JUDGMENT : Mohinder Pal, J. 1. All the aforementioned petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment as facts narrated and reliefs claimed in these petitions are one and the same. 2. The petitioner is a Cooperative Bank at present under liquidation. Through this petition, petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 3.10.2013 passed by the learned Gujarat Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad (herein after referred to as 'the Tribunal') in Revision Application Nos. 140, 141, 155 and 156 of 2012. By the impugned order, all the four revision applications filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively have been allowed and the order of learned Board of Nominees, Ahmedabad has been set aside. 3. Petitioner had given loan to deceased Liyakatkhan Pathan for purchase of Truck No. GJ-lU-5849 of Rs. 2,50,000/-. Said deceased was also guarantor in another case. Since the payment was defaulted by the deceased, Summary Lavad Suit No. 1944 of 2001 was filed against deceased Liyakatkahn and other persons by the petitioner-Bank for recovery of Rs. 5,53,212/- along with interest. Another Civil Suit being Lavad Suit No. 1948 of 2001 was filed against the deceased along with other persons for recovery of Rs. 2,92,288/- with interest. 4. Said Liyakatkhan expired and since the Liquidator could not get any of the legal heirs and in fact respondent No. 2 had fraudulently suppressed her relationship with the deceased from the petitioner-Bank, pursis was filed on 24.2.2003 by the petitioner-Bank to delete the deceased at that stage and suit was proceeded against other person by deleting the deceased. Thereafter, on 10.3.2003, suit came to be decreed in favour of the petitioner-Bank and against the other defendants. In the meanwhile, petitioner came to know that respondent No. 2 was legal heir and wife of the deceased Liyakatkhan. The petitioner-Bank also got information that amount of Rs. 10,98,064/- has been deposited in the bank of respondent No. 1 and hence, notice came to be issued to respondent No. 1-Bank on 10.6.2003. Thereafter, an application came to be moved on 13.6.2003 for restoration of the suit qua deceased and to bring on record respondent No. 2 as heir of deceased. On 13.6.2003, the petitioner preferred restoration application No. 123 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1944 of 2001 and restoration application No. 124 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1948 of 2001 praying to restrain respondent No. 1-Bank to disburse the amount. On 13.6.2003, the petitioner preferred restoration application No. 123 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1944 of 2001 and restoration application No. 124 of 2003 in Summary Suit No. 1948 of 2001 praying to restrain respondent No. 1-Bank to disburse the amount. Initially, on 13.6.2003, learned Board of Nominees granted ex-parte interim relief and even yadi was sent to respondent No. 1 not to disburse the amount in favour of Bombay Mercantile Co. Op. Bank Ltd., Zakariya Masjid Branch, Relief Road, Branch Manager, Shri Gulamhussain D. Palsania. Thereafter, notice also came to be issued to respondent No. 2, however, she did not appear despite notice. The interim order passed on earlier dates was made final and restoration application was allowed. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that despite stay being made permanent by learned Board of Nominees, officials of respondent No. 1 made payment of Rs. 5,90,000/- to respondent No. 2 on 29.12.2004. On 29.7.2005, Summary Lavad Suit No. 1944 of 2001, respondent No. 1-Bank was directed to produce the details of the saving bank account of respondent No. 2 and on 31.8.2005, respondent No. 1-Bank produced list of documents wherein it was mentioned that on 29.12.2004, Rs. 5,90,000/- has been permitted to be withdrawn by respondent No. 2. Thus, petitioner came to know with regard to illegal withdrawal in defiance of Court's order on 31.8.2005. Petitioner having come to know about this payment, filed Contempt Application No. 171 of 2005 in Summary Lavad Suit No. 1944 of 2001 and Contempt Application No. 170 of 2005 in Summary Lavad Suit No. 1948 of 2001 on 18.10.2005. At this stage, yadi of earlier stay order was sent to respondent No. 1 along with respondent No. 2 and even final order was also within full knowledge of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. On 27.7.2012, after hearing all the parties, learned Board of Nominees allowed both the Contempt Applications. While allowing such applications, following order/directions were issued. (A) That in revision application No. 123 of 2003 the opponents have disobeyed the permanent order dated 25.9.2003 by disbursing amount on 29.12.2004. Reference be made to Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat for initiating contempt proceedings against opponent No.1 and No.2 Bombay Mercantile Co. Op. Bank Ltd. Zakariya Masjid Branch, Relief Road, Ahmedabad, Branch Manager Shri Gulamhusen D. Palsania. (A) That in revision application No. 123 of 2003 the opponents have disobeyed the permanent order dated 25.9.2003 by disbursing amount on 29.12.2004. Reference be made to Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat for initiating contempt proceedings against opponent No.1 and No.2 Bombay Mercantile Co. Op. Bank Ltd. Zakariya Masjid Branch, Relief Road, Ahmedabad, Branch Manager Shri Gulamhusen D. Palsania. (B) The amount withdrawn by opponent No. 1 from opponent No. 2 bank and its branch manager Shri Gulamhusen D. Palsania on 29.12.2004 being Rs. 5,90,000/- shall be paid along with 18% interest from 29.12.2004 till it is paid to applicant Janta Commercial Co. Op. Bank Ltd. immediately. If opponent does not repay the said amount then the applicant shall be entitled to recover the same from the opponents and their properties. (C) The opponent No. 1 and 2 bank and its officers were directed that further amount which is lying in Savings Bank Account No. 31233 of respondent No. 2 shall not be allowed to be withdrawn, except petitioner-Bank. (D) Opponents to pay applicant bank Rs. 1,000/- as compensatory amount. 6. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the abovesaid two orders passed in Contempt Proceedings, respondent No. 1-Bank preferred Revision Application Nos. 155 and 156 of 2012 before the Tribunal. Respondent No. 2 also preferred Revision Application before Tribunal though did not participate in the proceedings before the learned Board of Nominees and was proceeded against ex-parte. 7. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned Board of Nominees, Ahmedabad in both the applications and all the four revision applications filed by respondent No. 1 and 2 came to be allowed by order dated 3.10.2013. Aggrieved from this decision passed by the Tribunal, petitioner-Bank has filed the present petition before this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Dipak R. Dave, has submitted that reasoning given by the Tribunal while allowing revision is liable to be set aside on the following grounds: (A) The point of limitation was never urged before learned Board of Nominees and raised for the first time before learned Tribunal; (B) Learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that respondent No. 1 was issued notice of the Courts order. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were well aware with regard to Court's order which was made permanent. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were well aware with regard to Court's order which was made permanent. Despite injunction, the amount was allowed to be withdrawn by respondent No. 2 and as such, there was contempt on the face of the Court; (C) The learned Tribunal has not taken into account that even decree has been finally passed against respondent No. 2. The reasoning of the Tribunal that once restoration application was disposed of, the stay will come to an end was perverse and against the law. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that the stay has been made permanent i.e. until disposal of the suit that was very intention of learned Board of Nominees and in fact on the stay application, separate order was passed. Even while passing final decree, this aspect of stay has been mentioned in the order. All these aspects have not been considered by the Tribunal. 9. These arguments have been controverted by Mr. Bharat Jani, learned avoidable for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dilip B. Rana, learned advocate for respondent No. 2 mainly on the ground that application moved by the Bank was not signed. (A) The bank was not party in the restoration application and the order was never passed against the bank. (B) Learned Board of Nominees passed the order as if the respondents have committed contempt; (C) Bank was under liquidation and it was power of the Liquidator to have moved application under Section 103 of the Act rather than by the petitioner-Bank. (D) The respondent No. 1 has acted in view of the directions given by the Court while depositing the amount with the respondent No. 1-Bank. As the amount in question was regarding compensation of the land and there was specific directions to pay this amount to the land owner, the respondent-Bank acted upon this order and made the payment accordingly. 10. Having heard learned counsel Mr. Dipak R. Dave for the petitioner, learned counsel, Mr. Bharat Jani for respondent No. 1, learned counsel Mr. Dilip B. Rana for respondent No. 2 and learned AGP, Mr. Rohan Yagnik, for respondent No. 3 who is a formal party and this Court has considered the submissions made by the parties. The Tribunal seems to have set aside the findings of the learned Board of Nominees mainly on the ground of limitation. Dilip B. Rana for respondent No. 2 and learned AGP, Mr. Rohan Yagnik, for respondent No. 3 who is a formal party and this Court has considered the submissions made by the parties. The Tribunal seems to have set aside the findings of the learned Board of Nominees mainly on the ground of limitation. At this stage, it will be relevant to point out that when the contempt application was filed by the petitioner, in the application, signatures of competent persons were missing. It seems that at some later stage, an application was moved before learned Board of Nominees that permission be granted to put signature on the application which was granted by the Board on 30.4.2008. The Tribunal has considered this date 30.4.2008 as the date on which the application has been filed by the petitioner-Bank. As the limitation prescribed for moving such application was within a period of one year from the date of knowledge, the Tribunal set aside the findings of learned Board of Nominees on the ground of limitation. 11. This Court is of the considered opinion that the reasoning given by the Tribunal while setting aside the order of learned Board of Nominees on the ground of limitation is incorrect. It will be relevant to note that immediately after petitioner-Bank came to know about deposit of Rs. 10,98,064/- with respondent No. 1-Bank, an application came to be filed on 30.6.2003 which was duly served upon respondent No. 1 as well as respondent No. 2 i.e. wife of deceased Liyakatkhan. Despite such notice, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 succeeded in withdrawing sum of Rs. 5,90,000/- from the bank of respondent No. 1 on 29.12.2004. After coming to know about such withdrawal by respondent No. 2 on 29.12.2004 and 31.8.2005, immediately thereafter contempt application has been filed on 18.10.2005. Filing of this application is within limitation. The reasoning of the Tribunal to have treated this application beyond limitation on the ground that application was without signatures is perverse and liable to be set aside. It will be further relevant to note that there is no objection regarding signatures by the Court at the time of moving such application. Application has been entertained and remained pending with the Court from 2005 till 2008 and, with the permission of the Court, signatures are put on the application. It will be further relevant to note that there is no objection regarding signatures by the Court at the time of moving such application. Application has been entertained and remained pending with the Court from 2005 till 2008 and, with the permission of the Court, signatures are put on the application. When the matter is filed in the Court, clock of limitation stops ticking. It is nobody's case that objection regarding filing of application without signature was there and the petitioner deliberately avoided to put signatures on such application. 