JUDGMENT Hon’ble Alok Kumar Mukherjee, J.—The instant revision has been preferred by Sri Kamlesh Kumar Singh, the then Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoband, Saharanpur, only for quashing/setting aside/expunging the following adverse observations/remarks/strictures made against the revisionist, as and where, in the body of judgment and order dated 13.5.2010 passed by Sri Rajan Chaudhary, Additional Sessions Judge, Deoband, Saharanpur in Criminal Revision No. 122 of 2010 (Munna v. State of U.P. and another) under Section 133 Cr.P.C., P.S. Nagal, District Saharanpur and not on the merits of the matter/case, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge while allowing the aforementioned criminal revision and remanding the matter for decision by another Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed certain observations/remarks/strictures against the revisionist : ^^,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd fo}ku mi&ftyk eSftLVszV nsocUn dks fof/kd izfdz;k dk Kku ugha gSA^^ 2. Heard Sri Brijesh Sahai, learned counsel for the revisionist and learned AGA for the State as well as perused the record. 3. In his submission, the learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that while passing the judgement in question, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has made uncalled for remarks in the impugned judgment against the revisionist/the then SDM in a very mechanical and cursory manner against the principles of natural justice. He has further submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has completely ignored the facts and provisions of law involved in the case and without considering the material facts and legal aspect of the case, passed the impugned order in which uncalled for observations/remarks/strictures were passed against the revisionist/the then SDM concerned, whereas the revisionist himself made the spot inspection in the matter on 4.3.2010, as such summoning the spot inspection report prior to passing of the order dated 11.3.2010 was absolutely irrelevant. 4. He also contended that the impugned observations/remarks/strictures passed against the revisionist/the then SDM concerned had no bearing or impact on the merits of the impugned judgment and were not at all necessary to do so as part of reasoning for arriving at a conclusion necessary for deciding the main controversy. Further, while passing such remarks the learned Session Judge has ignored the guidelines time to time passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its catena of decisions. 5. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. has submitted that the remarks/observations/strictures made in the body of the impugned judgment were absolutely necessary for the decision of the case. 6. Further, while passing such remarks the learned Session Judge has ignored the guidelines time to time passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its catena of decisions. 5. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. has submitted that the remarks/observations/strictures made in the body of the impugned judgment were absolutely necessary for the decision of the case. 6. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and have delved into the legal position in the matter. 7. The Supreme Court has time and again observed that though the Courts have the power to make adverse comments against a judicial officer, the need and propriety to make such an observation should always be considered and that the Courts must observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. The Supreme Court has also observed that the Courts should remember that criticism and observations touching a subordinate judicial officer incorporated in judicial pronouncements have their own infirmities for not only is the judicial officer condemned unheard but the harm caused by such criticism or observations is also incapable of being undone. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that expunging of the observations by a judicial officer by filing an appeal or a petition reduces him to the status of a litigant which is not a very happy situation from the point of view of the functioning of the judicial system. Law on this point is elaborately discussed in the case of ‘K’ a Judicial Officer, (2001) 3 SCC 54 . The observations made by the Supreme Court in the said matter needs to be reproduced and are as follows: “6. Several cases are coming to our notice wherein observations are being made against the members of subordinate judiciary in the orders of superior forums made on judicial side and judicial officers who made orders as presiding Judges of the subordinate Courts are being driven to the necessity of filing appeals to this Court or petitions before the High Courts seeking expunging of remarks or observations made and sometimes strictures passed against them behind their back. We would therefore like to deal with a few aspects touching the making of observations or adverse comments against judicial officers and methodology to be followed if it becomes necessary. ................. 8. The primary purpose of pronouncing a verdict is to dispose of the matter in controversy between the parties before it. We would therefore like to deal with a few aspects touching the making of observations or adverse comments against judicial officers and methodology to be followed if it becomes necessary. ................. 8. The primary purpose of pronouncing a verdict is to dispose of the matter in controversy between the parties before it. A judge is not expected to drift away from pronouncing upon the controversy, to sitting in judgment over the conduct of the judicial and quasi-judicial authorities whose decisions or orders are put in issue before him, and indulge into criticising and commenting thereon unless the conduct of an authority or subordinate functionary or anyone else than the parties comes of necessity under review and expression of opinion thereon going to the extent of commenting or criticising becomes necessary as a part of reasoning requisite for arriving at a conclusion necessary for deciding the main controversy or it becomes necessary to have animadverted thereon for the purpose of arriving at a decision on an issue involved in the litigation. This applies with added force when the superior Court is hearing an appeal or revision against an order of a subordinate judicial officer and feels inclined to animadvert on him........ 12. Though the power to make remarks or observations is there but on being questioned, the exercise of power must withstand judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of following tests : (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The overall test is that the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. 