JUDGMENT : Challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 13/01/2016 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 17, Jaipur Metropolitan, whereby the court has allowed an application filed by the respondent-plaintiff under Order 8 Rule 10 and Section 151 C.P.C. and ordered that written statement be struck out from the record. 2. For the purpose of deciding the instant writ petition, facts in brief are that the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration wherein it is alleged that the petitioner/defendant has no right or titles over the suit property as per agreement dated 18/02/1981 and 05/01/1994. It was prayed by the respondents that the petitioner be directed to handover the possession of the suit property as per the layout plan. 3. An application under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. was filed on 24/08/2013, by the plaintiffs/respondents praying therein that the right of the defendants to file written statement may be closed and the court may be proceeded further as provided in Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. Reply to the said application was filed by the petitioner/defendant wherein it was stated that the plaintiffs/respondents have neither annexed original documents nor the certified copies of the same with the plaint on which they relied to substantiate their claim. Without perusal of the documents, written statement cannot be filed. There are many applications pending, qua the maintainability of the suit itself, which are to be decided first before filing of the written statement. It is stated that the present application is premature and liable to be dismissed and opportunity may be given to file written statement to the defendant. 4. The application was allowed by the trial court vide impugned order dated 13/01/2016, therefore, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner/defendant. 5. It is submitted by learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Shri Ashok Gaur, that the written statement was filed by the petitioner on 12/01/2015 and the same was taken on record and no objection was raised by the plaintiffs at that stage. Thus, in these circumstances, application under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. filed by the respondents had already become infructuous as the learned trial court had taken the written statement on record. The respondents did not challenge the order dated 12/01/2015, therefore, the direction of striking out the written statement of the petitioner without reversing the order dated 12/01/2015, is illegal.
Thus, in these circumstances, application under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. filed by the respondents had already become infructuous as the learned trial court had taken the written statement on record. The respondents did not challenge the order dated 12/01/2015, therefore, the direction of striking out the written statement of the petitioner without reversing the order dated 12/01/2015, is illegal. In spite of this fact, the trial court erroneously allowed the application under Order 8 Rule 10. The impugned order is manifestly perverse, contrary to law and therefore liable to be set aside. It is submitted that an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is still pending and the same has to be decided first before filing of the written statement. Several other applications are also pending and must be decided first. Without considering these facts, the trial court struck out the written statement of the petitioner which is manifestly wrong. The limitation of 90 days mandated by Order 8 Rule 1 is directory and not mandatory in nature. Thus, the learned trial court has discretion to allow the written statement to be filed even after completion of 90 days. It is submitted that an application under Order 1 Rule 8 filed by the respondents came to be dismissed by the trial court thus the learned trial court has committed an illegality by continuing with the suit. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mini Sindhu (Smt.) Vs. The Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No.2 and Ors., RLW 2009(4) Raj. 3604 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R.K. Roja Vs. U.S. Rayudu (2016 SCC Online SC 682) and the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of Telefonaktiebolaget L.M Ericsson vs. Lava International Ltd. (IA No.25029/2015 in CS (O) No.764/2015, decided on 9th December, 2015). 6. On the other hand, it is submitted by learned senior counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs Shri Sudhanshu Kasliwal that the application under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. was filed much prior to filing of the written statement and the same are pending with the trial court. In view of this fact, if the written statement is filed subsequently the same shall not adversely affect the right of the respondents.
In view of this fact, if the written statement is filed subsequently the same shall not adversely affect the right of the respondents. The written statement was filed with the delay of one and a half years and no satisfactory explanation has been given by the petitioner and no application was filed to condone the delay in filing the same. Without filing such application, delay in filing written statement cannot be condoned. It is submitted that in view of the amendment in the C.P.C. in 2015, a written statement filed after the expiry of 120 days from the date of service of summons cannot be taken on record, as the procedural law has retrospective application. The trial court has exercised its judicial discretion properly and hence, no interference is called for in the impugned order. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance upon Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab Vs. Kumar and Ors., (2006) 1 SCC 46 ), Zolba Vs. Keshao and Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 769 ), Mohd. Mehtab Khan and Ors. Vs. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221 . Heard learned counsel for the parties perused the material on record and considered the submissions. 7. This court shall be dealing with each argument advanced by the learned counsels and alongside discuss the import of Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C. and its applicability to the present facts. 8. It is an admitted fact that in the present case the written statement was not filed within prescribed period of limitation. It is also an admitted fact that prior to filing of the same, an application under Order 8 Rule 10, C.P.C. was filed. At this stage, it is pertinent to reproduce order-sheet dated 12/01/2015 which reads as under:- ^^12-1-15 odqy; mifLFkrA izfroknh dh vksj ls tokc nkok e; dkmaVj Dyse is'k x;kA udy fnykbZ x;hA okLrs tokcqy tokc@cgl nj O.11 R.12 CPC gsrq fn- 24-3-15 dks is'kA** 9. The above mentioned order sheet reveals that when the written statement was filed by the petitioner-defendant along with a counter claim, not only did the court take the same on record but also no objection thereto was raised by the plaintiffs-respondents. In fact, the plaintiff himself sought time to file a reply to the counter claim.
The above mentioned order sheet reveals that when the written statement was filed by the petitioner-defendant along with a counter claim, not only did the court take the same on record but also no objection thereto was raised by the plaintiffs-respondents. In fact, the plaintiff himself sought time to file a reply to the counter claim. In such circumstances, in my considered opinion, the plaintiff waived his right to raise any objection at a belated stage to the filing of the said written statement and counter claim, as also the delay of one and a half years stands impliedly condoned by the learned court below as soon as the written statement and counter claim was taken on record. In view of this, this court deems it appropriate to consider that the application filed under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. filed by the plaintiffs respondents lost its sanctity owing to becoming infructuous and superfluous. 10. Now coming to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents that in the absence of an application for condonation of delay in filing the written statement, delay could not be condoned, this court fails to find this argument tenable. There is no requirement under the Code of Civil Procedure to file a formal application for condonation of delay under Order 8 Rule 1. The proviso appended to the said provision gives ample power to the court to condone the delay and does not provide for any requisite as to the moving of an application for the said purpose. The power being directory in nature as settled, the court's power to condone delay is not restricted by such a hyper-technicality. For clarification of doubts, this court does not suggest that in every cases filing of an application for the said purpose be dispensed with; in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, the right of the petitioner-defendant to be given an opportunity to defend his cause cannot be taken away merely because he did not move a formal application. More so, when the court took the written statement and counter claim on record and the same was not objected to by the respondent plaintiff, it impliedly condoned the delay and proceeded to try the lis. 11.
More so, when the court took the written statement and counter claim on record and the same was not objected to by the respondent plaintiff, it impliedly condoned the delay and proceeded to try the lis. 11. As for the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-defendant qua the fact that the filing of the written statement is suspended till the decision on the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C., this court finds force therein. The application under the aforesaid provision can be filed at any stage and it is an independent right of the defendant to point out any infirmity in the suit. The challenge to maintainability of the suit is permissible before the conclusion of trial irrespective of the defendants right to contest the same on merits. However, at the cost of repetition of a settled principle, this court feels the need to state that the only condition which the courts must be bear in mind at the time of adjudicating upon an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is that, the court has to consider only the averment set-forth in the plaint and the documents annexed there with and must not look into those put forth in the written statement. When such application is filed, the court has to adjudge the same and dispose it of before it proceeds with the matter. In the present case, the application under the said provision was filed by the petitioner-defendant before the expiry of the period of 90 days viz on 17/05/2013. Considering the facts of the case and upon the perusal of the record, the conduct of the defendant does not seem tainted with any foul-play with a malafide intention to delay the proceedings. In these circumstances, the learned court below should have decided the said application first and only then proceeded with the suit. The question as to whether the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is required to be disposed of before proceeding further with the trial has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of RK Roja vs. US Rayudu (supra) and their Lordships in paragraphs Nos.6 and 9 have held as under:- “6. Once an application is filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the court has to dispose of the same before proceeding with the trial.
Once an application is filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the court has to dispose of the same before proceeding with the trial. There is no point or sense in proceeding with the trial of the case, in case the plaint (Election Petition in the present case) is only to be rejected at the threshold. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to file the application for rejection before filing his written statement. In case, the application is rejected, the defendant is entitled to file his written statement thereafter (See Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others).But once an application for rejection is filed, the court has to dispose of the same before proceeding with the trial court. To quote relevant portion from paragraph-20 of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable case (supra): “20. ... Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word “shall” is used, clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. ...” 9. The procedure adopted by the court is not warranted under law. Without disposing of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the court cannot proceed with the trial. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is only to be set aside. Ordered accordingly.” (Emphasis supplied). 12. Thus, the court below erred in allowing the application filed under Order 8 Rule 10 without adjudicating upon the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 by the petitioner defendant. 13. The next argument by the plaintiff respondent qua the applicability of the amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Commercial Court Ordinance, promulgated on 23rd October, 2015, also does not appeal to this court. The matter at hand is not a commercial dispute to which the amended proviso applies.
13. The next argument by the plaintiff respondent qua the applicability of the amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Commercial Court Ordinance, promulgated on 23rd October, 2015, also does not appeal to this court. The matter at hand is not a commercial dispute to which the amended proviso applies. The said matter of the suit pertains to an immovable property in respect whereof the declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction is sought. Even otherwise, for the sake of argument if the transaction be treated as a commercial one, the period of 120 days timeline will be applicable in cases filed subsequent to the notification of the ordinance dated 23/10/2015. Thus, the said argument holds no water. 14. This view finds support from the view taken by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Telefonaktiebolaget L.M Ericsson (supra). 15. The question as to whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and it would depend upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making out the provision is determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. (See: Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 ). 16. Considering the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Raza Buland (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of SK Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab (supra) in paragraph No.15 have held as under:- “It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words - "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non- extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication.
Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.” 17. The learned court below has allowed the application filed by the plaintiffs/respondents under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. very cursorily and casually, obviating the necessity to state any reasons therefore save that the written statement was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation of 90 days. The impugned order is non-speaking and as, deserves to be quashed. 18. Resultantly, this writ petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. Stay application stands also disposed of.