JUDGMENT : The three civil revision petitions and one writ petition are based on a set of common basic facts and the reliefs claimed by the parties are also aimed at achieving the same object. Accordingly, all these four petitions have been heard together. They can be and are accordingly disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The three revision petitions have been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging various orders of the Executing Court in Title Execution No. 2/2014 of the Court of learned Additional District Judge at Dibrugarh. This title execution case was instituted by the decree holder (hereinafter referred to as ‘the DH’) of Title Suit No. 6/1983 of that court after the decree passed on 20.01.1995 by the trial court was upheld by the High Court and civil appeal preferred there-against by the judgment debtors (hereinafter referred to as ‘the JD’) before Supreme Court was dismissed. 3. Facts involved in the matter are stated in brief hereinafter. One Bhawani Shankar Bagaria, as plaintiff, had instituted aforesaid Title Suit No. 6/1983 in the court of learned Assistant District Judge at Dibrugarh stating that M/s Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. had entered into an agreement for sale on 25.05.1970 agreeing to sell land measuring approximately 421.49 acres described in schedule to the agreement and subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein at a price of Rs. 450/- per acre. As per the agreement, the vendor received a sum of Rs. 5000/- towards earnest money. It was agreed that sale of the schedule land would be completed on resurvey of the area by the company and 45 days after handing over of vacant possession of the demised land to the purchaser. The sum of Rs. 5000/- received towards earnest money was supposed to have been adjusted against total consideration of Rs. 1,89,670/- at the time of completion of sale. Some of the terms and conditions of the contract were mentioned in the body of the plaint and the agreement in entirety was annexed as Annexure – A to the plaint. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 committed breach of the said agreement by refusing to sell and deliver to the plaintiff the demised land or any portion thereof notwithstanding repeated demands. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 committed breach of the said agreement by refusing to sell and deliver to the plaintiff the demised land or any portion thereof notwithstanding repeated demands. It was, therefore, prayed that a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 25.05.1970 be passed directing the defendants to execute the sale deed on receipt of balance consideration. An alternative prayer was also made for realisation of Rs. 6,54,309.50 towards damages in lieu of specific performance in addition to refund of Rs. 5,000/- and an interest of Rs. 4,375/- thereon. 4. On being summoned, the defendants No. 1 and 2 contested the suit by filing a joint written statement. They raised plea of maintainability, want of cause of action, mis-joinder of parties, limitation etc. However, the facts relating to execution of agreement on 25.05.1970 and receipt of Rs. 5,000/- towards earnest money as alleged in the plaint were admitted. According to the defendants, they did not repudiate the agreement intentionally but it became impossible to fulfil the obligation due to supervening interruption of laws on enforcement of Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1956 as well as Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Admitting incorporation of defendant No. 2, it was stated that the agreement made by defendant No. 1 was not binding on defendant No. 2 and that the defendants are not liable to refund the earnest money of Rs. 5,000/-. 5. The learned Assistant District Judge upon consideration of the rival contentions of the parties framed as many as 14 issues and the same are quoted below:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether there is any cause of action? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of Jokai India Ltd.? 5. Whether the defendant No. 1 is also carrying on business in the Dibrugarh District? 6. Whether the plaintiff was and is still ready and willing to buy the land in terms of the agreement? 7. Whether the defendant No. 1 committed breach of the agreement by refusing to sell and deliver to the plaintiff the land or any portion thereof in spite of demands made on behalf of the plaintiff? 8. Whether it became impossible for the defendant to carry out his obligation under the contract due to operation of law and the contract became void? 9. 8. Whether it became impossible for the defendant to carry out his obligation under the contract due to operation of law and the contract became void? 9. Whether the agreement dated 25.5.70 has any binding effect on defendant No. 2? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 25.5.70? 11. Whether the defendant is entitled to claim damage in lieu of specific performance and whether the claim of Rs. 6,54,309.50 as damage is highly inflated? 12. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to refund of Rs. 5000.00? 13. Whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 is binding on defendant No. 2? 14. Whether there is any cause of action against defendant No. 2? 6. Plaintiff examined himself as sole witness and adduced as many as 6 documents including the agreement dated 25.05.1970 as Ext. 1. But the defendants did not adduce any evidence either oral or documentary. The learned Additional District Judge to whose court the matter was transferred in the mean time, after hearing the arguments of both sides and on perusal of materials available on record passed judgment on 20.01.1995 thereby decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for specific performance of contract on contest. The defendants were directed to carry out the obligation of the agreement within 3 months from the date of the decree and to deliver khas possession of the suit land within 3 months from the date of offering the balance consideration by the plaintiff. In default, the plaintiff was given the liberty to put the decree into execution after expiry of 3 months from the date of offering the balance consideration and thereupon to get sale deed executed and to get possession through court. 7. Being aggrieved, the defendants preferred F.A. No. 59/1995 before this Court. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having appreciated the materials available on record, this court by judgment and decree dated 22.12.2006 dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial court decree. The defendants thereafter preferred SLP(C) No. 17447/2007 and thereupon civil appeal No. 4290/2009 was subsequently registered. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the civil appeal on 03.04.2014. 8. The defendants thereafter preferred SLP(C) No. 17447/2007 and thereupon civil appeal No. 4290/2009 was subsequently registered. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the civil appeal on 03.04.2014. 8. It is to be noted here that immediately after framing of the decree on 20.01.1995 following the judgment dated 20.01.1995, the decree holder offered by sending a bank draft to the judgment debtors under registered post the balance consideration money of Rs. 1,84,670.50. But the judgment debtors refused to accept the same. The trial court thereafter on being approached by the plaintiff in this regard vide petition No. 268/95 dated 05.05.1995, passed an order on 06.05.1995 observing that the plaintiff had offered the money to the defendant in full who refused to accept the bank pay order of Rs. 1,84,670.80 and so it was up to the plaintiff to put the decree into execution. Perhaps, the decree holder because of pendency of the first appeal before the High Court and the Civil Appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, did not put the decree into execution earlier. However, after dismissal of the civil appeal by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the decree holder initiated Title Execution No. 2/2014 in the court of learned Additional District Judge at Dibrugarh. 