JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present writ petition the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “That the present petition may kindly be allowed and the impugned annexure i.e. P-2, the enquiry report dated 19.10.2009, conducted by respondent no.2 may please be quashed & set aside by issuing a writ of certiorari, with the further directions to the respondent to conduct the same by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners & associating them in the enquiry, to lift the veil so that truth comes out by issuing a writ of mandamus keeping in view the facts & circumstances of the case & submission made here in above, with the further directions to the respondents to complete the same in a time bound period. That the respondents may also be directed to produce the entire record for the kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court to satisfy the conscience of this Hon’ble Court.” 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case, as emerged from the record, are that the present petitioners by way of Civil Writ Petition bearing CWP No. 561 of 2006, titled Jagdish Prashad & Others vs. State, approached this Court for directions to the respondents to initiate disciplinary proceedings against respondent No. 5; namely; Shri Vijay Kumar Sharma, since he had indulged in embezzlement of funds of the Mehnja Agricultural Co-operative Society, Mehnja, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra (hereinafter referred to as `Society’). Petitioners specifically averred in the petition that they are the members/share-holders of the Society. As per petitioner, respondent No.5 was appointed as a Secretary in the Society to ensure its smooth working which was constituted for selling agricultural items at controlled price in the area. 3. In the year 2003, Department of Cooperative Societies got the records of Society inspected through its District Inspector, who after carrying out inspection, pointed out that there is embezzlement to the tune of Rs.1,50,129/- in the funds of Society and also observed that records of the society have not been maintained properly. However, immediately after being pointed out by District Inspector, respondent No.5 deposited an amount of Rs.1,50,129/- with the Society. However, immediately after being pointed out by District Inspector, respondent No.5 deposited an amount of Rs.1,50,129/- with the Society. Record further reveals that the matter was subsequently reported to the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Palampur, (for short `ARCS’) who directed the President of the Society to suspend respondent No.5, but President of Society did not comply with the directions issued by the `ARCS’, who lateron himself placed respondent No.5 under suspension vide order dated 17th November, 2005. Since, Society was not working in terms of the principles & guidelines formulated at the time of constitution of Society, `ARCS’ vide order dated 22nd April, 2006 dissolved the same and appointed an Administrator to manage the affairs of the Society. 4. Feeling aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the order of suspension, respondent No.5 resorted to remedy of revision prescribed under Cooperative Societies Act by filing revision before the Additional Secretary (Co-operation), Government of Himachal Pradesh, (for short `ASC’), who allowed the revision petition of respondent No. 5 vide order dated 30th March, 2006. It also emerge from the record as well as judgment dated 7.7.2009, passed by the Division Bench in CWP No. 561 of 2006 (hereinafter referred to as `Division Bench Judgment’) that at that time petitioners as well as two share-holders requested the President of the respondent-Society to lay challenge to order dated 30th March, 2006 passed by `ASC’. Since no heed was paid to the request made by the petitioners as well as other share-holders of the Society, present petitioners as well as other members were compelled to file the aforesaid CWP No. 561 of 2006. 5. Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with CWP No. 561 of 2006, allowed the same and set aside the order dated 30th March, 2006 passed by `ASC’ and as a result of which respondent No.5 was put under suspension. Division Bench, while setting aside the order, as referred above, held that inquiry against respondent No.5 (the then respondent No.7) should be carried out by the high ranking officer not below the rank of Additional Registrar (Co-operation) to the State Government. In this regard respondent No.3 was directed to nominate the Inquiry Officer within two weeks from the date of passing of judgment i.e. dated 7th July, 2009 (Annexure P-1). Further Inquiry Officer so nominated was directed to complete the inquiry within a period of three months thereafter. 6. In this regard respondent No.3 was directed to nominate the Inquiry Officer within two weeks from the date of passing of judgment i.e. dated 7th July, 2009 (Annexure P-1). Further Inquiry Officer so nominated was directed to complete the inquiry within a period of three months thereafter. 6. Division Bench, while deciding the matter in hand, finally came to the conclusion that some officials in the department, for reasons best known to them, are trying to help the respondent No.5. Division Bench also concluded that it is apparent from the record that the respondent No.5 is having support of some persons who wield substantial influence. 7. Careful perusal of the Division Bench judgment suggests that Division Bench, after examining the record made available to it during the proceedings of the writ petition, referred hereinabove, came to the conclusion that all out efforts were being made by the Society as well as officials of the department of Cooperation to protect respondent No.5, who was facing the charge of financial irregularities. At this stage it would be apt to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment referred hereinabove:- “This order was challenged by the respondent No. 7 and the same was set-aside by respondent No.2. We have gone through the order of the respondent No.2 dated 30.3.2006 whereby was has set-aside the said order. We are constrained to observe that the said Officer holding a high post of Additional Secretary (Co-operation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh exceeded his jurisdiction while setting-aside the order. At best he could have held that the suspension of the respondent No.7 was not warranted. However, a perusal of the order shows that the then Additional Secretary went on to decide the case on merits itself and virtually held that all the allegations leveled against the petitioner were false. This amounted to virtually stopping the inquiry proceedings. The Additional Secretary (Co-operation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh while hearing the appeal against the order of suspension should have limited himself to deciding the question as to whether the suspension was proper or not but could definitely not have decided the question as to whether the allegations were right or wrong. The allegations had to be proved in an inquiry. The allegations had to be proved in an inquiry. The Additional Secretary while passing his order has relied upon Section 69(1) of the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act and its proviso, which read as follows:- “Surcharge:- (1) If in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the winding up of a co-operative society, it is found that any person who is or was entrusted with the organization or management of such society, or who is or has at any time been an officer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-law or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust, or willful negligence or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property belonging to the society, the Registrar may, of his won motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorized by him, by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire into the conduct of such person; [Provided that no such inquiry shall be held after the expiry of six years from the date on which any act of commission or omission referred to in this sub-section comes to knowledge.] The respondent No.2 only on the basis of the Section 69 held that since the inquiry was being held after six year came to the conclusion that the same was vitiated. Unfortunately, the respondent No. 2, has not at all taken into consideration the wording of the proviso which clearly lays down that no inquiry shall be held after six years of the appropriate authority acquiring the knowledge of the act of commission or omission referred to in sub-section. In this case, according to the State, the offence was detected only in 2003 and therefore, the period of six years would start from that date. We are not deciding the question as to whether this contention of the State is right or wrong but this contention could not have been totally ignored as has been done by the respondent No.2. We also find that the respondent No.2 has gone into certain questions which he was not required to deal with in an appeal directed against the order placing the respondent No.7 under suspension. We also find that the respondent No.2 has gone into certain questions which he was not required to deal with in an appeal directed against the order placing the respondent No.7 under suspension. He has tried to give a certificate of hard work and honesty to the respondent No.7 which could not have been done unless a thorough inquiry was held in the matter. We have, therefore, no option but to set-aside the order of the Additional Secretary (Cooperation) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh dated 30.3.2006. On perusal of the entire file we also find that at least some officials in the department for reasons best known to them are trying to help the respondent No.7. He apparently is having the support of some persons who wield substantial influence…..” 