JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant, a former Talati cum Mantri, has prayed for the following reliefs; "(A) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue any appropriate writ order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside the judgment in Appeal No. 62/2005 produced at Annex-A together with penalty order dated 15.6.2004 and order passed by Dy. D.D.O. dated 18.2.2005. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant all the consequential reliefs in terms of reinstatement in the service with continuity wages and all other benefits as a result of granting prayer-A as above. (C) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition Your Lordship may be pleased to grant stay against any further implementation and operation of the impugned judgment and penalty order dated 15.6.2004, and direct the respondents to take the petitioner on job subject to the result of the petition. (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant the cost of this petition." 2. The case of the applicant may be summarized as under; 3. The applicant, at the relevant point of time, was serving as a Talati cum Mantri of the Village: Palasa, Taluka: Kalol, District: Panchmahals. A departmental charge-sheet came to be issued against him on the allegations that he made the payment to the beneficiaries of a scheme by way of bearer cheques and not by way of account payee cheques. It appears that for the purpose of up-liftment of the landless agricultural village labourers and to bring the economically backward class people to a higher standard of living, a scheme of upgrading the residential houses in the villages was introduced. After a survey, 99 villagers were found to be falling within the scheme and were recommended to be given the financial assistance for repairs of their residential houses. For this purpose, an amount of Rs. 1,48,500/- was sanctioned and placed at the disposal of the Taluka Panchayat, Godhra. The allegations are that this amount came to be misappropriated by the applicant herein along with the others. According to the scheme, the amount was to be released and paid only after the spot inspection of the houses repaired houses. The authorities found that none of the 99 beneficiaries had undertaken any repairs of their houses. The allegations are that this amount came to be misappropriated by the applicant herein along with the others. According to the scheme, the amount was to be released and paid only after the spot inspection of the houses repaired houses. The authorities found that none of the 99 beneficiaries had undertaken any repairs of their houses. Despite the same, it was certified that the necessary repairs had been undertaken and completed. 4. After the issue of the departmental charge-sheet, the applicant, as the delinquent, filed his reply to the same denying all the allegations. 5. An Inquiry Officer was appointed for the conduct of the departmental inquiry. At the end of the departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Officer reached to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the applicant herein was found to be established. 6. The Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the Deputy District Development Officer, Panchmahals, relying on the report of the Inquiry Officer, passed an order dated 15th June, 2004, which is at page-60, Annexure-H, removing the applicant herein from the service in exercise of his powers under the Gujarat Panchayat Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1997. 7. The applicant, being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority removing him from the service, preferred an appeal under Rule 15 of the Rules, 1997. The District Development Officer, as the Appellate Authority, thought fit to dismiss the appeal vide order dated 18th February, 2005. 8. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Appellate Authority, the applicant preferred Appeal No. 62 of 2005 before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal, Gandhinagar. The Tribunal, vide order dated 27th May, 2006, dismissed the appeal and thereby affirmed the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority. 9. Being dissatisfied, the applicant has come up with this application invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. Mr. R.D. Raval, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the authorities including the Tribunal committed a serious error in passing the impugned orders. Mr. Raval submits that his client had practically no role to play in the alleged fraud. Mr. Raval very fairly submitted that the only role that could be attributed to his client is that he, in his capacity as the Talati cum Mantri, handed over the 99 cheques to the individual beneficiaries. According to Mr. Mr. Raval submits that his client had practically no role to play in the alleged fraud. Mr. Raval very fairly submitted that the only role that could be attributed to his client is that he, in his capacity as the Talati cum Mantri, handed over the 99 cheques to the individual beneficiaries. According to Mr. Raval, there is not an iota of evidence to even remotely suggest that the applicant herein misappropriated the amount. He pointed out that none of the 99 cheques were signed by the applicant. The cheques in question were signed jointly by the Sarpanch and a member of the Panchayat. 11. According to Mr. Raval, if the drawers of the cheques had not crossed the same or had not stated to be account payee, then the applicant, as the disbursing authority, could not have crossed those cheques. 