ORDER : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of present petition, petitioner has challenged the judgment passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 31-S/10 of 2009 dated 23.01.2012 vide which, learned Appellate Court has upheld the judgment of conviction passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. VI, Shimla in Cri. Complainant No. 402/3 of 2007/06. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of present case are that in a complaint filed by the present respondent (hereinafter referred to as "complainant) under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the petitioner/accused, learned trial Court returned the findings of conviction against the accused for having committed offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and accordingly it sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and also to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 19000/- to the complainant. As per the complainant, the accused was well acquainted with him and both of them knew each other since long. Accused approached the complainant and requested him to lend an amount of Rs. 1,18,000/- for meeting out domestic expenses and also for doing business. The said amount was lent by the complainant to the accused and in lieu of the same, accused issued post dated cheque No. 966545 dated 14.10.2006 for an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- and cheque No. 966546 dated 14.10.2006 for an amount of Rs. 18,000/- in favour of the complainant, both payable at UCO Bank, Kotkhai. Further, as per the complainant, when he presented the said two cheques to his banker, the same were dishonoured by the bank of the accused on the ground "funds insufficient". Thereafter, a legal notice was sent by the complainant to the accused and he was called upon to make good the payment. When despite this, the accused did not pay the said amount to the complainant, he filed a complaint under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. As a prima facie case was found against the accused, Notice of Accusation was put to him, to which he pleaded not guilty. 4. In order to substantiate his case, the complainant examined three witnesses. 3. As a prima facie case was found against the accused, Notice of Accusation was put to him, to which he pleaded not guilty. 4. In order to substantiate his case, the complainant examined three witnesses. Though initially the accused intended to lead evidence in his defence, but subsequently vide separate statement, he closed his evidence without examining any defence witness. 5. On the basis of material on record, learned trial Court held that the accused had not disputed the loan transaction as entered between him and the complainant and issuance of cheques in lieu of the same as well as the factum of dishonouring of the said cheques, but he had come up with the defence that he had taken loan from the elder brother of the complainant and the said loan already stood returned to him. Further, as per learned trial Court, the defence so put up by the accused could not be corroborated and on the other hand, the complainant on the basis of material on record was able to prove that in lieu of loan advanced by him to the accused, the accused had issued two cheques in his favour which were dishonoured. Accordingly, learned trial Court allowed the complaint and convicted the accused. 6. It is relevant to refer at this stage that during the course of trial of the said case before the learned trial Court, no objection at any stage was taken by the accused to the effect that learned trial Court was not having territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction, the accused preferred an appeal. Learned appellate Court vide judgment dated 23.01.2012 upheld the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction, the accused preferred an appeal. Learned appellate Court vide judgment dated 23.01.2012 upheld the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal. A perusal of the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court demonstrates that two points were argued in appeal on behalf of the accused and these points were: (a) that the case of the complainant as narrated in the complaint and as deposed by him on oath was totally improbable and suspicious; and (b) that the cheques in issue were drawn at UCO Bank, Kotkhai and were presented for encashment by the complainant with his banker at Kotkhai and intimation regarding dishonouring of the same was also at Kotkhai, hence cause of action arose to the complainant within the jurisdiction of the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class at Theog and not at Shimla and mere sending of demand notice from Shimla did not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla. Therefore, on these basis, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court was attacked in appeal. 8. On the point of jurisdiction, learned appellate Court held that though it was not in dispute that the cheques in question were drawn at UCO Bank, Kotkhai by the accused and they were also presented by the complainant for encashment with his banker at Kotkhai and the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act took place at Kotkhai, within the jurisdiction of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Theog and mere sending of demand notice from Shimla did not confer any territorial jurisdiction on the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla, however, the accused cannot be permitted to take this plea at a belated stage in appellate proceedings and the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court was protected by the provisions of Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because it could not be said that there was lack of inherent jurisdiction with the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla to adjudicate upon the matter pertaining to Negotiable Instruments Act and the appellant had also not substantiated as to what prejudice was caused to him as a result of the case having been tried at Shimla. It further held that no such plea was in fact taken by the appellant before learned trial Court at any time and accordingly, learned appellate Court rejected this ground. Thereafter, learned appellate Court on the basis of appreciation of the material placed on record by the complainant as well as on the basis of appreciation of the reasonings given by the learned trial Court in allowing the complaint and convicting the accused, upheld the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment passed by learned appellate Court, the accused has filed the present revision petition. 10. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the judgments passed by learned Courts below whereby the accused has been convicted, are liable to be set aside on this score alone that the learned trial Court which at the first instance had adjudicated upon the matter had no territorial jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, Accordingly, on this ground, it has been argued that the judgments under challenge were perverse and were liable to be set aside. No other point was urged. 11. On the other hand, Mr. B.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/complainant submitted that the petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below on this count for the reason that the accused at no stage during pendency of the case before learned trial Court ever objected to this fact that learned trial Court was not having territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. According to learned Senior Counsel, once the accused had submitted himself to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla and had acquiesced to the trial of the said case by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla, he was estopped both at the appellate stage and now before this Court from challenging the judgment passed by both the learned Courts below on this ground. Mr. Mr. Chauhan further argued that even otherwise, the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court and upheld by learned appellate Court was protected by the provisions of Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 because it is not the case of the petitioner that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction with the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla to adjudicate upon the matter arising out of Negotiable Instruments Act nor the petitioner has been able to demonstrate as to what prejudice has been caused to him on account of the accused having been tried by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla. Accordingly, Mr. Chauhan submitted that there was no merit in the present petition and the same was liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records of the case. 13. The factum of cheques in question issued by the accused in favour of the complainant being payable in UCO Bank at Kotkhai is not in dispute. Further, the factum of said cheques having been presented by the complainant for encashment with his banker, i.e. State Bank of India at Kotkhai is also not in dispute. Further, the factum of the said cheques having been dishonoured at Kotkhai is also not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that mere sending of a demand notice from Shimla cannot confer any territorial jurisdiction on the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla to take cognizance and try a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, in which cause of action has arisen in Kotkhai. However, the fact of the matter still remains that when the complaint was filed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Shimla and the case was tried by learned Judicial Magistrate, no objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the said Court was taken by the accused. On the contrary, the accused contested the case on merits and suffered the judgment passed by learned trial Court. 14. Incidentally, a perusal of the grounds of appeal filed before learned Appellate Court also demonstrates that it was not the case of accused in appeal that though the issue of jurisdiction was raised before learned trial Court, but the same was not answered by it. 14. Incidentally, a perusal of the grounds of appeal filed before learned Appellate Court also demonstrates that it was not the case of accused in appeal that though the issue of jurisdiction was raised before learned trial Court, but the same was not answered by it. Therefore, it is apparent and evident that the accused submitted himself to the territorial jurisdiction of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla and also acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the said Court and contested the case before the said Court on merit. It is only after he was convicted by learned trial Court that he raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in appeal. 15. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides as under: "462. Proceedings in wrong place. - No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice." 16. Therefore, it is evident that under the provisions of Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court can be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong Sessions Division, District, Sub-Division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has occasioned a failure of justice. 17. Coming to the facts of the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy as to what prejudice was caused to the accused by the trial of the said case before learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla. He has not been able to point out any fact from which it can be deciphered that because the trial took place before learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla, this has occasioned failure of justice. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the Court of learned Judicial Magistrates 1st Class, Shimla was not otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a case under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 18. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the Court of learned Judicial Magistrates 1st Class, Shimla was not otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a case under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 18. Another important aspect of the matter is that the case has been adjudicated by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla which Court is under Sessions Division, Shimla. As per the petitioner, the case should have been tried by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Theog, which Court is also incidentally within the Sessions Division, Shimla. 