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2016 DIGILAW 1482 (HP)

Arjun Singh v. State of H. P.

2016-07-26

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The instant case is a glaring and shocking example of abuse of process of Court whereby the petitioner has virtually called in question the judgment rendered earlier by this Court in CWP No. 2978 of 2015, titled Gram Panchayat, Nangal Kalan vs. State of H.P. and others decided on 24.8.2015 and the SLP (C) No. 28601 of 2015 against which decision was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 12.10.2015. 2. The undisputed facts are that the Gram Panchayat, Nangal Kalan, the petitioner in CWP No. 2978 of 2015 had challenged the notification dated 27.04.2015 whereby the areas of Tahliwal, specified in the Schedule, had been declared as Nagar Panchayat, Tahliwal and the said writ petition vide a detailed judgment running into 38 pages and containing 41 paragraphs, was dismissed on 24.8.2015. 3. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by this Court, the Gram Panchayat, Nangal Kalan approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP(C) No. 28601 of 2015, however, the same was dismissed vide order dated 12.10.2015, which reads thus: “Learned counsel for the petitioner would like to withdraw the petition and move the High Court by way of a writ petition. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to approach this Court again, if necessary.” 4. The petitioner herein would claim a right to file the instant writ petition assailing that very notification which has already been upheld by this Court in CWP No. 2978 of 2015 on the ground that liberty had been reserved to him to approach this Court by filing writ petition. 5. To say the least, the contention raised by the petitioner is fallacious to his very knowledge. Admittedly, the petitioner herein was not the petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to whom the liberty had been reserved to approach this Court again. Even if it is assumed that such liberty was granted to the present petitioner, even then the present writ petition is totally misconceived and amounts to re-litigation which not only is impermissible but is also abuse of process of the Court and against the principle of finality of litigation. It is more than settled that re-agitation may or may not be barred by res judicata, but if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court. It is more than settled that re-agitation may or may not be barred by res judicata, but if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court. Where there is clear abuse of process of the Court, the Court has to view such conduct seriously and the same is to be halted to save precious time of the Court being wasted. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.K.Modi vs. K.N. Modi and others (1998) 3 SCC 573 , while elaborately considering the abuse of process of the Court, held that re-litigation is one of the examples of abuse of process of Court and such litigation should be summarily dismissed in order to prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted, it was observed: “42. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code of Civil Procedure. (15th Edition, Volume II, page 1179 note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases where the abuse of he process of the Court is manifest from the pleadings; and that this power is unlike the power under Section 151 where under Courts have inherent power to strike out pleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are an abuse of their process. In the present case the High Court has held the suit to be an abuse of he process of Court on the basis of what is stated in the plaint. 43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell in paragraph 18/19/33 (page 344) explains the phrase "abuse of the process of the court" thus: "This term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation........ The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation........ The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interests of justice may be very material." 44. “One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which h as already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of court.” A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of courts' discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding. 45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard [19147 (2) All ER 255] the court had to consider different proceedings on the same cause of action for conspiracy, but supported by different averments. The Court, held that if the plaintiff has chosen to put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction before the court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. The Court, held that if the plaintiff has chosen to put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction before the court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with the plea of res judicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out on the ground that the action is frivolous and vexation and an abuse of the process of court. 46. In Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force and another [1980 (2) All ER 227], the Court of Appeal in England struck out the pleading on the ground that the action was an abuse of the process of the court since it raised an issue identical to that which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs' earlier criminal trial. The court said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint on the ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court because it is an abuse for a party to re-litigate a question or issue which has already been decided against him even though the other party cannot satisfy the strict rule of res judicata or the requirement of issue estoppel.” 7. The dictum laid down in the aforesaid judgment is squarely applicable to the case in hand and it is, therefore, absolutely clear that the petitioner has tried to overreach the orders already passed by this Court and this attempt to re-argue the case, which has finally decided, is clear abuse of process of the Court. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, not only is the writ petition not maintainable, but the same is gross abuse of process of the Court and consequently, the same is dismissed with costs of Rs.20,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the H.P. High Court Advocates’ Welfare Association. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms along with all pending applications, if any.