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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1499 (GUJ)

RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. CHAVDA RASIKBHAI DAAYABHAI

2016-07-26

K.M.THAKER

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. Heard Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, and Mr. Pandya, learned advocate for the respondent workmen. 2. In this group of petitions, the petitioner corporation has challenged separate but similar awards dated 28.3.2014 passed by learned Labour Court at Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 113 of 2012 whereby the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner corporation to reinstate the concerned claimants without continuity of service and without backwages. 2.1 Actually, the directions passed by the learned Labour Court amount to directing the corporation to engage concerned claimant as fresh employees. 2.2 Any burden of backwages or even continuity of service is not imposed on the corporation. However, the corporation felt aggrieved by the direction to reinstate the claimants and that therefore, filed this group of petitions. 3. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention that the learned Labour Court has passed similar awards in respect of 29 claimants. In that view of the matter, the corporation has filed 29 petitions. However, in respect of one of the claimants i.e. claimant concerned in Special Civil Application No. 8991 of 2014 (Mr. Prakash B. Balva, Reference No. 99 of 2012) never appeared in the proceedings. So far as the said claimant is concerned, he has not shown any inclination to work with the corporation after the award was passed and even at the stage when other workmen preferred applications under Section 17-B, the concerned claimant in Special Civil Application No.8991 of 2014 did not come forward to prefer said application and he did not claim benefit of last drawn wages. It is also accepted by the learned counsel for the claimants that when the petitioner corporation issued orders re-engaging the workmen (with a view to avoiding liability to pay idle wages in accordance with Section 17-B of the Act), the concerned claimant has not reported for work. Therefore, it is clarified at the outset that present order will not be applicable to and available in respect of Special Civil Application No. 8991 of 2014 and separate directions are passed in respect of the said claimant. 4. As mentioned earlier, by the impugned awards, the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner corporation to reinstate the concerned claimants without continuity of service and without backwages. However, the corporation is aggrieved by the direction. 4. As mentioned earlier, by the impugned awards, the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner corporation to reinstate the concerned claimants without continuity of service and without backwages. However, the corporation is aggrieved by the direction. The learned Labour Court passed impugned awards without having regard to the fact that the concerned claimants raised industrial dispute after delay of 15 years and also without considering the fact that none of the concerned claimants had, according to the petitioner corporation, worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months. The award are challenged inter alia on the ground that before the service of the concerned claimants were discontinued in June 1997, none of the concerned workmen had worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months and despite such fact, the learned Labour Court directed the corporation to reinstate the workmen. Second ground, in light of which the corporation felt aggrieved by the direction is that the workmen had raised industrial dispute after delay of 15 years i.e. in July 2012. According to the petitioner corporation, such dispute/reference should not have been entertained by the learned Labour Court and in any case, should not have been allowed to any extent. 5. In view of the said contentions by the learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, this Court, while admitting the petitions, passed below quoted order on 7.8.2014:- “1. Heard Mr.Gadhia, learned advocate for the petitioner-Corporation and Mr.Yogen N. Pandya, learned advocate for the contesting respondent No.1, in each petition. 2. Rule. Mr.Pandya, learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the contesting respondent No.1, in each petition. 3. Learned advocates are heard on the question of interim relief. 4. Challenge in this group of petitions is made to the identical awards passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot in Reference (LCR) No. 113 of 2012 and cognate matters. The Labour Court has granted reinstatement without continuity of service, and without back wages. 5. Mr. Gadhia, learned advocate for the petitioner-Corporation has submitted a statement showing that, the concerned workmen had worked for very few days, and in one case, the workman had not worked even for a day. The said statement is taken on record. Further, it is submitted that, the alleged date of termination was 12.06.1997 and the date of references was 17.07.2012. Thus, there was delay of about 15 years in raising the industrial dispute. 6. The said statement is taken on record. Further, it is submitted that, the alleged date of termination was 12.06.1997 and the date of references was 17.07.2012. Thus, there was delay of about 15 years in raising the industrial dispute. 