8. Division Bench, on the basis of record before it, came to conclusion that `ASC’, while passing the order dated 30th March, 2006 exceeded his jurisdiction by deciding the case on merits, whereas in revision proceedings he should have limited himself to decide the question as to whether suspension was proper or not but could definitely not have decided the question as to whether the allegations were right or wrong, since the allegations were to be proved in an inquiry. However, fact remains that Division Bench was not satisfied with the approach of the Society as well as `ASC’, wherein he had set aside the order of suspension passed by `ARCS’ on the allegations of financial irregularities pointed out by the District Inspector, who had carried the inspection of the affairs of the Society in the year 2003. Division Bench, being not satisfied with the mode and manner of the inquiry conducted by the `ASC’ directed the respondents to carry out fresh inquiry by high ranking officer in the rank of Additional Registrar (Co-operation) with the direction to complete the inquiry within a period of three months. It may be noticed that Division Bench, while passing judgment dated 7th July, 2009, refused to set aside the order of suspension of respondent No.5 which was passed by the `ARCS’ and Administrator was appointed to look into the affairs of the society. 9. Aforesaid judgment dated 7th July, 2009 was never challenged in any proceedings by respondents in superior Court of law as a result of which, it attained finality. 10. 9. Aforesaid judgment dated 7th July, 2009 was never challenged in any proceedings by respondents in superior Court of law as a result of which, it attained finality. 10. Now, by way of present writ petition bearing CWP No. 4392 of 2010, the petitioners have again approached this Court praying therein quashing of Annexure P-2 i.e. Inquiry Report dated 19th October, 2009, conducted by respondent No. 2 i.e. Additional Registrar (Monitoring), Co-operative Societies, to the Government of Himachal Pradesh in terms of Division Bench judgment. The petitioners have further prayed that the respondents may be directed to conduct fresh inquiry by affording opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. Pursuant to the application made by the petitioners under RTI Act, inquiry report dated 19.10.2009, Annexure P-2, consisting of 22 pages, has been supplied to the petitioners. 11. Careful perusal of inquiry report, referred hereinabove, suggests that the Inquiry Officer i.e. respondent No.2, found respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct for causing deficiency in the assets of the Society by breach of trust or willful negligence and embezzlement of an amount of Rs.1,50,129/-. Inquiry Officer also found respondent No.5 liable for interest for the intervening period of embezzled amount of Rs.1,50,129/- and called upon respondent No.5 to deposit Rs.62,610/- on account of interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum on embezzled amount of Rs.1,50,129/-. But interestingly despite holding respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct, as mentioned above, respondent No.2 recommended that respondent No.5 may be directed to deposit this amount with the Society within a period of three months from now, failing which this amount may be recovered as arrears of land revenue from him. Inquiry Officer further recommended that since respondent No.5 had already deposited the principal amount immediately after being pointed out in the inquiry report, his suspension may be revoked. He also pointed out that since respondent No.5 was penalized by Managing Committee for his misconduct by stoppage of two increments and there was no instance of misconduct thereafter, his suspension may be revoked. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of the Inquiry Report:- “I have gone through the said Audit note for the year 2004-05. On Page 2 of the Audit Note, it has been specifically mentioned that no embezzlement or misappropriation has been found in the society during the year. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce relevant portion of the Inquiry Report:- “I have gone through the said Audit note for the year 2004-05. On Page 2 of the Audit Note, it has been specifically mentioned that no embezzlement or misappropriation has been found in the society during the year. At Page 22 of the Audit note, it has again been mentioned that no embezzlement or misappropriation has been found during the year. However, an amount of Rs.6905/- has been recovered less from loanee members and an amount of Rs.21172/- has been paid as excess interest to nonmember depositors. These amount had subsequently been recovered from the concerned loanees and depositors. These can not be termed as misappropriations or embezzlements. Hence no misappropriation or embezzlement has been reported to have been committed by Sh. Vijay Kumar in the Audit for the year 2004-05. I have gone into all the major acts of misconduct of Sh.Vijay Kumar as indicated in the Inspection Note dated 25.08.2003, Special Audit Report submitted under Section 63 of the H.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1968 on the basis of Test audit for the years 1993-94, 1995-96 and 1997-98 as well as the charges framed against him in the charge-sheet issued by the ARCS, Palampur. All these acts have been discussed in detail above. In my view the only misconduct of Sh.Vijay Kumar through which he has caused deficiency in the asserts of the Menhja society by breach of trust or willful negligence is the embezzlement of an amount of Rs.1,50,129/-. The year-wise break-up of this amount is as under:- Year Amount 1. 1993-94 Rs.58739.00 2. 1995-96 Rs.76,390.00 3. 1997-98 Rs.15,000.00 Rs.1,50,129.00 This amount of Rs.1,50,129/- was deposited by Sh.Vijay Kumar in the society on 14.11.2003. However, no interest on this amount for the intervening period was deposited by Sh.Vijay Kumar in the society on 14.11.2003. However, no interest on this amount for the intervening period was deposited. Vide its resolution dated 06.04.2004, the managing committee of the society while observing that the embezzled amount had been recovered from Sh. However, no interest on this amount for the intervening period was deposited by Sh.Vijay Kumar in the society on 14.11.2003. However, no interest on this amount for the intervening period was deposited. Vide its resolution dated 06.04.2004, the managing committee of the society while observing that the embezzled amount had been recovered from Sh. Vijay Kumar, Secretary and the managing committee is satisfied with the explanation given by him, resolved that keeping in view the repeated directions being given by the ARCS Palampur for taking disciplinary action against Sh.Vijay Kumar, a penalty of stoppage of two increments for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 is imposed on him with cumulative effect. I do feel that it would be in the interest of justice if Sh. Vijay Kumar is also made to pay the interest for the intervening period on the embezzled amount of Rs.1,50,129/- to the society. Keeping in view the cost of funds of the society at that time, I feel that the interest should be charged @ 5.5% p.a. The total amount recoverable from him as interest at this rate is calculated as under: (Amount in Rs.) Year Amount embezzled Intervening Period Amount payable as interest @ 5.5% 1993-94 58,739.00 9 years 29,075.00 1995-96 76,390.00 7 years 29,410.00 1997-98 15,000.00 5 years 4,125.00 Total 62,610.00 I further recommend that Sh.Vijay Kumar, Secretary (under suspension) may be directed to deposit this amount with the society within a period of three months from now failing which this amount may be recovered as arrears of land revenue from him. As far as the suspension of Sh.Vijay Kumar is concerned, I observe that he had deposited the embezzled amount soon after it was pointed out in the Inspection Note. He has also been penalized by the managing committee for his misconduct by stoppage of two increments. Besides, no instances of misconduct have been found against him in the recent past. Keeping this in view, I recommend that his suspension may be revoked. The Inquiry report is submitted herewith to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, H.P. for further necessary action please. Sd/- (Dr.Pankaj Lalit) Additional Registrar (Monitoring) Cooperative Societies, H.P. Shimla-9” 12. Besides, no instances of misconduct have been found against him in the recent past. Keeping this in view, I recommend that his suspension may be revoked. The Inquiry report is submitted herewith to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, H.P. for further necessary action please. Sd/- (Dr.Pankaj Lalit) Additional Registrar (Monitoring) Cooperative Societies, H.P. Shimla-9” 12. Further perusal of order dated 12th January, 2010, available on Court case file at page No. 41 annexed by the petitioners alongwith the inquiry report, also buttress the apprehension expressed by the Division Bench while rendering judgment dated 7.7.2009, wherein Division Bench, after seeing the material on record, was constrained to observe that at-least some officials from the department are trying to help respondent No.5 (then respondent No.7) and he seems to have the support of some persons who wield substantial influence. By way of order dated 12th January, 2010, Registrar Cooperative Societies on the basis of aforesaid inquiry report furnished by respondent No.2 ordered to revoke the suspension of respondent No.5 with immediate effect. Registrar, Cooperative Societies while passing order dated 12th January, 2010 on the basis of inquiry report furnished by Additional Registrar (Co-operation) ordered as under:- “whereas, the enquiry officer has submitted his report under Section 69(1) of the Act ibid to the undersigned on 22.10.2009 holding that Sh. Vijay Kumar had embezzled the sum of Rs.1,50,129/- during the year 1993-94, 1995-96 & 1997-98 by causing deficiency in the assets of the Menjha CAS by breach of trust and by willful negligence. Whereas, Sh.Vijay Kumar has deposited the whole embezzled amount in the Society on 14.11.2009 and has also deposited the interest amounting to Rs.62,610/- as accrued on the embezzled amount with the Society on 8.12.2009 as informed by the President of the Society. Whereas, the President of the society has requested the undersigned to issue necessary order for revocation of suspension of