9. In the mean time, there were some changes in the structure of the defendant companies. The two defendants became 7 defendants by amalgamation and otherwise. The defendants No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 merged with defendant No. 7 and defendants No. 5 and 6 remained separate entities. Having received notices, all the judgment debtors appeared. The defendants No. 5 and 6 filed objections contending, inter alia, that the decree is not executable, that the decreetal land is neither identifiable nor does it exist, that the decree holder incorporated new schedule in the execution petition which is different from the schedule of the plaint etc. According to the objectors, no survey number/ patta number was incorporated either in the original schedule or in the new agreement. The execution has been instituted for land covered by periodic patta but no boundary has been furnished. It is also raised that the execution is barred by Registration Act, Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act etc and that Executing Court has no power to amend the decree. The execution has been instituted for land covered by periodic patta but no boundary has been furnished. It is also raised that the execution is barred by Registration Act, Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act etc and that Executing Court has no power to amend the decree. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having found that the decree holder had already submitted draft sale deed and that the judgment debtors refused to accept balance consideration of Rs. 1,84,670.50 and that this amount stood deposited in court by the decree holder, the learned Executing Court vide order dated 24.09.2015 directed the decree holder to submit requisite stamp papers for execution of sale deed in terms of decree dated 20.01.1995 in T.S. No. 6/1983 and fixed the case on 01.10.2015 for necessary orders. 10. By filing the CRP No. 455/2015, the aforesaid order passed by the learned Executing Court has been called in question by the judgment debtors, M/S M.K. Jokai Agri Plantations (P) Ltd. under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the mean time, the decree holder died and so his legal heirs have been impleaded as opposite parties No. 1(a) to 1(f) of the present revision petition. These decree holders entered appearance by filing caveat. On 09.10.2015, this court heard both sides and observed that the sale deed had already been executed and the matter remains pending only for delivery of khas possession. As these subsequent events were brought on record by oral submission of learned counsel, a single bench of this court passed an order permitting the parties to submit an appropriate affidavit on the next date. The court also held that it is not a fit case to grant stay of execution proceeding and accordingly rejected the prayer by order dated 09.10.2015. However, notice issued to the respondents was made returnable on 13.11.2015 further directing the respondents No. 1(a) to 1(f) to submit necessary affidavit as proposed. 11. In the mean time, on 13.10.2015 two more revision petitions were filed. M/s Jokai Agri Plantations (P) Ltd., which had earlier preferred the pending CRP No. 455/2015, now preferred a new revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution being CRP No. 472/2015 this time challenging orders dated 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 in Title Execution Case No. 2/2014. 11. In the mean time, on 13.10.2015 two more revision petitions were filed. M/s Jokai Agri Plantations (P) Ltd., which had earlier preferred the pending CRP No. 455/2015, now preferred a new revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution being CRP No. 472/2015 this time challenging orders dated 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 in Title Execution Case No. 2/2014. These are the two subsequent orders passed in the aforesaid title Execution case which had earlier passed order dated 24.09.2015 giving rise to the pending CRP No. 455/2015. 12. The statements made in paragraphs 1 to 7 in CRP No. 455/2015 are verbatim reproduced in paragraph 1 to 7 of the CRP No. 472/2015. In CRP No. 455/2015, the order dated 24.09.2015 was annexed as Annexure-VI after making statements of facts in paragraph 7. There is no mention of the order dated 24.09.2015 in the body of paragraph 7 of either of these petitions except saying that the learned Executing Court allowed the petition of the decree holder praying for execution of the decree dated 20.01.1995. In the second revision petition i.e., CRP No. 472/2015, the petitioners stated in paragraph 8 that on 01.10.2015, the learned court heard the counsel for stay and objection on draft sale deed and fixed the matter on 07.10.2015. The counsel of the petitioner waited till 4.30 P.M. that day and the learned Presiding Officer on being asked allegedly informed the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order would be passed on the following day. On the next day, file was released at 4.30 P.M. when the learned counsel for the petitioner noticed that the order had been passed on 07.10.2015 itself. By order dated 07.10.2015, the decree holder has been directed to submit modified draft sale deed which the decree holder submitted on 08.10.2015 and the same was approved on the same date. According to the petitioner, on 08.10.2015, decree holder moved another petition stating that judgment debtor had not executed the sale deed and as such Civil Nazir be directed to execute the sale deed requesting Sub-Registrar, Dibrugarh for registering the same and the learned Executing court allowed the prayer and issued writ. It may be mentioned herein that by order dated 07.10.2015, the objection raised by the JD/revision petitioner as to incorporation of new schedule in the draft sale deed was allowed by the learned Executing court. It may be mentioned herein that by order dated 07.10.2015, the objection raised by the JD/revision petitioner as to incorporation of new schedule in the draft sale deed was allowed by the learned Executing court. The learned court held that dag No. And Patta number mentioned in schedule A of the draft sale deed being different from the dag number and patta number mentioned in original agreement, the schedule A of this draft sale deed stood omitted and the draft sale deed containing only schedule B which is the schedule mentioned in the agreement of the suit stood accepted. The learned court accepted the modified draft sale deed under Order XXI Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the requisite stamp papers had already been deposited by DH, the learned court issued order for preparation of the sale deed fixing 08.10.2015 for necessary order. 13. On 08.10.2015, learned court observed that DH had already filed modified sale deed and so the learned court approved the same directing office to prepare sale deed as per approved draft. By another order passed later on, the final sale deed prepared in the mean time, was kept on record having checked and found the same to be correct. The learned court considered the petition No. 755/15 filed by the DH praying for issuance of writ and letter of request to Sub-Registrar, Dibrugarh and allowed the same fixing 15.10.2015 for return of it. This is why, on 09.10.2015 when CRP No. 455/2015 was heard by a single bench of this Court, it was brought to the notice of this court that sale deed had already been executed and registered for which this court had rejected the stay prayer against order dated 24.09.2015 passed in the same Execution case and directed the opposite parties No. 1(a) to 1(f) herein to file affidavit in this regard. 