maharashtra and ors. 1987 (1) Bom. C.R. 748. Ms. T. Khan, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and supported the impugned order. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of learned Single Judge in Punichand s/o Ramsing Chavan v. The State of Maharashtra and ors. 1987 (1) Bom. C.R. 748. Ms. T. Khan, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and supported the impugned order. 3-A. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. I have given due consideration to their respective submissions. It is not in dispute that the original applicant Smt. Jankibai had initiated the proceedings seeking restoration of land under Section 4 of the said Act during her life time. During pendency of the said proceedings said Smt. Jankibai expired on 13/09/2011 after which the Tahsildar decided the proceedings vide order dated 26/12/2013. The question that requires adjudication is whether on the death of the original applicant if the legal heirs are not brought on record before the proceedings are decided, the same would result in vitiating the impugned order. 4. One of the modes of seeking restoration of land under Section 3(1) of the said Act is by making an application under Section 4 of the said Act in that regard by the tribal. Though such proceedings can be initiated suo motu by the Collector, in the present case the proceedings have been initiated on an application moved by the predecessor of the respondent Nos. 3A to 3D. The proceedings in question were held under provisions of Section 3 of the said Act. Rule 3 of the said Rules lays down the procedure of holding the enquiry in proceedings under Section 3 of the said Act. Rule 3(1) of the said Rules empowers the Collector to hold an enquiry in the manner provided by sub-rules (3) to (5) of Rule 3. Rule 3(3) contemplates issuance of notice to the party specifying date, time and place of hearing. Under Rule 3(5) of the said Rules, the Collector has to examine the parties and also record statements of witnesses. Rule 3(7) of the said Rules requires the Collector to give reasons for his decision and the same should contain a full statement of the grounds on which it is based. Rule 10 of the said Rules requires service of any notice under the said Act to be made on the person named whenever it is practicable. Rule 3(7) of the said Rules requires the Collector to give reasons for his decision and the same should contain a full statement of the grounds on which it is based. Rule 10 of the said Rules requires service of any notice under the said Act to be made on the person named whenever it is practicable. The aforesaid provisions as regards the manner in which an enquiry has to be made while deciding the application for restoration indicates that the same contemplates giving of an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and also requires passing of a reasoned order. It also contemplates issuance of notice to a party who is to be examined or if the statement of a witness is to be recorded. The aforesaid facts indicate that only after the Collector arrives at the conclusion that the applicant is entitled for restoration of the land in question can such order be passed. 5. It can thus be seen that the Rules prescribe the manner of holding an inquiry while deciding an application for restoration under Section 3(1) of the said Act. It contemplates presence of an applicant for being examined in these proceedings and also for giving an undertaking in terms of Section 3(2) of the said Act. Though the term 'tribal-transferor' in Section 2(k) of the said Act includes the successor-in-interest of such tribal-transferor, the same cannot be taken to mean that it would not be necessary to bring on record the legal representatives of the tribal-transferor if the death has occurred prior to adjudication of the application. It would mean that the successor-in-interest can continue such proceedings initiated by a tribal-transferor. Considering the manner in which such inquiry has to be held, it is obvious that the presence of the tribal-transferor or his successor-in-interest in a given case is necessary when such proceedings are adjudicated by the Collector. In other words, on the death of the tribal-transferor during pendency of such proceedings, the successor in interest would have to be brought on record. 6. At this stage reference to the judgment of learned Single Judge in Baburao Deorao Wankhede v. Sewa Sahakari Sanstha and Anr. 1989 (2) Bom. C.R. 15 would be apposite. In other words, on the death of the tribal-transferor during pendency of such proceedings, the successor in interest would have to be brought on record. 6. At this stage reference to the judgment of learned Single Judge in Baburao Deorao Wankhede v. Sewa Sahakari Sanstha and Anr. 1989 (2) Bom. C.R. 15 would be apposite. In said case an order passed by the Additional Tahsildar under provisions of Section 3 of the said Act by which the Additional Tahsildar had reviewed his earlier order was under challenge. It was urged before the Court that as the provisions of the said Act did not confer any power of review on the Additional Tahsildar, such exercise was without jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge after considering the provisions of the said Act along with provisions of Chapter XIII of the Maharashtra Revenue Code, 1966 held that the Collector/Additional Collector while exercising powers conferred by the said Act does not cease to be a Revenue Officer and therefore by virtue of provisions of Section 247(1) of the Code, all such powers would be available to said Authority. It was therefore held that the power to review an order in proceedings under Section 3 of the said Act could be exercised by the Additional Tahsildar under Section 258 of the Code. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that the power of review is available with the Additional Tahsildar which enables him to review an order passed by him under Section 3 of the said Act. If that be so, then there is no reason whatsoever to hold that the proceedings before the Additional Tahsildar are not judicial proceedings. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that in the inquiry that is required to be conducted by the Additional Tahsildar while deciding an application under Section 3 of the said Act, examination of the parties, recording of statement of witnesses and giving reasons for the conclusion arrived at is contemplated. Moreover, the rights of the parties as well as entitlement of an applicant to restoration of land is decided in these proceedings. The proceedings though summary in nature have the character of being "judicial proceedings". The observations of learned Single Judge in Dhani Ram and ors. Moreover, the rights of the parties as well as entitlement of an applicant to restoration of land is decided in these proceedings. The proceedings though summary in nature have the character of being "judicial proceedings". The observations of learned Single Judge in Dhani Ram and ors. (supra) and the expression "judicial proceedings" as being a course authorised to be taken to secure determination of a controversy or to obtain enforcement of a right support the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. The ratio of the decision in Punichand s/o Ramsing Chavan (supra) cannot be made applicable to the case in hand. 7. The impugned order dated 27/02/2015 passed by the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal records that since the legal heirs are brought on record, the abatement stands set aside. This finding overlooks the fact that the original applicant had expired even before the application under Section 3 of the said Act was decided by the Tahsildar. The legal heirs were brought on record after the notice of the appeal was issued by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to the original applicant who had already expired. It is therefore obvious that the initial order passed by the Tahsildar was in favour of a party who was no more and was therefore a nullity. The learned Member therefore was not justified in permitting the appeal to proceed when it was clear that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the said Act was in favour of a dead person. 8. For aforesaid reasons, the order dated 26/12/2013 passed by the Tahsildar in favour of a dead person cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the following order is passed : (i) The order dated 27/02/2015 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal below Exhibit 27 is set aside. The order dated 26/12/2013 passed by the Tahsildar in proceedings under Section 3(1) of the said Act is also set aside. Consequently, the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal would not survive. (ii) It is clarified that it would be open for the respondent No.3A to 3D to apply afresh under the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act in accordance with law. It is made clear that this Court has not examined the correctness of the findings recorded by the Tahsildar in the order dated 26/12/2013. (ii) It is clarified that it would be open for the respondent No.3A to 3D to apply afresh under the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act in accordance with law. It is made clear that this Court has not examined the correctness of the findings recorded by the Tahsildar in the order dated 26/12/2013. (iii) Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.