Sh.Vijay Kumar keeping in view the fact that the delinquent has already deposited embezzled amount with the society alongwith interest thereon and the Society has also taken disciplinary action against Sh.Vijay Kumar by imposing a penalty of stoppage of two increments for the year 2004-05 and 2005-06 for committing acts of omissions and commission. Whereas, adequate opportunity of being heard was given to all concerned to present their respective contentions, produce record and defend their respective cases. Whereas, adequate opportunity of being heard was given to all concerned to present their respective contentions, produce record and defend their respective cases. Whereas, the managing committee of the Menjha CAS ltd has no objection I case the suspension orders of Sh.Vijay Kumar are revoked; and Whereas, I am satisfied that adequate penalty of stoppage of two increments for the year 2004-05 and 2005-06 has been imposed on the delinquent by managing committee and the delinquent has made good the loss caused to the society by depositing the embezzled amount alongwith with interest; Now, therefore, I, Dr.A.J.V. Prasad, Registrar Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh in exercise of the powers vested in me under section 69(2) of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968 do hereby order to revoke the suspension of Sh. Vijay Kumar, Secretary (under suspension) with immediate effect. The managing committee of the Menjha CAS shall take necessary steps in this regard within a period of two weeks from today under intimation to the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Palampur. Sd/- (Dr. A.J.V. Prasad) Registrar Co-operative Societies Himachal Pradesh” 13. Registrar Cooperative Societies before revoking suspension has also mentioned that respondent Vijay Kumar has embezzled a sum of Rs.1,50,129/- during the years 1993-94, 1995-96 and 1997-98 by causing deficiency in the assets of the Society by breach of trust and by willful negligence. But, it appears that depositing of embezzled amount by respondent No.5 weighed heavily with competent authority while passing order dated 12th January, 2012. Most interestingly, Registrar Cooperative Societies, while passing order dated 12th January, 2010 has specifically mentioned that President of Society has requested the undersigned to issue necessary orders of revocation of suspension of respondent No.5, keeping in view the fact that delinquent has already deposited the amount and Society has already taken action against him by imposing penalty of stoppage of two increments in the year 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 for committing acts of omission and commission. 14. Bare perusal of the aforesaid order dated 12th January, 2010 clearly demonstrates that there is no application of mind by the competent authority while taking action on the recommendation of the inquiry officer appointed pursuant to the Division Bench judgment. 15. 14. Bare perusal of the aforesaid order dated 12th January, 2010 clearly demonstrates that there is no application of mind by the competent authority while taking action on the recommendation of the inquiry officer appointed pursuant to the Division Bench judgment. 15. In the aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant petition by specifically averring therein that inquiry, if any, conducted by the respondents, pursuant to the directions passed by the Division Bench of this Court, as referred above, is complete eye wash. Petitioners have also averred in the petition that before initiating any inquiry and thereafter during inquiry and at the time of passing of orders, petitioners were never associated by the respondents during the alleged inquiry conducted by the respondents in compliance to the Division Bench judgment passed by this Court. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that since no basic principles of natural justice as well as audi alterm partem have been adhered to in the present case by the respondents, fresh inquiry is required to be conducted by independent agency to look into the allegations leveled against the respondent No.5 so that adequate punishment commensurate with the offence is imposed upon the respondent No.5. 16. Respondents, by way of detailed reply, refuted the averments contained in the petition. Respondents No.1 and 2 specifically stated in the reply that in compliance to the Division Bench Judgment, respondent in exercise of powers vested in him under Section 19(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968 (for short `Act’) passed an order dated 6th August, 2009 to initiate the surcharge proceedings against respondent No.5 for alleged misconduct and in that regard appointed respondent No.2 as an Inquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry and to fix responsibility of the respondent No.5/delinquent, if found guilty. It has also been contended on behalf of the respondents that respondent No.2 being an Inquiry Officer conducted an inquiry under Section 69(1) of the Act against respondent No.5 and submitted his report on 19.10.2009, pointing therein that respondent No.5; namely; Vijay Kumar had embezzled an amount of Rs.1,50,129/- pertaining to the Society. It has also been contended on behalf of the respondents that respondent No.2 being an Inquiry Officer conducted an inquiry under Section 69(1) of the Act against respondent No.5 and submitted his report on 19.10.2009, pointing therein that respondent No.5; namely; Vijay Kumar had embezzled an amount of Rs.1,50,129/- pertaining to the Society. Respondents also stated that bare reading of Section 69 of the Act suggests that it provides action thereunder only, if an offending act or omission is discovered during the course of audit, inquiry, inspection or winding up of a cooperative society and since in this case the offending act/omission came to light at the time of inspection of the respondent-Society conducted by the District Inspector on 25.8.2003, the inquiry was ordered against respondent No.5. Respondents have also submitted that principles of natural justice were duly complied with during the proceedings of inquiry as opportunity of being heard was afforded to respondent No.5 before passing any adverse order against him. But, interestingly, it has been mentioned that since no adverse orders were to be passed against the petitioners, there was no reason to afford them opportunity of being heard. Respondents have justified the report of Inquiry Officer where he has recommended for revocation of suspension by stating that since respondent No.5 had deposited the embezzled amount of Rs.1,50,129/- in the Society on 14.11.2003 i.e. within 7 days of submission of inspection report by District Inspector, there is no illegality, whatsoever, in recommending the revocation of suspension. Respondents also claimed that Inquiry Officer while holding respondent No.5-delinquent as guilty of misconduct imposed an interest amounting to Rs.62,610/- on the embezzled amount to compensate the Society. Moreover, Managing Committee, for misconduct of respondent No.5, had already penalized him by inflicting penalty of stoppage of two increments and since no further instance of misconduct was found or noticed against the respondent No.5, therefore, there is no illegality, whatsoever, in the order of Inquiry Officer recommending revocation of suspension. Respondents further justified the order of revocation of suspension passed by the Registrar Cooperative Societies on the recommendation of Inquiry Officer by stating that he passed these orders, after satisfy himself that delinquent has made good the loss caused to the Society and as such there is no illegality, whatsoever, in the order passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies revoking the suspension of respondent No.5. Respondents further justified impugned order of suspension passed by the authority concerned, as mentioned above, by stating that as per provisions of rule 56(5) of the H.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1971, the Registrar has powers to direct the Committee of any Society to place the services of any employee under suspension. As per respondents, Registrar can do so if there is any prima facie evidence against that officer or servant, and suspension of such officer or servant is necessary in the interest of the society, pending the investigation and disposal of the mater. Respondents, while justifying the passing of impugned order dated 19.10.2010, further submitted as under in their reply:- “14. That the petitioners in the present petition have mainly prayed to direct the respondents to again conduct enquiry against respondent no.5. In this behalf it is submitted that the inquiry proceedings initiated against the Respondent No.5 have been completed and the Respondent No.5 has restored the money embezzled by him along with interest in the respondent society. There is no justification of again ordering the enquiry under section 69 of the Act against the respondent no.5 as the objective and purpose of conducting enquiry under section 69 of the Act is to recover the embezzled money belonging to the society and order payment and in the instant case said objective has been accomplished. In this behalf it is worth stating that the managing committee of the respondent society on the strength of the enquiry conducted under section 69 of the Act against the respondent No.5, may, at its discretion, initiate separate disciplinary proceedings as per the provisions of the service rules. As already submitted that the Respondent No.5 is an employee of a co-operative society and the managing committee of the society is the competent authority to appoint, suspend and take disciplinary action against its employees. The office of the Registrar has no role to play in respect of the employees of the co-operative societies except that provided under section 69 of the Act and rule 56 of the rules made thereunder as discussed above.” 17. The office of the Registrar has no role to play in respect of the employees of the co-operative societies except that provided under section 69 of the Act and rule 56 of the rules made thereunder as discussed above.” 