JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In this Regular First Appeal, filed under the provisions of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, correctness of judgment and decree dated 10.2.2006, passed by District Judge, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, in Civil Suit No.6 of 2013, titled as Kashmir Singh v. Prithi Chand & others, is under challenge. 2. Plaintiff-respondent Kashmir Singh (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) filed a suit for recovery of Rs.7,00,000/- as compensation against the defendants-respondents Prithi Chand, Milap Chand, Ishar Singh, Pritam Chand, Nek Chand and Hari Chand (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), on the premise that on 5.12.1995, amongst other villagers, defendants filed a false complaint (Ex.PW-1/A), alleging embezzlement of funds of the Society, in which plaintiff was working as a Salesman. The said complaint came to be dismissed on 8.1.1999, with the allegations found to be untrue. Even thereafter, the defendants ensured that the plaintiff is socially boycotted in the village. As such, on 25.4.2003, suit for damages came to be filed. 3. Defendants resisted the suit, inter alia, on the ground of delay, non-joinder of necessary parties and malicious prosecution. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of Rs.7,00,000/- from defendants on account of damages he allegedly suffered due to false and frivolous allegations of corruption leveled publically by them against him as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, if so, to what effect? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff is stopped from filing the suit due to his own acts and conduct? OPD 5. Relief. 5. Plaintiff has led the following evidence. Shri Ajmer Katoch (PW-1), Inspector of Cooperative Societies, to prove the proceedings conducted by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, plaintiff himself as PW-2, independent witnesses Shri Balbir Singh (PW-3), Shri Dharam Chand (PW-4), Shri Amar Singh (PW-5), Shri Ravinder Singh (PW-6) and Shri Shakti Chand (PW-7). 6. In rebuttal, defendants examined defendant No.1 Shri Prithi Chand (DW-1) and Shri Suresh Kumar (DW-2). 7. Finding the plaintiff’s reputation to have been damaged and the defendants to have caused mental and physical agony to him as also published defamatory material against him, trial Court decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit, by awarding damages to the extent of Rs.1,00,000/-. 8. 7. Finding the plaintiff’s reputation to have been damaged and the defendants to have caused mental and physical agony to him as also published defamatory material against him, trial Court decided the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit, by awarding damages to the extent of Rs.1,00,000/-. 8. In the instant case, complaint (Ex.PW-1/A) came to be filed on 5.12.1995. It is signed by 64 villagers. In the said complaint, it is only alleged that the complainant, aged 58 years, ordinarily remains mentally upset, as such he needs to be retired and another competent person appointed in his place. Also, there was embezzlement of funds of the society. Allegedly, sale proceeds of the society received by the plaintiff were misappropriated. Records further reveals that the said complaint came to be considered and decided, with the passing of order dated 8.1.1999. Plaintiff was never absolved of the charges of embezzlement. On the contrary, the proceedings came to closed, for the reason that the amount in question, alongwith interest, came to be recovered. Now, these proceedings came to an end in the year 1999 and the suit filed on 25.4.2003. What transpired in the interregnum, stands proved only by way of oral evidence. 9. Shri Ajmer Katoch (PW-1) has simply proved complaint (Ex.PW-1/A) and action taken report (Ex. PW-1/B). He clarifies that none of the complainants, muchless the defendants, had made such allegations on oath. Whether the defendants signed the said complaint or not is not proved by this witness. Be that as it may, from the perusal of the testimony of the plaintiff himself, it is evident that no harm was caused to his reputation, as is so admitted by him. He alleges that subsequent to the passing of the order, on 11.1.2001, a meeting was convened in the village, wherein it was decided that he be boycotted from the society and none from the village call him for any function. As a result of such meeting, some of the villagers refused to call him for social/religious functions and ceremonies nor would anyone from the village visit his house. These are all vague allegations and assertions. Where was the meeting held? Who all attended? Where is the record of such meeting, has neither been placed nor proven on record. 10. As a result of such meeting, some of the villagers refused to call him for social/religious functions and ceremonies nor would anyone from the village visit his house. These are all vague allegations and assertions. Where was the meeting held? Who all attended? Where is the record of such meeting, has neither been placed nor proven on record. 