12. Mr. Raval pointed out that there was a criminal prosecution also against his client and others. I take notice of the fact that three persons were prosecuted for the offence punishable under sections 465, 467, 420, 408, 409 read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge-sheet culminated in Criminal Case No. 1427 of 1995. The criminal case was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panchmahals, Godhra. The Trial Court, vide judgment and order dated 19th March, 2010, acquitted all the accused including the applicant herein. Mr. Raval further pointed out that when the appeal came to be dismissed by the Tribunal in the year 2006, the criminal prosecution was still pending. The judgment and order of acquittal is dated 19th March, 2010. 13. Mr. Raval submitted that the entire inquiry conducted against his client stood vitiated on account of an illegal procedure adopted by the Inquiry Officer. Mr. Raval pointed out that the departmental inquiry which was conducted against one Mr. Babat, Additional Executive Engineer, was considered as the departmental inquiry against the applicant. To put it in other words, whatever oral evidence was led in the departmental inquiry against Mr. Babat, the very same oral evidence was relied upon, later on, in the departmental inquiry against the applicant herein. According to Mr. Raval, his client had no opportunity to cross-examine any of those witnesses who were examined in the departmental inquiry, which was instituted against Mr. Babat. 14. According to him, the oral evidence, which was led in the departmental inquiry of Mr. According to Mr. Raval, his client had no opportunity to cross-examine any of those witnesses who were examined in the departmental inquiry, which was instituted against Mr. Babat. 14. According to him, the oral evidence, which was led in the departmental inquiry of Mr. Babat, could not have been relied upon to hold the applicant herein guilty of the charge. 15. Lastly, Mr. Raval pointed out that his client had put in 33 years of unblemished spotless service. He had just 5 years of service left before he came to be removed from the service. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Raval prays that there being merit in this application, the same may be allowed and the impugned orders be quashed. 17. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. U.M. Shastri, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 18. Mr. Shastri submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the authorities including the Tribunal in passing the impugned orders. According to Mr. Shastri, no interference is warranted in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. Mr. Shastri, however, with a view to assist the Court very fairly pointed out the following; "(i) The entire oral evidence, which was recorded in the departmental inquiry of Mr. Babat, Additional Executive Engineer, was relied upon for the purpose of holding the applicant herein guilty of the charge. (ii) None of the witnesses, who were examined by the department in the departmental inquiry against Mr. Babat, were produced in the departmental inquiry of the applicant herein. (iii) The above issue was raised by the applicant before the Inquiring Officer, but the objection was overruled. (iv) No opportunity was given to the delinquent, i.e., the applicant herein to cross-examine any of the witnesses. (v) There is no evidence to even remotely suggest that there was misappropriation of the funds by the applicant herein. (vi) The applicant had merely distributed the 99 cheques to the 99 beneficiaries in his capacity as the Talati cum Mantri. (vii) Those cheques were signed by the Sarpanch and the joint holder of the account, i.e. one of the members of the Panchayat. (viii) The criminal prosecution against the applicant herein and the other two persons resulted in acquittal. (vi) The applicant had merely distributed the 99 cheques to the 99 beneficiaries in his capacity as the Talati cum Mantri. (vii) Those cheques were signed by the Sarpanch and the joint holder of the account, i.e. one of the members of the Panchayat. (viii) The criminal prosecution against the applicant herein and the other two persons resulted in acquittal. (ix) In the criminal trial, almost 40 witnesses were examined, i.e., the 40 beneficiaries. (x) None of those witnesses supported the case of the prosecution. (xi) They all deposed before the Court that they had received the amount of the cheque." 20. However, according to Mr. Shastri, the above by itself is not sufficient to give a clean chit to the applicant. Mr. Shastri submits that the removal from the service is based on some evidence on record. He further contends that if there is some material and the allegations are proved in the inquiry, and the same are accepted by the Appellate Authority as well as the Tribunal, then this Court should not generally interfere by exercising the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution as an Appellate Authority. According to Mr. Shastri, the High Court can only interfere when such finding is based on inadmissible evidence or perverse. According to Mr. Shastri, the applicant should have been careful before handing over the cheques. According to Mr. Shastri, he could have brought to the notice of the authorities concerned that having regard to the amount filled-in in the cheques, those cheques could not have been issued as the bearer cheques. Those cheques could have been issued only as the account payee cheques. He, therefore, prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. 21. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is that whether the authorities and the Tribunal committed any error in passing the impugned orders. 