17. Respondent No.5 i.e. delinquent officer also filed separate reply wherein he stated that present petition is not maintainable as the relief claimed primarily is against the Cooperative Society, which is neither owned or controlled by the State Government and is not `State’ within the meaning of Article 12 or the Article 226 of the Constitution of India and thus not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court as held by this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra vs. H.P. State Cooperative Bank Volume 1993 (2), Shi.L.C. 243 as well as judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in S.S. Rana vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, (2006)2 SCC 634. Respondent No.5 also stated that the petitioners have no cause of action to file and maintain the present writ petition, more particularly, when respondent No.5 has already been penalized by respondent-Society by withholding his two increments and moreover he has already deposited alleged embezzled amount with up to date interest, as directed by the Inquiry Officer. Respondent No.5 further contended that action of the respondent Cooperative Society is regulated by the provisions of H.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Rules as well as bye-laws of the society, which provide adequate machinery for redressal of the grievance of the members of the Society and as such present petition, at the instance of there members, is not maintainable. Respondent No.5 further sought dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners have not availed alternate remedy available under the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act and Rules, which remedy, apart from being the proper remedy, is both efficacious and speedy also. However, on merits respondent No.5 reiterated/adopted the stand of respondents No.1 and 2, which has been discussed in detail above and as such same is not being discussed here for the sake of brevity. 18. Mr. However, on merits respondent No.5 reiterated/adopted the stand of respondents No.1 and 2, which has been discussed in detail above and as such same is not being discussed here for the sake of brevity. 18. Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the petitioners, vehemently argued that the impugned orders dated 19.10.2009 and 12.1.2010 passed by the Additional Registrar (Monitoring) Cooperative Societies (IO) as well as Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh recommending and thereafter revoking suspension of respondent No.5 are not sustainable in the eye of law as same are not based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record. He forcefully contended that the respondents, pursuant to the Division Bench judgment, conducted an eye wash inquiry and no opportunity, whatsoever, of being heard was ever afforded to the complainant on whose petition, Division Bench had directed the respondents to initiate inquiry proceedings against respondent No.5. During arguments having been made by him, he made this Court to travel through the impugned orders dated 12.1.2010 and 19.10.2009 purportedly passed in compliance of Division Bench judgment to demonstrate that how respondents have attempted to hoodwink the Court. He specifically invited the attention of the Court to that portion of the inquiry report wherein inquiry officer specifically concluded that respondent No.5 has mis-conducted whereby he has caused deficiency in the assets of the Society by breach of trust and willful negligence in order to cause embezzlement to the tune of Rs.1,50,129/-. 19. Mr. Dadwal also made this Court to go through the order passed by the Registrar Cooperative Societies, wherein he, taking action on the inquiry report, ordered for revocation of suspension. To substantiate his arguments that there is no application of mind while passing order dated 12th January, 2010 by the Registrar Cooperative Societies, he specifically made reference to that portion of the order dated 12th January, 2010, wherein Registrar Cooperative Societies while revoking suspension of the respondent No.5 has stated that President of Society has requested the undersigned to issue necessary orders for revocation of suspension of respondent No.5, keeping in view the fact that he has already deposited embezzled amount with the Society with interest thereon. Mr. Mr. Dadwal forcefully contended that once inquiry officer had come to the conclusion that respondent No.5 delinquent officer embezzled an amount of Rs.1,50,129/-, there was no occasion for him to recommend for revocation of suspension, which clearly suggests that respondents are making all out efforts to protect respondent No.5, who has admittedly embezzled the amount of Society. It is also contended on behalf of the respondents that bare perusal of the reply filed on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 clearly suggests that no opportunity of being heard was ever granted by the respondents while passing impugned orders because there is specific mention in the reply, wherein respondents have admitted that since no adverse orders, if any, whatsoever were to be passed against the petitioners, there was no occasion to associate them in the proceedings. 20. Mr. Dadhwal also refuted the contention put forth on behalf of the respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction and no writ is maintainable against the Cooperative Societies in the light of the law laid down in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case supra. Mr. Dadwal contended that inquiry, if any, was conducted by the respondents pursuant to directions issued by this Court while passing judgment dated 7.7.2009 in CWP No. 561 of 2006 and as such discrepancies, if any, in the same could be looked into by this Court and at this stage plea of not having jurisdiction as raised by the respondent is not available to them. It is also contended on behalf of the respondents that bare perusal of impugned orders suggest that no inquiry, whatsoever, has been conducted strictly in terms of judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court and moreover no adequate punishment commensurate to offence allegedly having been committed by respondent No.5 has been awarded and as such this Court has all the jurisdiction to look into the matter in the present writ petition and order for fresh inquiry or imposition of adequate punishment. 21. On the other hand, Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. 21. On the other hand, Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, learned counsel representing the respondents No. 1, 2 and 5 supported the impugned orders dated 19.10.2009 and 12.1.2010 passed by the Additional Registrar (Monitoring) Cooperative Societies (IO) as well as Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh and the inquiry purportedly conducted in compliance to the Division Bench judgment, aforesaid counsel vehemently argued that present writ petition is not maintainable at all and as such same deserves to be dismissed on this ground only. 22. Learned counsel representing the respondents specifically contended that since relief claimed in the present petition is primarily against a Cooperative Society which is neither owned or controlled by State Government and is not “State” within the meaning of Article 12 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the present writ petition is not maintainable before this Court in view of the law laid down by this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case supra, which was further upheld by Hon’ble Full Bench in Vikram Chauhan vs. The Managing Director and Others , 2013(2) Him.L.J. (FB) 828. It is also contended on behalf of the respondents that the present writ petition filed by the petitioners is a sheer abuse of process of law because no cause of action, whatsoever, has accrued to the petitioners to file present writ petition because the respondents strictly in terms of Division Bench judgment, conducted fresh inquiry and having found respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct made him to deposit amount embezzled by him alongwith interest. Aforesaid counsel representing the respondents forcefully contended that once punishment has been imposed by the competent authority on the basis of inquiry report furnished by the Inquiry Officer, the petitioners have no right, whatsoever, to dictate and guide that in what manner and what kind of punishment should be imposed on the delinquent officer. It is sole prerogative of the competent authority, relying upon by the inquiry report, to impose punishment and in the present case, where respondent No.5 had admittedly deposited embezzled amount alongwith interest, no fault, whatsoever, can be found with the order of competent authority revoking suspension. 23. Mr. It is sole prerogative of the competent authority, relying upon by the inquiry report, to impose punishment and in the present case, where respondent No.5 had admittedly deposited embezzled amount alongwith interest, no fault, whatsoever, can be found with the order of competent authority revoking suspension. 23. Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, forcefully contended that otherwise, also petitioners are not the persons, who are aggrieved with the passing of any impugned order and as such they have no right, whatsoever, to challenge the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authorities and in this regard he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2013)4 SCC 465 . Mr. Bhardwaj forcefully contended that moreover the petitioners have no locus, whatsoever, to file present petition, who are admittedly the members of the Society. As per Mr. Bhardwaj by becoming member of Society one loose his individuality and cannot claim himself to be individual while initiating any proceedings against the Society. He forcefully contended that if any body could be effected by the impugned orders was only the management of the Society i.e. “Manjha Agricultural Cooperative Society” but since they have not filed any proceedings, challenging the passing of impugned order, present writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable on the ground of locus itself. In this regard he also placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Daman Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1985)2 SCC 670 , to demonstrate that once a person becomes the member of the Society he looses his individuality. 