Santosh W/o Ramswaroop v. Ramswaroop S/o Ganeshlal
2016-10-17
GOVERDHAN BARDHAR, NAVIN SINHA
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The present appeals arise out of a soured matrimonial relationship between the appellant and the respondent. They have therefore been heard together and are being disposed by a common order. 2. Civil Misc. Appeal 368 of 2006 has been preferred against the judgment and decree for restitution of conjugal rights granted to the respondent under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") dated 09.11.2004 by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nagaur in Civil Suit (Hindu Marriage) Case No. 8 of 2002. Civil Misc. Appeal 481 of 2008 arises from the judgment and decree for divorce granted to the respondent dated 11.05.2007 in Civil Misc. (Hindu Marriage) Case No. 01 of 2006 by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nagaur under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act consequent to the failure of the appellant to abide by the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Civil Misc. Appeal 1856 of 2014 assails order dated 24.06.2014 passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 27 of 2013 (87/2004) by the Family Judge, Merta, District Nagaur dismissing the application filed by the appellant under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C."). Civil Misc. Appeal 2518 of 2011 arises from the order dated 10.04.2008 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nagaur in Civil Suit (Guardian and Wards) Case No. 1 of 2006 under Section 7 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as "the Guardianship Act") granting custody of the two minor children Bharat and Hansraj to the respondent. Counsel for the parties are unanimous that the last appeal has become infructuous by event of time as the two children have since attained majority. 3. Counsel for the appellant submits that the decree for restitution of the conjugal rights has been granted without proper consideration of the contentions of the appellant in its correct perspective and upon erroneous appreciation and misreading of her evidence. The respondent was habituated to drugs and alcohol and would beat her and the children who were minor at the relevant time. The fact that she may have stayed for ten years in the matrimonial home after marriage under compulsion for societal reasons tolerating the respondent's behaviour towards her and the minor children without complaining, has been completely misunderstood and misconstrued by the court below.
The fact that she may have stayed for ten years in the matrimonial home after marriage under compulsion for societal reasons tolerating the respondent's behaviour towards her and the minor children without complaining, has been completely misunderstood and misconstrued by the court below. She did not complain in the hope and expectation that the respondent would change his behaviour and the matrimonial relationship could be saved. She had to leave the matrimonial home under compulsion for reasonable cause. She never filed any criminal prosecution even with regard to the assaults and harassment for dowry. All these would have only aggravated the situation jeopardising all possibilities for revival or continuance of the matrimonial relationship. These aspects have not been properly considered and do not find any consideration. 4. The appellant never made it a pre-condition that the respondent must come and live with her father or alternatively that he must agree to look after her father by keeping him with them. Her mother died in the year 2000 and the father also died in the year 2003. During his lifetime, her father was looked after by her brothers and there was no occasion for her to make such demand. It was on account of the refusal of the respondent to give any assurance of good behaviour that she considered it unsafe for herself and the minor children to go back to the matrimonial home. The respondent was running a welding workshop and would earn approximately Rs.12,000/- to Rs.13,000/- every month. However, he did not give any earning either to her or to support the minor children, who were living with her. No finding has been given with regard to her allegations that the gold ornaments were also forcibly take back by the respondent and his family members. Non-appellant witnesses 2 to 5 have also supported the allegations of harassment to the appellant for dowry including physical assaults especially after the younger brother of the respondent got married with good dowry. 5. The occasion for the respondent to file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights could have arisen if the appellant had left the matrimonial home without reasonable cause.
5. The occasion for the respondent to file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights could have arisen if the appellant had left the matrimonial home without reasonable cause. In the facts of the present case, when she had been forced to leave the matrimonial home because of the respondent's conduct and there was evidence with regard to the harassment for dowry, physical assault and also upon the minor children, the drug addiction and alcoholism, there was no occasion to direct restitution of conjugal rights. Consequently the decree for divorce based on the same is also not sustainable. The appellant had no source of income and even otherwise it was the bounden duty of the respondent to provide for the appellant and the two minor children born from the marriage. It was lastly fairly acknowledged that the appellant has been paid interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Act during the pendency of the restitution case. 6. Counsel for the respondent opposing the application submitted that the marriage worked successfully for ten long years. Three children were born from the wedlock. The entire problems arose after the death of the appellant's mother in 2000. The brothers of the appellant were not looking after their father. She therefore desired that either they should go and live with her father or alternatively her father should be allowed to live with them. The court below has not mis-appreciated or misconstrued her evidence but has only co-related it to the actual point of time and not to the facts as may have existed on the date her evidence was recorded in July 2004. Merely because her father may have died in 2003 and her evidence was recorded on 21.07.2004 cannot lead to the conclusion that if her father was not alive, there was no occasion for her to insist that the respondent must look after her father also. Even otherwise the question of misreading any evidence would have arisen if the appellant had furnished sufficient reason for her having had to leave the matrimonial home for reasons attributable to the respondent. In her cross-examination, the appellant acknowledged that she never told her parents or anybody else with regard to any ill-treatment by the respondent. If that were so, the evidence of non-appellant witnesses 2 to 5 claiming to have been informed by her of the same is but fabricated and unreliable evidence. 7.