6. Under above circumstances, prima facie, the impugned awards of the Labour Court granting fresh appointment may not be sustainable. Therefore, it is ordered that, during the pendency of these petitions, the impugned awards passed by the Labour Court, Rajkot, shall remain stayed.” 6. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the submissions by learned counsel for the contesting parties and from the record, more particularly from the impugned awards, that the claimants were engaged on daily wage basis by the petitioner corporation for casual work and for temporary duration. The concerned claimants were engaged as labourers in, what is commonly called as “vonkda gang” (i.e. the persons who are engaged for cleaning, open drains and water outlets more particularly during monsoon season) and that they were being engaged since last about 3 to 4 years on daily wage and casual basis during monsoon season. It appears that with the allegation that their services were illegally and arbitrarily and suddenly terminated w.e.f. 12.6.1997, the concerned claimants raised industrial dispute after about 15 years i.e. in 2012. 6.1 The appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication before the learned Labour Court vide order of reference dated 17.7.2012. The concerned claimants filed their respective statement of claim before the learned Labour Court with the allegation that the corporation terminated their services without granting opportunity of hearing and without payment of retrenchment compensation. It was also alleged that after they were terminated, the petitioner corporation engaged other persons to do similar work, however, they were not called back and not offered work while other employees on fresh appointments were engaged for same work. The claimants, accordingly, alleged breach of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H by the corporation. With the said allegations, the concerned claimants demanded that they should be reinstated with consequential benefits. 6.2 The corporation opposed the reference cases on the ground that the dispute was raised after inordinate delay of 15 years. It was also claimed that the concerned persons were engaged on daily wage basis and they were appointed without following procedure for recruitment and selection. 6.2 The corporation opposed the reference cases on the ground that the dispute was raised after inordinate delay of 15 years. It was also claimed that the concerned persons were engaged on daily wage basis and they were appointed without following procedure for recruitment and selection. It was also claimed that the names of the concerned claimants were not sponsored by the employment exchange. However, they were engaged on ad-hoc and temporary basis for seasonal work. They were engaged and continued on daily wage basis to deal with the exigencies. The corporation, however, did not dispute the fact that the concerned claimants were discontinued w.e.f. 12.6.1997 and at the relevant time, retrenchment compensation or any other amount were not paid to the concerned claimant. With reference to the allegation about breach of Section 25F, the corporation claimed that the concerned workmen did not work for 240 days in proceeding 12 months. On such premise, the corporation opposed the reference cases. 7. Before proceeding further, it is also relevant to note that in its reply and in its evidence before the learned Labour Court, the corporation also claimed that the details about the appointment of the claimants which are given out by the claimants are not correct. It was also claimed that if the details about the alleged date of joining as claimed by the claimants is presumed to be correct, then, it would mean that one of the claimants was appointed while his age was of 16 years and other claimant was appointed when his age was 34 years. By mentioning such illustration, the petitioner corporation disputed the details mentioned by the claimants with regard to their age and date of appointment. 8. During the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the workmen filed their respective affidavits in lieu of chief examination and they were subjected to cross-examination. Likewise, the corporation examined one witness – Mr. J.P. Patel in one of the reference case and filed a purshis (Exh.14) requesting the learned Labour Court to treat said evidence as common evidence for all reference cases. Thereafter, learned Labour Court heard learned advocates for the contesting parties and after taking into account the evidence available on record learned Labour Court passed impugned award. 9. J.P. Patel in one of the reference case and filed a purshis (Exh.14) requesting the learned Labour Court to treat said evidence as common evidence for all reference cases. Thereafter, learned Labour Court heard learned advocates for the contesting parties and after taking into account the evidence available on record learned Labour Court passed impugned award. 9. At the time of hearing of present petitions learned advocate for the corporation reiterated same two contentions which are recorded in the order dated 7.8.2014 passed by this Court while admitting the petitions. He also submitted that when the Court passed order directing the corporation to comply the condition under Section 17B of the Act, the corporation considered it appropriate to re-engage the claimants and thereafter the concerned claimants (except the claimant in SCA No. 8991 of 2014) have been working with the corporation in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the orders passed by the corporation from time to time for engaging the claimants. He also submitted that the concerned claimants are performing same work which they were performing before June 1997 (when they were terminated). 9.1 The learned advocate for the concerned claimants submitted that so far as the alleged delay caused in instituting claimants’ reference proceedings is concerned, the claimants were assuring, from time to time, by officers of the municipal corporation that appropriate orders reengaging the claimants will be passed and the claimants relied on oral assurances given by the officers from time to time which caused delay. He further submitted that the corporation has made many efforts to engage other persons in place of the claimants for carrying out the work which the claimants used to perform however despite many efforts corporation could not find any person for the said work. He submitted that the corporation had issued tender to get the work executed through other persons/agencies however that attempt also did not fructify. Learned advocate for the claimants submitted that the corporation has, since 2015, re-engaged the claimants. He tendered a copy of the order dated 5.5.2015 and 18.6.2016 under which the concerned claimants have been re-engaged by the claimants. He also submitted that while passing the award learned Labour Court has considered the aspect of delay and has consequently denied backwages. He submitted that the award may not be disturbed. 10. He tendered a copy of the order dated 5.5.2015 and 18.6.2016 under which the concerned claimants have been re-engaged by the claimants. He also submitted that while passing the award learned Labour Court has considered the aspect of delay and has consequently denied backwages. He submitted that the award may not be disturbed. 10. I have heard learned advocate for the petitioner corporation and the learned advocate for the claimants. I have also considered material on record and the impugned award. 10.1 From the award it emerges that the petitioner corporation had raised objection about delay caused in initiating reference case. It is also true that the learned Labour Court has considered it appropriate to decide the case on merits instead of rejecting the reference only on ground of delay. 10.2 On this count, it is relevant to recall that according to the concerned claimants they had pursued their request and claims before concerned officer/competent authority of the corporation. According to the case of the claimants they were asked to keep patience for some time since the corporation was trying to work out the procedure to engage them/continue them and they continued to rely on assurance with the corporation and ultimately they realized that any concrete steps have not been taken by the corporation therefore they initiated proceedings. 10.3 Of course evidence to such effect has not come on record however, learned Labour Court has decided the reference cases on merits by condoning the delay on the ground that the claimants are very poor and illiterate delay deserves to be condoned. 10.4 In this backdrop and more particularly in light of the fact that the reasons which contributed to the delay caused in instituting reference cases are not established by appropriate evidence and since the reasons which satisfied the Court with regard to delay are also not recorded in the award, the petitioners demand for quashing the award on the ground that the dispute was raised after delay or the request to remand the cases for reconsideration in view of the delay caused in raising the dispute cannot be considered baseless and cannot be ignored. 10.5 However, before recording final decision with regard to the petitioners grievance against the award in light of the delay caused in raising industrial dispute it is necessary and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to also examine the award with regard to the other findings and conclusions which are recorded by the learned Labour Court. 10.6 So far as the termination of the concerned claimants is concerned, the petitioner corporation has tendered a statement which reflects details with regard to total number of days for which the claimants had worked with the corporation. The details which are compiled by the petitioner corporation in the statements are as follows:- Sr. No. Spl. C.A. No. Year Name of person Total no. of days worked 1 9001/2014 Parmar Dineshbhai Mansukhbhai 113 2 9002/2014 Jadav Natubhai Chanabhai 145 3 9003/2014 Parghi Rameshbhai Karshanbhai 45 4 8980/2014 Bokhani Jayendrabhai Govindbhai 163 5 8981/2014 Parmar Kishor Gangaram 135 6 8982/2014 Khimsuriya Bharatbhai Babulal 125 7 8992/2014 Chudasma Hasmukhbhai Karshanbhai 108 8 8991/2014 Balva Prakash Dahyabhai 314 9 8979/2014 Saresa Amrutlal Khimjibhai 138 10 8990/2014 Solanki Rajesh Chakubhai 106 11 8993/2014 Rathod Dayabhai Chanabhai 232 12 8978/2014 Vizunda Narendrabhai Bachubhai 130 13 8989/2014 Ranwa Harshadbhai Premjibhai 118 14 8977/2014 Sagathiya Babubhai Bijalbhai 128 15 8988/2014 Jadav Dipakbhai Ratilal 26 16 8976/2014 Rathod Pankajbhai Dudajibhai 32 17 8999/2014 Saresa Ashokbhai Ranchhodbhai 27 18 8994/2014 Saresa Bipin Ranchhodbhai 30 19 9000/2014 Pardhi Mahendrabhai Laljibhai 28 20 8987/2014 Pardhi Kishorbhai Jethabhai 44 21 8986/2014 Saresa Vasantbhai Bhimjibhai Nil 22 8975/2014 Chavda Rasikbhai Daayabhai 14 23 8995/2014 Jadav Jivanbhai Batukbhai 61 24 8984/2014 Jadav Vijay Hirabhai 33 25 8985/2014 Makwana Himatbhai Premjibhai 34 26 8983/2014 Makwana Vinodbhai Nazabhai 52 27 8998/2014 Makwana Vashrambhai Chanabhai 175 28 8997/2014 Moradia Premjibhai Kesubhai 151 29 8996/2014 Vaghela Nareshbhai Somabhai 101 11. According to the petitioner the said statement reflects the details of the days for which the concerned claimants had worked with the corporation. 