10. There is also no evidence that Shri Babu Ram, Shri Rakesh Kumar, Shri Nek Chand, Shri Rattan Chand and Shri Braham Dass ever boycotted the plaintiff in social or religious ceremonies. These persons have also not been examined in Court. Plaintiff himself does not disclose as to how and in what manner on account of alleged acts of the defendants, his reputation came to be harmed. The allegations are absolutely vague and unspecific. Even Shri Balbir Singh (PW-3) admitted his relations with the plaintiff to be cordial, despite the alleged action of the defendants. He does not disclose the contents of the complaint (Ex.PW-1/A). To similar effect is the testimony of Shri Dharam Chand (PW-4), Shri Amar Singh (PW-5), Shri Ravinder Singh (PW-6) and Shri Shakti Chand (PW-7). Witness Shri Shakti Chand also admits to have signed the complaint (Ex.PW-1/A). 11. It is a settled principle of law that to establish an action for damages, either for malicious prosecution or defamation, plaintiff is required to establish that the prosecution was instituted against him, without any reasonable and probable cause and that too with malicious intent. ( Balbhaddar Singh v. Badri Shah, AIR 1926 PC 46 ). 12. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the complaint was filed with a malafide intent or that the allegations made therein were held ex-facie to be false and incorrect. None has come forward to establish the factum of malice, for there is nothing on record to show that the alleged action of the defendants was improper or with a wrongful motive, deliberately done to harm or injure the plaintiff’s reputation. 13. The apex Court in Smt. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of Inida, (1979) 2 SCC 491 , has defined “malice” in its legal sense as meaning malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable for probable cause. 14. In Amar Singh & others v. Tara Dutt, 1997(2) SLC 173, this Court held as under: “18. 14. In Amar Singh & others v. Tara Dutt, 1997(2) SLC 173, this Court held as under: “18. In a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, it is therefore, necessary for the plaintiff, inter alia, to prove that defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause and that the defendant was actuated by malice. Even when the plaintiff succeeds in establishing malice of the defendant, in order to make out a cause of action, however, malice and want of reasonable and probable cause must concur. Either is insufficient without the other. The important question for determination in such a case is whether the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause when he sent the report to the police leading to the prosecution of the plaintiffs. The burden of proving absence of reasonable and probable cause is on the plaintiffs.” 15. The apex Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 , has observed: “8. The Preamble of the Constitution of India inter alia speaks of liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. It also says that India is a sovereign democratic republic. It cannot be over emphasized that when it comes to democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a cardinal value that is of paramount significance under our constitutional scheme. 9. Various judgments of this Court have referred to the importance of freedom of speech and expression both from the point of view of the liberty of the individual and from the point of view of our democratic form of government. For example, in the early case of Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 , this Court stated that freedom of speech lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305 , a Constitution Bench of this Court said freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic constitution which envisages changes in the composition of legislatures and governments and must be preserved. In a separate concurring judgment Beg,J. said, in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 , that the freedom of speech and of the press is the Ark of the Covenant of Democracy because public criticism is essential to the working of its institutions. 10. In a separate concurring judgment Beg,J. said, in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 , that the freedom of speech and of the press is the Ark of the Covenant of Democracy because public criticism is essential to the working of its institutions. 10. Equally, in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 , this Court stated, in paragraph 45 that the importance of freedom of speech and expression though not absolute was necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular views. This right requires the free flow of opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. While an informed citizenry is a pre-condition for meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally of great societal importance. 11. This last judgment is important in that it refers to the "market place of ideas" concept that has permeated American Law. This was put in the felicitous words of Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in Abrams v. Unites States, 250 US 616, thus: "….But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." 