In her cross-examination, the appellant acknowledged that she never told her parents or anybody else with regard to any ill-treatment by the respondent. If that were so, the evidence of non-appellant witnesses 2 to 5 claiming to have been informed by her of the same is but fabricated and unreliable evidence. 7. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The lower court records have been summoned in Civil Misc. Appeal 481 of 2008 and Civil Misc. Appeal 2518 of 2011. To have adjourned these appeals today for summoning of the other lower court records, more importantly in Civil Misc. Appeal 368 of 2006 would have only delayed matters further. With consent of counsel for the parties and assistance we examined the certified copies of the evidence placed before us by them and which has facilitated in disposal of the appeals today itself. 8. The appellant and the respondent were married on 28.05.1991 and lived blissfully as husband and wife till April, 2001 when the appellant left the matrimonial home. Despite his best efforts the respondent was unable to persuade her to return leading to institution of proceedings under Section 9 of the Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The appellant contended that she was assaulted by her mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and sister-in-law etc daily. The respondent was addicted to drugs and alcohol and would also beat her and the children, chiding her for bringing less dowry unlike that given to his brother. Acknowledging that she had lived in the matrimonial home for ten years it was stated to be under compulsion. She was willing to go back to the matrimonial home provided the respondent mended his ways. Despite allegations of physical assault, not a single instance or date of assault was mentioned by her much less the nature of the assault. Assault by lathi was not pleaded but only mentioned in deposition. Though she claimed having visited a doctor more than once for treatment of injuries caused, no name of the doctor was mentioned much less any prescriptions produced. Again this was beyond pleadings and was stated in deposition only. She explicitly acknowledged never having told her parents, brothers or any other with regard to the ill-treatment meted to her and neither had she reported the matter to the Police. In her cross-examination, she sought to deny the suggestion that her brothers lived separately from her father.
Again this was beyond pleadings and was stated in deposition only. She explicitly acknowledged never having told her parents, brothers or any other with regard to the ill-treatment meted to her and neither had she reported the matter to the Police. In her cross-examination, she sought to deny the suggestion that her brothers lived separately from her father. 9. The appellant led no evidence with regard to drug and alcohol addiction of the respondent. It is difficult to accept that she lived for ten long years without any protest or complaining to her family members regarding ill treatment by the respondent. After having left the matrimonial home in April, 2001 she again did not mention of any ill treatment to her family members till her deposition in July, 2004. 10. The respondent deposed that the appellant had three brothers. Two of them lived separately from her father and the minor child lived with her father. A cumulative analysis of the evidence reveals that the parties lived happily since their marriage in 1991. The mother of the appellant expired in 2000. Her brothers were not looking after her father. She left matrimonial home soon thereafter in April, 2001 obviously because her father was left to fend for himself alone. Her concern for the father is natural and appreciable. Nonetheless, if she had married the respondent, sired three children from him, she had a responsibility towards them also arising out of the matrimonial relationship. A harmonious balance had to be struck by finding a solution rather than a hardened stand that either her father should be allowed to live in the matrimonial home or alternatively the respondent himself must along with her live with her father. The fact that the father of the appellant may have been deceased subsequently in 2003 and was not alive when her evidence was recorded in July, 2004 will not wipe out the sequence of earlier events at the time when relationship between the parties became estranged and they parted ways. 11. If the appellant never disclosed to anyone in her family or any other regarding the ill treatment there was no occasion for the non-appellant witnesses to depose having been told or heard regarding any ill treatment to her.
11. If the appellant never disclosed to anyone in her family or any other regarding the ill treatment there was no occasion for the non-appellant witnesses to depose having been told or heard regarding any ill treatment to her. No witness has deposed a single instance or nature of assault or the nature of abusive language used by the respondent or his family members much less about her ornaments having been forcibly kept back. The fact that the appellants concern for her father became a flash point in the relationship between the parties stands established from the evidence of non-appellant witness No. 5 Banshi Lal, who in his cross-examination has acknowledged that there were minor skirmishes between the parties but nothing serious. The appellant led no evidence that her father was well cared for or had sources of income because of which there was no occasion for her to desire that the respondent show concern for her father. 12. Section 9 of the Act provides that if either husband or the wife, without reasonable excuse, withdraws from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may move for restitution of conjugal rights and upon being satisfied with regard to the truthfulness of the statements made, the court may order accordingly. The evidence available leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant left the matrimonial home without reasonable excuse. As observed, her concern for her father who may have been left with no source of income even though appreciable cannot be construed by any stretch of reasoning in our society as reasonable excuse to leave the matrimonial home much less can it be attributed as an unbecoming conduct to the respondent compelling the appellant to leave the matrimonial home. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights granted to the respondent. 13. In view of above conclusion, the order granting divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act also calls for no interference. 14. Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. mandates that if the spouse refuses to live in the matrimonial home still maintenance could be granted if the magistrate was satisfied that there were grounds for doing so. Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. mandates that the spouse shall not be entitled to maintenance if without any sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband.
14. Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. mandates that if the spouse refuses to live in the matrimonial home still maintenance could be granted if the magistrate was satisfied that there were grounds for doing so. Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. mandates that the spouse shall not be entitled to maintenance if without any sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband. We find no reason to interfere with the order refusing to grant maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in view of divorce granted to the respondent under section 13(1A)(ii) of the Act consequent to the refusal of the appellant to abide by the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. 15. Resultantly, Civil Misc. Appeal 368 of 2006, Civil Misc. Appeal 481 of 2008 and Civil Misc. Appeal 1856 of 2014 are dismissed. Civil Misc. Appeal 2518 of 2011 is disposed as infructuous. Three appeals dismissed as infructuous.