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2016 DIGILAW 151 (MAN)

L. Rochung v. State of Manipur

2016-09-06

N.KOTISWAR SINGH

body2016
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Addl. Advocate General, Manipur assisted by Mr. A. Rommel, learned Government Advocate for the State respondent 2 Nos. 1 and 2. Also heard Mr. A. Modhuchandra, learned counsel for the respondent No.3. 2. The dispute in this petition centres round the claim of Chiefship of the village of Kangreng, Churachandpur District. 3. The case of the petitioner is that, originally one Mr. Phakpu was the Chief of Kangreng Village who died in the year 1946. The petitioner states that on the death of Mr. Phakpu, his second son namely, Mr. Hleia succeeded as the Chief of Kangreng Village and on the death of the said Mr. Hleia on 20-2-2004, the present petitioner who is the son of the said Mr. Hleia became the Chief of the said village as his successor. Accordingly, on an application filed by the petitioner and after necessary enquiry, the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur passed the order on 29.10.2004 allowing transfer of the Chiefship of Kangreng Village from late Hleia to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner has become the Chief of Kangreng village. 4. The petitioner states that when the petitioner’s father, Mr. was alive, the present respondent No. 3 had raised objections regarding chiefship of Kangreng Village contending that Mr. Zolien, the father of Zawlthanlien (respondent No.3), being the eldest son of Mr. Phakpu would inherit the chiefship as per the customary law following the law of primogeniture on the death of Mr. Phakpu. Thus, after the death of Mr. Zolien, the respondent No.3 being the eldest son, in turn, would inherit the Chiefship. However, when Zolien died, the present respondent No. 3, Zawlthanlien was a minor, because of which his uncle, namely, Mr. Hleia, the father of the present petitioner was acting as the regent, and also as the Chief of the village. Accordingly, the respondent No. 3, Zawlthanlien on attaining majority filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur for declaring him as the Chief of the village as the inheritor from his father, Zolien. On the basis of the aforesaid application filed by the respondent No. 3 the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 4-5-1988 in Hill Misc Matter No. 10 of 1988 directing the deletion of the name of Mr. On the basis of the aforesaid application filed by the respondent No. 3 the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 4-5-1988 in Hill Misc Matter No. 10 of 1988 directing the deletion of the name of Mr. Hleia, father of the petitioner from the Touzi Book and for recording the name of Mr. Zawlthanlien (respondent No. 3) as the Chief of Kangreng Village. It has been stated by the petitioner that being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 4-5-1988 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, directing deletion of the name of Mr. Hleia from the Touzi Book, and recording the name of the respondent No. 3, Mr. Hleia, father of the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Hill Commissioner being the appellate authority. According to the petitioner, the office of the Hill Commissioner on the advice of the Law Department decided that the dispute of chiefship was of civil nature which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court and that order of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur dated 4-5-1988 is void ab initio and parties were advised to approach the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction for settlement of the dispute as evident from the letter dated 15-9-1988 issued by the Under Secretary (Hills) Government of Manipur. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that in view of the above decision of the Commissioner (Hills), subsequently, the Deputy, Churachandpur while considering a claim for compensation payable by M/s NEEP Co. Ltd on account of damages to standing crops and trees in connection with construction of 132 KV Transmission Line to the Chief of the village, passed the order dated 27.03.1989 in Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988 in which the Deputy Commissioner recorded that a clarification sought from the Hill Commissioner’s office requesting to send a copy of the order if the order of the Deputy Commissioner had been struck down as appellate authority in connection with the appeal filed against the order dated 04.05.1988, however, no such clarification was received from the office of the Hill Commissioner. In the said order dated 27.03.1989, the Deputy Commissioner also recorded the statement of Zawlthanlien, respondent No. 3 that he had filed a case in the Civil Court at Imphal claiming the Chiefship of Kangreng Village and as such the matter has become sub-judice. It has been also recorded in the said order that Mr. In the said order dated 27.03.1989, the Deputy Commissioner also recorded the statement of Zawlthanlien, respondent No. 3 that he had filed a case in the Civil Court at Imphal claiming the Chiefship of Kangreng Village and as such the matter has become sub-judice. It has been also recorded in the said order that Mr. Hleia, the father of the present petitioner also did not make any comments in the matter. Accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner in the said order dated 27-3-1989 passed in Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988 decided that the payable to the Chief of Kangreng Village for damages caused to standing crops and trees for construction of transmission line by the M/S NEEP Co. Ltd should be returned to the said M/S NEEP Co. Ltd