ORDER : In the instant writ application, the petitioner has inter alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned order of dismissal dated 31.08.2000 (Annexure-4) and the letter dated 18.07.2003 (Annexure-7) as well as the letter dated 28.07.2003 (Annexure-10), issued by the Management, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City and further for issuance of a writ of Mandamus, commanding upon the respondents for reinstatement of the petitioner in services with arrears of back wages and the petitioner has further challenged the premature retirement on 30.11.2001 before the actual date of retirement i.e. 31.01.2006, basing on the BSL Record, School Leaving Certificate and the Medical Book. 2. The facts, as disclosed in the writ application, in a nutshell is that initially, the petitioner was appointed as Khalasi Staff No. 488925 under the Respondent Company, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City on 02.01.1981. Basing on the complaint lodged by the daughter-in-law of the petitioner, the complaint case being No. 19 of 1996, T.R. No. 247 of 2000 was lodged against the petitioner along with five others of his family under Section 498 (A) and 323 of the I.P.C. and in the said complaint case, the petitioner was convicted vide judgment and order dated 29.03.2000 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Bermo at Tenughat. The petitioner preferred Cr. Appeal No. 43 of 2000 in which he has been acquitted vide order and judgment dated 29.11.2002, passed by the learned 05th Additional Sessions Judge, Bermo at Tenughat. The Respondent-authority dismissed the petitioner from services vide order dated 31.08.2000 (Annexure-4) on the ground of conviction in a criminal case. After acquittal from the criminal case, the petitioner has approached the Management of Bokaro Steel Plant on 21.12.2002 through the Conciliation Officer, Bokaro, but the Management refused to accept the claim of the petitioner. Again the petitioner submitted representation to the Respondent-Managing Director on 02.06.2003 for reinstatement in services but the Respondents-Management vide letter dated 28.07.2003, intimated the petitioner that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefits as evident from Annexure-10 to the writ application. Thereafter, the petitioner again approached the Respondents-Management, Bokaro Steel Plant vide letter dated 25.08.2004, for payment of postretirement benefits vide Annexure-11 to the writ application but the said representation failed to evoke any response from the respondents-authorities. Thereafter, the petitioner again approached the Respondents-Management, Bokaro Steel Plant vide letter dated 25.08.2004, for payment of postretirement benefits vide Annexure-11 to the writ application but the said representation failed to evoke any response from the respondents-authorities. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order of dismissal from services, the petitioner left with no other efficacious, alternative and speedy remedy, has been constrained to approach this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the basis of dismissal of the petitioner was the conviction in a criminal case and after acquittal in the criminal case, the Respondent-authority ought to have considered the case of the petitioner for reinstatement in services from the date of dismissal till the date of attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 31.11.2001. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the B.S.L. Record, School Leaving Certificate, Medical Book categorically mentions the date of birth of the petitioner as 02.01.1946 and on that basis, he ought to have retired on 31.01.2006 on attaining the age of 60 years, but he has been made prematurely retired on 30.11.2001. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in view of the acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner ought to have continued from 31.08.2000 to 31.01.2006. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the dismissal of the petitioner from services by the respondents-Management without assigning reason for dispensing the enquiry, is violative of the basic requirement of the natural justice and as such, the impugned order of dismissal is unsustainable in the eyes of law. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents controverting the averments made in the writ application. Learned counsel for the respondents-Management has reiterated the submissions made in the counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that so far as the date of birth of the petitioner is concerned as recorded in the P.D. Form is 40 years, as on 01.12.1981 i.e. 01.12.1941 and accordingly, the petitioner attained 60 years on 30.11.2001. Learned counsel for the respondents-Management has reiterated the submissions made in the counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that so far as the date of birth of the petitioner is concerned as recorded in the P.D. Form is 40 years, as on 01.12.1981 i.e. 01.12.1941 and accordingly, the petitioner attained 60 years on 30.11.2001. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submits that as per the date of birth recorded in the P.D. Form, the date of superannuation of the petitioner is 30.11.2001 and vide letter dated 28.07.2003, he has been informed that in view of his superannuation, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as he stood convicted on the date of his superannuation. Moreover, the case of the petitioner was considered by the respondents-authorities in a right perspective and the same has been considered and the petitioner is not found entitled to any relief. 5. During course of hearing, the learned counsel for the respondents has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22538 of 1996, dated 28.10.1996 and on the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 3892 of 1999, decided on 28.10.2005 as well as on the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 8565 of 2003 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 24017 of 2002, decided on 03.11.2003 and submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions, the petitioner is not entitled to any back wages and continuity in service. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the records, the case of the petitioner needs reconsideration in view of the facts and submissions made hereinbelow : - (i) Admittedly, the petitioner while continuing on the post of Khalasi, was dismissed from service on 31.08.2000 because of conviction in a criminal case on 29.03.2000 and on the basis of his date of birth recorded, in the P.D. Form, he attained the age of superannuation on 31.11.2001, but subsequently, the petitioner has been acquitted in Cr. Appeal No. 43 of 2000 vide judgment dated 29.11.2002, passed by the learned 05th Additional Sessions Judge, Bermo at Tenughat from the charges under Section 498 A of the IPC. Appeal No. 43 of 2000 vide judgment dated 29.11.2002, passed by the learned 05th Additional Sessions Judge, Bermo at Tenughat from the charges under Section 498 A of the IPC. After acquittal in the criminal case although the petitioner submitted his representation vide Annexure-9 to the writ application for de novo consideration, but the respondents-Management in a very cryptic manner and vide non-reasoned order dated 28.07.2003, rejected the claim of the petitioner. On perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-10), it appears that the same has been passed in a very cryptic manner, bereft of any cogent reasons being not legally sustainable. In this respect, it would be profitable to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others v. A. Masilamani reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 and paragraph 19 of the said judgment appears to be relevant, which is quoted hereinbelow: - “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumar and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat.)” The question relating to dismissal in a departmental proceedings basing on the conviction in a criminal case, came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , has been, inter alia, pleased to hold as under :- “24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows: (Raghava case, SLR p. 47, para 8) “8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 27. We have also come across cases where the service rules provide that on registration of a criminal case, an employee can be kept under suspension and on acquittal by the criminal court, he be reinstated. In such cases, the reinstatement is automatic. There may be cases where the service rules provide that in spite of domestic enquiry, if the criminal court acquits an employee honourably, he could be reinstated. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules. 28. In other words, the issue whether an employee has to be reinstated in service or not depends upon the question whether the service rules contain any such provision for reinstatement and not as a matter of right. Such provisions are absent in the Tamil Nadu Service Rules. 28. In view of the abovementioned circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings as against the respondent, in its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 7. In view of the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the impugned order of dismissal dated 31.08.2000 (Annexure-4) and the letter dated 18.07.2003 (Annexure-7) as well as the letter dated 28.07.2003 (Annexure-10), issued by the Management, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City are hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the respondents to consider the matter afresh on the question of quantum of punishment and taking into consideration the acquittal of the petitioner, in a criminal case and pass appropriate order, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four months strictly in accordance with law considering the fact that on the date of dismissal, the petitioner rendered 20 years of service . 8. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition stands disposed of.