22. The Tribunal, while dismissing the appeal of the applicant herein, observed as under; "9. Shri N.P. Jalaiya, Incharge Dy. D.D.O. made a point that the order of punishment was passed after all the facts were considered including the contradiction which the advocate of the appellant was pointing out. He pointed out the financial rules regarding payment of Account Payee Cheques if amount happens to be more than Rs. 500/-. Shri N.P. Jalaiya, Incharge Dy. D.D.O. made a point that the order of punishment was passed after all the facts were considered including the contradiction which the advocate of the appellant was pointing out. He pointed out the financial rules regarding payment of Account Payee Cheques if amount happens to be more than Rs. 500/-. Therefore, there is clear violation of this rule on the part of Shri Panchal and to say that he had done it at the instance of the Sarpanch of the village is no sound defense. The fact that the building has not come up and the fact that some of the beneficiaries say not to have received any amount can be more than adequate ground for assuming Shri Panchal's involvement in not providing necessary assistance to the beneficiaries. 10. On going through the case papers and shifting arguments brought before this Tribunal during the course of hearing it becomes clear that the amounts to be given economic up grading was not actually given. Some beneficiaries have clearly stated not to have received money. Some have stated that even though they had received money, for various reasons they used it for some other purpose. Even if some people might have received money, the fact remains that there are persons who did not receive money and that as per the documentary evidence they also had taken the amount. This coupled wit the fact of violation of the Financial Rules by issuing Bearer Cheques instead of Account Payee Cheques is definitely a pointer against Shri Panchal. To take shelter that it was under the Sarpanch's instructions is too lame an excuse to accept either in the departmental inquiry or in any court for that matter. 11. It is a fact that a criminal case against Shri Panchal has also been filed and the case is yet to be decided. However, there is no ban to proceed departmentally against Shri Panchal and to take a decision as warranted by the facts and that is precisely what has been done by the Deputy District Development Officer, Godhra. We do not find any strong reason brought on record to change the order of the latter. In view of this, we feel that the appeal can not be entertained. Hence, we pass the following order." 23. We do not find any strong reason brought on record to change the order of the latter. In view of this, we feel that the appeal can not be entertained. Hence, we pass the following order." 23. So far as the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 15th June, 2004 is concerned, Annexure-H, Page-60, the same is a non-speaking order. No reasons worth the name are to be found in the order. There is no discussion of any nature in the order. 24. The same mistake came to be committed by the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority is also a non-speaking order. Nothing has been considered by the Appellate Authority. I take notice of the manifold grounds raised in the memo of the appeal. The copy of the memo of the appeal is at Page-29 of the paper-book. I do not find discussion of any of those 13 grounds. The law in this regard is well settled. 25. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Maganbhai Oza v. State of Gujarat reported in 2016 (2) GLR 1607 , this court observed as under:-- "8.1 Legal importance of the reasons in an order was explained by the Supreme Court in Daya Ram v. Raghunath [ (2007) 11 SCC 241 ] in the following words. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the inscrutable face of the sphinx, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking order. 8.2 Recording of reasons is an aspect of natural justice. The reasons properly recorded in support of an order is the natural justice duly complied with in that part. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking order. 8.2 Recording of reasons is an aspect of natural justice. The reasons properly recorded in support of an order is the natural justice duly complied with in that part. The principle that the reason in an order is an ingredient of natural justice becomes clear from the following judgment of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla & Bros., [ (2010) 4 SCC 785 ], the Apex Court observed as under, The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities.... (Para 14)" 26. In B.V. Gor v. Gujarat Water Supply And Sewerage Board & Anr. reported in 2011 (4) GLR 3211, I have explained what is expected of the appellate authority and how he supposed to decide the appeal. I may quote the observations as under:-- "5. It is abundantly clear from the notings in the file that there is no order passed by the appellate authority which would indicate any independent application of mind by the appellate authority. The findings which are recorded by the disciplinary authority can always be reappreicated by the appellate authority. As an appellate authority, it can take a different view on the same set of evidence. Appellate authority also owes a duty to see as to whether procedure laid down in the rules was complied with, inquiry officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him and, whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 6. I am of the view that the appellate authority has failed to discharge his duty as the law demands. Appeal is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner as a delinquent. 