15. In the case at hand we are concerned with the observations made by the High Court against a judicial officer who is a serving member of subordinate judiciary. Under the Constitutional scheme control over the district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto has been vested in the High Courts. The control so vested is administrative, judicial and disciplinary. The role of High Court is also of a friend, philosopher and guide of judiciary subordinate to it. Under the Constitutional scheme control over the district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto has been vested in the High Courts. The control so vested is administrative, judicial and disciplinary. The role of High Court is also of a friend, philosopher and guide of judiciary subordinate to it. The strength of power is not displayed solely in cracking a whip on errors, mistakes or failures; the power should be so wielded as to have propensity to prevent and to ensure exclusion of repetition if committed once innocently or unwittingly. “Pardon the error but not its repetition”. The power to control is not to be exercised solely by wielding a teacher’s cane; the members of subordinate judiciary look up at the High Court for the power to control to be exercised with parent-like care and affection. The exercise of statutory jurisdiction, appellate or revisional and the exercise of constitutional power to control and supervise the functioning of the district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto empowers the High Court to formulate an opinion and place it on record not only on the judicial working but also on the conduct of the judicial officers. The existence of power in higher echelons of judiciary to make observations even extending to criticism incorporated in judicial orders cannot be denied, however, the High Courts have to remember that criticisms and observations touching a subordinate judicial officer incorporated in judicial pronouncements have their own mischievous infirmities. Firstly, the judicial officer is condemned unheard which is violative of principles of natural justice. A member of subordinate judiciary himself dispensing justice should not be denied this minimal natural justice so as to shield against being condemned unheard. Secondly, the harm caused by such criticism or observation may be incapable of being undone. Such criticism of the judicial officer contained in a judgment, reportable or not, is a pronouncement in open and therefore becomes public. The same judge who found himself persuaded, sitting on judicial side, to make observations guided by the facts of a single case against a subordinate judge may, sitting on administrative side and apprised of overall meritorious performance of the subordinate judge, irretrievably regret his having made these observations on judicial side, the harming effect whereof even he himself cannot remove on administrative side. Thirdly, human nature being what it is, such criticism of a judicial officer contained in the judgment of a higher Court gives the litigating party a sense of victory not only over his opponent but also over the judge who had decided the case against him. This is subversive of judicial authority of the deciding judge. Fourthly, seeking expunging of the observations by a judicial officer by filing an appeal or petition of his own reduces him to the status of a litigant arrayed as a party before the High Court or Supreme Court — a situation not very happy from the point of view of the functioning of the judicial system. May be for the purpose of pleading his cause he has to take the assistance of a legal practitioner and such legal practitioner may be one practicing before him. Look at the embarrassment involved. And last but not the least, the possibility of a single or casual aberration of an otherwise honest, upright and righteous Judge being caught unawares in the net of adverse observations cannot be ruled out. Such an incident would have a seriously demoralising effect not only on him but also on his colleagues. If all this is avoidable why it should not be avoided?” (emphasis supplied) 8. It needs to be noticed that in the aforesaid judgment in the matter of ‘K’ a Judicial Officer (supra), the Supreme Court also pointed out that if the conduct of a judicial officer comes to the notice of a Judge of the High Court hearing the matter on the judicial side, the matter can be decided on merits but criticism of the subordinate judicial officer should be avoided and information about the conduct of the subordinate Judge can be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice. The observations are as follows : “16. .............The conduct of a judicial officer, unworthy of him, having come to the notice of a judge of the High Court hearing a matter on the judicial side, the lis may be disposed of by pronouncing upon the merits thereof as found by him but avoiding in the judicial pronouncement criticism of, or observations on the ‘conduct’ of the subordinate judicial officer who had decided the case under scrutiny. Simultaneously but separately in-office proceedings may be drawn up inviting attention of Hon’ble Chief Justice to the facts describing the conduct of the subordinate judge concerned by sending a confidential letter or note to the Chief Justice. It will thereafter be open to the Chief Justice to deal with the subordinate judicial officer either at his own level or through the inspecting judge or by placing the matter before the Full Court for its consideration. The action so taken would all be on the administrative side. The subordinate judge concerned would have an opportunity of clarifying his position or putting-forth the circumstances under which he acted. He would not be condemned unheard and if the decision be adverse to him, it being on administrative side, he would have some remedy available to him under the law. He would not be rendered remediless.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, (1990) 2 SCC 533 , the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution that as a general principle for the proper administration of justice, derogatory remarks should not be made against the judicial officers whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case. 10. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1994) 1 SCC 540, the Apex Court has observed that using intemperate language and castigating strictures on the officers of the lower judiciary diminishes the image of the judiciary as a whole in the eyes of public and therefore the higher Courts should exercise restraint while using disparaging remarks against the lower judiciary. 11. As regards the remedy to such officers, the Supreme Court in the matter of ‘K’ a Judicial Officer (supra), has made it clear that a subordinate Judge faced with undeserving remarks made by a Court of superior jurisdiction is not without a remedy. The judicial officer can approach the High Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction which vests in the High Court by virtue of it being a Court of record and possessed with inherent powers. The observations are as follows: “11. A subordinate judge faced with disparaging and undeserving remarks made by a Court of superior jurisdiction is not without any remedy. The judicial officer can approach the High Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction which vests in the High Court by virtue of it being a Court of record and possessed with inherent powers. The observations are as follows: “11. A subordinate judge faced with disparaging and undeserving remarks made by a Court of superior jurisdiction is not without any remedy. He may approach the High Court invoking its inherent jurisdiction seeking expunction of objectionable remarks which jurisdiction vests in the High Court by virtue of its being a Court of record and possessing inherent powers as also the power of superintendence. This view is settled by the law laid down in Dr.Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another, AIR 1964 SC 1 . However, if a similar relief is sought for against remarks or observations contained in judgment or order of High Court the aggrieved judicial officer can, in exceptional cases, approach this Court also invoking its jurisdiction under Article 136 and/or 142 of the Constitution. With the law laid down by this Court in Dr. Raghubir Saran (supra) and the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Naim, [1964] 2 SCR 363, it is well-settled that the power to expunge remarks exists for redressing a kind of grievance for which the law does not provide any other remedy in express terms though it is an extraordinary power. Any passage from an order or judgment may be expunged or directed to be expunged subject to satisfying the following tests : (i) that the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable; (ii) that its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the persons to whom it refers; (iii) that its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Similarly in the State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, (1964) 2 SCR 363 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated that the High Court has inherent power to expunge the remarks made by itself or by the Lower Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 13. This now brings this Court to the main issue as to whether the remarks that have been made against the revisionist are required to be expunged. 13. This now brings this Court to the main issue as to whether the remarks that have been made against the revisionist are required to be expunged. This aspect, as noticed above, has to be addressed in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the matter of ‘K’ a Judicial Officer (supra), as the principles laid down in the aforementioned case laws are equally applicable in the case of the revisionist/S.D.M. Also, as he was also performing quasi-judicial Act while deciding the matter in question, even otherwise the principles are applicable in the case of the revisionist/S.D.M. 14. This Court is conscious that it is not sitting in appeal or revision over the merits of the impugned judgment and order of the learned S.D.M./revisionist and has only to decide as to whether in this revision the observations/remarks/strictures made against the revisionist/the then SDM concerned should be expunged. 15. A Division Bench of this Court (Lucknow Bench) while dealing with a similar matter in Hoshiyar Singh v. State of U.P., 2015 (91) ACC 82, has summarized all the observations that have been made by the Apex Court, which are as follows : “(i) A Judge should not indulge in criticisms or make comments on a judgment while deciding an Appeal or a Revision unless it is necessary to do so as a part of reasoning for arriving at a conclusion necessary for deciding the main controversy; (ii) There should be evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; (iii) The role of the High Court is of a friend, philosopher and guide to the subordinate judiciary and the strength of power is not displayed solely in cracking a whip on errors, mistakes or failures; (iv) The High Courts have to remember that criticisms and observations touching a subordinate judicial officer incorporated in judicial pronouncements have mischievous infirmities as not only is the judicial officer condemned unheard, but the harm caused by such criticism or observations may be incapable of being undone; (v) The criticism gives the litigating party a sense of victory not only over his opponent but also over the judge who had decided his case. This is subversive of the judicial authority of the deciding judge; (vi) The Judicial Officer, in such a situation, is reduced to the status of a litigant as he has to move an application for expunging the observations and possibility of a righteous Judge being caught unawares in the net of adverse observations would have a seriously demoralising effect not only on him but also on his colleagues; and (vii) that using intemperate language and castigating strictures on the officers of the lower judiciary diminishes the image of the judiciary as a whole.” 16. It is in the light of the aforesaid facts and the law that it has to be examined whether it was really necessary to make the observations referred to above against the revisionist, more particularly, when they would not have any impact on the merits of the judgment. This Court is of the view that the observations that have been enumerated in the case of Hoshiyar Singh (supra), in connection with the making of adverse comments against Judicial Officers while deciding of an Appeal or a Revision, come to the aid of the revisionist also. 17. Having considered the aforesaid principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and the factual position enumerated in the revision filed by the revisionist, this Court is of the considered opinion that the observations made against the revisionist were wholly uncalled for, for the reasons, firstly, that the observations are not necessary as a part of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion and secondly, they are even otherwise not called for. 18. To conclude, this Court is satisfied that (i) the impugned remarks complained of are wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable; (ii) their retention on the records will cause serious harm to the person to whom it refers; and (iii) their expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order. 19. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned observations/remarks/strictures made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the judgment and order in question are totally uncalled for and they are really not necessary for passing the impugned judgment and order. A judge should not indulge in criticism or make comments of a judgment while deciding an appeal/revision unless it is necessary to do so as part of reasoning for arriving at a conclusion, necessary for deciding the impugned controversy. A judge should not indulge in criticism or make comments of a judgment while deciding an appeal/revision unless it is necessary to do so as part of reasoning for arriving at a conclusion, necessary for deciding the impugned controversy. The Court, therefore, for all the reasons stated above, has no hesitation in deleting/expunging the following observations as and where the same appear in the impugned judgment and order against the revisionist/the then SDM concerned : ^^,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd fo}ku mi&ftyk eSftLVszV nsocUn dks fof/kd izfdz;k dk Kku ugha gSA^^ 20. Accordingly, the revision is allowed and adverse remarks/observations/strictures indicated above are hereby expunged.