which is to be released to the village chief as and when the same is determined by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. In the said order dated 27-3-1989 passed in Hill Misc No. 10 of 1988 by the Deputy Commissioner, it was also clearly mentioned that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 45-1988 was cancelled and issue regarding chiefship of Kangreng will be determined by the order of the competent Civil Court. It may be mentioned that by the earlier order dated 04.05.1988 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the respondent No.3 had been recorded as the Chief of Kangreng Village. The petitioner further submits that the end result was that the petitioner’s father namely, Mr. Hleia continued to be the chief of Kangreng Village, after the earlier order dated 04.05.1988 transferring Chiefship to the respondent No. 3 was cancelled as recorded in the order dated 27.03.1989. It has been further stated by the petitioner that after the father of the petitioner, Hleia had become chief of the village, Zawlthanlien (respondent No. 3) had filed a case before the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Manipur West, being Original Suit No. 16/89/35/90 against Hleia, claiming Chiefship of the village. However, the said suit was dismissed for non prosecution is evident from the order 4-1-1992 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Manipur West. The petitioner submits that after the said civil suit filed by Zawlthanlien was dismissed on default for none appearance, there was no step taken by the respondent No. 3 to revive it. However, the said suit was dismissed for non prosecution is evident from the order 4-1-1992 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Manipur West. The petitioner submits that after the said civil suit filed by Zawlthanlien was dismissed on default for none appearance, there was no step taken by the respondent No. 3 to revive it. Hence, it will be deemed that the title of the father of the petitioner, namely, Hleia, as the Chief of Kangreng Village would remain undisturbed. The petitioner also submits that the present respondent No. 3 has not challenged the decision of the Deputy Commissioner passed on 27-3-1989 cancelling the earlier order dated 4-5-1988 by which the respondent No. 3 was declared to be the Chief of Kangreng Village. Accordingly, it has been stated that, in view of the above, the petitioner, after the death of his father, Hleia, would become Chief of the village as the rightful inheritor. The petitioner contends that thus, after the death of his father, Mr. Hleia on 20-2-2004, the petitioner submitted an application for transfer of the Chiefship of the said village before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur. The Deputy Commissioner, after making necessary enquiry in the matter transferred the Chiefship in favour of the petitioner as per customary law by issuing the order dated 29-10-2004 by directing recording of the name of the petitioner in the Touzi Book as the Chief of Kangreng Village. The petitioner contends that the said order was passed after calling for objections from interested persons through the local dailies. However, since there was no objection from any quarter, including the respondent No. 3, the Deputy Commissioner passed the aforesaid order dated 29-102004, declaring the petitioner to be the Chief of Kangreng Village. 6. The petitioner states that after about 9 (nine) years of passing of the said order by the Deputy Commissioner on 29-10-2004 declaring the petitioner to be the Chief of Kangreng Village, the present respondent No.3 filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur being Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 claiming to be the Chief of Kangreng Village on the basis of which the Deputy Commissioner passed the order dated 23.11.2013. It has been submitted by the petitioner that in the aforesaid Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 claiming to be the Chief of Kangreng Village on the basis of which the Deputy Commissioner passed the order dated 23.11.2013. It has been submitted by the petitioner that in the aforesaid Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013, the claimant Zawlthanlien, the respondent No. 3 had contended that he was only 8 years old when his father, Zolien who was the Chief of Kangreng Village died and family council appointed Mr. Hleia, the younger brother of Zolien, father of the petitioner, to take authority of the village administration till Zawlthanlien attains his majority, regarding which, there was an agreement executed between the parties stating that Mr. Hleia shall continue to be the Chief of Kangreng Village during his lifetime and after his death, Zawlthanlien, the respondent No. 3 will take over as chief of the village. It has been stated by the petitioner that the petitioner filed objections to the said application of the respondent No. 3 contending, interalia, that the Deputy Commissioner by order dated 27.03.1989 had already cancelled the earlier order dated 04.05.1988 and that the civil suit filed by the respondent No.3 was dismissed for default of appearance. Accordingly, the petitioner prayed for dismissing the application of the respondent No. 3. It has been stated by the petitioner that inspite of the objections, the Deputy Commissioner allowed the application filed by the respondent No.3 in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 and passed the order dated 23.11.2013 recognising the said Zawlthanlien, respondent No. 3 as the rightful Chief of Kangreng Village and set aside the earlier order dated 29-10-2004 transferring the Chiefship of Kangreng Village from Hleia to his son L. Rochung, the petitioner. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 23-11-2013, the petitioner approached the Commissioner (Hill) which is the Appellate Authority by submitting an appeal on 20-12-2013. The petitioner states that the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal as devoid of merit without considering the various pleas raised by the petitioner vide order dated 2010-2014 under order No. 9/1/2014-Hills passed by the Commissioner (Hills). 8. Thus being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner passed on 23-11-2013 as well as order dated 20-10-2014 passed by the Appellate Authority, the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the aforesaid orders. 9. 8. Thus being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner passed on 23-11-2013 as well as order dated 20-10-2014 passed by the Appellate Authority, the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the aforesaid orders. 9. The respondent No. 3 has vehemently objected to this writ petition by raising various grounds. Firstly, it has been contended by Mr. Modhuchandra, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 that it is not correct as submitted by the petitioner that the petitioner’s father, Mr. Hleia inherited the Chiefship after the death of Mr. Phakpu in as much as Mr. Hleia was the second son of Mr. Phakpu. He submits that the law of primogeniture is applicable amongst the tribe of the parties in deciding Chiefship of the village. According to him, as per the law of primogeniture, Zolien, who is the eldest son of the original Chief, Phakpu, and who is also the father of respondent No. 3 is the rightful inheritor of the Chiefship and not Mr. Hleia, who was the second son of Phakpu and younger brother of Zolien. In this connection, Mr. Modhuchandra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has drawn attention of this Court to Annexure-D/5, which is an extract copy of the Schedule attached to the Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947 showing the name of Zolien, who is the father of the respondent No.3 as the Chief of Kangreng Village in respect of Tamenglong Circle No. 3. According to him, this official document affirms that the respondent No. 3’s father, Mr. Zolien was infact the Chief of Kangreng Village after the death of Mr. Phakpu and not Mr. Hleia, father of the present petitioner, which fact has been concealed by the petitioner in the present writ petition. Secondly, it has been contended that after the death of Mr. Zolien, father of respondent No. 3 in the year 1966, the respondent No. 3 being the eldest son of the said Mr. Zolien became the Chief by following the law of primogeniture among Khurbi Clan of the Hmar Tribe. However, since the respondent No. 3 at the relevant time was a minor, the elders of the village held a meeting in which it was decided that till the respondent No. 3 attains the age of majority, his uncle Mr. Hleia, the second son of Mr. However, since the respondent No. 3 at the relevant time was a minor, the elders of the village held a meeting in which it was decided that till the respondent No. 3 attains the age of majority, his uncle Mr. Hleia, the second son of Mr. Phakpu and younger brother of the then Chief, Zolien would function as the Chief of the village. Accordingly, as per the decision of the village elders, Mr. Hleia was made the Chief of Kangreng Village on the aforesaid condition and not by following the customary law of the rule of primogeniture or on the abandonment of right by the eldest son to inherit Chiefship. Mr. Modhuchandra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 states that upon attaining the age of majority, the respondent No. 3, Mr. Zothanlien approached Mr. Hleia to transfer the Chiefship which he was enjoying which Mr. Hleia refused to do so, upon which the dispute about chiefship arose. Mr. Modhuchandra states that the respondent No.3 upon verification of the official record came to learn that Mr. Hleia in the meantime, without any authority had surrepticiously managed to enter his name as a full fledged Chief of Kangreng Village. Accordingly, after coming to know of the illegal usurpation of Chiefship, being aggrieved, the respondent No. 3 approached the Deputy Commissioner by filling the Hill Misc No.10 of 1988 for a direction to transfer the name of the chief of the village from Hleia to the respondent No.3 which was allowed by the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 04.05.1988. It has been further stated that the petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 5-8-1988 by the Deputy Commissioner, had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. It has been stated by Mr. Modhuchandra that while the appeal was pending, a compromise was arrived at between the respondent No.3 and Hleia, the father of the petitioner, at the instance of the village elders and other parties for peaceful co-existence of the villagers by which, it was agreed that the father of the petitioner viz. Hleia would continue to be the Chief of Kangreng Village during his lifetime and upon his death, the Chiefship would revert back to the respondent No.3 who is the rightful inheritor. According to Mr. Hleia would continue to be the Chief of Kangreng Village during his lifetime and upon his death, the Chiefship would revert back to the respondent No.3 who is the rightful inheritor. According to Mr. Modhuchandra, the aforesaid compromise was arrived at and a deed was executed on 3-10-1988, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure D/I to this writ petition. The said deed of compromise entered between Mr. Hleia, father of the petitioner, and the respondent No. 3 was witnessed by village elders and