6. I am of the view that the appellate authority has failed to discharge his duty as the law demands. Appeal is a statutory remedy available to the petitioner as a delinquent. It is a valuable right which the rules has conferred upon the petitioner as a delinquent and, therefore the delinquent is well within his rights to expect the appellate authority to reconsider the entire matter being the final fact finding authority. 7. I am not at all satisfied with the manner in which the appeal is decided and disposed of. It is a settled position of law that an appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regard the compliance of the requirement of the law while exercising his jurisdiction under the Rules. 7.1 In case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [1991 (1) SCC 759], it has been stated as under: "The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities." (Emphasis supplied) 7.2 In case of Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co Ltd., & Ors., [ AIR 2006 SC 1748 ], in paragraph No. 36 and 37 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: 36. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The appellate authority, when the rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression 'consider' is of some significance. The appellate authority, when the rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression 'consider' is of some significance. In the context of the rules, the appellate authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the rules was complied with; (ii) the Enquiry Officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 37. In R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 ] this Court opined: "The word "consider" in Rule 27(2) implies "due application of mind". It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the Appellate Authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the Appellate Authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 7.3 In a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the matter of Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem & Ors. v. Madhusudhan Rao reported in (2008) 3 SCC 469 , the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph No. 20 as under: "20. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum." 7.4 In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would also be appropriate for me to quote the well known judgment of the Apex Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab. It was a case where a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court had to consider the effect of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not communicated. This is how the Apex Court dealt with the effect of the noting by a Minister on a file: [ AIR 1963 SC 395 (Para No. 9)]. "9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones." (emphasis supplied) 27. It is well settled principle of law that this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, is not an Appellate Authority while reviewing a question of fact. Therefore, the High Court should not review the evidence and reverse a finding of fact based on evidence. Of course, if the finding is not based on any evidence or is based on inadmissible evidence, or there is an error of law apparent on the face of record, there is no bar to this Court to interfere. A similar question fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Ram Rao (1964-II-LLJ-150). Speaking for the Constitution Bench, justice Shah observed; Page 154 "The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry of where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrive at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the constitution. A similar view was taken by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964-II-LLJ-38). A similar view was taken by the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964-II-LLJ-38). To the same effect, decisions were rendered in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972-I-LLJ-1) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. (1983-II-LLJ-1) and State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991-I-LLJ-269)" 28. It is also a settled principle of law that perverse evidence cannot be an admissible evidence. A finding based on perverse evidence has to be stated as a finding based on no evidence, or is based on inadmissible evidence. Hear, it is relevant to refer what is the meaning of 'No evidence" from Wade on the Administrative Law (Fifth Edition) at page 287. "No evidence does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding; or where in other words no Tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence (R.V. Robertys (1909) IKB page 407 @ 423). This no evidence principle clearly has something in common that the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is authorised and ultra vires." 29. A reading of the above makes it clear that the finding based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or on evidence which is not legal, is perverse and the same amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record and the High Court can interfere while exercising power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 30. It is true that the criminal prosecution against the applicant herein resulted in an acquittal. I do not intend to say or take the view that since the applicant came to be acquitted in the criminal prosecution, he should be exonerated departmentally also. It is settled law that in the criminal prosecution the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental inquiries, the charge has to be proved on the preponderance of probability. I also take notice of the fact that the acquittal was on account of the fact that all the 40 witnesses turned hostile. It is settled law that in the criminal prosecution the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental inquiries, the charge has to be proved on the preponderance of probability. I also take notice of the fact that the acquittal was on account of the fact that all the 40 witnesses turned hostile. None of those supported the case of the prosecution and they all resiled from their police statements recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. The judgment and order of acquittal has not appealed me at all, except the fact which I have taken note of that the applicant came to be acquitted. 