JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Sh. Vivek Chauhan, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karsog and Sh. Santu Lal, Tehsildar (Retd.) are present in Court. 2. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner invokes the equitable writ jurisdiction of this court in seeking quashing of order dated 20.9.2014 (Annexure P-17) passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Deputy Registrar of Societies, Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the S.D.M.) as affirmed by the Addl. Registrar Cooperative Societies-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Mandi vide order dated 10.2.2015 (Annexure P-19) and Registrar of Societies, Himachal Pradesh in terms of order dated 26.5.2015 (Annexure P-20). 3. Challenge being primarily on the ground that the orders came to be passed contrary to the material on record and in violation of principles of natural justice. 4. It is a matter of record that a Society under the name of Bhardwaj Shikshan Sansthan (hereinafter referred to as the Society) came to be registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which Act came to be repealed by virtue of Section 58 of the Himachal Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Leela Dhar (Chairman of the petitioner Society) and Dharam Pal & Mitter Dev (private respondents No. 6 and 7 respectively) were primarily responsible for establishing the Society for the purpose of setting up of an educational institution in Tehsil Karsog, Distt. Mandi, H.P. Inter se dispute between them resulted into the matter being brought to the notice of the statutory authorities. 5. Based thereupon, the S.D.M. instituted an inquiry and the Tehsildar in terms of his report dated 9.06.2014 (Annexure P-14), inter alia, found Leela Dhar to have forged and fabricated the record of the Society, i.e. resolutions No. 2 and 6 dated 24.11.2013 and 8.12.2013 purportedly passed in the general house of the Society. Leela Dhar as Chairman of the Society was associated all throughout and afforded opportunity to put forward his case. 6. Based on the said inquiry report, the S.D.M. issued a show cause notice dated 27.6.2014 (Annexure P-15). Undisputedly notice pertained to the fabrication of record of resolutions No. 2 and 6. In response thereto, Leela Dhar in his capacity as Chairman of the Society explained the position, clarifying that the members of the Society had participated in the proceedings of the general house where after only, the resolutions in question came to be passed. Undisputedly notice pertained to the fabrication of record of resolutions No. 2 and 6. In response thereto, Leela Dhar in his capacity as Chairman of the Society explained the position, clarifying that the members of the Society had participated in the proceedings of the general house where after only, the resolutions in question came to be passed. The correctness and authenticity of such resolutions came to be pleaded by him. 7. Independently students of the educational institute, opened by the Society also lodged a complaint against Leela Dhar for having collected fee and issued fake receipts. The money was never accounted for in the records of the Society. The said complaint came to be independently inquired and both the Tehsildar and the Inspector Co-operative Society, Karsog, found it to be factually correct. 8. As such, during the pendency of the proceedings arising out of show cause notice dated 27.6.2014, the S.D.M. brought such fact to the notice of Leela Dhar. His statement dated 7.7.2014 so made before the Tehsildar, admitting receipt of the amount from the students which was to be accounted for, was brought to his notice. Significantly he also wrote to the Tehsildar that a sum of Rs. 6,09,870/- stood received by him from the students as fee. 9. Based on the response filed by Leela Dhar and his admissions, the S.D.M. in terms of composite order dated 20.9.2014 (Annexure P-17), in exercise of his power under Section 41 of the Act ordered: (a) Removal of Leela Dhar from the governing body of the Society; (b) directed him to deposit an amount of Rs. 4,95,701/- into the account of the Society; (c) appointed an Administrator to manage the affairs of the Society; and (d) directed convening of a meeting of the general house of the Society for conducting elections of the new governing body, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 10. The said order, as already observed, came to be affirmed by the appellate/revisional authorities. 11. Insofar as the question of violation of principles of natural justice is concerned, Sh. Bipin C. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, rightly invites attention of this Court to the principles of law laid down by the apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein the Court after considering its earlier decisions observed as under: “38. Bipin C. Negi, learned Senior Counsel, rightly invites attention of this Court to the principles of law laid down by the apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati & others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , wherein the Court after considering its earlier decisions observed as under: “38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straightjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. 39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straight-jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. While emphasizing that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straight-jacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason – perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling – it is felt that a fair hearing 'would make no difference' meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker – then no legal duty to supply a hearing arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, (1971) 1 WLR 1578, who said that: “… a 'breach of procedure ... cannot give (rise to) a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain”. Relying on these comments, Brandon L.J. opined in Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1 WLR 582 that: “…no one can complain of not being given an opportunity to make representations if such an opportunity would have availed him nothing.” In such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no purpose since 'right' result can be secured without according such treatment