24. Mr. Bhardwaj also invited the attention of this Court to the effect that respondent No.5 has been already acquitted by the criminal court vide its judgment dated 30th May, 2011 with regard to alleged offence of embezzlement having been committed by him and as such it cannot be held that respondent No. 5 has committed any offence much less embezzlement of funds of Society. Mr. Bhardwaj also contended that this Court cannot substitute its own view to that of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of awarding punishment because Court can substitute the view only in case of illegality or material procedural irregularities by the competent authority while passing the impugned orders. Mr. Bhardwaj also contended that this Court cannot substitute its own view to that of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of awarding punishment because Court can substitute the view only in case of illegality or material procedural irregularities by the competent authority while passing the impugned orders. In the present case, disciplinary authority has not committed material procedural irregularities and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the punishment awarded to the respondent. He also invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M.Lad, (2010)5 SCC 775 and State Bank of Mysore and Others vs. M.C. Krishnappa, (2011)7 SCC 325 . 25. While concluding their argument, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. Bhardaj, representing the respondents, vehemently prayed for dismissal of the petition on the ground of maintainability. 26. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 27. Since the question of maintainability of writ petition has been raised by the respondents, it would be appropriate to examine and decide the issue of maintainability at first instance before adverting to the merits of the case. 28. Learned counsel representing the respondents unequivocally stated that since respondent-Cooperative Society has been created under the Act and as such it being a Society having been created under the Act is not “State” within the definition of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 29. In support of aforesaid arguments having been made by them they invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case supra, wherein banks established under Cooperative Societies Act have not been held to be a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and further have not been held to fall within the meaning of “other authority” for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution. The judgment in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Full Bench in S.S. Rana vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, (2006)2 SCC 634 and Vikram Chauhan vs. The Managing Director and Others, 2013(2) Him.L.J. (FB) 828. 30. The judgment in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Full Bench in S.S. Rana vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, (2006)2 SCC 634 and Vikram Chauhan vs. The Managing Director and Others, 2013(2) Him.L.J. (FB) 828. 30. Perusal of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench leaves no scope to dwell on the issue of the maintainability of writ petition against Societies constituted under the Act. It is also admitted fact that the “Mehnja Cooperative Society” is also constituted/created under the aforesaid Act but it may be noticed at this stage that the said Society is not party in the present case. 31. Careful perusal of the judgment referred hereinabove leaves no scope for this Court to infer that Cooperative Societies created under Act are “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The relevant part of the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case is reproduced hereinbelow:- “98. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the three Societies, namely, The Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd, The Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd, and the Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing and Development Federation Ltd, are not “other authorities” and, as such, cannot be characterized as ‘State’ when the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution and the same are also not authority within the meaning and for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution, Order passed by the Societies under their respective service regulations against its employees, as such, or in connection with employment cannot be corrected by way of writ petitions. The petitions also would not be maintainable in order to challenge the action of the Registrar since the same is not an exercise of statutory conferred upon him under the provisions of the Act of the Rules but an exercise of powers by him under service regulations framed under Bye-laws having no force of law. The writ petition also will not be maintainable since none of the three Societies are discharging any public functions.” 32. After carefully going through the judgments referred hereinabove it can be safely concluded that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against Societies created under Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. 33. However, Mr. The writ petition also will not be maintainable since none of the three Societies are discharging any public functions.” 32. After carefully going through the judgments referred hereinabove it can be safely concluded that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against Societies created under Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. 33. However, Mr. Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that perusal of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court while answering the reference has clearly held that writ would lie against the Cooperative Societies also, if circumstances so warrant despite it not being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. He vehemently argued that the facts attending the present case certainly call for interference of this Court. He vehemently argued that plea of maintainability, at this stage, cannot be allowed to be raised by the respondents especially when the impugned orders have been passed by the respondents in terms of Division Bench judgment and as such any challenge to the same can be laid by way of writ petition before the same Court. Mr. Dadwal strenuously argued that perusal of impugned orders leaves no doubt in the mind of this Court that both orders have not been passed with the proper application of mind, rather same have been passed by the authorities concerned under the influence of President of Society as well as other influential persons and as such same cannot be allowed to sustain, failing which great prejudice would be caused to the public at large. 34. Mr. Dadwal also contended that by way of present petition, petitioners have not laid any challenge to the action of the Society. Rather, by way of present petition specific challenge has been laid to the impugned orders dated 19.10.2009 and 12.1.2010 passed by the Additional Registrar (Monitoring) Cooperative Societies (IO) as well as Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Himachal Pradesh in compliance to Division Bench judgment and as such present petition is maintainable. 35. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties on the question of maintainability as well as law, referred hereinabove, this Court sees no reason, whatsoever, to show dis-agreement with the contention raised on behalf of the counsel representing the respondents that no writ can lie against the Co-operative Societies constituted under the Act. 35. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties on the question of maintainability as well as law, referred hereinabove, this Court sees no reason, whatsoever, to show dis-agreement with the contention raised on behalf of the counsel representing the respondents that no writ can lie against the Co-operative Societies constituted under the Act. Though Full Bench of this Court while answering the reference in Vikram Chauhan’s case held that a writ would lie even against a Cooperative Bank if the facts and circumstances so warrant despite it not being a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. But once Hon’ble Full Court, while answering the reference, held that decision of Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case that the Cooperative Banks created under the Act are not “State” within the definition of Article 12 of the Constitution and thus they are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction, still holds good, meaning thereby that banks created under Registration of Cooperative Societies Act are not “State”. The contentions put forth on behalf of the petitioners that writ can lie even against a Cooperative Bank if the facts and circumstances so warrant cannot be considered especially in view of the judgment rendered in Chandresh Kumar Malhotra’s case wherein it has been specifically held that The Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd, The Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd, and the Himachal Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing and Development Federation Ltd, are not “other authorities” and, as such, cannot be characterized as ‘State’. 