14. In the second revision petition, it is the case of the petitioner that the sale deed has been executed without verification of land and without prior approval of the Government which is required under various orders of the state Government. Moreover, under Assam Amendment of the Registration Act made in 2009 non testamentary instrument relating to immovable property cannot be accepted for registration unless the Dy. Commissioner of the concerned district issues an NOC containing description of such immovable property to be transferred. Moreover, under Assam Amendment of the Registration Act made in 2009 non testamentary instrument relating to immovable property cannot be accepted for registration unless the Dy. Commissioner of the concerned district issues an NOC containing description of such immovable property to be transferred. The letters of the State Government in regard to prior approval for transfer of grant land has been annexed as Annexure-XI (series) and copy of the notification in regard to amendment of Registration Act has been annexed as Annexure-XII to the revision petition. 15. The CRP No. 473/2015 has been preferred by Rossell Tea Limited which is the respondent No. 6 in CRP No. 455/2015. By a single revision petition, the orders dated 24.09.2015, 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 described above have also been challenged by this revision petitioner on identical grounds. The same story as to execution of an agreement for sale on 25.05.1970 by Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. for sale of approximately 421.49 acres land to Bhawani Shankar Bagaria, the failure of the vendor to execute the sale deed and consequent institution of title suit No. 31/1997 in the court of learned Assistant District Judge at Dibrugarh by Bhawani Shankar Bagaria, transfer of the suit to the Court of learned Addional District Judge, Dibrugarh by order dated 09.11.1983 by District Judge, Dibrugarh and thus re-numbering of the suit as Title Suit No. 6/1983 is disclosed in the initial paragraphs 1 to 4 of the revision petition. In paragraph 6 of this revision petition, the petitioner has narrated the chronological events as to change in the organisation of the defendant company in aforesaid title suit No. 6/1983. Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. merged with Jokai India Ltd. by an order dated 13.08.1976 passed by the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court leading to transfer and vesting of all assets of Jokai (Assam) Tea Co. Ltd. with Jokai India Ltd. w.e.f. 31.03.1976 which on turn got renamed as Rossell Industries Ltd. with a new certificate of incorporation on 07.03.1991. Rossell Industries Ltd. was renamed as MK Jokai India Ltd. by fresh certificate of incorporation dated 21.12.2005. Ltd. with Jokai India Ltd. w.e.f. 31.03.1976 which on turn got renamed as Rossell Industries Ltd. with a new certificate of incorporation on 07.03.1991. Rossell Industries Ltd. was renamed as MK Jokai India Ltd. by fresh certificate of incorporation dated 21.12.2005. Accordingly, all assets of Rossell Industries Ltd. stood acquired by MK Jokai India Ltd. This company then merged with MK Shah Exports Ltd. leading to vesting of all assets of MK Jokai India Ltd on MK Shah Exports Ltd. The revision petitioner, however, has not stated anywhere as to how Rossell India Tea Ltd. came into picture. Be that as it may, fact remains that all the parties are litigating on the basis of the sale agreement dated 25.05.1970. Whereas the revision petitioners and the writ petitioner have been claiming relief through executors of the aforesaid agreement, the opposite parties No. 1(a) to 1(f) in the revision petitions and respondents No. 6(a) to 6(f) are the legal heirs of the beneficiary of the aforesaid agreement. The revision petitioners and the writ petitioner, thus, have stepped into the shoes of the JD of decree dated 20.01.1995 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Suit No. 6/1983 which has been confirmed by this court as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is, therefore, really immaterial as to what and how changes have occurred in the structure of original defendant companies. As long as, they litigate through their predecessors, who were defendants of Title Suit No. 6/1983, they are bound by the decree and thus they are also judgment debtors. Be that as it may, the prayer of the present petitioner is same as that of the previously instituted two revision petitions, namely, CRP No. 455/2015 and CRP No. 472/2015. Both the revision petitions came up for motion hearing on 16.10.2015 when after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, another Hon’ble Single Judge passed order observing the rival contentions of the parties and thereupon all these revision petitions were directed to be listed on 13.11.2015 for hearing and necessary orders. The court also observed that the sale deed has already been exhibited. Relevant part of the aforesaid order passed by this court on 16.10.2015 is quoted below:- “..........On perusal of the earlier order passed in CRP No. 455/2015 and the order passed by the trial court it appears that the sale deed has already been executed. The court also observed that the sale deed has already been exhibited. Relevant part of the aforesaid order passed by this court on 16.10.2015 is quoted below:- “..........On perusal of the earlier order passed in CRP No. 455/2015 and the order passed by the trial court it appears that the sale deed has already been executed. Whether it is in accordance with the Registration Act, as amended by the government of Assam in the year 2009, will be considered in due course after hearing. It also appears from the order passed by the Executing Court that although the bailiff of the Court was directed to give delivery of the possession of the suit land by demarcating the same, taking help of the Circle Officer, if necessary, the possession of the land could not be delivered to the decree holder and the deed was returned to Executing Court and further it has been fixed on 16.11.2015 for taking necessary steps by the decree holder.” 16. On 13.11.2015 all these three revision petitions were listed under the heading of ‘Hearing’. A perusal of the order dated 13.11.2015 shows that learned counsel for the parties made prayer for listing of all these matters on 18.11.2015 for admission hearing along with WP(C) No. 6780/2015. 17. On 13.11.2015 all these three revision petitions were listed under the heading of ‘Hearing’. A perusal of the order dated 13.11.2015 shows that learned counsel for the parties made prayer for listing of all these matters on 18.11.2015 for admission hearing along with WP(C) No. 6780/2015. 