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with similar question in case of Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian reported in 2001 Law Suit (SC) 1043 and held as under:- 33. The question which squarely arises is as to what is the meaning to be given to the expression "no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt..." occurring in Section 20 of the 1971 Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies not only to the contempt committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court but would also be applicable in the case of contempt of the subordinate court. The procedure which is to be followed in each of these cases is different. 37. Under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 power has been given to this Court and to the High Courts to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Our attention has been drawn to Rules framed under Section 23 by this Court as well as by the High Courts in India. All these Rules inter alia require, other than suo motu action is taken, petition or application being filed in Court it is then taken up for consideration. For example, relevant part of Rule 2 of the Calcutta High Court Contempt of Courts Rules, 1975 reads as follows: "Rule 2. (1) Proceedings in connection with a Civil Contempt may be initiated- (a) by a petition presented by a party or parties aggrieved; or (b) by the High Court on its own motion; or (c) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts as in the case of "Criminal Contempt". (1) Proceedings in connection with a Civil Contempt may be initiated- (a) by a petition presented by a party or parties aggrieved; or (b) by the High Court on its own motion; or (c) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts as in the case of "Criminal Contempt". (2) Proceedings in connection with a criminal contempt may be initiated- (a) on a motion of the High Court in respect of a contempt committed upon its own view under section 14 of the Act; or (b) on its own motion by the High Court under section 15(1) of the Act; or (c) on a motion founded on a petition presented by the Advocate-General under section 15(1)(a) of the Act; or (d) on a motion founded on a petition presented by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General under section 15(1)(b) of the Act; or (e) on a reference made to the High Court by the subordinate courts under section 15(2) of the Act, containing the following particulars: (a) a brief statement of the case; (b) the particulars of the contumacious acts; (c) name, address and other particulars of the respondents along with the copies of the papers relating to contumacious acts." 41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the Appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra), to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show-cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. So, the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground of limitation etc. are without any basis. 13. Both the respondents have laid emphasis on the point that Bank was not party to the proceedings and as such, contempt proceedings cannot be initiated against them. This contention of learned counsel is also without any basis. The amount of compensation amounting to Rs. 10,98,064/- was lying with respondent No. 1-Bank. This money was regarding compensation having been paid for the land which was in the name of deceased Liyakatkhan and was lying with respondent No. 1-Bank. The Board of Nominees has issued specific instructions dated 13.6.2003 which were duly served upon the respondent No. 1 on 21.6.2003 directing not to release any payment in favour of respondent No. 2. Despite such directions, respondent No.1 released the payment of Rs.5,90,000/- in favour of respondent No. 2 on 29.12.2004 which was in violation of the directions of learned Board of Nominees. In a way respondent No.1 has facilitated respondent No.2 in withdrawal of this amount in order to deprive the petitioner-bank to recover the amount which was due towards deceased Liyakatkhan. 14. It was also argued that learned Board of Nominees has passed the final order as if the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have committed contempt. In a way respondent No.1 has facilitated respondent No.2 in withdrawal of this amount in order to deprive the petitioner-bank to recover the amount which was due towards deceased Liyakatkhan. 14. It was also argued that learned Board of Nominees has passed the final order as if the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have committed contempt. Once again, the reasoning of Tribunal in this regard requires to be reversed as learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that in fact the issue whether the contempt has been committed or not will be finally determined by the High Court for which a reference was ordered to be made to the High Court in the order of learned Board of Nominees. Perhaps the Tribunal has not gone through the process which was required to be followed while referring the contempt matter to the High Court. 15. Finally, learned counsel for the respondents also disputed the action of the petitioner in moving application under Section 103 of the Act for the grant of injunction and ordered to restrain respondent No. 2 from getting the payment. Such arguments are without any basis as it is the petitioner-Bank who will be the ultimately sufferer in case of respondent No. 2 succeeds in withdrawing the amount lying in deposit with respondent No. 1-Bank. It should always be an endeavor of the Bank to minimize the losses and there is nothing wrong with the petitioner to have initiated the process in order to recover their dues. 16. Arguments were also raised that at the time of deposit of compensation amount with respondent bank, directions were issued by the Land Acquisition Court to disburse this amount to the Liyakatkhan. These arguments are misleading and meaningless as Land Acquisition Court was never knowing that deceased Liyakatkhan has raised loan from Bank and was surety in another case. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order dated 3.10.2013 passed by the learned Gujarat Co. Op. Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Revision Application Nos. 140, 141, 155 and 156 of 2012 is set aside and order dated 27.7.2012 passed by the learned Board of Nominees, Ahmedabad in Contempt Application Nos. 170 of 2005 and 171 of 2005 is upheld, with a further direction to respondent No. 1 an 2 to immediately comply with the order of learned Board of Nominees. Petitions accordingly stand allowed. Rule is made absolute.