36. He also placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and Others, (2015)4 SCC 670 , wherein the Court held: “34. In this context, the first question which arises is as to what meaning is to be assigned to the expression “any person or authority”. By catena of judgments rendered by this Court, it now stands well grounded that the term “authority” used in Article 226 has to receive wider meaning than the same very term used in Article 12 of the Constitution. This was so held in Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukarjee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989)2 SCC 691 . In that case, dispute arose between the Trust which was managing and running science college and teachers of the said college. This was so held in Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukarjee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989)2 SCC 691 . In that case, dispute arose between the Trust which was managing and running science college and teachers of the said college. It pertained to payment of certain employment related benefits like basic pay, etc. Matter was referred to the Chancellor of the Gujarat University for his decision. The Chancellor passed an award, which was accepted by the University as well as the State Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the award. Teachers filed the writ petition seeking mandamus and direction to the trust to pay them their dues of salary, allowances, provident fund and gratuity in accordance therewith. It is in this context an issue arose as to whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable against the said Trust which was admittedly not a statutory body or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as it was a private trust running an educational institution. The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable and said view was upheld by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. 37. Further, the Court explained in para 20 that the term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context, would receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12, inasmuch as Article 12 was relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31, whereas Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also non-fundamental rights. What is relevant is the dicta of the Court that the term 'authority' appearing in Article 226 of the Constitution would cover any other person or body performing public duty. The guiding factor, therefore, is the nature of duty imposed on such a body, namely, public duty to make it exigible to Article 226. (PP.688, 690) 37. Since our own High Court has repeatedly held in various judgments, as referred hereinabove, that no writ is maintainable against the Society constituted under the Act, there is no occasion to deliberate upon issue of maintainability further at this stage. 38. (PP.688, 690) 37. Since our own High Court has repeatedly held in various judgments, as referred hereinabove, that no writ is maintainable against the Society constituted under the Act, there is no occasion to deliberate upon issue of maintainability further at this stage. 38. The question which now remains to be determined/decided by this Court is that, “whether at this stage plea of maintainability, as raised by the respondents, is available to them or not? Admittedly, present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners assailing therein the inquiry report dated 19.10.2009 furnished by respondent No.2, who was appointed as Inquiry Officer in terms of Division Bench judgment. It is also fact that order dated 12th January, 2010 passed by Registrar, Cooperative Societies is based upon the inquiry report dated 19th October, 2009 submitted by respondent No.2. 39. After giving its thoughtful consideration, this Court is of the view that the plea of maintainability, as being raised by the respondents in the present case, may not be available to the respondents, at this stage, because once they had subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court in CWP No. 561 of 2006, wherein direction was issued to appoint Inquiry Officer and conduct fresh inquiry in terms of observation made in that judgment, plea of maintainability cannot be allowed to raise at this stage to defeat the mandate contained in the judgment of Division Bench as referred above. It nowhere emerges from the reading of Division Bench judgment that plea of jurisdiction was ever raised by the respondents in earlier writ petition preferred by the petitioners, rather respondents with a view to justify their action rendered certain explanations which were not accepted by the Division Bench and fresh inquiry was ordered. If respondents were really aggrieved with the passing of judgment dated 7.7.2009 which was admittedly passed in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, they could challenge the same on ground of maintainability before the superior Court. Since no challenge, whatsoever, was laid to the judgment passed by the Division Bench in the superior Court, undisputedly, the same has attained finality. 40. It is also undisputed that inquiry report dated 19.10.2009 as well as order dated 12.1.2010, which are impugned in the present case, are the outcome of inquiry initiated in terms of Division Bench judgment. Since no challenge, whatsoever, was laid to the judgment passed by the Division Bench in the superior Court, undisputedly, the same has attained finality. 40. It is also undisputed that inquiry report dated 19.10.2009 as well as order dated 12.1.2010, which are impugned in the present case, are the outcome of inquiry initiated in terms of Division Bench judgment. This Court is of the view that once respondents subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court without any demur, they cannot be allowed to rake up the issue of maintainability at this stage in another petition which, admittedly, has arisen from the proceedings initiated by the respondents in compliance to Division Bench judgment. Rather, this Court is of the view that by taking plea of jurisdiction, citing law, as referred hereinabove, respondents have attempted to defeat the mandate of judgment dated 7.7.2009 passed by Division Bench which has attained finality. It may be noticed that law which has been relied upon by the respondents claiming that this Court has no jurisdiction was very much in existence at the time of passing of Division Bench judgment and as such respondents cannot be allowed to raise the issue of maintainability as per their convenience. As far as impugning the action of the Society under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, this Court has already observed that it is in agreement with the contention put forth on behalf of the respondents that no writ is maintainable against the Society incorporated under the Societies Act. But, in the present case the petitioners have laid challenge to the action of respondents, which admittedly is the outcome of the proceedings initiated at the behest of this Court in CWP No. 561 of 2006. In view of peculiar facts and circumstances, as has been, discussed above, plea of maintainability, as raised by the respondents, cannot be accepted because that would amount to virtually defeat all mandate/directions passed by Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 561 of 2006. 41. Moreover, Society is not a party in the present case and no action, whatsoever, of Society is under challenge in the present writ petition. 41. Moreover, Society is not a party in the present case and no action, whatsoever, of Society is under challenge in the present writ petition. Petitioners, by way of present writ petition, have challenged the action of respondents which they initiated pursuant to the directions passed by the Division Bench of this Court and as such plea of maintainability cannot be allowed to be raised by them at this stage. 42. Careful perusal of relief clause in the petition suggests that petitioners, by way of present petition, have prayed that inquiry report Ex.P-2 dated 19.10.2009 conducted by respondent No.2 may be quashed and set aside by issuing a writ of certiorari, with a further direction to respondents to conduct the same afresh by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and associating them in the inquiry. Petitioners, by way of present petition, have made an attempt to demonstrate that inquiry conducted by respondent No.2, purportedly made in compliance to the judgment passed by the Division Bench, is not actually in compliance of the directions contained in that judgment, rather same has been conducted on its own whims and fences. Though, in the body of writ petition, petitioners have stated that great prejudice has been caused to the petitioners by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies while revoking suspension and not awarding adequate punishment, but in relief clause only direction has been sought to conduct fresh inquiry by associating and affording them opportunity of being heard. Hence, plea of maintainability, if any, cannot be allowed to raise by the respondents at this stage. This Court, after perusing the inquiry report and thereafter order passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies need not to say and observe much about the correctness and legality of inquiry report as well as order of revocation of suspension issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies because bare perusal of the same suggest that there is no application of mind by the authorities, rather same has been passed on the recommendation of the President of the Cooperative Society concerned. Moreover, this Court is shocked and pained to see that inquiry officer, after holding delinquent official-respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct, recommended that his suspension may be revoked since he has already deposited the embezzled amount. Moreover, this Court is shocked and pained to see that inquiry officer, after holding delinquent official-respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct, recommended that his suspension may be revoked since he has already deposited the embezzled amount. Once inquiry officer had come to the conclusion that delinquent officer-respondent No.5 has mis-conducted by embezzling an amount, as indicated above, he had no occasion, whatsoever, to recommend that his suspension may be revoked, rather he was expected to propose adequate punishment proportionate to offence committed by him. But in the present case, this Court had an occasion to peruse the inquiry report, wherein inquiry officer categorically concluded that respondent No.5 Vijay Kumar had embezzled Rs.1,50,129/- during the years 1993-94, 1995-96 and 1997-98 by causing deficiency in the assets of the Mehnja CAS by breach of trust and by willful negligence, but, despite that, he recommended that since delinquent officer respondent No.5 Vijay Kumar had