Order : This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 08.12.2010 and 22.12.2010 respectively passed by the District Judge, Bokaro in Title (Eviction) Appeal No.11 of 2006 affirming the judgment and decree dated 24.03.2006 and 15.04.2006 respectively passed by the Munsif, Bokaro in Title (Eviction) Suit No.9 of 2002. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted the suit under Section 11(i)(d) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000 for eviction of the defendant/tenant on the ground of default on payment of rent from July, 2002 to November, 2002 and during the pendency of the suit an amendment was also incorporated for eviction of the tenant on the ground of expiry of lease in terms of Section 11(i)(e) of the Act. 3. The defendant in his written statement while admitting the relationship of landlord and tenant stated that the lease deed was in fact executed and duly signed by the defendants and the plaintiff on 26.07.2002. The defendant stated that he had regularly paid the monthly rent of Rs.500/- and the rent for the month of December, 2002 was paid lastly on 05.01.2003. It is stated that the plaintiff never issued any rent receipt. It is stated that since the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was very cordial, the defendant did not insist for issuance of rent receipt neither did he raise any objection for non-issuance of the rent receipts. The defendant asserted that in the first week of February, 2003 when he went to the plaintiff for tendering the rent of January, 2003 the plaintiff refused to accept the same instead he asked the defendants to enhance monthly rent to Rs.1000/- per month and asked him to pay a security of Rs.50,000/- to which the defendant expressed his inability whereupon the plaintiff assured the defendant that they would sort out the matter regarding enhancement of monthly rent and the quantum of security by talking it out. It is alleged that talks were not initiated by the plaintiff nor any date was fixed by the plaintiff for amicable settlement of the matter whereafter the defendant started sending the monthly rent through postal money order but it was refused by the plaintiff. It is alleged that talks were not initiated by the plaintiff nor any date was fixed by the plaintiff for amicable settlement of the matter whereafter the defendant started sending the monthly rent through postal money order but it was refused by the plaintiff. It is asserted by the defendant that he never defaulted in payment of rent rather he paid the rent regularly but the plaintiff did not issue the rent receipts and the present suit has been instituted only with the intent to extort security deposit and the enhanced rent from the defendants. 4. The trial court, on the pleadings of the parties, framed as many as eight issues. The plaintiff examined three witnesses and also the agreement dated 07.04.2001 was marked as Exhibit-1. The defendant has examined six witnesses and exhibited 13 postal money order receipts marked as Exhibit-A to A/12 and money order return coupon Exhibit-B to B/12. The trial court on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence adduced, held that the defendant had defaulted in payment of rent from July, 2002 to November, 2002 and further held that the agreement Exhibit-1 has been admitted by the defendants, the period of tenancy was for three years commencing from 01.03.2001 accordingly the defendant was also liable to be evicted on the ground of expiry of lease period. It is necessary to notice that trial court held that since the lease agreement was for more than three years hence in terms of the Registration Act it required registration but since it was not registered, the lease agreement could not be read into evidence and decided the issue in favour of the defendant. The trial court held that the plaintiff was not able to prove violation of the lease agreement but the plaintiff proved his case on the ground of default and on the ground of expiry of the period of tenancy and the suit was decreed directing the defendant to handover the vacant possession of the suit premises. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order the defendant preferred Title (Eviction) Appeal No.11 of 2006 and the appellate court has upheld the judgment and decree and the findings of the trial court giving rise to the present appeal. 6. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order the defendant preferred Title (Eviction) Appeal No.11 of 2006 and the appellate court has upheld the judgment and decree and the findings of the trial court giving rise to the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment of the appellate court mainly on the ground that the trial court and the appellate court have committed an error as there is perversity in finding of the fact regarding default in payment of rent. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that from the trial court judgment it would be evident that the plaintiff has admitted that he had issued the rent receipts and the counterfoil of the same is with him but the plaintiff/landlord never produced the counterfoils in support of his case, that the defendants have defaulted in payment of the rent. That the courts below have failed to appreciate that witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant have supported the fact that the defendant had paid the monthly rent of Rs.500/- regularly to the plaintiff/landlord and the monthly rent of December, 2002 was paid by the defendant on 05.01.2003. That since the plaintiff/landlord refused to accept the rent, the rent was tendered by postal money order. It is also contended that as per the lease agreement, the lease was executed on 26.07.2008 and the trial court as well as the appellate court have erred in fact and in law by giving a findings that the tenancy commenced from March, 2001. That the amendment sought by the plaintiff on the basis of the period of tenancy as per the lease agreement should not have been considered since the said deed was not registered as mandated under the Registration Act and in terms of the agreement the amendment sought was premature and should not have been allowed. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff has supported the impugned judgment of the lower courts and submitted that there is no substantial question of law as there is a concurrent finding of fact on the issue regarding the default in payment of rent as well as the expiry of the period of lease. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff has supported the impugned judgment of the lower courts and submitted that there is no substantial question of law as there is a concurrent finding of fact on the issue regarding the default in payment of rent as well as the expiry of the period of lease. In support of the contention, learned counsel has relied on the judgments reported in 2010 (4) PLJR 175 and 1995 (1) PLJR 569 and submitted that the lease agreement was not registered but the courts below have relied on the admission made by the defendant. That the defendant has not denied the fact that the tenancy started from March, 2001 itself. That the courts below have also held that if the tenancy started from March, 2001 then there is no explanation as to why the defendant did not insist that rent receipts should be issued by the plaintiff. It is argued that the onus to prove, that the monthly rent was regularly paid, was upon the defendant/tenant and the witnesses examined have stated about payment of rent of December, 2002 and none have stated about the rents paid for the month of July, 2002 to November, 2002 and there is a specific pleading that the defendant have defaulted in payment of the said rent. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the admissions are with respect to the period of tenancy and even if the lease agreement is not looked into as evidence then also the admission by the defendant itself proves that the tenancy commenced from March, 2001 and expired in February, 2004. That there is no perversity in the findings and it is settled principle that the second appeal can be admitted for hearing only when there is substantial question of law involved. 8. Having heard the counsels and on going through the judgments and decree of the lower appellate court as well as the trial court, it is evident that the lower appellate court has merely passed the judgment on the submissions without framing the points for determination as contemplated under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Having heard the counsels and on going through the judgments and decree of the lower appellate court as well as the trial court, it is evident that the lower appellate court has merely passed the judgment on the submissions without framing the points for determination as contemplated under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellate court ought to have discussed the issues of default and expiry of lease for which the existence of lease is a sinequanon which has not been discussed or considered by the first appellate court. It is settled proposition of law that first appellate court is the final court of fact and law and the judgment of first appellate court must reflect conscious application of judicial mind by recording its findings founded on reasoning on all issues pressed and raised by the parties. It is well settled that the appellate court must not merely concur with the trial court's judgment rather it is the duty of the first appellate court to give reason for its decisions. It is evident that the first appellate court has neither considered the evidence nor discussed the law and passed a cryptic judgment which is against the settled proposition of law giving rise to substantial question of law as the appellate court's judgment is not based on the discussion of facts and law. Therefore, the judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the lower appellate court to determine the issues and pass a speaking and reasoned order with respect to Exhibit1 i.e. lease agreement exhibited by the parties and on point of default in payment of the rent. Since the suit is of the year 2002, the lower appellate court shall decide the appeal by May, 2017 positively by proceeding on a day-to-day basis after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties and no unnecessary adjournment should be granted except in compelling circumstance. The defendant/tenant shall deposit the arrear rent in the court below which the plaintiff/respondent is at liberty to withdraw. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove shall not cause prejudice or adversely affect the cause of the parties. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed with the aforesaid direction.