to the individual.” “46 To recapitulate the events, the appellant was accorded certain benefits under the Notification dated July 08, 1999. This Notification stands nullified by Section 154 of the Act of 2003, which has been given retrospective effect. The legal consequence of the aforesaid statutory provision is that the amount with which the appellant was benefitted under the aforesaid Notification becomes refundable. Even after the notice is issued, the appellant cannot take any plea to retain the said amount on any ground whatsoever as it is bound by the dicta in R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 725 . Likewise, even the officer who passed the order has no choice but to follow the dicta in R.C. Tobacco. It is important to note that as far as quantification of the amount is concerned, it is not disputed at all. Likewise, even the officer who passed the order has no choice but to follow the dicta in R.C. Tobacco. It is important to note that as far as quantification of the amount is concerned, it is not disputed at all. In such a situation, issuance of notice would be an empty formality and we are of the firm opinion that the case stands covered by 'useless formality theory'.” [Emphasis supplied] 12. Now in the instant case, it cannot be disputed that show cause notice was confined to the fabrication of records of the meetings of the general house of the Society. But it is also a matter of record, as is evident from the proceedings conducted by the S.D.M., so made available in Court, as also petitioner’s communication dated 20.2.2013 (Annexure P-18), that he was totally aware of the allegations against him as also the nature and the extent of the proceedings which were under inquiry by the concerned officer. Both were going on simultaneously in which petitioner was heard and afforded opportunity to put forward his case. Serious allegations of embezzlement of amount, that being, fee received from the students came to be made against Leela Dhar in his capacity as officiating Chairman of the Society. He himself was associated by the Tehsildar during the course of inquiry. Yes, it is true that no independent show cause notice came to be issued with respect thereto, but then he was fully aware of all that was happening in the proceedings pending before the S.D.M. He knew the issues and the very nature and the extent of the inquiry, which at one stage was clubbed and dealt with as such. He himself had subjected to the same. 13. It is not in dispute that the S.D.M. was otherwise authorized in law, more so, under Section 39 of the Act, to inquire into the allegations made against Leela Dhar who was officiating as the Chairman of the Society. It is in exercise of such power, as envisaged in law, that the S.D.M. passed the order of super-session of the governing body. 14. Record reveals that there were serious allegations and counter allegations made both against and by Leela Dhar and the private respondents. It is in exercise of such power, as envisaged in law, that the S.D.M. passed the order of super-session of the governing body. 14. Record reveals that there were serious allegations and counter allegations made both against and by Leela Dhar and the private respondents. It is in this backdrop that the S.D.M. passed the order, superseding the governing body for ensuring that the democratic process and will of the members, as is the spirit of the Act, prevails in the management of the affairs of the Society. 15. Leela Dhar was fully aware of all that was happening in the proceedings pending against him. As such, in view of the ratio of law laid down by the apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal (supra), it would not be open for Leela Dhar to make out a grievance of violation of the principles of natural justice. Absence of another show cause notice in the aforesaid factual backdrop would also not vitiate the impugned order dated 20.9.2014 (Annexure P-17). No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner. The doctrine enunciated in Malloch and Cinnamond (supra) is clearly invokable and applicable in the instant case. 16. Can it be said that the impugned order is perverse and grossly disproportionate to the alleged act and conduct of Leela Dhar or the private respondents? Most certainly not. Serious allegation of embezzlement and misappropriation of fee and public money came to be made against Leela Dhar and as such in its wisdom, the concerned officer rightly passed an order superseding the governing body, more so, in the light of admitted facts. 17. It is contended by Leela Dhar that the amount in question can be reimbursed only when he receives the rent from the Society as his personal premises are being used to run the educational institute. This cannot be a ground for withholding the amount admittedly received by the petitioner. It is fee from the students. However it is always open for Leela Dhar to take appropriate action in accordance with law for such an issue cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings. 18. As to whether the members participated in the meeting of the general house or not cannot be a subject matter of review in the present petition, for findings of fact cannot be said to be perverse or erroneous. 18. As to whether the members participated in the meeting of the general house or not cannot be a subject matter of review in the present petition, for findings of fact cannot be said to be perverse or erroneous. Allegedly members of the Society have made mutually contradictory statements of having participated in the proceedings of the general house. All this stands minutely examined by the authorities below, warranting no interference on the factual matrix. 19. This Court would not re-appreciate the evidence to disturb the finding of fact returned by the authorities below. What is the scope of judicial review of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority is now well settled and how the order is illegal or perverse in the instant case, could not be pointed out. 20. Learned counsel representing the S.D.M. states that free and fair elections would positively be held within a period of one month. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, present petition, devoid of any merit, is dismissed. Interim orders stand vacated. 22. No other point urged. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.