others belonging to the tribe of the parties. In view of the compromise/agreement entered between the parties i.e., the father of the petitioner and the respondent No. 3, the pending legal proceedings were not pursued and hence, no new case was also filed in connection with the Chiefship of the village. Mr. Modhuchandra states that in terms of the aforesaid compromise, the respondent No. 3 became the Chief of the village after the death of Mr. Hleia on 20-2-2004. However, the present petitioner had managed to get the order dated 29-10-2004 surrepticiously from the Deputy Commissioner claiming himself to be the Chief of Kangreng Village on the ground that he is the son of Mr. Hleia and is entitled to be the chief as per customary law and on the basis of the order dated 29.10.2004 Mr. L. Rochung, the petitioner had entered his name in the Touzi Book as Chief of Kangreng Village in the year 2004. The respondent No. 3 states that later he came to know about the entry of the name of the petitioner as the Chief of the Village in course of a proceeding relating to claim for transfer of Chiefship from the petitioner, L. Rochung to Lalrawngbawl, the youngest brother of Mr. L. Rochung in the year 2011. The respondent No. 3 states that on coming to know the same, the respondent No. 3 filed his objection before the Deputy Commissioner which led to the proceeding which was registered as Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 which was disposed of by the Deputy Commissioner on 23.11.2013 by declaring the respondent No. 3 as the Chief of Kangreng Village and set aside the earlier order dated 29-10-2004 passed in favour of the petitioner, Mr. L. Rochung, which was later upheld by the Appellate Authority, Commissioner (Hills) by order dated 20.10.2014. 10. The main grounds raised by Mr. L. Rochung, which was later upheld by the Appellate Authority, Commissioner (Hills) by order dated 20.10.2014. 10. The main grounds raised by Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel the petitioner in challenging the aforesaid orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner as well as the Appellate Authority is that the petitioner had been already recognised as the Chief of the Kangreng Village vide order dated 29.10.2004 passed by the Deputy Commissioner which he inherited from his late father Hleia upon his death, that too after calling for objection from interested persons. It has been submitted by the petitioner that on the basis of the enquiry report submitted by Sub Divisional Officer, Tipaimukh the aforesaid order dated 29.10.2004 was passed by the Deputy Commissioner transferring the Chiefship in favour of the petitioner. It has been submitted by the petitioner that the transfer of the Chiefship in favour of the petitioner was merely a matter of recording the claim of the petitioner to the Chiefship of the Village which was not disputed by anybody. The petitioner contends that if anyone else including the respondent No. 3 claims to be Chief of Kangreng Village after the petitioner has been officially recognised as the Chief of the village, such a person has to make the claim through a civil suit. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to entertain an application involving disputed question of Chiefship and it would only be the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction which will have the jurisdiction to decide the claim of the Chiefship as also observed in the letter dated 15.09.1988 from the Under Secretary (Hills), Government of Manipur (Annexure A/7). Therefore, it has been contended by Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that after the petitioner had been recognised as the Chief of the village, the Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained the Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 and passed the order dated 23.11.2013 cancelling the earlier order dated 29.10.2004 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in Hill Misc. Matter No. 25 of 2004 by which the Chiefship of Kangreng Village was transferred from late Hleia to his son L. Rochung, the petitioner herein. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to re-open the issue of Chiefship which had been duly settled earlier in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 24.10.2004 and only a civil court could do it. Secondly, Mr. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to re-open the issue of Chiefship which had been duly settled earlier in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 24.10.2004 and only a civil court could do it. Secondly, Mr. B.R. Sharma contends that apart from the lack of jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner in entertaining the claim of the petitioner of Chiefship of Kangreng Village after it has been settled in favour of the petitioner without any objection from any quarter, the Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained the aforesaid application filed by the respondent No.3 in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 as it was barred by principle of res judicata. It has been contended by Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur as far back in the year 1989 had decided the Chiefship of the village in favour of the father of the present petitioner in Hill Misc. Case No. 10 of 1988 in an application filed by the present respondent No.3 against Hleia, father of the petitioner. The Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur in the said Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988 in the order passed on 27.03.1989 had cancelled the order dated 04.05.1988 passed by the Deputy Commissioner transferring the Chiefshief of Kangreng Village in favour of the respondent No. 3. In the said order dated 27.03.1989 the Deputy Commissioner also had noted that the respondent No. 3 had filed a civil suit at Imphal claiming the Chiefshief of the village and hence, the matter was sub-judice. Accordingly, it has been submitted by Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that since the matter stood settled by order dated 27.03.1989 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988 to the effect that the petitioner would remain the Chief of the village by virtue of the order dated 29.10.2004, the application filed by the respondent No. 3 in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 claiming Chiefship will be hit by principle of res judicata. It has been also submitted by Mr. Matter No. 10 of 1988 to the effect that the petitioner would remain the Chief of the village by virtue of the order dated 29.10.2004, the application filed by the respondent No. 3 in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 claiming Chiefship will be hit by principle of res judicata. It has been also submitted by Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that the civil suit filed by the respondent No. 3 in Original Suit No. 16/89/35/99 before the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Manipur West was dismissed on default of appearance on 04.01.1992 and as such, it will be deemed that the claim of the respondent No. 3 as regards Chiefshief stood dismissed by the civil court and in view of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 27.03.1989 in Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988, the rightful claim of the petitioner as the Chief of the village would remain undisturbed. 11. However, Mr. Modhuchandra, learned counsel for the No. 3 has contended that the Deputy Commissioner has every right to decide dispute regarding the Chiefship. Mr. Modhuchandra submits that respondent No. 3 was not aware when the order dated 29.10.2004 was passed by the Deputy Commissioner transferring the Chiefship to the present petitioner. Accordingly, when the respondent No. 3 became aware of the same, he approached the Deputy Commissioner by seeking review and cancelling earlier order dated 29.10.2004 passed in DC (CCP) Hill Misc. Matter No. 25 of 2004. The respondent No. 3 also has denied that the application filed by him before the Deputy Commissioner in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 is barred by res judicata. The respondent No. 3 has specifically stated in affidavit-in-opposition that the respondent No. 3 never filed the suit in as much as the matter relating to Chiefship was amicably settled by a Compromise Deed dated 03.10.1988 and as such, the question of filing a suit did not arise. It has been also contended that though the respondent No. 3 had preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, i.e., the Commissioner (Hills), against the order dated 04.05.1988 in Hill Misc. Matter No. 10 of 1988, the appeal was never decided by the appellate authority as clearly evident from the letter dated 15.09.1988 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Manipur, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition. Matter No. 10 of 1988, the appeal was never decided by the appellate authority as clearly evident from the letter dated 15.09.1988 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Manipur, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition. It has been submitted by the respondent No.3 that the said letter was not an order passed by the appellate authority but merely an administrative order. The said letter merely conveyed to the Deputy Commissioner that as per the advice of the Law Department the matter relates to a civil dispute which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The letter also stated that the order of the D.C., Churachandpur dated 04.05.1988 is void ab initio. However, it has been submitted by Mr. Modhuchandra that no order was passed by the appellate authority in the judicial side and if any such order had been passed it would have been annexed by the petitioner and as such the content in the letter that order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 04.05.1988 is void ab initio is merely an observation by the Deputy Commissioner. It has been also contended that perusal of the aforesaid letter dated 15.09.1988 would clearly indicate that the copy of the said letter was endorsed only to the father of the petitioner and not to the respondent No. 3. Thus, it was merely an administrative order and not an appellate order passed by the appellate authority after hearing the parties. It has been submitted that in any event, the said letter also does not have any binding effect as the stand taken by the State Government that the matter relates to civil dispute which is exclusive jurisdiction which cannot be sustained in view of Section 6 of the Manipur Hills Areas (Acquisition of Chief Rights) Act, 1967. 12. Mr. N. Ibotombi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General has submitted that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to decide a dispute regarding Chiefship of a village and it is not necessary that one has to resort to a civil suit for this purpose. 