12. Brandeis, J. in his famous concurring judgment in Whitney v. California, 71 L. Ed. 1095 said: "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated." (at page 1105, 1106) 13. This leads us to a discussion of what is the content of the expression "freedom of speech and expression". There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is advocacy, and the third is incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in. [ 3 ] It is at this stage that a law may be made curtailing the speech or expression that leads inexorably to or tends to cause public disorder or tends to cause or tends to affect the sovereignty & integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, etc. Why it is important to have these three concepts in mind is because most of the arguments of both petitioners and respondents tended to veer around the expression "public order".” 16. The elements of cause of action for malicious prosecution are (1) commencement of prosecut8ion of proceedings against present plaintiff: (2) its legal causation by present defendant; (3) its termination in favour of present plaintiff; (4) absence of probable cause of such proceedings; (5) presence of malice therein; and (6) damage to plaintiff by reason thereof. 17. The elements of cause of action for malicious prosecution are (1) commencement of prosecut8ion of proceedings against present plaintiff: (2) its legal causation by present defendant; (3) its termination in favour of present plaintiff; (4) absence of probable cause of such proceedings; (5) presence of malice therein; and (6) damage to plaintiff by reason thereof. 17. Law is well-settled that malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause, are distinct and separate facts, and that absence of reasonable and probable cause does not lead to any presumption that the complaint was actuated by malice. Total absence of reasonable and probable cause may be relied upon as evidence for inferring malice but it is not the law that the absence of reasonable and probable cause must necessarily lead to the raising of a presumption that the defendant was actuated by malice. 18. In Raja Braja Sunder Singh Deb v. Ramdeb Das alias Pattanaik, AIR 1944 P.C. 1 , the Privy Council observed that: “In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must in the first instance prove two things: (i) that defendant was malicious and (ii) that he acted without reasonable and probable cause. Malice has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive, but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However wrong-headed a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be the initiator of a malicious prosecution. But malice alone is not enough; there must also be shown to be absence of reasonable and probable cause.” 19. There are three sorts of damages; anyone of which would be a sufficient ground to support an action for malicious prosecution: (1) the damage to a man’s fame, as if the matter whereof he is accused be scandalous; (2) The second sort of damages which would support such an action are, such as are done to the person; as where a man is put in danger to lose his life, or limb, or liberty, which has always been allowed as good foundation, of such an action; (3) the third sort of damages which support such an action is damage to a man’s property, as where he is forced to expend his money in unnecessary charges to acquit himself of the crime, of which he is accused. 20. 20. The tort of malicious prosecution is essentially an action for damages. 21. In order, that an action for malicious prosecution may succeed, the following elements must be proved by the plaintiff that – (1) the proceedings must have been instituted or continued by the defendant; (2) the proceedings must have been unsuccessful, that is to say, must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff who is now suing; (3) the defendant must have acted without reasonable and probable cause; and (4) the defendant must have acted maliciously. 22. The above proposition of law is now firmly established by the numerous decisions of the Courts, and it is now well-settled laws, that unless all the four elements as stated above, co-exist; the suit for malicious prosecution will fail. 23. None of the aforesaid ingredients stands pleaded or established by the plaintiff. 24. Trial Court has not assigned any reason for quantifying the damages to the extent of Rs.1,00,000/-. 25. Trial Court erred in correctly and completely appreciating the material on record in its totality, while holding the plaintiff entitled to damages of Rs.1,00,000/-. Also, the complaint came to be dismissed in the year 1999 and the suit for defamation as per Article 74 of the Limitation Act could have been filed only within a period of one year, i.e. before 7.1.2000. 26. As such, findings on Issues No.1, 2 & 4 cannot be said to be legal and borne out from the record. Hence, these issues are decided against the plaintiff. Issue No.3 is not pressed. 27. Hence, judgment and decree dated 10.2.2006, passed by District Judge, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, in Civil Suit No.6 of 2013, titled as Kashmir Singh v. Prithi Chand & others, is set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with no order as to costs. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.