11.1 However on this count it is necessary and relevant to mention that the petitioner corporation had not placed on record the attendance register to support the details which are mentioned in the above quoted statement. 12. Learned advocate for the corporation submitted that actually the claimants had demanded details by submitting an application under Right To Information Act and the details were supplied to the claimants. 12. Learned advocate for the corporation submitted that actually the claimants had demanded details by submitting an application under Right To Information Act and the details were supplied to the claimants. He further submitted that the details supplied by the corporation to the applicants were placed on record before learned Labour Court by claimants and the said details have been compiled by the corporation in the statement. 12.1 In short, the said statement contains the details which were supplied by the corporation to the claimants in response to the application under RTI Act. However undisputedly the attendance registers were not placed before learned Labour Court. Thus, technically the said details are not proved before learned Labour Court in accordance with law. 12.2 Of course the petitioner corporation would claim that burden to establish that the claimants had worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months was on the claimants and though they failed to discharge said burden. 12.3 However, short and relevant fact which emerges from the said details is that cogent evidence with regard to total number of days for which concerned claimants had worked with the corporation and more particularly during period of preceding 12 months was not proved before learned Labour Court in accordance with law. This aspect also would persuade the Court to remand the matter to the learned Labour Court for reconsideration so that the parties can place appropriate evidence. 12.4 It is also pertinent to note that even if the details with regard to total number of days for which the concerned claimants worked are assumed to be correct then said details will lead the Court to the conclusion that the corporation had not committed breach of Section 25F of the Act when service of the concerned claimants was terminated in June 1997. 12.5 It is not in dispute that service of 29 claimants were discontinued on the same day i.e. 12.6.1997. The said fact is admitted even by the corporation. 12.6 Thus, assuming that the corporation did not commit breach of section 25F while discontinuing service of the claimants, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the claimants had categorically and specifically asserted that when they were relieved persons junior to them were continued in service and after they were terminated the corporation had engaged other persons to perform same work. 13. 13. On this count it is relevant to note that the corporation has not placed any evidence to controvert said assertion by the claimants. There is no material on record that any other person were not engaged subsequently and/or persons junior to the claimants were not continued at the time when they were relieved from service. Actually, even proper denial from side of the corporation (with regard to said claim and assertion by the claimants) is not on record. 13.1 Besides this it is also relevant to note that the learned Court has recorded, in 3rd sub paragraph of paragraph no. 9 (issue no.2) that the seniority list of the claimants (which was placed on record by the corporation) brought out the fact that the work which the concerned persons were performing continued even after the claimants were relieved from service and that the corporation had continued to engage other persons to perform said work. In the same paragraph learned Labour Court has also recorded finding of fact that from the seniority statement (which was placed on record by the corporation) it also emerged that persons with shorter tenure of service i.e. persons junior to the claimants were continued in service when the claimants were relieved from the service. The learned Labour Court has also recorded findings of fact that after concerned claimants were relieved the corporation had engaged other/fresh employees. With the said observations the learned Labour Court has recorded the conclusion that the petitioner corporation committed breach of section 25G and Section 25H. 13.2 When the said aspects are taken into account it emerges that the learned Labour Court has reached and recorded specific findings on merits of the case which brings out that the corporation’s act is tainted by infraction of statutory provisions viz. Section 25G and Section 25H. 13.3 Therefore, question arises as to whether present cases should be remanded to learned Labour Court for fresh consideration with regard to corporation objection against reference cases on ground of delay and in light of the fact that the details with regard to the days for which the concerned claimants had worked with the corporation in preceding 12 months are not proved in accordance with law. 13.4 If the said question is examined in light of the findings of fact recorded by learned labour Court that breach of section 25F and 25G is established and in light of the fact that learned Labour Court has denied benefit of continuity of service and backwages to the concerned claimants, and if regard is had to the fact that whether the claimants had worked for 240 days in receding 12 months would not be relevant fact so far as section 25G and Section 25H are concerned since the said sections operate independently and they stand on their own without being dependant on fulfillment of condition prescribed by Section 25F of the Act, then the Court is persuaded to and convinced to hold that the factum of delay caused in raising industrial dispute and the aspects related to said aspect are sufficiently taken care of by the learned Labour Court and the learned Labour Court has, by impugned award, balanced the equity inasmuch as any benefit for the period from the date of termination until the date of award i.e. right from 1997 to 2014 is not granted. 