12. Mr. N. Ibotombi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General has submitted that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to decide a dispute regarding Chiefship of a village and it is not necessary that one has to resort to a civil suit for this purpose. In this regard he has referred to Section 6 of the Manipur Hills Areas (Acquisition of Chief Rights) Act, 1967 which provides that if a question arises as to whether a person is the Chief of the village, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the question being referred to him by the Compensation Officer or on an application made by any person interested, by an order an in writing, decide it. 13. On hearing the rival contentions of the parties and also on perusal of the materials on record, what comes out clearly is that the matter in issue is essentially regarding the claim of the Chiefship of Kangreng Village, which is a disputed question of fact, which this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not embark upon to decide. Therefore, it should be left to the competent court or authority to decide. In the present case, it is contended by the petitioner as also was the view of the State Government at the relevant time as contained in the letter dated 15.09.1988, that it is the civil court of the competent jurisdiction, which would be competent to decide such dispute regarding Chiefship of a village. However, it has been pointed out by Mr. N. Ibotombi, Ld. Additional Advocate General, that the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction and competence to decide the disputed question of Chiefship as provided under Section 6 of the Manipur Hills Areas (Acquisition of Chief Rights) Act, 1967. The aforesaid Section being relevant is reproduced hereinbelow:- “6. (1) If a question arises as to the existence of a custom of paying changseo to the chief of a village or whether a person is the chief of a village, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the question being referred to him by the Compensation Officer, or on an application made by any person interested, by order in writing decide it. (emphasis added) (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the Deputy Commissioner shall cause a notice of the substance of the question to be published in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 3, requiring all persons interested to file written statement in regard to the matter. (3) The Deputy Commissioner shall, after considering the statements, if any, filed under sub-section (2), and after giving the persons interested a reasonable opportunity of being heard, record his decision. (4) Every decision of the Deputy Commissioner shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. (5) Every decisions under this section, shall, subject to the provisions of sections 7 and 15, be final. Explanation:- For the purposes of this Act, the expression “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in the compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the rights, title and interest of a chief in the gams in the village.” Section 6(1) of the aforesaid Act, thus, provides that if a question arises as to whether a person is the chief of a village or not, the Deputy Commissioner shall on the question being referred to him by the Compensation Officer, or on an application made by any person interested, decide the same. Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the dispute regarding Chiefship is relating only to the dispute about payment of compensation under the aforesaid Act and as such, only when a dispute arises about Chiefship when it is connected with the payment of compensation concerning acquisition of rights, title and interest of a chief in the “gams” of the village, the Deputy Commissioner would have jurisdiction or authority to decide the Chiefship and not otherwise. He contends that it is the civil court of competent jurisdiction which could decide the disputed issue of Chiefship. He submits that this is also clearly evident from the fact that the aforesaid Section 6 is included in Chapter III of the Act which deals with the matter of “Compensation” and not under Chapter II which deals with the subject of “Acquisition of Rights of Chiefs”. Mr. He submits that this is also clearly evident from the fact that the aforesaid Section 6 is included in Chapter III of the Act which deals with the matter of “Compensation” and not under Chapter II which deals with the subject of “Acquisition of Rights of Chiefs”. Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that “Explanation” to Section 6 would also clearly indicates that the “interested person” is one who is interested in the rights, titles and interest of a Chief in the “gams” of the village. Thus, person interested cannot mean any other persons other than the person interested as mentioned in the Explanation. Since, in the present case, no issue has arisen relating to compensation under the aforesaid Act, Section 6 will not be applicable. 14. A perusal of the Preamble of the Act would indicate that the Act had been enacted to provide for the acquisition of certain rights, title and interest of Chiefs in and over land in the Hill Areas of Manipur and matters connected therewith. The expression “Chief” has been defined under Section 2 (b) to mean a person who (by whatever name called) is on the date immediately before the commencement of this Act, a Chief of village under any law for the time being in force in this Hill areas and is recognised by the government as a Chief for the purposes of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that the Government may, at any time, by notification in the Official Gazettee, declare that as from such date as may be specified therein (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting) all rights, titles and interests of the chiefs in the gams in the villages in such areas as may be specified in the said notification shall stand transferred to and vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 4 provides that upon such notification, such gams shall stand, with effect from the date of vesting, cease and be vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and