deposited the whole embezzled amount immediately after being pointed out in inspection report and he was penalized by imposing penalty of stoppage of two increments, his suspension may be revoked. Thus, aforesaid conduct of inquiry officer itself speaks about the kind of clout being enjoyed by respondent No.5, who despite committing embezzlement has been repeatedly managing orders in his favour by the competent authorities. At the cost of repetition it may be again reiterated that in previous writ petition, Division Bench, after perusing the record, was compelled to observe that there are some officials in the department, who are trying to help respondent No.5, who apparently have the support of some persons who wield substantial influence. Aforesaid apprehension of the Division Bench is getting substantiated with the passing of orders dated 19.10.2009 and 12.1.2010, which clearly suggest that authorities have played in the hand of delinquent respondent No.5. Further perusal of order dated 12th January, 2010 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, on the basis of inquiry report, submitted by respondent No.2 has compelled this Court to draw the inference that actually no inquiry, whatsoever, was conducted in terms of judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court. Rather inquiry, if any, conducted in compliance of judgment passed by Division Bench, was mere eyewash and all out efforts were made therein to ensure that no penalty, whatsoever, is imposed upon the delinquent official-respondent No.5. Rather inquiry, if any, conducted in compliance of judgment passed by Division Bench, was mere eyewash and all out efforts were made therein to ensure that no penalty, whatsoever, is imposed upon the delinquent official-respondent No.5. It is shocking to see that Registrar, Cooperative Societies instead of applying his own mind states in order that the “President of Society has requested the undersigned to pass necessary orders for revocation of suspension of delinquent official-respondent No.5, keeping in view the fact that he has already deposited the embezzled amount with the Society alongwith interest and Society has already initiated disciplinary action against him by imposing penalty of stoppage of two increments.” This Court is surprised and shocked that both, inquiry officer as well as competent authority, who imposed punishment despite concluding that delinquent official-respondent No.5 had mis-conducted himself by embezzling the amount, ordered for revocation of his suspension. It is not understood that why no punishment was imposed by the respondents on the basis of inquiry report, wherein respondent No.5 was held guilty of misconduct, because inquiry, if any, was conducted after imposing of so called penalty of stoppage of two increments by the Managing Committee and as such there was no occasion for inquiry officer as well as Registrar, Cooperative Societies to take into consideration penalty of stoppage of two increments by the Managing Committee at the time of passing of order dated 12th January, 2010. Leaving everything aside, perusal of impugned orders dated 19.10.2009 and 12.1.2010 shocked the conscious of this Court and this Court really finds it difficult to accept the explanation/logic behind passing of aforesaid orders put forth on behalf of the respondents. 43. Admittedly, it is the complete domain of the competent authority to award adequate punishment on the basis of inquiry report and Court has no role, whatsoever, to substitute its own view to that of disciplinary authority for the purpose of awarding punishment. But, as has been discussed above, Court is shocked to see the manner in which inquiry has been conducted and thereafter punishment which has been awarded to the delinquent official-respondent No.5. It is well settled law that if some orders passed in disciplinary proceedings shocks the conscious of the Court, Courts can pass order directing the authority to pass appropriate adequate punishment which commensurate with the offence committed by the delinquent officer/official. It is well settled law that if some orders passed in disciplinary proceedings shocks the conscious of the Court, Courts can pass order directing the authority to pass appropriate adequate punishment which commensurate with the offence committed by the delinquent officer/official. Since decision qua the punishment, if any, keeping in view the gravity of offence involved in the present case, is ultimately to be taken by the authority, this Court sees no occasion whatsoever to propose some penalty which can be imposed in the case of respondent No.5. But, admittedly, in plenty of cases Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that what should be the adequate penalty/punishment in the case of embezzlement/mis-appropriation. In the present case, since this Court is of the view that adequate penalty, if any, to be imposed by the authority concerned, does not deem it proper to propose any penalty, rather thinks it fit to leave it to the wisdom of the authority. 44. In this regard reliance is placed on the following decisions, which can be a guiding factor to the authority while imposing punishment. (See: Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh vs. Krishnan Behari and Others, AIR 1996 SC 1249 , Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) and Others vs. Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara Sangha and Others, (2000)7 SCC 517 , Regional Manager, RSRTC vs. Ghanshyam Sharma, (2002)10 SCC 330, Narendra Nath Bhalla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2007)15 SCC 775, Dharam Swaroop vs. Hon’ble High Court of H.P. and another, 2010(2) HLJ 846, and Sh.Madan Lal Sharma vs. H.P. Khadi & Village Industries Board, Cleave Land, Shimla through its Chairman, Latest HLJ 2012 (HP) 1432.) 45. As far as another contention put forth on behalf of the respondents that petitioners have no locus, whatsoever, to file writ petition, because being a member of Society he is not entitled to file writ petition against Society, this Court is of the view that at first instance aforesaid plea being raised by the respondents is not available to them at this stage because issue with regard to locus of petitioner was never raised at the time of filing of CWP No.561 of 2006, wherein fresh inquiry was ordered to be conducted. It is also pertinent to note at this stage that aforesaid judgment passed by the Division Bench was accepted by the respondents at that stage without any demur and no challenge, whatsoever, was laid to the same in the superior Court of law and as such no plea of locus, if any, with regard to petitioner can be allowed to sustain at this stage, especially when both the petitions have filed by the same petitioners. As far as law laid down in Daman Singhs’ case supra, wherein it has been held that once the persons become the member of the Society, they loose their individuality, there cannot be any quarrel with regard to the proposition laid down in this behalf but same cannot be made applicable in the present case for the reasons stated hereinabove. 46. Similarly, there cannot be any quarrel with regard to law cited by Shri J.L. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5, to substantiate his plea. The Court may not substitute its own view to that of the disciplinary authority for the purpose of awarding the punishment as has been held in State Bank of Mysore and Others vs. M.C. Krishnappa, (2011)7 SCC 325 . The Hon’ble Apex Court has also held as under: “8. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court. It is well settled that punishment is primarily a function of the Management and the courts rarely interfere with the quantum of punishment. (See: Administrator, UT of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad., (2010) 5 SCC 775 ; paragraphs 9 and 14). 9. In this case the proven charge against the respondent was of financial irregularities and of making fraudulent withdrawals deriving pecuniary gain for himself. In a bank an offence of this kind is one of the most serious offences and the disciplinary authority had passed an order of removal against the respondent. In the facts of the case even that punishment could not be said to be unreasonable or unduly harsh. The Reviewing Authority modified the order of punishment and gave him a lighter punishment instead. At that time the respondent accepted it without ado. In those facts we fail to see any scope for interference with the punishment on a purely subjective view taken by the High Court.” (p.327) 47. The Reviewing Authority modified the order of punishment and gave him a lighter punishment instead. At that time the respondent accepted it without ado. In those facts we fail to see any scope for interference with the punishment on a purely subjective view taken by the High Court.” (p.327) 47. Reliance has also been placed on Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M.Lad, (2010)5 SCC 775 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “9. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters has come up for consideration before this Court time and again. It is worthwhile to refer to some of these decisions. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995)6 SCC 749 , this Court held: (SCC p.762, para 18) "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof". 14. The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary Authority, and/or on appeal the Appellate Authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the Court/Tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. Ordinarily the Court or a Tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts.” (pp.778 & 780) 48. Undoubtedly, aforesaid judgments clearly provide that Court cannot substitute its own view to that of the disciplinary authority. But it has been categorically held in these judgments that Courts can substitute its own view in case it comes to the conclusion that material illegality has been committed by the authority while awarding the punishment. Since, there cannot be any quarrel with regard to the proposition of law as discussed hereinabove, this Court does not see any reason to deliberate upon the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the respondents. 