Janshakti Shikshan Sanstha, Pandharkawada, Distt. Yavatmal through its Secretary v. Kum. Karuna Baburao Patil alias Smt. Karuna w/o Govindrao Kale
2016-08-22
INDIRA JAIN, VASANTI A.NAIK
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Whether an appeal under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to the Act for the sake of brevity) could be filed by an employee against an order of termination before the date on which the termination is to take effect, is the question that is required to be answered by this Division Bench. Though a writ petition challenging the order of the University and College Tribunal in an appeal under Section 59 of the Act needs to be placed before the learned Single Judge for hearing in view of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, the occasion for placing this matter before the Division Bench is referable to the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 22.8.2000. After disagreeing with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in the judgment, reported in People's Welfare Society v. Second Labour Court, Civil Linesw, Nagpur, 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. page 707, the learned Single Judge hearing this petition on 22.8.2000 requested the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice, that the matter should be placed before the Division Bench for deciding whether an appeal under Section 59 of the Act could be filed against the order of termination, dismissal or removal though the termination is to take effect on a date, subsequent to the date of filing of the appeal. 2. The petitioner - Management had by the order, dated 25.1.1999 terminated the services of the respondent w.e.f. 30.4.1999, that is, after the completion of the notice period. On the receipt of the said order, dated 25.1.1999, the respondent filed an appeal before the University and College Tribunal on 6.2.1999. The appeal filed by the respondent was allowed by the Tribunal, by the judgment, dated 7.5.1999. The said judgment is challenged by the petitioner - Management in this writ petition. When this matter came up for admission and hearing before the learned Single Judge of this Court on 22.8.2000, a submission was made on behalf of the petitioner - Management by placing reliance on a judgment of another learned Single Judge, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by the respondent, as in view of the provisions of Section 59 (1) of the Act, an appeal could have been filed only by an employee, who is dismissed, terminated or removed.
It was canvassed before the learned Single Judge on 22.8.2000 that the respondent's services were not terminated on the date of filing the appeal, i.e., on 6.2.1999, as by the order dated 25.1.1999, the termination was to take effect only on 30.4.1999. The learned Single Judge, however, on a reading of the provisions of Section 59 (2) of the Act, disagreed with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the judgment, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 as in the view of the learned Single Judge that was hearing this writ petition, if the respondent would have waited for his termination to take effect on 30.4.1999, he would have run the risk of filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. In view of the divergence in the views of the two learned Single Judges, the learned Single Judge hearing this writ petition on 22.8.2000 requested the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice to place the matter before the Division Bench for appropriate orders. In pursuance of the said order, dated 22.8.2000, the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice had directed the placement of this writ petition before the Division Bench. However, neither the learned Single Judge hearing the writ petition on 22.8.2000 nor the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice have framed the question for reference. Though the question is not framed, it is clear that the question that arises for consideration in the matter placed before us is, whether an employee is entitled to file the appeal against the order of termination though the actual termination is to take effect later, that is, after the filing of the appeal. 3. Shri Gordey, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner - Society relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 to submit that a Tribunal, constituted under the Maharashtra Universities Act, has no jurisdiction to decide the case of threatened dismissal or termination of an employee. It is submitted that a right of appeal is available to an employee only after he/she is dismissed, removed or otherwise terminated. It is submitted that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the judgment, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 reflects the correct position of law and this Court may hold that in the circumstances of the case, the right of appeal would not be available.
It is submitted that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the judgment, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 reflects the correct position of law and this Court may hold that in the circumstances of the case, the right of appeal would not be available. It is, however, fairly stated that while expressing the aforesaid view in the judgment, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 707 , the learned Single Judge had not considered the provisions of Section 59 of the Act in the entirety and the provisions of Sub Section 2 of Section 59 of the Act were not considered. 4. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge while recording the order of disagreement, dated 22.8.2000 would be the expression of the correct position of law. It is submitted that on a combined reading of the provisions of Section 59 (1) and (2) and Section 60 of the Act, it is clear that an employee would have a right to file an appeal after he/she receives the order of termination or dismissal and the fact that the termination would take effect on a subsequent date would not disentitle the employee to file the appeal. It is submitted that in any case, the defect, if any, in filing the appeal before the date on which the actual termination takes effect would stand cured by the pendency of the appeal, till the date on which the termination takes effect. It is submitted that in the judgment, reported in 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. page 707, the Hon'ble Single Judge was considering the question whether the Labour Court under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 could grant an interim relief in an action initiated by an employee against an order of termination that was to take effect on a subsequent date and the question involved in this case did not fall for consideration in that case. 5. For deciding the question that falls for consideration in this case, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 59 of the Act.