it shall not be lawful for the Chiefs thereafter to collect “changseo” for any period after the date of vesting from any resident of a village in such areas. Section 4 provides that upon such notification, such gams shall stand, with effect from the date of vesting, cease and be vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances and it shall not be lawful for the Chiefs thereafter to collect “changseo” for any period after the date of vesting from any resident of a village in such areas. Section 5 provides that Deputy Commissioner upon such publication of the notification under Section 3, shall take charge of all “gams” and interests of Chiefs vested in Chiefs. Thus, when any such dispute arises as to the question of paying “changseo” to the Chief of the village or whether a person is the Chief of the Village, the Deputy Commissioner shall have the authority to decide the dispute about the Chiefship as provided under Section 6(1) under the “Chapter III” with the subject “Compensation”. Section 8 of the Act provides for payment of compensation by Government to every Chief whose rights, titles and interests in any “gam” have vested in accordance with Section 9. Other provisions of the Section provides for the scale of compensation, determination of the same by the Compensation Officer, mode of compensation, etc. 15. Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner may be correct in his submission that this Act is primarily regarding payment of compensation on acquisition and transfer of rights, titles and interests of the Chiefs in respect of gams in the villages. However, the Act also specifically provides for determination of the dispute about the claim of the Chiefship of a village in as much as the possession of title of Chiefship by any person is crucial as rights, titles and interests of the Chiefs would stand adversely affected by any notification which may be issued under Section 3 of the Act and would be also entitled to compensation. Thus in event of any dispute arising about the Chiefship of the village, provision has been made under the Act for deciding such a dispute, even though it may incidentally arise while determining compensation or any other issue under the Act. Thus in event of any dispute arising about the Chiefship of the village, provision has been made under the Act for deciding such a dispute, even though it may incidentally arise while determining compensation or any other issue under the Act. Though the question as to whether a person is the Chief of a village or not, may arise incidentally in the course of acquisition of the rights, interest and title of the Chief in the gams in the village under Section 3 of the Act or relating to any acts taken under the Act, it is to be determined in terms of Section 6(1), and it cannot be stated that such determination of the dispute of a Chief is to be confined only relating to payment of compensation under the Act, for, there cannot be one chief for the purpose of dealing with the notification issued under Section 3 or any other actions taken under the aforesaid Act and another Chief for the purpose of other issues and other matters not related to Manipur Hills Areas (Acquisition of Chief Rights) Act, 1967. A plain reading of the provision of Section 6(1) of the Act would make it very clear that when a dispute arises as to whether a person is a Chief of a village, it shall be decided by the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, if Section 6 unambiguously confers power on Deputy Commissioner to decide the question as to whether a person is Chief or not on an application made by any person interested as provided under Section 6(1) of the Act, it is of general application and the dispute about Chiefship can be decided by the Deputy Commissioner, not only when the said Act is involved, but in respect of other cases also. Further, the expression “person interested” as mentioned in the “Explanation” to Section 6 is of inclusive nature. The person interested need not be only a person interested in the compensation to be paid on account of acquisition of the rights, title and interest of a Chief in gams in the village under the Act, but also refer to any other person who is claiming to be Chief of the village and not related to payment of compensation under the Act by giving a comprehensive and expansive meaning to the expression “person interested”. In view of the above, this Court would hold that the Deputy Commissioner would have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to Chiefship of a village as provided under Section 6 of the Act. This jurisdiction to decide the dispute of Chiefship of a village may not be related to payment of compensation under the Act, but in any other situation also. Therefore, it cannot be said that the dispute regarding claim of Chiefship of village would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil court. 16. Section 7 of the aforesaid Act further provides that any person by the decision of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 6 may, within thirty days from the date of communication of the decision, appeal to the Chief Commissioner, who shall, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard and making such further enquiry as may be necessary, pass such order as he thinks fit confirming or modifying or annulling the decision appealed against. Therefore, Section 7 provides a substantive provision for appeal against any order passed under Section 6 of the Act, which would include any decision by the Deputy Commissioner as regards claim to Chiefship of the village. The Appellate Authority, as provided under Section 7 will hear and decide appeals against the decision by the Deputy Commissioner as regard the issue of Chiefship of a village for which the appellate authority would be within the jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence on record and also decide the various issues raised in the appeal. It has been stated by the parties that the appellate authority as provided under Section 7 of the Act is now Commissioner (Hills), Government of Manipur. 