19. Jurisdiction of a Judicial Magistrate is governed by Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as under: "14. Local jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrates. (1) Subject to the control of the High Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, define the local limits of the areas within which the Magistrates appointed under section 11 or under section 13 may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code: Provided that the Court of a Special Judicial Magistrate may hold its sitting at any place within the local area for which it is established.] (2) Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend throughout the district. (3) Where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate, appointed under section 11 or section 13 or section 18, extends to an area beyond the district, or the metropolitan area, as the case may be, in which he ordinarily holds Court, any reference in this Code to the Court of Session, Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall, in relation to such Magistrate, throughout the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed, unless the context otherwise requires, as a reference to the Court of Session, Chief Judicial Magistrate, or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district or metropolitan area." 20. Further, Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as under: "15. Subordination of Judicial Magistrates. (1) Every Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge; and every other Judicial Magistrate shall, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, be subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Further, Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as under: "15. Subordination of Judicial Magistrates. (1) Every Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge; and every other Judicial Magistrate shall, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, be subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders, consistent with this Code, as to the distribution of business among the Judicial Magistrates subordinate to him." 21. This Court in Sanjay Kumar & Ors. v. State of H.P., 2008 (1) Current Law Journal 184 has held that this Court in exercise of its powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has issued a Notification authorising all the Judicial Magistrates posted within a particular District to exercise the powers of inquiry and trial in respect of the cases pertaining to any part of the District. That is to say, the Magistrates have been conferred the powers to be exercised by them throughout the area of the District they are posted in. 22. Learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla is posted in District Shimla. According to the petitioner, the jurisdiction to try the present petition was with learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Theog, which is also posted in District Shimla. Therefore, even according to the petitioner, the case was triable before a Judicial Magistrate in District Shimla, though at Theog, but not at proper Shimla. Keeping in view what has been held by this Court in the above mentioned case, it is apparently clear that learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Shimla is duly authorised to exercise the powers of inquiry and trial in respect of a case pertaining to any part or area of the District, i.e. District Shimla as the said Magistrate has been conferred the powers to be exercised by it throughout the area of the District he is posted. This Court does not intend to say that all cases of Negotiable Instruments Act pertaining to District Shimla can be tried by a Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Shimla, especially in view of the amendment carried out in the Negotiable Instruments Act, but, the fact of the matter still remains that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case wherein issue of territorial jurisdiction was not raised during the entire period when the case was being tried by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and it has been raised only at the appellate stage, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is saved by the provisions under Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the findings returned by this Court in the above mentioned case. 23. The Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v. Dev Raj Vijh, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1101 has held: "7. Section 531 of the Code reads an follows - "531. No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice." The section therefore relates to a defect of jurisdiction. As has been stated by this Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. The State of West Bengal those are two types of jurisdiction of a criminal court, namely, (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to try particular kinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to the root of the matter and any transgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a preemptory character and is curable under section 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided "just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court. Territorial jurisdiction is provided "just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court. Sub-section (8) of section 488 in fact provides that proceedings under the section "may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child." This therefore is ordinarily the requirement as to the filing of an application under section 488 within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned." 24. It has also been held by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1354. "14. The High Court, however, observed that provisions of Section 465, Cr. P. C. cannot be made use of to regularise this trial. No reasons have been stated for this conclusion. Section 465, Cr. P. C. reads as under: "Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity: (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court, shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings." It is provided that a finding or sentence passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction could not be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity if no prejudice is caused to the accused. It is not disputed that this question was neither raised by the accused at the trial nor any prejudice was pleaded either at the trial or at the appellate stage and therefore in absence of any prejudice such a technical objection will not affect the order or sentence passed by competent court. Apart from Sections 465,462 provides for remedy in cases of trial in wrong places. Section 462 reads as under: "Proceedings in wrong place: No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry trial or other proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local are unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice." This provision even saves a decision if the trial has taken place in a wrong Session Division or Sub-Division or a district or other local area and such an error could only be of some consequence if it results in failure of justice otherwise no finding or sentence could be set aside only on the basis of such an error. 