31. What has appealed to me is the dubious manner in which the entire inquiry came to be conducted. I just fail to understand how could the oral evidence recorded in the departmental inquiry of one Shri Babat, the Additional Executive Engineer, be relied upon so far as the inquiry against the applicant is concerned. The applicant, from day one, kept on telling the Inquiry Officer that he had no opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses who were examined during the course of the departmental inquiry against Mr. Babat. This aspect was highlighted in the appeal also before the Appellate Authority. This aspect was even highlighted before the Tribunal, but I do not find any discussion worth the name in this regard. 32. I am of the view that the undisputed facts, which have surfaced on record, should be sufficient to quash the impugned orders. There is one additional factor which has weighed with me in the present case. The departmental inquiry against Mr. Babat was with the allegations that he, in his capacity as the Additional Executive Engineer, should have personally verified whether the beneficiaries had undertaken the necessary repairs of their individual houses or not. The charge against Mr. Babat was that he was negligent in this regard. However, for the reasons best known to the authorities, Mr. Babat came to be fully exonerated from the departmental inquiry. Whatever was said in the inquiry of Mr. Babat against the applicant herein weighed with the authorities in reaching to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty of the charge. 33. Babat was that he was negligent in this regard. However, for the reasons best known to the authorities, Mr. Babat came to be fully exonerated from the departmental inquiry. Whatever was said in the inquiry of Mr. Babat against the applicant herein weighed with the authorities in reaching to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty of the charge. 33. Neither in the order of the Disciplinary Authority nor in the order passed by the Appellate Authority or the Tribunal, there is any reference of the fact that the applicant herein misappropriated the amount. To handover the bearer cheques to the beneficiaries, instead of the account payee cheques or cross cheques, is something different from saying that the amount mentioned in the cheque has been misappropriated. I am told that so far as the Sarpanch is concerned, i.e., one of the signatories to the cheques, he was removed from his office for drawing the bearer cheques. Nothing is coming on the record what happened to the member of the Panchayat who was the joint signatory on the cheques. 34. Thus, in the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that the allegations levelled against the applicant could not be said to have been proved even on preponderance of probability. Let me assume for the time being that he was negligent to a certain extent. When I say negligent, he could have brought to the notice of the authorities that the cheques should be crossed or the account payee and not the bearer. However, such lapse, by itself, should not warrant penalty of removal from the service and more, particularly, when the applicant had put in 33 years of spotless service and was left only with 5 years of service before attaining superannuation. 35. The last question is what relief should be granted. I am of the view, having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that only 5 years of service was left, the period between 2004 and 2009 should be treated notionally for all purposes so that, at least, the applicant would be able to get the retiral benefits. 36. I am of the view, having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that only 5 years of service was left, the period between 2004 and 2009 should be treated notionally for all purposes so that, at least, the applicant would be able to get the retiral benefits. 36. Having regard to the defective departmental inquiry, I could have ordered for a de novo inquiry with a view to give an opportunity to the applicant to cross-examine the witnesses who were examined by the department in the departmental inquiry of Mr. Babat. However, taking into consideration the fact that almost 12 years have passed from the date the first order of removal was passed, and 9 years from the date of filing of the application, and also considering the fact that the applicant attained the age of superannuation in the year 2009, it will be unreasonable to do so. Probably, it would be difficult even to secure the presence of those beneficiaries after these many years. 37. As a result of the above discussion, the impugned orders are hereby quashed. There is no question of ordering reinstatement in service because the applicant has already attained the age of superannuation in the year 2009. The period between 2004 and 2009 shall be treated as on duty notionally without the back wages. 38. The authorities concerned shall calculate and work out the retiral benefits which the applicant would have otherwise received if he would have been in service and superannuated. Such benefits shall be paid to the applicant within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the writ of the order. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.