17. In the present case, what has been noted is that after the Commissioner passed an order on 23.11.2013 in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013, the present petitioner has filed an appeal before the appellate authority which by an order dated 20.10.2014 rejected the appeal confirming the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 23.11.2013. Perusal of the aforesaid appellate order dated 20.10.2014 which has been also challenged in this writ petition, however, indicates that various pleas raised by the petitioner as mentioned in his memo of appeal filed on 20.12.2013 had not been considered by the appellate authority. Perusal of the aforesaid appellate order dated 20.10.2014 which has been also challenged in this writ petition, however, indicates that various pleas raised by the petitioner as mentioned in his memo of appeal filed on 20.12.2013 had not been considered by the appellate authority. It has been further mentioned in the appellate order that it has been stated by the Deputy Commissioner that hearing notice was served to the petitioner on two occasions on 15.11.2013 and 20.11.2013 but neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared without showing any cause. The petitioner, however, submits that the petitioner never received any such notice and the Deputy Commissioner proceeded to pass the order without giving opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. Be that as it may, this Court is not making any observation as to the correctness of the various facts mentioned in the order dated 23.11.2013 passed by the Deputy Commissioner or to the order dated 20.10.2014 passed by the appellate authority. The correctness of the order dated 23.11.2013 passed by the Deputy Commissioner can be always examined by the appellate authority. Thus, this Court would observe that while holding that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction and competence to pass the order dated 23.11.2013, correctness of the decision arrived at would be subjected to the decision of the Appellate Authority. This Court has observed that the appellate authority while passing the order dated 20.10.2014 has not considered the various pleas raised by the petitioner as mentioned in his memo of appeal. Accordingly, this Court would require the appellate authority to rehear the appeal afresh by taking into consideration the pleas raised by the petitioner in his memo of appeal filed in accordance with law and pass a fresh order by taking into consideration the relevant facts and laws involved in the appeal. In this regard, Mr. B.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he may be allowed to take additional pleas as regards the facts and laws. As regards this, the petitioner may approach the appellate authority by making necessary application, in which event, the respondent No. 3 would be also granted opportunity to file objections and take such pleas as permissible under the law. The appellate authority accordingly, after hearing the parties will pass a fresh order. As regards this, the petitioner may approach the appellate authority by making necessary application, in which event, the respondent No. 3 would be also granted opportunity to file objections and take such pleas as permissible under the law. The appellate authority accordingly, after hearing the parties will pass a fresh order. In view of the above, the earlier appellate authority order dated 20.11.2014 passed by the Commissioner (Hills) is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority for passing a fresh order, without making any observation on merit on the rival contentions raised before this Court. 18. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of by setting aside the impugned order dated 20.10.2014 passed by the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.1 is directed to re-hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner as directed above in accordance with the law. As regards the validity of the order dated 23.11.2013 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, in Hill Misc. Case No. 1 of 2013 this Court is not making any observation about it as the validity of the order will be subject to any order and decision of the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the order dated 23.11.2013 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur will stand till such appropriate order is passed by the Appellate Authority. Earlier interim order passed by this Court, accordingly, stands vacated. 19. As regards the jurisdiction and competent of the Deputy Commissioner to decide the dispute about the Chiefship, as already discussed above, the same cannot be doubted in view of Section 6 of the Manipur Hill Areas (Acquisition of Chief Rights) Act, 1967. 20. Considering the fact that the matter pertains to an order on 23.11.2013 by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur, relating to Chiefship of a village, which is the subject matter of challenge before the appellate authority, the appellate authority is directed to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible, so as to avoid any uncertainty about the Chiefship of the village, as any prolonged uncertainty will not be in the interest of the villagers. 21. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.