17. After passing of the order dated 09.10.2015 in CRP No. 455/2015 and before listing of the three revision petitions on 18.11.2015, the revision petitioners in CRP No. 455/2015 and CRP No. 472/2015, as petitioner, preferred a writ petition being WP(C) No. 6780/2015 challenging registration of sale deed dated 08.10.2015 by the Deputy Registrar, Dibrugarh on the ground that in the absence of prior approval of the State Government as required under guideline No. RSS.573/94/25 dated 26.03.2001 issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Revenue Department as well as the W.T. message dated 10.08.2006 and 05.03.1997 and Government guideline No. RSS.573/94/23 dated 31.07.1998 issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Revenue Department and also in the absence of NOC by Deputy Commissioner, as required under section 21A of the Registration Act, the Deputy Registrar, Dibrugarh committed error in entertaining sale deed from Civil Nazir of the Court of District Judge, Dibrugarh for registration at mere asking pursuant to order dated 08.10.2015 in Title Execution No. 2/2006 and so a writ of mandamus and/or appropriate order should be issued declaring the registration of sale deed bearing 2331/2015 dated 08.10.2015 as bad in law and for issuance of writ of certiorari for setting aside of the same. The writ petitioner also made a prayer for interim prayer staying operation of sale deed dated 08.10.2015. In so doing, the statement in regard to passing of decree in Title Suit No. 6/1983 by learned Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh, dismissal of F.A. No. 59/1995 upholding the said decree and dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 4290/2009 there-against by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and passing of order dated 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 by the learned Executing court in Title Execution No. 2/2006 was mentioned but pendency of the present revision petitions including refusal to pass interim order by this court on 09.10.2015 and passing of order on 16.10.2015 deciding to consider the same objections as raised in the writ petition in course of hearing of the civil revisions, were not mentioned in the writ petition. The writ petition on being moved before an Hon’ble Single Bench taking up writ matters on 06.11.2015, the court issued notice of motion and passed an interim order directing that the sale deed bearing No. 2331/2015 dated 08.10.2015 shall not be acted upon till the returnable date. By another order passed on 15.12.2015, another Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court extended the interim order dated 6.11.2015 till 19.01.2016 further directing that the case would be listed for hearing on that date as a fixed item. 18. Thereafter on 17.12.2015, the respondents No. 6(a) to 6(f) of the writ petition who are none other than the DHs in Title Execution No. 2/2006, filed an affidavit-in-opposition wherein vide paragraph 1 thereof, the respondents have raised question as to maintainability of the writ petition alleging that the writ petitioner as well as its learned counsel are guilty of suppressing material facts and that the writ petitioner has not approached this court with clean hands and so it is not entitled to any discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph 2(a) of the affidavit-in-opposition is quoted below:- “2(a). At the outset it is respectfully submitted that the extra-ordinary jurisdictional proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution of India is a proceedings based on equity and discretion and the said equitable and discretionary jurisdiction is exercised in respect to matters wherein the Petitioner approaches the Hon’ble Court not only with clean hands but also with a clean heart; meaning thereby, that the Petitioner approaching the Hon’ble Court should not suppress material facts. In the instant case, surprisingly, not only the Petitioner but also its counsel have been guilty of suppression of material facts in as much as the Petitioner have suppressed about the pendency of proceedings before this Hon’ble Court wherein the same question has been raised and agitated that too by the same set of counsels. It may be relevant herein to mention that the Petitioner had initially filed an Application under Article 227 of the constitution of India challenging the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Execution Case No. 2/2014. It may be relevant herein to mention that the Petitioner had initially filed an Application under Article 227 of the constitution of India challenging the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Execution Case No. 2/2014. It may be pertinent herein to mention that by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015, the learned Executing Court had rejected the various contentions raised by the Petitioner and thereupon directed the Decree Holders i.e. the Respondent No. 6(a) to 6(f) herein to submit the requisite Stamp Duty for execution of the Sale Deed in terms with the Decree dated 20.01.1995 passed in Title Suit No. 6/1983. In this regard, paragraph 10 of the said Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015 being relevant is quoted herein below. “10. Decree is not executable because land in question in is not indefinable and not in existence, New schedule cannot be incorporated in the Decree; Schedule cannot be amended in the execution proceeding; No survey N/Patta No. is incorporated in the original schedule and well as new schedule; Annexure- 5 of the Ext. Petition No. 2/14 is relating to periodic patta; No boundary in the new schedule; Bar created by Registration Act, Bar Created by Assam Ceiling Act; Land acquired by OIL and Gas Cracker by Govt. Notification; Bar Created by O.21 R.13 (No Boundary and Survey No); S. 47 CPC and O. 21 give no power to executing Court to amend the decree etc.” The said Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015 have however been selectively suppressed by not enclosing the same as well as also by not mentioning about the pendency of C.R.P. No. 455/2015. It is also pertinent herein to mention that a stay was sought to the operation of the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2015 passed in Title Execution Case No. 2/2014 as well as for stay of the further proceedings of Title Execution Case No. 2/2014 but the same was rejected by detailed Order dated 09.10.2015. The said Order has also been selectively suppressed.” 19. In paragraph 2(b) of the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents have pointed out that before filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, same petitioner had filed an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with same facts and prayers leading to registration of CRP No. 472/2015. The said Order has also been selectively suppressed.” 19. In paragraph 2(b) of the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents have pointed out that before filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, same petitioner had filed an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with same facts and prayers leading to registration of CRP No. 472/2015. The order dated 08.10.2015 impugned in CRP No. 472/2015 is nothing but a consequential order to the order dated 24.09.2015 impugned in CRP No. 455/2015. In CRP No. 472/2015, petitioner had already made prayer for setting aside sale deed dated 08.10.2015. Against all these pre-existing impugned orders there is yet another application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India vide CRP No. 473/2015 and both these petitions were taken by this court on 16.10.2015 eventually rejecting the prayer for stay of sale deed dated 08.10.2015 by a common order. 20. In paragraph 2(c) of the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents stated that the writ petitioner did not make a single whisper of the aforesaid proceedings under Article 227 and the order dated 16.10.2015 passed therein. In paragraph 2(d) of the affidavit, the respondents stated that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against judicial orders passed by civil courts what really has been done by the instant writ petition. With these averments, the maintainability of the writ petition has been basically challenged. 