15. It is therefore clear that even if the trial before the III Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge would have been in a Division other than the Bangalore Metropolitan Area for which HI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge is also notified to be a Sessions Judge still the trial could not have been quashed in view of Section 462. This goes a long way to show that even if a trial takes place in a wrong place where the Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case still unless failure of justice is pleaded and proved, the trial cannot be quashed. In this view of the matter therefore reading Section 462 along with Section 465 clearly goes to show that the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that where there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction merely either on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction or on the ground of any irregularity of procedure an order or sentence awarded by a competent court could not be set aside unless a prejudice is pleaded and proved which will mean failure of justice. But in absence of such a plea merely on such technical ground the order or sentence passed by a competent court could not be quashed. 16. It is not disputed that the plea of prejudice or failure of justice is neither pleaded nor proved. Not only that even the judgment of the High Court does not indicate any possibility of prejudice or failure of justice. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent also did not suggest, any possibility of prejudice or failure of justice. Under these circumstances therefore the view taken by the High Court does not appear to be correct in view of the language of Section 462 read with Section 465. The judgment of the High Court is therefore set aside. The direction of remand made by the High Court is also quashed. It is unfortunate that these matters pertaining to incidents of 1980 should not have been disposed of till today and that the matter should have remained pending on such technical grounds for all these years. We therefore direct that the appeals be remitted back to (he High Court so that they are heard and disposed of on merits as expeditiously as possible." 25. Recently, the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Ex-Gnr Ajeet Singh, (2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 186 : (2013 AIR SCW 2116 (Paras 20, 21, 22) has held: "22. So far as the failure of justice is concerned. this Court in Barbara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 840 : ( AIR 2013 SC 840 ) held that: "Failure of justice" is an extremely pliable or facile expression, which can be made to fit into any situation in any case. The court must endeavour to find the truth. There would be "failure of justice": not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to produce requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and also safeguarded, but they should not be over emphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in respect of the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. "Prejudice" is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in respect of the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. "Prejudice" is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to matters falling outside their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious prejudice caused to him. with respect to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under criminal jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders of the court." (Emphasis added) (See also: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 ; Rafiq Ahmed alias Rafi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 3114 ; Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485 and Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2012 SC 3026 23. In Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P., AIR 2012 SC 1979 , this court dealt with the issue of the liberal approach adopted by the court to grant an unwarranted acquittal, and held that while dealing with a criminal case, it is a matter of paramount importance for any court to ensure that the miscarriage of justice be avoided in all circumstances. (See also: Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 3617 ; and S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman & Ors., (2011)2 SCC 83 24. The expression "failure of justice" would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon. The Court has to examine whether there is really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure, not technicalities of law can stand in its way. Even the law bends before justice. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the "guilty should be punished" and that technicalities and irregularities, which do not occasion the "failure of justice" are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end as this would be counter-productive. "Courts exist to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. The interests of justice equally demand that the "guilty should be punished" and that technicalities and irregularities, which do not occasion the "failure of justice" are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end as this would be counter-productive. "Courts exist to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. And, the justice to be dispensed, is not palm-tree justice or idiosyncratic justice". Law is not an escape route for law breakers. If this is allowed, this may lead to greater injustice than upholding the rule of law. The guilty man, therefore, should be punished, and in case substantial justice has been done, it should not be defeated when pitted against technicalities. (Vide : Ramesh Kumar v. Ram Kumar & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1929; S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595; State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1660 ; and Shaman Saheb M. Multani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 921 ." 26. Therefore, keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the discussion held above, in my considered view, there is no merit in the present petition and the learned appellate Court has rightly upheld the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court in view of the statutory provisions of Section 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit.