JUDGMENT : Dinesh Maheshwari, J. With the consent and at the request of the learned counsel for the parties, we have heard the matter finally at this stage itself. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 30.09.2014 as passed in WP (C) No.378 of 2013, whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court has upheld the challenge of writ petitioner (respondent herein) to the notification dated 01.10.2012, as issued by the appellant Garo Hills Autonomous District Council ['GHADC'] on the ground that GHADC had no authority to fix the value of the land acquired or to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ['the Act of 1894'] or the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ['the Act of 2013']. 3. In brief, the relevant background aspects of the matter are that the respondent/writ petitioner, said to be the owner of a plot of land measuring about one bigha at Dalamgre village under Dalomgre A'khing P.S. Dalu, West Garo Hills District, which had been acquired by the Government of India for the purpose of erecting fencing on the International Border, stated the grievance that he had not received adequate compensation; and in the enquiry for determination of compensation, the Collector concerned was feeling bound by the rates mentioned in the impugned notification dated 01.10.2012, as issued by GHADC in exercise of its powers under Clause (a) of Rule 30 of the Assam and Meghalaya Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951 ['the Rules of 1951']. It had been the case of the respondent/writ petitioner that GHADC had no authority to determine the amount of compensation for acquisition; and the notification in question, to that extent, was beyond GHADC's legislative powers emanating from Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 4. It appears that before the learned Single Judge, though it was essentially contended on behalf of the present appellants that the matter relating to land acquisition ought to be agitated before the concerned authority/Collector but then, it was also suggested on their part that as regards A'khing land, GHADC was competent to assess the same for the land acquisition in Garo Hills Districts; and that when the rate was fixed, there was no question of assessment of the market rate by the Collector. 5. 5. In the wake of the aforesaid stand of the appellant GHADC, the learned Single Judge surveyed the scheme of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India as also the powers and authority of a District Council under the Rules of 1951 and different arena of operation of the statutes relating to land acquisition namely, the Act of 1894 and the Act of 2013. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, concluded that the competent authority for assessing the value of the land acquired under such enactments was the Collector concerned and the District Council like GHADC was not having the authority to assess the value of the land acquired. The learned Single Judge, inter-alia, observed as under:- "On reading of Sub-Paragraph (6) of Paragraph 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Assam [and Meghalaya] Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, vis-a-vis, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, it is crystal clear that the competent authority is the Collector of land acquisition, who can assess the value of the land acquired under the said Special Acts. The District Council is not the authority to assess the value of the land acquired and the said Rules i.e. Assam [and Meghalaya] Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, do not provide any provision under which the District Council could assess the value of the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; over and above, the Special Acts enacted by the Central Govt. shall prevail the Rules makes by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred under Sub-Section (6) of Paragraph 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India." 6. Having said so and while referring to the basic principles that the statutory provisions cannot be allowed to be defeated by any subterfuge and that the constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly, the learned Single Judge proceeded to conclude on the writ petition that the impugned notification dated 01.10.2012 was required to be quashed. 7. In this appeal against the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, learned senior counsel Mr. 7. In this appeal against the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, learned senior counsel Mr. GS Massar, while confining his challenge to a narrow and limited compass, has submitted that the notification in question, as issued by GHADC essentially for the purpose of regulating the land revenue, valuation of the land and rates of trees etc. by virtue of the powers conferred by Paragraph 3 of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, was not illegal or unauthorized as such and was not required to be quashed in toto. Learned senior counsel has frankly submitted that when proviso to Clause (a) of Paragraph 3 (1) of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India specifically carves out an exception as regards matters relating to compensatory acquisition of land for public purposes, neither there had been any intention of the appellant GHADC to make any law relating to such matters relating to land acquisition nor the notification in question was issued by GHADC for the purpose of land acquisition. Learned counsel would submit that even if any objection was taken on the clause relating to the valuation of A'khing land in the notification dated 01.10.2012, the entire notification could not have been quashed. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner has particularly referred to the notification for re-assessment of land revenue, as issued by the appellant GHADC in the year 2006 [Annexure-I to the writ petition] and submitted that even while fixing the land revenue and other fees for different categories of land with reference to their location and utility, it was provided regarding the A'khing land that the rates were being fixed "only for the purpose of acquisition of land". The learned counsel has stated the grievance that the notification issued by GHADC in the year 2006 has not been superseded as such; and in the face of such a clause therein concerning A'khing land, the Collector concerned was feeling bound as if no separate and independent assessment of the market value was to be made by him. The learned counsel has stated the grievance that the notification issued by GHADC in the year 2006 has not been superseded as such; and in the face of such a clause therein concerning A'khing land, the Collector concerned was feeling bound as if no separate and independent assessment of the market value was to be made by him. The learned counsel has again referred to the pleadings taken by the appellants in their affidavit-in-opposition before the Writ Court and submitted that in view of the appellants suggestion on the competency of GHADC to assess the A'khing land for the purpose of land acquisition, the learned Single Judge has dealt with the issue in detail and, thereafter, has rightly set aside the notification in question, for the same being not in accord with the spirit of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material placed on record, we are clearly of the view that for the fair stand taken on behalf of the appellants now in this appeal, not much of adjudication is required and only a relevant clarification would suffice. 10. It is noticed that the impugned notification dated 01.10.2012 had essentially been issued for the purpose of 'enhancement' of the 'existing rates of land revenue, valuation of land and rates of trees, fruit bearing trees, bamboos etc.' Even if the expression occurring in the earlier notification of the year 2006 in relation to A'khing land was suggestive that the rates were being fixed "only for the purpose of acquisition of land", it has nowhere been suggested in the impugned notification dated 01.10.2012 that the enhanced rates and valuation were being provided for the purpose of land acquisition also. Thus, it could not have been directly concluded that the impugned notification was wholly illegal or unauthorized. 11. Upon our making the observations thus, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner has also candidly submitted that apart from the aspect relating to the land acquisition, he has no grievance against the notification as such; and it has not been the case of the respondent/writ petitioner that the notification in question could not have been issued by the appellant GHADC at all and even for the purpose of rates of land revenue, valuation of land, and rates of trees etc. 12. 12. In view of the aforesaid, notification dated 01.10.2012, which has otherwise not been shown suffering from any vice of want of power and authority except that relating to the matter of land acquisition, is not required to be quashed as such; and a clarification would suffice that the said notification (or any other notification for that matter), as issued by the appellant GHADC for the purpose of land revenue and valuation of land and the rates of trees etc., will not be considered decisive of the issue relating to the determination of the amount of compensation to be awarded for compulsory acquisition of land, whether under the Act of 1894 or under the Act of 2013 or any other law in force. 13. For what has been observed herein above, the order as passed by the learned Single Judge stands modified in the manner that the impugned notification dated 01.10.2012 shall not be treated as quashed by this Court; but shall be read subject to the observations foregoing and shall not be considered decisive for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation under the Act of 1894 or the Act of 2013 or any other law in force. 14. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No costs.