21. The writ petitioner by filing an affidavit-in-reply on 08.01.2016 denied the allegations levelled by the respondents. According to the writ petitioner, the civil revisions are directed against the orders passed by the executing court and the writ petition has been filed against the action of the Deputy Registrar in registering the sale deed. The writ petitioner further stated that there is no prayer in the revision petitions for setting aside sale deed dated 08.10.2015 and Deputy Registrar was not a party to the revision petitions. The writ petitioner denied that interim order was obtained by misleading the court and there is no question of fraud etc. 22. I have heard Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned senior counsel assisted by Md. Aslam, learned counsel for the revision petitioners in CRP No. 455/2015 and CRP No. 472/2015 as well as writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 6780/2015, Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. K Das, for the petitioner in CRP No. 473/2015 and Mr. 22. I have heard Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned senior counsel assisted by Md. Aslam, learned counsel for the revision petitioners in CRP No. 455/2015 and CRP No. 472/2015 as well as writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 6780/2015, Mr. NC Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. K Das, for the petitioner in CRP No. 473/2015 and Mr. D Baruah, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 1(a) to 1(f) in the revision petitions and respondents No. 6(a) to 6(f) in the writ petition. I have also heard Mr. G Sarma, learned Government Advocate on behalf of the official respondents in the writ petition. I have perused the materials brought on record by both sides. 23. The learned counsel for both sides argued in the same way as pleaded in their respective pleadings and cited reported judgments to buttress the same. I have gone through the judgments relied on by them. 24. The basic argument of Mr. D Baruah, learned counsel for the respondents No. 6(a) to 6(f) of the writ petition is that the writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected in limini for suppressing material facts. He read out paragraph 2 of the affidavit-in-opposition a part of which is quoted above. Although the learned senior counsel representing the writ petitioner made an argument that subject matter of the writ petition and that of the revision petitions are different but yet no plausible explanation could be put forward as to why necessary facts as indicated in the preceding paragraphs and pointed out in paragraph 2 of the affidavit-in-opposition were not mentioned in the writ petition at the time of asking for stay of sale deed which had already been executed and registered. By filing two successive revision petitions, the same party through the same set of learned counsel sought to stay execution of sale deed on the basis of the order passed by the Executing court and the same having failed, ultimately petitioners got stay in the writ petition. Although, on execution and registration of sale deed, transfer of title as per decree of court has already taken place and stay of sale deed cannot snap title so acquired, yet the DH has been deprived from getting possession on the basis of the sale deed. Although, on execution and registration of sale deed, transfer of title as per decree of court has already taken place and stay of sale deed cannot snap title so acquired, yet the DH has been deprived from getting possession on the basis of the sale deed. If one single bench of this Court passed an order refusing to grant stay on the same facts and deciding to hear the same objections subsequently raised in the writ petition, non-mentioning of these facts before the bench of the same court taking up writ matters and asking for stay at least does not depict a healthy affair. The strenuous argument made by Mr. D Baruah questioning conduct of writ petitioner under such facts cannot be totally ignored. In the case of K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the question of maintainability of writ petition on the basis of conduct of petitioner and relying on earlier judgment in Vijay Kumar Kathuria v. State of Haryana reported in (1983) 3 SCC 333 the following observation was made: “42. In Vijay Kumar Kathuria v. State of Haryana it was the case of the petitioners that the provisional admissions granted to them were not cancelled and they were continuing their studies as postgraduate students in Medical College on the relevant date. On the basis of that statement, they obtained an order of status quo. The Supreme Court ordered inquiry and the District Judge was asked to submit his report whether the provisional admissions granted to the petitioners were continued till 1-10-1982 or were cancelled. The report revealed that to the knowledge of the petitioners their provisional admissions were cancelled long before 1-10-1882 and thus, the petitioners had made false representation to the Court and obtained a favourable order. Dismissing the petitioner, this Court observed: “1. ....... But for the misrepresentation this Court would never have passed the said order. By reason of such conduct they have disentitled themselves from getting any relief or assistance from this Court and the special leave petitions are liable to be dismissed”.” 25. The stay order which the JD could not achieve from two successive revision petitions he succeeded to get it in the subsequent writ petition may be because full facts were not disclosed. The stay order which the JD could not achieve from two successive revision petitions he succeeded to get it in the subsequent writ petition may be because full facts were not disclosed. The interference sought by the writ petitioner by way of invoking power of judicial review, at the end of the day amounts to frustrating a legally obtained decree. The decree was unsuccessfully challenged in first appeal before the High Court and in Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court. More than three decades have elapsed in the mean time. The subject matter of the writ petition is really the subject matter of the execution case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of invoking writ jurisdiction of High Court for challenging judicial orders of the civil court. In the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , a three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judicial orders of the civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even from that angle as well the writ petition deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable. However, since it has already been indicated by this court in the revisions petitions being CRP No. 472/2015 and CRP No. 473/2015 that the questions as to whether registration has been done in accordance with the Registration Act would be considered after hearing the parties, the same objections raised in the writ petition can be decided in the revision petitions as well. 26. The case of the petitioners is that the registering authority ought not to have entertained the document for registration at the direction of the Executing court and ought to have asked for compliance of Section 21A of the Registration Act as applicable in Assam and also as per various guidelines of the Government of Assam. According to Mr. Sahewalla, if those compliance would have been sought to be done, in that event, the very decreetal land would have been found to be nonexistent. The central point of this argument is that the decreetal land is not identifiable. It is not transferable without there being no objection from the Government. We cannot forget at this stage that we are merely concerned with the