14. Under the circumstances the delay caused in raising industrial dispute has, actually, not resulted into or it has not caused any fatal or adverse consequences for the petitioner corporation. Further, in view of denial of benefit of backwages as well as continuity of service, though breach of section 25G and section 25H are established, the delay is sufficiently compensated. 14.1 The issue as to whether the claimants had worked for 240 days during preceding 12 months or not also pales into significance in view of the fact that the learned Labour Court has held that the corporation’s action is vitiated on account of breach of Section 25G and 25H. 14.2 In case of Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs. Kishor Govind 1996 (2) G.L.R. 246 this Court has held that Section 25G and 25H are independent of Section 25F. 14.2 In case of Rajkot Municipal Corporation vs. Kishor Govind 1996 (2) G.L.R. 246 this Court has held that Section 25G and 25H are independent of Section 25F. It is observed in the decision that:- “On close scrutiny of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that though they are part of the same scheme, of providing against arbitrary retrenchment of workman by the management and to curb the tendency of hire and fire and also to provide for re-employment of such retrenched workman in case same employer again employs new person so that retrenchment simpliciter is not used as a tool merely to make room for somebody else by removing person whose services are otherwise required. Viewing in this light it cannot be said that on plain reading of the language of the provisions of the Statute and also keeping in view the object of various provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act, that rule envisaged under Section 25-G is also subject to same condition as are the provisions of Section 25-F. It may be noticed that Section 25-G necessarily has within it ingredients of Article 14 which provides equality as fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens and Article 16 which provides for equal opportunities in the matter of employment. Section 25-G is meant to guard against arbitrarily motivated retrenchment. The provision curbs the tendency of conferring favour on one employee by retaining his service while discharging the senior. Section 25-G does not refer to 'such workman falling under Section 25'. Had Section 25-G been dependent upon Section 25-F for its operation terminology used by the legislature would have been different. In that event, instead of the words' any workman', the legislature would have used 'such workman'. I am fortified in my aforesaid conclusions by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Bhanvarlal & Ors. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport, reported in (1985-I-LLJ-111) and another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Navbharat Hindi Daily v. Navbharat Shramik Sangh, reported in (1985-I-LLJ-474) with which, I am in respectful agreement. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport, reported in (1985-I-LLJ-111) and another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Navbharat Hindi Daily v. Navbharat Shramik Sangh, reported in (1985-I-LLJ-474) with which, I am in respectful agreement. In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the following passage from the decision in the case of Indian Air Lines v. Sebastian, reported in 1991 (1) GLR No. 43 : "It should be remembered that Sections 25-E, 25-F and 25-H are all inter-linked provisions and they all come under Chapter V-A. Section 25-E dealt with definition of 'continuous service'. Under Section 25-E(2)(a)(ii), unless a person had worked for 240 days continuously in a year, he cannot be deemed to be in continuous service. Section 25-F deals with 'conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen' and it mentions that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year, shall be retrenched ... Section 25-G deals with procedure for retrenchment of retrenched workmen. In view of the fact that these workmen were not in continuous service as contemplated under Section 25-B and as they do not satisfy requirement of Section 25-F, they are not entitled to the benefits of Section 25-H." Having carefully gone through the aforesaid decision, I am of the opinion that the aforesaid observation, in no way, helps the contention of the petitioner. It was not a case in which the provisions of Section 25-G were at all involved and considered. It was a case in which person whose services were terminated had not completed one year's continuous service and his case did not fall within the scope of Section 25-F of the Act. The termination of the services of the workman was not held to be illegal for breach of Section 25-G of the Act. Thereafter, when the question of giving appointment to fresh hands in the same establishment arose, whether benefit of Section 25-H for giving preference to such person can be extended or not was the only issue raised and decided that Section 25-H can only operate in case where there is