49. But in the present case fact remains, as has been discussed in detail, that inquiry officer and thereafter competent authority, while awarding punishment, have committed material illegality and as such this Court can look into the issue and propose some punishment. But, as has been discussed above, punishment, if any, is ultimately to be passed by the competent authority on the basis of inquiry report and in the present case, this Court, instead of proposing adequate punishment, deems it fit to relegate the matter back to the competent authority to impose adequate punishment on the delinquent official respondent No. 5 on the basis of inquiry report dated 19.10.2009, wherein he has been held guilty of misconduct of mis-appropriation of funds. 50. Before parting with the present case and issuing necessary directions, this Court deems it necessary to deal with another plea of alternative remedy, if any, available with the petitioner. As per respondents, petitioners have approached this Court without availing alternative appropriate remedy as envisaged under the Act. But in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case where, despite there being specific orders passed by the Division Bench in CWP No. 561 of 2006, respondents have not bothered to conduct inquiry in fair manner. Rather, all out efforts have been made to ensure that no harm is caused to delinquent-official respondent No.5. Division Bench of this Court, while ordering for fresh inquiry, had specifically concluded that somebody in department is trying to shield its erring official and as such had ordered for inquiry from some high ranking officer. Rather, all out efforts have been made to ensure that no harm is caused to delinquent-official respondent No.5. Division Bench of this Court, while ordering for fresh inquiry, had specifically concluded that somebody in department is trying to shield its erring official and as such had ordered for inquiry from some high ranking officer. But despite there being aforesaid observations of the Division Bench, Inquiry Officer has failed to make proper recommendation to the competent authority. Inquiry Officer, despite holding delinquent official respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct/embezzlement, himself recommended for revocation of his suspension and on the top of it competent authority while passing orders states that the “President of the Society has recommended that suspension of respondent No.5 may be revoked”, meaning thereby authorities have virtually took in the hand of officials of the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Department. This Court is shocked to see that alleged embezzlement was done in the year 1995-96 and had come to the notice of auditor in the year 2004-2005, but since then respondent No.5 has been successfully managing the affairs in his favour. Apart from the above, this Court solely with a view to ensure that the directions passed by the Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.561 of 2006 are taken to logical end, decided to proceed ahead with the present matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Careful perusal of the instant judgment would itself demonstrate that very endeavour of this Court, while passing this judgment, has been to ensure that complete/substantive justice is done to the parties and no one is allowed to defeat the mandate of the Division Bench by raising those pleas i.e. maintainability, locus and alternative remedy, which were admittedly never raised at the time of passing of judgment dated 7.7.2009 in CWP No. 561 of 2006, which has attained finality. 51. Though, in catena of judgments, as has been referred above, this Court is competent to substitute its own view to that of disciplinary authority when this Court purposely with a view to dispel/negate element of bias, if any, in the mind of Court against the delinquent official deems it fit to leave it to the wisdom of the competent authority to re-examine the issue in the light of judgments referred hereinabove and award appropriate punishment in accordance with law. 52. 52. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Janatha Bazar (South Kanara Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) and Others vs. Secretary, Sahakari Noukarara Sangha and Others, (2000)7 SCC 517 , wherein the Court held: “6. As stated above, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench in writ appeals confirmed the findings given by the Labour Court that charges against the workmen for breach of trust and misappropriation of funds entrusted to them for the value mentioned in the charge-sheet had been established. After giving the said findings, in our view, the Labour Court materially erred in setting aside the order passed by the Management removing the workmen from the service and reinstating them with 25% back wages. Once act of misappropriation is proved, may be for a small or large amount, there is no question of showing uncalled for sympathy and reinstating the employees in service. Law on this point is well settled. (Re.: Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari, (1996)2 SCC 714 ). In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997)11 SCC 370 this Court set aside the judgment passed by the High Court in a case where a conductor serving with the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation was removed from service on the ground that the alleged misconduct of the conductor was an attempt to cause loss of Rs. 65/- to the Corporation by issuing tickets to 23 passengers fro a sum of Rs. 2.35 but recovering @ Rs. 5.35 per head and also by making entry in the waybill as having received the amount of Rs. 2.35, which figure was subsequently altered to Rs. 2.85. The Court held that it was not possible to say that the Corporation removing the conductor from service has imposed a punishment which is disproportionate to his misconduct. Similarly in Punjab Diary Development Corporation Ltd. v. Kala Singh, (1997)6 SCC 159 this Court considered the case of a workman who was working as a Diary Helper-cum-Cleaner for collecting milk from various centers and was charged for the misconduct that he inflated the quantum of milk supplies in milk centers and also inflated the quality of fat contents where there were less fat contents. The Court held (at SCC pp.161-62, para 4) that in view of proof of misconduct a necessary consequence will be that the Management had lost confidence that the workman would truthfully and faithfully carry on his duties and consequently the Labour Court rightly declined to exercise the power under Section 11A of the ID Act to grant relief with minor penalty". (p.520) 53. Reliance is also placed on Narendra Nath Bhalla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2007)15 SCC 775, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “6. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that the appellant has already paid back the money which was held proved against him that he had misappropriated. Mere repayment of money does not absolve him of serious charge of misappropriation. The last submission that the punishment imposed on the appellant is too harsh also does not appeal to us, having regard to the serious nature of charges including the misappropriation of money and issuing a receipt on plain paper and reflecting it in the official record as something else. The decision in Mehnga Singh v. Inspector General of Police, (1995)5 SCC 682 relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant does not help him as that is a case which governs the facts of that case. The other decision relied on for the same purpose is M.A. Khalsa v. Union of India, 1988 (Supp.) SCC 436. Even this decision does not help the appellant in any way as can be seen from the very facts and the opinion expressed therein that the order of dismissal having regard to the serious nature of the charge of misappropriation was felt appropriate. However, the penalty was modified on the peculiar facts of that case. Under these circumstances, we find no merits in this appeal. Consequently, it stands dismissed with no order as to costs.” (p.777) 54. In Dharam Swaroop vs. Hon’ble High Court of H.P. and Anr., HLJ 2010 (HP) 846, this Court held: “11. In view of the settled position as indicated above, this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the finding of the disciplinary authority as well as Appellate Authority i.e. the decision of Hon’ble the Chief Justice taken on the administrative side. In view of the settled position as indicated above, this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the finding of the disciplinary authority as well as Appellate Authority i.e. the decision of Hon’ble the Chief Justice taken on the administrative side. Keeping in view the gravity of the charges against the petitioner, the report of inquiry officer affirmed by disciplinary authority as well as the Appellate Authority, the said punishment of removal of petitioner from service does not shock the conscience of this Court. Therefore, in our respectful consideration, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the order dated 1.4.2002 (Annexure P-5) as well as 6.8.2003 (Annexure P-6). The writ petition being devoid of merits is therefore, liable to be dismissed.” (pp.852-853) 55. Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, the present writ petition is allowed and the order dated 12.1.2010 passed by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies revoking suspension of respondent No. 5 is quashed and set aside and he is further directed to pass fresh order on the basis of inquiry report dated 19.10.2009 submitted by respondent No.2 ignoring his recommendation for revocation of suspension. Needless to say that, since inquiry officer in his report dated 19.10.2009 has held respondent No.5 guilty of misconduct for misappropriation of funds, Registrar, Cooperative Societies will impose punishment, if any, on the aforesaid findings returned by respondent No.2, keeping in view the judgments referred hereinabove in this regard by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 56. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.