5. For deciding the question that falls for consideration in this case, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Section 59 of the Act. The relevant provisions of the Act read thus :- "Section 59 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the time being in force, any employee (whether a teacher or other employee) in any university, college or recognised institution (other than that managed and maintained by the State Government, Central Government or a local authority), who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank by the university or management and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and any appeal against any such order (shall) lie to the Tribunal : Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a court or Tribunal of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such court or Tribunal on the date of commencement of this Act or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the management at any time before the date on which this Act comes into force and in which case the period for filing an appeal has expired. (2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of services, or reduction in rank, as the case may be : Provided that, where such order was made before the date of commencement of this Act, such appeal may be made if the period of thirty days from the date of receipt of such order has not expired." 6. On a reading of the provisions of Section 59 of the Act, it is clear that an appeal could be filed by a teaching or a non-teaching employee of any University, College or a recognised Institution, who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated. In this case the order of termination, dated 25.1.1999 is served on the respondent - employee by the Management and the order recites that the services of the respondent shall stand terminated w.e.f. 30.4.1999.
In this case the order of termination, dated 25.1.1999 is served on the respondent - employee by the Management and the order recites that the services of the respondent shall stand terminated w.e.f. 30.4.1999. It is apparent on a reading of the said order that the services of the respondent were terminated by the petitioner - Management by the order, dated 25.1.1999 and only the termination was to take effect on a subsequent date, on the expiry of the notice period, on 30.4.1999. The services of the respondent stood terminated by the order of termination, though the termination was to take effect on a subsequent date. It is not the case of the petitioner - Management that the services of the respondent were not terminated by the order, dated 25.1.1999 and hence it cannot be a case of threatened termination. On a reading of paragraph 6 of the order of termination, it appears that by the said order, the respondent was informed that his services would stand terminated w.e.f. 30.4.1999. It would be necessary to hold that if an order terminating the services of an employee is served on the employee, the employee would have a right to file an appeal against his termination, though the actual termination is to take effect from a date, that is, subsequent to the order of termination. The provisions of Sub Section 2 of Section 59 of the Act throw some light on the question that falls for consideration before us. It would be necessary to harmoniously read the provisions of Sub Section 1 and 2 of Section 59 of the Act to give effect to the provision in respect of the right to appeal. Sub Section 2 of Section 59 of the Act refers to the presentation of the appeal by an employee within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order of termination, dismissal or removal and does not provide that the appeal could be filed by an employee within 30 days from the date of order of termination or the date on which the termination takes effect. Sub Section 2 of Section 59 refers to the receipt of an order of termination, dismissal or removal and does not refer to the date on which the termination, removal or dismissal is to take effect.
Sub Section 2 of Section 59 refers to the receipt of an order of termination, dismissal or removal and does not refer to the date on which the termination, removal or dismissal is to take effect. Though the provisions of Sub Section 1 of Section 59 are clear, Sub Section 2 of Section 59 of the Act throw greater light on the controversy for leading to a conclusion that an appeal could be filed by an employee against the order of termination, dismissal or removal, though the actual termination would take effect on a date, subsequent to the filing of the appeal. Our view could be further fortified by the provisions of Sub Section 1 of Section 60 of the Act that refer to the powers of the Tribunal to stay the effect, operation of any order against which an appeal is made. 7. After holding that an appeal could be filed by an employee against the order of termination, dismissal or removal, though the termination, dismissal or removal would take effect on a date subsequent to the filing of the appeal, we direct the Registry to place the matter before the learned Single Judge for hearing the writ petition on merits.