executability of the decree already passed when the defendants contested the suit from trial court to Supreme Court. The central point of this argument is that the decreetal land is not identifiable. It is not transferable without there being no objection from the Government. We cannot forget at this stage that we are merely concerned with the executability of the decree already passed when the defendants contested the suit from trial court to Supreme Court. The questions as to maintainability of the suit, the availability of a decree and all other objections on merit were taken by the defendants by filing written statement although they did not lead any evidence. The trial court considered all objections and then passed a decree which has been affirmed upto the Supreme Court. The objections raised at this stage before the revisional court in regard to applicability of Section 21A of the Registration Act, was never raised before the trial court at the time of trial nor could the same be raised at that time. The suit was instituted in the year 1983 and Section 21A has been incorporated in the Registration Act by Assam amendment in 2009. The decree was passed in 1995 and first appeal was dismissed in 2006. Obviously, these objections did not exist at the time entitlement of the plaintiff for getting decree of specific performance was adjudicated. But when the Civil Appeal was pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the provision of section 21A was very much there. The defendant could have raised the plea at that stage. No such point was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court when civil appeal was dismissed and so the trial court decree has attained finality. So, applying the principle of Explanation IV under section 11 of the CPC, such objection shall be deemed to have been raised but not sustained. 27. Should a subsequent law be applicable to a previously instituted suit, is yet another question which may arise in the present case. Even after this question was raised, Mr. Sahewalla did not make any argument except saying that the law made later on would be applicable. The submission of the learned senior counsel lacks persuasive force. There is no doubt that intention of legislature behind an enactment is to be invariably determined from the wording for the enactment itself and not from any extraneous material like speeches made on the floor of the House (Investment and Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Boeing Co. AIR 1994 SC 1136 at Pg. There is no doubt that intention of legislature behind an enactment is to be invariably determined from the wording for the enactment itself and not from any extraneous material like speeches made on the floor of the House (Investment and Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Boeing Co. AIR 1994 SC 1136 at Pg. 1140) or from objects and reasons of legislation (Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 at Pg. 378). This is why whenever legislature intended to apply an enactment either retrospectively or retroactively, it did so by express provision or by necessary implication. In this regard, a reference to observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 21 of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare ( AIR 1989 SC 1247 ) would be profitable. The same is quoted below for ready reference:- “21. We read in Maxwell that it is a fundamental rule of English Law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly at the time of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. A retrospective operation is therefore, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. writes that the general rule of law that statutes are not operated retrospectively may be departed from (a) by express enactment and (b) by necessary implication from the language employed, and the author goes on to say: “If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. “Baron Parke”, said Lord Hatherley in Pardo v. Bingham, ((1869) LR 4 Ch App 735) did not consider it an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be, construed, and said that the question in each case was whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, what it was that the legislature contemplated.” But a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of necessity.................... In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, what it was that the legislature contemplated.” But a statute is not to be read retrospectively except of necessity.................... In Main v. Stark, ((1890) 15 AC 384) Lord Selborne said: “Their Lordships, of course, do not say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of Parliament, or to be collected from its language, which might give towards prima facie prospective a larger operation, but they ought not to receive a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it................In all cases it is desirable to ascertain the intention of the legislature.” He went on: “Words not requiring a retrospective operation, so as to affect an existing statute prejudicially, ought not to be so construed”, but in Reynolds v. Att. Genl. for Nova Scotia (1896 AC 240) it was held that this rule did not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal a privilege which did not amount to an accrued right.” 28. In the case in hand there is nothing in section 21A of the Assam amendment of Registration Act to suggest that this provision would have retrospective operation. A suit was decreed and appeals dismissed. At execution stage, a new point cannot be raised for the first time to frustrate the decree, particularly when it does not obviously go to root of the matter. 29. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Suit was instituted in the year 1983 for cause of action in existence at that time. Had the suit been decreed and appeals dismissed in time, the rigour of Section 21A would not have haunted the plaintiff. On the other hand, had this provision existed at the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiff could have impleaded the Registrar and could have prayed for decree against him as well. In that event, the present objections would have been adjudicated. If subsequently enacted provisions are sought to be applied in the present case, in that event, it may not only result in unsettling the decree which has already attained finality, it also would indirectly result in giving retrospective effect to Section 21A of the Registration Act although, the legislature in its wisdom, did not do so. If subsequently enacted provisions are sought to be applied in the present case, in that event, it may not only result in unsettling the decree which has already attained finality, it also would indirectly result in giving retrospective effect to Section 21A of the Registration Act although, the legislature in its wisdom, did not do so. Prima facie, raising these issues after part execution of the decree, is not permissible. 30. Coming to the question of identity of the decreetal land as raised by Mr. Sahewalla, it appears that the defendants fought the litigation upto Supreme Court knowing the identity of the land. In page 21 of the SLP, filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court a copy of which has been made available to this court by the learned counsel, it appears that the present petitioners made following statement therein:- “L. For that the empty land has since been converted for tea plantation at heavy expenditure. The suit land is necessary to maintain the contiguity and compactness of the petitioner’s tea estate and in the event of the suit land is segregated, the very substratum of the petitioner’s tea estate would be lost. Not only would the petitioner be subjected to severe losses, the massive labour force employed by the petitioner would also be rendered jobless and destitute. Considering the subsequent events, it is humbly submitted that grant of specific performance would be inequitable and compensation in money as claimed by the Respondent No. 1 would afford him adequate relief.” 31. The SLP was dismissed even after such disclosure of facts. The aforesaid paragraph of the SLP goes to show that the revision petitioners were very much aware as to identity of the suit land and that is why it was possible for them to claim that they made tea plantations already on those lands incurring heavy expenditure. The question of identity, therefore, as raised by the revision petitioners at the time of argument cannot be countenanced. 32. Moreover, even if identity of the land is not sure, in that event merely for such question a successful plaintiff cannot be denied the benefit of his hard earned decree. The question of identity, therefore, as raised by the revision petitioners at the time of argument cannot be countenanced. 32. Moreover, even if identity of the land is not sure, in that event merely for such question a successful plaintiff cannot be denied the benefit of his hard earned decree. When the suit as to immovable property has been decreed, resort can be had to Section 152 or Section 47 of the CPC depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and so, this cannot be a problem for executing a decree. Here in the present case, a sale deed has been executed and registered already with respect to land as described in sale agreement dated 25.05.1970. The land must have undergone changes in the mean time both in field as well as in revenue records but it does not mean that the land for which the agreement was entered into cannot be traced, more particularly, when the JD has specifically stated that the land is under their possession and they have tea plantations over it. 33. Fact remains that sale deed has been executed and it has been registered. The only question raised by the petitioners is that Registrar ought not to have entertained the document for registration as Section 21A of the Registration Act has not been complied with. Section 21A of the Act is quoted below:- “21A. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, no non-testamentary instrument relating to immovable property shall be accepted for registration, unless the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district issues a No Objection Certificate containing the description of such immovable property to be transferred and also such other No Objection Certificates, which are required to be issued by the Deputy Commissioner or any other Authority under any law for the time being in force or under any Instruction, Order etc. issued by the State Government from time to time; Provided that all such No Objection Certificates shall be issued within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of application and in case No Objection Certificate is not issued within the stipulated period of thirty days, a speaking order with reasons thereof shall be issued to the applicant within the said stipulated period.” 34. According to Mr. According to Mr. Sahewalla, this is a mandatory provision of law and in the absence of its compliance the registration would become illegal. Relying on a judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Ma Pwa May v. SRMMA Chettiar Firm ( AIR 1929 PC 279 ), Mr. Baruah would retort that such a provision is merely procedural. This is because the jurisdiction of the Registrar has not been challenged. The Registrar has jurisdiction to entertain the document but he might have failed in following the procedure and so this would not affect the registered deed. The relevant paragraph of the said Privy Council judgment is quoted below:- “In seeking to apply this section it is important to distinguish between defects in the procedure of the registrar and lack of jurisdiction. Where the registrar has no jurisdiction to register, as where a person not entitled to do so presents for registration, or where there is lack of territorial jurisdiction, or where the presentation is out of time, the section is inoperative-: Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Bahim [1900] 23 All. 233= 28 I.A. 15= 7 Sar. 829 (P.O.). On the other hand, if the registrar having jurisdiction has made a mistake in the exercise of it, the section takes effect. Their Lordships, have no doubt that the mistake is an error in procedure. The prohibition; against registration is included in S. 35, amongst similar prohibitions as to admitting in evidence and authenticating, which can only be regarded as procedure. The duty of the registering officer is to scrutinise the stamp and pass an opinion on its adequacy, as he purports to do in this very document. It would be remarkable that, if he made a mistake of possibly a few annas on the amount of stamp required, and admitted a document to registration, it would be treated as having no effect years afterwards. Their Lordships are fortified in this view by former decisions of this Board. In Salt Muhhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall [1875] 2 I.A. 210= 24 W.R. 75= 15 B.L.R. 228= 3 Sar. 509 (P.C.), the registrar had registered a deed of sale in the absence of the vendors contrary to the provisions of S. 36, of the Act. The Board held that, having once been presented for Registration, it was still in time for regular registration, though the first registration may have been invalid. 509 (P.C.), the registrar had registered a deed of sale in the absence of the vendors contrary to the provisions of S. 36, of the Act. The Board held that, having once been presented for Registration, it was still in time for regular registration, though the first registration may have been invalid. There appears to have been an admission by the parties that the first registration was not valid. But the Board indicated an opinion that the first registration was validated by the provisions of S. indicated an opinion that the first registration was validated by the provisions of S. indicated an opinion that the first registration was validated by the provisions of S. indicated an opinion that the first registration was validated by the provisions of S. indicated an opinion that the first registration was validated by the provisions of S. In considering the effect to be given to S. 49, that section must be read in conjunction with S. 89, and with the words of the heading of part 10, "Of the Effects of Registration and Non-Registration." Now, considering- that the registration of all conveyances of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upward is by the Act rendered compulsory, and that proper legal advice is not generally accessible to persons taking conveyance of land of small value, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that it was the intention of the legislature that every registration of a deed should be null and void by reason of a non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 19, 21 or 36, or other similar provisions. It is rather to be inferred that the legislature intended that such errors or defects should be classed under the general words "defect in procedure" in S. 88 of the Act, so that innocent and ignorant persons should not be deprived of their property through any error or inadvertence of a public officer, on whom they would naturally place reliance. It is rather to be inferred that the legislature intended that such errors or defects should be classed under the general words "defect in procedure" in S. 88 of the Act, so that innocent and ignorant persons should not be deprived of their property through any error or inadvertence of a public officer, on whom they would naturally place reliance. If the registering officer refuses to register the mistake may be rectified upon appeal, under S. 83, or upon petition under S. 84, as the case may be; but if he registers where he ought not to register, innocent persons may be misled, and may not discover, until it is too late to rectify it, the error by which, if the registration is in consequence of it to be treated as a nullity, they may be deprived of their just rights.” 35. In the case of Sah Mukhun Lall Panday v. Sah Koondun Lall (1875) 2 IA 210, the Privy Council was called upon to decide as to whether a registered deed was null and void because of violation of Section 36 of the Act. Under Section 36 of that Registration Act, it was provided that no document shall be registered under the Act unless the persons executing such document, or their representatives, assigns or duly authorised agents appear before the registration officer. The Registrar was not authorised to register a deed in the absence of the vendors and of their agents merely because he was satisfied that there had been a sale pursuant to a previous agreement for purchase, and further a power given to the vendors’ agents authorising them to procure registration. By Section 40, Registrar has been empowered to compel appearance of such persons whose presence is required by law for execution. Deciding this case, the Privy Council observed as follows:- “There can be no doubt that the registering officer acted in contravention of Section 36 in registering the deed without the vendors having appeared before him; but it is not necessary for their Lordships to determine whether the registration was a nullity, or whether the error was one of which a stranger to the deed could take advantages. It may, however, be observed that there are no words in Section 06 declaring that the registration of a deed shall be null and void if made without the appearance of the persons who executed it; and it is very doubtful whether the words of that section are not merely directory to the registering officer for the benefit of the parties to the deed, and whether his acting without the appearance of the parties, and upon evidence, instead of the admission of the parties of the execution of the deed, was more than a defect in procedure within the meaning of Section 88. Again, it is not clear that the words "unless it shall have been registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act" in Section 49, are not, especially as regards strangers to the deed, confined to the procedure on "admitting to registration" without reference to any matters of procedure prior to registration, or to the provisions of sects. 19, 21, or 36 of the Act, or rather provisions of a similar nature. In considering the effect to be given to Section 49, that section must be read in conjunction with sect, 88, and with the words of the heading of part 10, "Of the Effects of Registration and Non-Registration." Now, considering that the registration of all conveyances of Immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards is by the Act rendered compulsory, and that proper legal advice is not generally accessible to persons taking conveyances of land of small value, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that it was the intention of the Legislature that every registration of a deed should be null and void by reason of a non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 19, 21, or 36, or other similar provisions. It is rather to be inferred that the Legislature intended that such errors or defects should be classed under the general words "defect in procedure" in Section 88 of the Act, so that innocent and ignorant persons should not be deprived of their property through any error or inadvertence of a public officer, on whom they would naturally place reliance. It is rather to be inferred that the Legislature intended that such errors or defects should be classed under the general words "defect in procedure" in Section 88 of the Act, so that innocent and ignorant persons should not be deprived of their property through any error or inadvertence of a public officer, on whom they would naturally place reliance. If the registering officer refuses to register, the mistake may be rectified upon appeal under Section 83, or upon petition under Section 84, as the case may be; but if he registers where he ought not to register, innocent persons may be misled, and may not discover, until it is too late to rectify it, the error by which, if the registration is in consequence of it to be treated as a nullity, they may be deprived of their just rights.” 36. Applying the same logic pursued in the aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council, it can be said that Section 21A of the Registration Act is merely procedural. The statute nowhere says that in case of violation of Section 21A of the Registration Act, the registration shall be null and void. For example, Section 47 of the same Act provides that a registered document shall operate from the time of its registration. This means that an instrument involving transfer of immovable property having value of Rs. 100/- and above, shall take effect from the date of execution only after it is registered and that it would be ineffective unless and until it is registered. Such provision is not available in Section 21A or elsewhere. Even in section 49 of the Registration Act, no amendment has been made prescribing that a document registered in violation of Section 21A of the Registration Act shall affect any immovable property comprised therein. Such a provision exists in Section 49(a) when a document liable to be registered under Section 17 of the Act is not registered. The cumulative effect of absence of such provision can only lead to one inference that legislature in its wisdom, did not wish to incorporate such a provision in the statute. The net result is that the sale deed already executed and registered by the registering authority pursuant to order dated 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 passed by the learned Executing court in Title Execution Case No. 2/2006 cannot be null and void. The net result is that the sale deed already executed and registered by the registering authority pursuant to order dated 07.10.2015 and 08.10.2015 passed by the learned Executing court in Title Execution Case No. 2/2006 cannot be null and void. The vendee is entitled to the benefit of the document. All the arguments put forward by the learned senior counsel pressing the petitions are not sustainable. 37. These three revision petitions and the writ petition, therefore, are devoid of any merit. They are accordingly dismissed. Interim orders passed in all these proceedings stand vacated forthwith. 38. Before parting, it is necessary to observe that the Executing Court would be in the discretion to take such steps as may be necessary for fixing identity of the property by appropriate steps and thereafter to hand over possession. A similar direction was given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment passed in Pratibha singh & anr. v. Shanti Devi Prasad & anr reported in (2003) 2 SCC 330 . The Executing court may follow the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case for the purpose of handing over possession to the decree holder. After all, a successful plaintiff cannot be informed after long three decades of protracted litigation that he is not entitled to the benefit of the decree he earned in all these years and which was affirmed till the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 39. No order as to costs.