valid retrenchment. Thereafter, when the question of giving appointment to fresh hands in the same establishment arose, whether benefit of Section 25-H for giving preference to such person can be extended or not was the only issue raised and decided that Section 25-H can only operate in case where there is valid retrenchment. Nowhere the Court stated nor the Court was called upon to decide whether the termination which is thought not attracting Section 25-F but is in breach of Section 25-G could be sustained, nor was it an issue before the Court nor the Court decided whether continuous service for a period of one year or more within the meaning of Section 25-B, as is required for the purpose of Section 25-F, is also necessary for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 25-G. In my, opinion, therefore, the aforesaid decision does not help the petitioner.” 14.3 As held by this Court, the said two provisions operate independently and they are not dependent on Section 25F and/or on compliance of the condition with regard to service of 240 days in preceding 12 months. 14.4 Therefore, even if it is assumed that the claimants had not worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months and even if it is assumed that the corporation did not commit breach of Section 25F then also the Court can independently examine the claim with regard to breach of Section 25G and 25H and in present case, finding of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court have brought out that the petitioner corporation committed breach of Section 25G and Section 25H at the time when the corporation relieved the concerned claimants but continued certain employees whose tenure of service was shorter than that of claimants i.e. corporation continued such employees who were junior to the claimants. Learned Labour court has also recorded findings of fact that new employees were engaged by the corporation after the claimants were relieved in June 1997. 15. At the time of hearing of the petitions the Corporation has failed to point out any material from the record which would establish that the said findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court are incorrect or perverse. 16. 15. At the time of hearing of the petitions the Corporation has failed to point out any material from the record which would establish that the said findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court are incorrect or perverse. 16. In view of the fact that breach of Section 25G and Section 25H is established and even at the time of hearing of these petitions any contrary material which could successfully assail said finding of fact recorded by learned Labour Court is not shown to the Court, there is no justification to interfere with and disturb the said conclusion and finding of fact by the learned Labour Court. 17. In the result the direction to reinstate/reengage the concerned claimants do not warrant or justify any interference. 17.1 There is one more reason which has convinced the Court that the said direction by the learned Labour Court does not warrant any interference. It is brought out before the court at the time of hearing of these petitions that since May 2015 the corporation has re-engaged the concerned claimants. The fact that the concerned claimants have been re-engaged and they have been performing same duty which they performed earlier again establishes or reinforces the fact that the work which the concerned claimants performed before June 1997 still continues. The said fact also establishes the need of service of the claimants and if the concerned persons are not engaged then corporation would, instead engage other persons. That would result into further or repeated breach of section 25H. In this view of the matter, even otherwise, the direction to reinstate the claimants does not warrant interference. 18. Any ground/case to interfere with the conclusion with regard to breach of Section 25G or Section 25H is not made out. Consequently any ground to interfere with the direction to reinstate the claimants is also not established. Therefore the petitions deserve to be disposed of without setting aside the direction to reinstate the claimants or without modification in the award. Therefore following order is passed:- The petitions are not accepted. The order directing the corporation to engage concerned persons as fresh appointees is not disturbed. It is clarified that the above mentioned directions will be applicable to the claimants except the claimant in Special Civil Application No. 8991 of 1994. Therefore following order is passed:- The petitions are not accepted. The order directing the corporation to engage concerned persons as fresh appointees is not disturbed. It is clarified that the above mentioned directions will be applicable to the claimants except the claimant in Special Civil Application No. 8991 of 1994. So far as said claimant is concerned, in view of the fact that even after the award and in pursuance of the order passed by the corporation in May 2009 and June 2016, the said respondent never reported for work the said claimant shall not be entitled for above mentioned directions. It is also clarified that the award passed by the learned Labour Court is passed in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and this Court has also passed present order after taking into account peculiar facts and circumstances of the case emerging from the award and that therefore neither the award nor this order would be treated as precedent in other cases. With the aforesaid clarification the petitions are disposed of. Rule is discharged.