JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. The dispute in this Regular Second Appeal is about the succession to 8 bigha 13 biswas land belonging to Budhu Ram, who was a bachelor and obviously died issueless. According to the plaintiffs/respondents, he died intestate and claimed to have proportionately inherited the suit land along with defendants/appellants in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘Act’). 2. On the other hand, the appellants/defendants claimed to have succeeded to the suit land exclusively on the basis of a Will executed by Budhu Ram. 3. Looking at the order I propose to pass, it is not relevant to refer to the pleadings in detail. Suffice it to say that out of the pleadings to the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues on 19.6.1992: 1. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants are joint owner in possession of the suit land as alleged? OPP 2. Whether Sh. Budhu Ram executed a valid Will in favour of defendant No.1? OPP 3. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly verified? OPD 6. Relief. 4. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the learned trial Court. 5. The appeal preferred against the judgment and decree, also came to be dismissed by the learned first Appellate Court giving rise to the instant appeal. 6. On 26.9.2006, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: Whether the two courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence pertaining to the execution of Will in the right perspective and as a result of that failure, there has been miscarriage of justice. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 7. The reason why I have intentionally not referred to the facts of the case in detail or to the statements recorded of the witnesses is that the learned first Appellate Court has completely failed to take into consideration that it was the plaintiffs who had alleged fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will and, therefore, such pleas had to be proved by them. in regard to the execution of the Will and, therefore, such pleas had to be proved by them. As such, the onus even as per issue No.2 had been rightly placed upon them. But the learned lower Appellate Court proceeded to decide the case as if it was dealing with a case where the issue framed was with regard to the suspicious circumstance surrounding in the Will and thereby placed the onus upon the defendants to prove the Will. 8. The learned lower Appellate Court has failed to take into consideration the correct legal position in matters of Will as laid down by the three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and others, AIR 1959 SC 443 and thereafter approved by the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee and others vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee and others, AIR 1964 SC 529 and thereafter reiterated in a number of cases including three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur and others, (1977) 1 SCC 369 , wherein the legal position was succinctly summed up in the following manner: “10. “There is a long line of decisions bearing on the nature and standard of evidence required to prove a will. Those decisions have been reviewed in an elaborate judgment of this Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thirnmajamma & Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 . The Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar J., laid down in that case the following propositions : 1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the ease of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by section 63 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surround-ed by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he re-ceives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstance that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution' of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.” 9. Thus, it is absolutely clear from the aforesaid exposition of law that if a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him and only where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will, then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 10. The learned first Appellate Court has not at all dealt with this aspect of the matter and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by it cannot be sustained. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The appeal is allowed and the same is remanded to the learned first Appellate Court for decision afresh. The parties are directed to appear before the learned first Appellate Court below on 22nd August, 2016. 12. Taking into consideration the fact that the suit was filed more than two and half decades back, the learned first Appellate Court shall make all endeavour to decide the same expeditiously as possible and in no event later than 31st December, 2016. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.